HISTORY 


MORGAN'S  CAVALRY 


BY    BASIL    W.    DUKE. 


CINCINNATI: 
MIAMI  FEINTING  AND  PUBLISHING  COMPANY, 

CORNER  BEDINGER  STREET  AND  MIAMI  CANAL. 
1867. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress  in  the  year  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-six. 

By  MRS.   HENRIETTA   MORGAN, 
In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  Kentucky,  at  Covington. 


TO  THE  WOMEN  OF  KENTUCKY, 

FRIENDS      AND      RELATIVES 

OF  THE  GALLANT  MEN  WHOSE  HEROISM  HAS  BECOME  PART  OF  THE  HISTORIC 
HERITAGE  OF  THE  STATE, 


10   t&*   frtlU  fNwua   01  16*   £0tttft, 

WHOSE    KINDNESS   ALLEVIATED   THE  HARDSHIPS 

WHICH   THESE  MEN  SO  LONG   ENDURED,  AND   FOR  WHOSE   SAKE  THEY  WERK 
PROUD   TO   SUFFER  AND   BLEED, 

THIS  BOOK  IS  RESPECTFULLY   DEDICATED. 


270S51 


PREFACE. 


'THE  writer  presents  to  the  reading  public  the  narrative  of  an  arduous 
and  adventurous  military  career,  which,  commencing  at  a  period  but 
little  subsequent  to  the  outbreak  of  the  late  civil  war,  continued  through 
the  four  eventful  years. 

lie  has  endeavored  to  make  the  work  a  correct  and  graphic  representa 
tion  of  the  kind  of  warfare  of  which  MORGAN  was  the  author,  and  in 
which  his  men  won  so  much  celebrity.  Strict  accuracy  has  been  attempt 
ed  in  the  description  of  the  military  operations  of  which  the  book  is  a 
record,  and  it  is  hoped  that  the  incidents  related  of  personal  daring  and 
adventure  will  be  read  with  some  interest. 

The  author  regrets  that,  for  reasons  easily  understood,  the  book  is  far 
less  complete  than  he  desired  to  make  it.  The  very  activity  of  the  ser 
vice  performed  by  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY  prevented  the  preservation  of  data 
which  would  be  very  valuable,  and  a  full  account  of  many  important 
operations  is  therefore  impossible.  Limited  space,  also,  forbids  the  men 
tion  of  many  brave  deeds.  If  many  gallant  and  deserving  men  were 
noticed  as  they  deserve,  the  book  could  not  be  readily  finished. 

To  the  friends  whose  contributions  assisted  the  work,  the  author 
returns  his  warmest  thanks. 

To  Mr.  MKADK  WOODSOX,  to  whom  he  is  indebted  for  the  maps  which  so 
perfectly  illustrate  his  narrative,  he  is  especially  grateful. 

He  regrets,  too,  that  many  of  his  old  comrades  have  altogether  failed 
to  render  him  aid,  confidently  expected,  and  which  would  have  been  very 
valuable.  B.  AV.  D. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

History  of  Morgan's  Cavalry — Why  written — First  enlistments — Popularity  of 
Morgan — Misrepresentation  of  the  press — New  uses  of  cavalry 9 

CHAPTER  II. 

E.arly  lifo  of  General  Morgan  —  His  qualities  as  a  commander — His  personal 
qualities 18 

CHAPTER  III. 

Political  condition  of  Kentucky  in  1861 — Bewilderment  of  the  people — Camp  Dick 
Robinson — First  entrance  of  Confederate  troops 31 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Military  situation  in  the  West — Advance  to  Bowlinggreen  —  Scarcity  of  arms — 
Organization  of  the  army — Want  of  discipline — Qualities  which  compensated 
for  its  absence 57 

CHAPTER  V. 

Morgan  leaves  Lexington — Roger  W.  Hanson — Service  on  Green  River — Scouting 
— Our  first  skirmish — Narrow  escape — Terry's  Rangers 88 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Retreat  from  Bowlinggreen — Evacuation  of  Nashville — Our  Fourth  Ohio  acquaint 
ances —  Scouting  near  Nashville  —  Morgan  holds  Murfreesboro' — Dash  on 
Mitchell  —  Night  attack  —  Capture  of  Gallatin — Stampede  of  our  pickets — 
Promotion  of  Morgan — Concentration  at  Corinth 110 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Battle  of  Shiloh — Death  of  Sidney  Johnston— Result  of  the  battle — Expedition 
into  Tennessee — Cotton  burning  and  telegraphing — Defeat  at  Lebanon — Ex 
pedition  to  Cave  City  in  Kentucky 138 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Reorganization  at  Chattanooga — First  raid  into  Kentucky — Fight  at  Tompkins- 
ville — Capture  of  Lebanon — Telegraphic  strategy — Morgan  master  of  the  sit 
uation — Fight  atCynthiana — Evade  the  pursuing  troops 169 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Capture  of  Gallatin — Active  service  near  Nashville  —  Fights  at  Gallatin  and 
Cairo^Destruction  of  the  railroad  —  Sojourn  at  Hartsville — The  videttes — 
Kentuckians  running  from  the  draft — "The  Vidette." 208 


viii 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

Again  on  the  march  for  Kentucky — Bushwhacking  experience — The  Confederate 
army  enters  the  State — Service  in  front  of  Covington — Efforts  to  embarrass 
the  retreat  of  the  Federal  General  Morgan — Fight  at  Augusta — Retreat  of 
the  army  from  Kentucky — Morgan  captures  Lexington 229 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Morgan's  retreat  through  Southwestern  Kentucky — At  Gallatin  again Scouting 

and  ambuscades  —  Driven  from  Gallatin  —  A  week's  fighting  around  Leba 
non—Battle  of  Hartsville 282 

CHAPTER  XII. 

December  raid  into  Kentucky— Capture  of  Elizabethtown— Fight  at  the  Rolling 
Fork — Escape  from  the  toils 317 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Service  during  the  winter  of  '62  and  '63  —  Cluke's  raid  into  Kentucky— Battle 
of  Milton— Defeat  at  Snow's  Hill 344 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

Service  in  Tennessee,  and  on  the  Cumberland  in  Kentucky — Fight  at  Greasy 
Creek— Active  scouting— The  division  starts  for  the  Ohio— Crossing  of  the 
Cumberland  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  —  Fights  at  Columbia,  Green  River 
and  Lebanon  — Crossing  the  Ohio— The  militia  objecting  — Fight  with  the 

gunboats — March  through   Indiana   and   Ohio — Detour  around  Cincinnati 

Defeat  at  Buffington 388 

CHAPTER  XV. 

Life  in  prison  —  Escape  of  Morgan  from  the  Ohio  Penitentiary — Exchange  at 
Charleston  463 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

Services  of  the  remnant  of  Morgan's  command  while  their  General  was  in  prison — 
Reception  of  General  Morgan  by  the  people  of  the  South — He  is  assigned 
to  command  in  Southwestern  Virginia — Fight  with  Averill — Action  at  Dub 
lin  Depot — Last  raid  into  Kentucky — Capture  of  Mt.  Sterling — Severe  en 
gagement  next  day — Capture  of  Lexington — Success  at  Cynthiana — Defeat 
nt  Cynthiana — Retreat  from  Kentucky 507 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

Death  of  Morgan — Grief  of  his  men — Subsequent  active  service  of  his  old  com 
mand — Hard  fight  at  Bull's  Gap — A  battle  by  moonlight,  and  a  night-long 
chase — The  Stoneman  raid — Disaster  at  Kingsport — Fighting  the  enemy  and 
the  elements  —  Battle  of  Marion — "Winter  quarters  at  Abingdon — March  tc 
Charlotte  after  Lee's  surrender — Escort  to  Jefferson  Davis  after  Johnston's 
surrender — The  last  Council  of  "War — Surrender  at  Woodstock ,  ..  529 


HISTORY 

OF 


MORGAN'S   CAVALRY 


CHAPTER    I. 

IN  undertaking  to  write  the  history  of  General  Morgan's  ser 
vices,  and  of  the  command  which  he  created,  it  is  but  fair  that  I 
shall  acknowledge  myself  influenced,  in  a  great  measure,  by  the 
feelings  of  the  friend  and  the  follower ;  that  I  desire,  if  I  can  do 
so  by  relating  facts,  of  most  of  which  I  am  personally  cognizant, 
to  perpetuate  his  fame,  and,  at  the  same  time,  establish  the  true 
character  of  a  body  of  men,  who  recruited  and  inured  to  war  by 
him,  served  bravely  and  faithfully  to  the  close  of  the  great 
struggle.  It  may  be  that  credence  will  be  given  with  hesitation 
to  the  statements  of  one,  who  thus  candidly  confesses  that  per 
sonal  regard  for  his  chief,  and  esprit-de-corps  mainly  induce  him 
to  attempt  the  task  I  propose  to  myself.  To  all  works  of  this 
nature,  nevertheless,  the  same  objection  will  apply,  or  the  more 
serious  one,  that  they  owe  their  production  to  the  inspiration 
of  hatred,  and  those  who  have  witnessed  and  participated  in  the 
events  which  they  describe,  must  (under  this  rule),  for  that  very 
reason,  be  denied  belief. 

General  Morgan's  career  during  the  late  war  was  so  remarkable, 
that  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  public,  accustomed  to  the  con 
tradictory  newspaper  versions  of  his  exploits,  should  be  disposed 
to  receive  all  accounts  of  it  with  some  incredulity. 


10 

It  was  so  rapid,  so  crowded  with  exciting  incidents,  appealed 
so  strongly  to  the  passions  and  elicited  so  constantly  the  com 
ments  of  both  sides,  that  contemporary  accounts  of  his  opera 
tions  were  filled  with  mistakes  and  exaggerations,  and  it  is 
natural  that  tome  should  be  expected  in  any  history  of  his 
campaigns,  although  written  after  the  strife  is  all  over. 

Convinced,  however,  that,  if  properly  understood,  his  reputa 
tion  will  be  greater  in  history  than  with  his  contemporaries, 
and  believing  that  the  story  of  his  military  life  will  be  a  contri 
bution  not  altogether  valueless  to  that  record  which  the  Southern 
people,  in  justice  to  themselves  and  their  dead,  must  yet  pub 
lish,  I  can  permit  no  minor  consideration  to  deter  me  from 
furnishing  correct,  and,  I  deem,  important  information,  which 
my  relations,  personal  and  official,  with  General  Morgan  enabled 
me  to  obtain.  A  correct  representation  of  a  certain  series  of 
events  sometimes  leads  to  a  correct  understanding  of  many 
more,  and  if  the  vail  which  prejudice  and  deliberate  unscru 
pulous  falsification  have  thrown  over  some  features  of  the  contest 
be  lifted,  a  truer  appreciation  may  perhaps  be  had  of  others  of 
greater  moment  and  interest.  I  may  add  that,  as  no  one  has 
been  more  bitterly  assailed,  not  only  while  living  but  even  after 
death,  than  General  Morgan,  so  no  man's  memory  should  be  more 
peculiarly  the  subject  of  vindication  and  protection  to  his  friends. 

But  there  are  also  other  and  cogent  reasons  why  this  tribute 
should  be  rendered  him  by  some  one,  who,  devoted  to  the  in 
terests  of  the  living  chieftain,  is  sensitive  regarding  the  reputa 
tion  he  has  left.  The  cruel  ingratitude  which  embittered  the 
last  days  of  his  life,  has  made  his  memory  all  the  dearer  to  the 
many  who  were  true  and  constant  in  their  love  and  esteem  for 
him,  and  they  feel  that  he  should  be  justly  depicted.  The  fame 
•which  he  desired  will  be  accorded  him ;  the  reward  for  which 
he  strove  is  his  already,  in  the  affection  of  the  people  by  whom 
he  hoped  and  deserved  that  the  kindest  recollections  of  him 
should  be  cherished  and  the  warmest  eulogies  pronounced.  In 
the  glory  won,  in  the  tremendous  and  unequal  struggle,  in  the 


POPULARITY   OF   MORGAN.  11 

pride  with  which  they  speak  the  names  of  the  dead  heroes  whose 
martyrdom  illustrated  it,  the  Southern  people  possess  treasures 
of  which  no  conqueror  can  deprive  them. 

A  man  who,  like  General  Morgan,  uninfluenced  by  the  public 
opinion  of  the  State  in  which  he  resided,  yet  surrendered  for 
tune,  home  and  friends  to  assist  the  people  of  the  South 
when  embarked  in  the  desperate  and  vital  strife  which  their 
action  had  provoked,  because  sharing  their  blood  and  their  con 
victions,  he  thought  that  they  had  an  imperative  claim  upon 
his  services ;  who  pledged  his  all  to  their  cause,  and  identified 
his  name  with  every  phase  of  the  contest,  until  his  death  became 
an  event  of  the  last  and  most  bitter — such  a  man  can  never  be 
forgotten  by  them.  It  is  impossible  that  the  memory  of  his 
services  can  ever  fade  from  their  minds. 

In  the  beautiful  land  for  which  he  fought  and  died,  the  tradi 
tions  which  will  indicate  the  spots  where  he  struck  her  foes,  will 
also  preserve  his  name  in  undying  affection  and  honor.  The 
men  of  the  generation  which  knew  him  can  forget  him  only 
when  they  forget  the  fate  from  which  he  strove  to  save  them ; 
his  name  belongs  to  the  history  of  the  race,  and  it  can  not  die. 

A  narrative  of  the  operations  of  a  command  composed,  in 
great  part,  of  Kentuckians,  must  possess  some  interest  for  the 
people  of  their  own  State.  So  general  and  intense  was  the 
interest  which  Morgan  excited  among  the  young  men  of  the 
State,  that  he  obtained  recruits  from  every  county,  numbers 
running  every  risk  to  join  him,  when  no  other  leader  could  en 
list  a  man.  The  whole  State  was  represented  in  his  command. 
Many  Kentuckians  who  had  enlisted  in  regiments  from  other 
States  procured  transfers  to  his  command,  and  it  frequently 
happened  that  men,  the  bulk  of  whose  regiments  were  in  prison, 
or  who  had  become  irregularly  detached  from  them  by  some  of 
the  many  accidents  of  which  the  volunteer,  weary  of  monotony, 
is  prompt  to  take  advantage,  would  attach  themselves  to  and 
serve  temporarily  with  it.  Probably  every  native  citizen  of 
Kentucky  who  will  read  these  lines,  will  think  of  some  relative 


12  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

or  friend  who  at  some  time  served  with  Morgan.  Men  of  even 
the  strictest  "  Union  principles,"  whose  loyalty  has  always  been 
unimpeachable,  and  whose  integrity  (as  disinterested  and  as 
well  assured  as  their  patriotism)  forbids  all  suspicion  that  they 
were  inclined  to  serve  two  masters,  have  had  to  furnish  aid  in 
this  way  to  the  rebellion.  Frequently  after  these  gentlemen  had 
placed  in  the  Federal  army  substitutes,  white  or  black,  for  loyal 
sons  of  unmilitary  temperaments,  other  sons,  rebellious,  and 
more  enterprising,  would  elect  to  represent  the  family  in  some 
one  of  Morgan's  regiments.  It  is  not  unlikely,  then,  that  a 
record  of  these  men,  written  by  one  who  has  had  every  oppor 
tunity  of  learning  the  true  story  of  every  important  and  inter 
esting  event  which  he  did  not  witness,  may  be  favorably  received 
by  the  people  of  Kentucky.  The  class  of  readers  who  will  be 
gratified  by  an  account  of  such  adventures  as  will  be  herein 
related,  will  readily  forgive  any  lack  of  embellishment.  My 
practical  countrymen  prefer  the  recital  of  substantial  facts,  and 
the  description  of  scenes  which  their  own  experience  enables 
them  to  appreciate,  to  all  the  fictions  of  which  the  Northern  war 
literature  has  been  so  prolific. 

The  popular  taste  in  Kentucky  and  the  South  does  not  re 
quire  the  fabulous  and  romantic ;  less  educated  and  more  prim 
itive  than  that  of  the  North,  it  rejects  even  the  beautiful,  if  also 
incredible,  and  is  more  readily  satisfied  with  plain  statements, 
supported  by  evidence,  or  intrinsically  probable,  than  with  the 
most  fascinating  legend,  although  illustrated  with  sketches  by 
special  artists. 

There  rests,  too,  upon  some  one  identified  with  this  command, 
the  obligation  of  denying  and  disproving  the  frequent  and 
grave  charges  of  crime  and  outrage  which  have  been  preferred 
against  General  Morgan  and  his  soldiers.  So  persistently  have 
these  accusations  been  made,  that  at  one  time  an  avowal  of 
"belonging  to  Morgan"  was  thought,  even'  in  Kentucky,  tan 
tamount  to  a  confession  of  murder  and  highway  robbery.  To 
this  day,  doubtless,  the  same  impression  prevail?  in  the  North, 


MISREPRESENTATIONS   REFUTED.  13 

and  yet,  when  it  is  considered  how  it  was  produced,  it  is  sur 
prising  that  it  should  or  could  last  so  long. 

The  newspapers  are  of  course  responsible  for  it,  as  for  every 
other  opinion  entertained  at  any  time  by  the  Northern  public. 

It  will  repay  any  one  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  examine 
the  files  of  these  papers  printed  during  the  war,  if  he  desires  a 
curious  entertainment.  Among  many  willful  misrepresentations 
of  Morgan's  as  well  as  of  other  Confederate  commands,  many 
statements  palpably  false,  and  regarding  events  of  which  the 
writers  could  not  possibly  have  obtained  correct  information, 
will  be  found  under  the  most  astounding  captions,  proclaiming 
the  commission  of  "  unheard  of  atrocities"  and  "  guerrilla  out 
rages,"  accounts  of  Morgan  having  impressed  horses  or  taken  for 
age  and  provisions  from  Union  men,  while  highly  facetious  de 
scriptions  of  house-burning,  jewelry  snatching,  and  a  thorough 
sacking  of  premises  are  chronicled,  without  one  word  of  condem 
nation,  under  the  heading  of  "  frolics  of  the  boys  in  blue."  In 
thus  referring  to  the  manner  in  which  the  Northern  newspapers 
mentioned  the  respective  combatants  whose  deeds  their  reporters 
pretended  to  record,  I  have  no  wish  to  provoke  a  renewal  of 
the  wordy  war. 

The  Southern  journals  were  undoubtedly  sufficiently  denun 
ciatory,  although  they  did  not  always  seem  to  consider  a  bad 
deed  sanctified  because  done  by  their  friends.  Nor  have  I  any 
intention  of  denying  that  inexcusable  excesses  were  committed 
at  various  times  by  men  of  Morgan's  command.  I  freely  admit 
that  we  had  men  in  our  ranks  whose  talents  and  achievements 
could  have  commanded  respect  even  among  the  "  Bummers." 
There  were  others,  too,  whose  homes  had  been  destroyed  and 
property  "  confiscated,"  whose  families  had  been  made  to  "  feel 
the  war,"  who  were  incited  by  an  unholy  spirit  of  revenge  to 
commit  acts  as  well  worth  relation,  as  any  of  those  for  which 
the  "  weekly  "  of  his  native  township  has  duly  lauded  the  most 
industrious  Federal  raider,  actuated  by  a  legitimate  desire  of 
pleasure  or  gain.  It  will  not  be  difficult  to  prove  that  such  prac- 


14  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

tices  met  with  rebuke  from  General  Morgan  and  his  officers, 
and  that  they  were  not  characteristic  of  his  command.  There 
are  other  impressions  about  Morgan  and  "  Morgan's  men"  which 
I  shall  endeavor  to  correct,  as,  although  by  no  means  so  serious 
as  those  just  mentioned,  they  are  not  at  all  just  to  the  reputa 
tion  of  either  leader  or  followers.  It  is  a  prevalent  opinion 
that  his  troops  were  totally  undisciplined  and  unaccustomed  to 
the  instruction  and  restraint  which  form  the  soldier.  They 
were,  to  be  sure,  far  below  the  standard  of  regular  troops  in 
these  respects,  and  doubtless  they  were  inferior  in  many  par 
ticulars  of  drill  and  organization  to  some  carefully-trained 
bodies  of  cavalry,  Confederate  and  Federal,  which  were  less 
constantly  and  actively  engaged  in  service  on  the  front. 

But  these  essential  requisites  to  efficiency  were  by  no  means 
neglected  or  in  a  great  degree  lacking.  The  utmost  care  was 
exercised  in  the  organization  of  every  regiment  to  place  the 
best  men  in  office — General  Morgan  frequently  interfering,  for 
that  purpose,  in  a  manner  warranted  neither  by  the  regulations 
nor  the  acts  of  congress.  No  opportunity  was  neglected  to  at 
tain  proficiency  in  the  tactics  which  experience  had  induced  us 
to  adopt,  and  among  officers  and  men  there  was  a  perfect  ap 
preciation  of  the  necessity  of  strict  subordination,  prompt  un 
questioning  obedience  to  superiors,  and  an  active,  vigilant 
discharge  of  all  the  duties  which  devolve  upon  the  soldier  in 
the  vicinity  or  presence  of  the  enemy. 

I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  "  Morgan's  Division,"  in  its  best 
days,  would  have  lost  nothing  (in  points  of  discipline  and  in 
struction)  by  comparison  with  any  of  the  fine  cavalry  commands, 
which  did  constant  service,  of  the  Confederate  army,  and  the 
testimony  of  more  than  one  inspecting  officer  can  be  cited  to 
that  effect.  More  credit,  too,  has  been  given  General  Morgan 
for  qualities  and  ability  which  constitute  a  good  spy,  or  success 
ful  partisan  to  lead  a  handful  of  men,  than  for  the  very  decided 
military  talents  which  he  possessed.  He  is  most  generally 
thought  to  have  been  in  truth,  the  "  Guerrilla  Chief,"  which  the 


NEW   USES  FOR   CAVALRY.  15 

Northern  press  entitled  and  strove  to  prove  him.  It  will  not 
be  difficult  to  disabuse  the  minds  of  military  men  (or,  indeed,  in 
telligent  men  of  any  class)  of  this  impression.  It  will  be  only 
necessary  to  review  his  campaigns  and  give  the  reasons  which 
induced  his  movements,  to  furnish  an  authentic  and  thorough  state 
ment  of  facts,  and,  as  far  as  practicable,  an  explanation  of  at 
tendant  circumstances,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  he  had  in  an  em 
inent  degree  many  of  th.e  highest  and  most  necessary  qualities 
of  the  General. 

An  even  cursory  study  of  Morgan's  record  will  convince  the 
military  reader,  that  the  character  he  bore  with  those  who  served 
with  him  was  deserved. 

That  while  circumspect  and  neglectful  of  no  precaution  to 
insure  success  or  avert  disaster,  he  was  extremely  bold  in 
thought  and  action.  That  using  every  mean^tTT^rbtatn^eTtelTsTve 
ancha  uc  ui  ale  mfoi illation  (attempting  no  enterprise  of  importance 
without  it),  and  careful  in  the  consideration  of  every  contin 
gency,  he  was  yet  marvelously  quick  to  combine  and  to  revolve, 
and  so  rapid  and  sudden  in  execution,  as  frequently  to  confound 
both  friends  and  enemies. 

And  above  all,  once  convinced,  he  never  hesitated  to  act ;  he 
v.-ould  back  his  judgment  against  every  hazard,  and  with  every 
resource  at  his  command. 

Whatever  merit  be  allowed  or  denied  General  Morgan,  he  is 
beyond  all  question  entitled  to  the  credit  of  having  discovered 
uses  for  cavalry,  or  rather  mounted  infantry,  to  which  that  arm 
was  never  applied  before.  While  other  cavalry  officers  were  ad 
hering  to  the  traditions  of  former  wars,  and  the  systems  of  the 
schools,  however  inapplicable  to  the  demands  of  their  day  and 
the  nature  of  the  struggle,  he  originated  and  perfected,  not  only 
a  system  of  tactics,  a  method  of  fighting  and  handling  men  in 
the  presence  of  the  enemy,  but  also  a  strategy  as  effective  as  it 
was  novel. 

Totally  ignorant  of  the  art  of  war  as  learned  from  the  books 
and  in  the  academies;  an  imitator  in  nothing;  self  taught  in  all 


16  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

that  he  knew  and  did,  his  success  was  not  more  marked  than 
his  genius. 

The  creator  and  organizer  of  his  own  little  army — with  a 
force  which  at  no  time  reached  four  thousand — he  killed  and 
wounded  nearly  as  many  of  the  enemy,  and  captured  more  than 
fifteen  thousand.  The  author  of  the  far-reaching  "  raid,"  so 
different  from  the  mere  cavalry  dash,  he  accomplished  with  his 
handful  of  men  results  which  would  otherwise  have  required 
armies  and  the  costly  preparations  of  regular  and  extensive 
campaigns. 

I  shall  endeavor  to  show  the  intimate  connection  between  his 
operations  and  those  of  the  main  army  in  each  department  where 
he  served,  and  the  strategic  importance  of  even  his  apparently 
rashest  and  most  purposeless  raids,  when  considered  with  refer 
ence  to  their  bearing  upon  the  grand  campaigns  of  the  West. 
When  the  means  at  his  disposal,  the  difficulties  with  which  he 
had  to  contend,  and  the  results  he  effected  are  well  understood, 
it  will  be  conceded  that  his  reputation  with  the  Southern  soldiery 
was  not  undeserved,  and  that  to  rank  with  the  best  of  the  many 
active  and  excellent  cavalry  officers  of  the  West,  to  have  had, 
confessedly,  no  equal  among  them  except  in  Forrest,  argues  him 
to  have  possessed  no  common  ability.  The  design  of  this  work 
may  in  part  fail,  because  of  the  inability  of  one  so  little  accus 
tomed  to  the  labors  of  authorship  to  present  his  subject  in  the 
manner  that  it  deserves ;  but  the  theme  is  one  sure  to  be  inter 
esting  and  impressive  however  treated,  and  materials  may,  in 
this  way  be  preserved  for  abler  pens  and  more  extensive  works. 
The  apparent  egotism  in  the  constant  use  of  the  first  person 
will,  I  trust,  be  excused  by  the  explanation  that  I  write  of  mat 
ters  and  events  known  almost  entirely  from  personal  observa 
tion,  reports  of  subordinate  officers  to  myself,  or  personal 
knowledge  of  reports  made  directly  to  General  Morgan,  and  that, 
iserving  for  a  considerable  period  as  his  second  in  command,  it 
was  necessarily  my  duty  to  see  to  the  execution  of  his  plans, 
and  I  enjoyed  a  large  share  of  his  confidence. 


SPIRIT   OF   THE   WORK.  17 

For  the  spirit  in  which  it  is  written,  I  have  only  to  say  that 
I  have  striven  to  be  candid  and  accurate;  to  that  sort  of  impar 
tiality  which  is  acquired  at  the  expense  of  a  total  divestiture  of 
natural  feeling,  I  can  lay  no  claim. 

A  Southern  man,  once  a  Confederate  soldier — always  thor 
oughly  Southern   in  sentiments   and  feeling,  I  can,  of  course, 
write  only  a  Southern  account  of  what  I  saw  in  the  late  war. 
and  as  such  what  is  herein  written  must  be  received. 
2 


, 


QHAPT1R 

Hwjrr  MORGAN  was  born  at  Huntsville,  Alabama,  on  the 
first  day  of  June,  1825.  His  father,  Calvin  C.  Morgan,  was  a 
native  of  Virginia,  arid  a  distant  relative  of  Daniel  Morgan,  the 
rebel  general  of  revolutionary  fame.  In  early  manhood,  Mr, 
Morgan  followed  the  tide  of  emigration  flowing  from  Virginia 
to  the  West,  and  commenced  life  as  a  merchant  in  Alabama. 
In  1823,  he  married  the  daughter  of  John  W.  Hunt,  of  Lexing 
ton,  Kentucky,  one  of  the  wealthiest  and  most  successful  mer 
chants  of  the  State,  and  one  whose  influence  did  much  to  de- 
velope  the  prosperity  of  that  portion  of  it  in  which  he  resided. 

Mr.  Morgan  is  described  by  all  who  knew  him  as  a  gentleman 
whom  it  was  impossible  to  know  and  not  to  respect  and  esteem. 
His  character  was  at  once  firm  and  attractive,  but  he  possessed 
neither  the  robust  constitution  nor  the  adventurous  and  im 
petuous  spirit  which  characterized  other  members  of  his  family. 
He  was  quiet  and  studious  in  his  habits,  and  although  fond  of 
the  society  of  his  friends,  he  shunned  every  species  of  excite 
ment.  When  failing  health,  and,  perhaps,  a  distaste  for  mer 
cantile  pursuits  induced  him  to  relinquish  them,  he  removed 
with  his  family  to  Kentucky  (his  son  John  was  then  four  years 
old),  and  purchased  a  farm  near  Lexington,  upon  which  he  lived 
until  a  few  years  before  his  death. 

John  H.  Morgan  was  reared  in  Kentucky,  and  lived  in  Lex 
ington  from  his  eighteenth  year  until  the  fall  of  1861,  when  he 
joined  the  Confederate  army.  There  was  nothing  in  his  boy 
hood,  of  which  any  record  has  been  preserved,  to  indicate  the 
distinction  he  was  to  win,  and  neither  friends  nor  enemies  can 
deduce  from  anecdotes  of  his  youthful  life  arguments  of  any 
value  in  support  of  the  views  which  they  respectively  entertain 
of  his  character.  In  this  respect,  also,  he  displayed  his  singular 


MORGAN'S  EARLY  HISTORY.  19 

originality  of  character,  and  he  is  about  the  only  instance  in 
modern  times  (if  biographies  are  to  be  believed)  of  a  distin 
guished  man  who  had  not,  as  a  boy,  some  presentiment  of  his 
future,  and  did  not  conduct  himself  accordingly. 

When  nineteen  he  enlisted  for  the  "Mexican  War'  and  was 
elected  First  Lieutenant  of  Captain  Beard's  company,  in  Colonel 
Marshall's  regiment  of  cavalry.  He  served  in  Mexico  for 
eighteen  months,  but  did  not,  he  used  to  say,  see  much  of 
"war"  during  that  time.  He  was,  however,  at  the  battle  of 
Buena  Yista,  in  which  fight  Colonel  Marshall's  regiment  was 
hotly  engaged,  and  his  company,  which  was  ably  led,  suffered 
severely.  Soon  after  his  return  home  he  married  Miss  Bruce, 
of  Lexington,  a  sweet  and  lovely  lady,  who,  almost  from  the  day 
of  her  wedding,  was  a  confirmed  and  patient  invalid  and  sufferer. 
Immediately  after  his  marriage,  he  entered  energetically  into 
business — was  industrious,  enterprising  and  prosperous,  and  at 
the  breaking  out  of  the  war  in  1861,  he  was  conducting  in  Lex 
ington  two  successful  manufactories.  Every  speculation  and 
business  enterprise  in  which  he  engaged  succeeded,  and  he  had 
acquired  a  very  handsome  property.  This  he  left,  when  he 
went  South,  to  the  mercy  of  his  enemies,  making  no  provision 
whatever  for  its  protection,  and  apparently  caring  not  at  all 
what  became  of  it.  As  he  left  some  debts  unsettled,  his  loyal 
creditors  soon  disposed  of  it  with  the  aid  of  the  catch-rebel 
attachment  law. 

When  quite  a  young  man  he  had  two  or  three  personal  diffi 
culties  in  Lexington,  in  one  of  which  he  was  severely  wounded. 
To  those  who  recollect  the  tone  of  society  in  Kentucky  at  that 
day,  it  will  be  no  matter  of  astonishment  to  learn  that  a  young 
man  of  spirit  became  engaged  in  such  affairs.  His  antagonists, 
however,  became,  subsequently,  his  warm  friends.  The  stigmas 
upon  General  Morgan's  social  standing,  so  frequent  in  the 
Northern  press,  need  not  be  noticed.  Their  falsity  was  always 
well  known  in  Kentucky  and  the  South. 


HISTORY    |F    MftRlAJts    CAVALRY. 

The  calumnies,  so  widely  circulated  regarding  his  private  life, 
must  be  noticed,  or  the  duty  of  the  biographer  would  be  neg 
lected  in  an  important  particular.  And  yet,  except  to  positively 
deny  every  thing  which  touched  his  integrity  as  a  man  and  his 
honor  as  a  gentleman,  it  would  seem  that  there  is  nothing  for 
his  biographer  to  do  in  this  respect.  The  wealth  at  the  disposal 
of  the  Federal  government  attracted  into  its  service  all  the  pur 
chasable  villainy  of  the  press — North  and  South.  It  was  not 
even  necessary  for  the  Government  to  bid  for  them — they  volun 
teered  to  perform,  gratis,  in  the  hope  of  future  reward.  To  un 
dertake  a  refutation  of  every  slander  broached  by  this  gang 
against  a  man,  so  constantly  a  theme  for  all  tongues  and  pens, 
as  was  Morgan,  would  be  an  impossible,  even  if  it  were  a  neces 
sary,  task.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  he  was  celebrated,  and  there 
fore  he  was  belied.  General  Morgan  was  certainly  no  "  saint "  — 
his  friends  may  claim  that  he  had  no  right  to  that  title  and  not 
the  slightest  pretension  to  it.  While  he  respected  true  piety  in 
other  men,  and,  as  those  who  knew  him  intimately  will  well  re 
member,  evinced  on  all  occasions  a  profound  and  unaffected 
veneration  for  religion,  he  did  not  profess,  nor  did  he  regulate 
his  life  by  religious  convictions.  Like  the  great  majority  of  the 
men  of  his  class — the  gentlemen  of  the  South — he  lived  freely, 
and  the  amusements  he  permitted  himself  would,  doubtless,  have 
shocked  a  New  Englander  almost  as  much  as  the  money  he  spent 
in  obtaining  them.  Even  had  the  manners  of  the  people  among 
whom  he  lived  have  made  it  politic  to  conceal  carefully  every 
departure  from  straight-laced  morality,  he,  of  all  men,  would 
have  been  the  least  likely  to  do  so,  for  he  scorned  hypocrisy  as 
he  did  every  species  of  meanness.  To  sum  up,  General  Morgan, 
with  the  virtues,  had  some  of  the  faults  of  his  Southern  blood 
and  country,  and  he  sought  so  little  to  extenuate  the  latter 
himself,  that  it  may  be  presumed  that  he  cared  not  the  least 
whether  or  no  they  were  recorded. 

While  no  censure  can,  of  course,  be  directed  against  those 
who  slandered  him,  as  they  did  others,  for  hire — and  it  -vould 

V,, 


SLANDERS    OF   THE    PRESS.  21 

be  as  absurd  in  this  age  and  country,  to  gravely  denounce  the 
lie-coiners  of  the  press,  as  to  waste  time  in  impeaching  the 
false  witnesses  that  figure  before  military  commissions — never 
theless,  as  justice  ought  to  be  done  to  all,  it  should  be  remarked 
that  among  the  respectable  people  who  furtively  gave  currency 
to  every  story  to  his  injury  were  some  who  owed  their  power  to 
harm  him  to  the  generosity  of  his  grandfather,  who  loved  to 
assist  all  sorts  of  merit,  but  was  particularly  partial  to  manual 
skill. 

The  qualities  in  General  Morgan,  which  would  have  attracted 
most  attention  in  private  life,  were  an  ^exceeding  gentleness  of 
disposition  and  unb oun de dj^njexasjj^r.  His  kindness  arid  good- 
ness^Of  h^art  were  proverbial.  His  manner,  even  after  he  had 
become  accustomed  to  command,  was  gentle  and  kind,  and  no 
doubt  greatly  contributed  to  acquire  him  the  singular  popular 
ity  which  he  enjoyed  long  before  he  had  made  his  military  rep 
utation.  The  strong  will  and  energy  which  he  always  displayed 
might  not  have  elicited  much  notice,  had  not  the  circumstances 
in  which  the  war  placed  him  developed  and  given  them  scope 
for  exercise.  But  his  affection  for  the  members  of  his  family 
and  his  friends,  the  generosity  which  prompted  him  to  consult 
their  wishes  at  the  expense  of  any  sacrifice  of  his  own,  his 
sensitive  regard  for  the  feelings  of  others,  even  of  those  in 
whom  he  felt  least  interest,  and  his  rare  charity  for  the  failings 
of  the  weak,  made  up  a  character  which,  even  without  an  un 
common  destiny,  would  have  been  illustrious. 

His  benevolence  was  so  well  known  in  Lexington,  that  to  "  go 
to  Captain  Morgan "  was  the  first  thought  of  every  one  who 
wished  to  inaugurate  a  charitable  enterprise,  and  his  business 
house  was  a  rendezvous  for  all  the  distressed,  and  a  sort  of 
"intelligence  office"  for  the  poor  seeking  employment.  His 
temper  was  cheerful  and  frequently  gay ;  no  man  more  relished 
pleasantry  and  mirth  in  the  society  of  his  friends,  with  whom 
his  manner  was  free  and  even  at  times  jovial;  but  he  never 
himself  indulged  in  personal  jests  nor  familiarities,  nor  did  he 


22 

permit  them  from  his  most  intimate  associates ;  to  attempt  them 
with  hirn  gave  him  certain  and  lasting  offense.  There  was  never 
a  more  sanguine  man ;  with  him  to  live  was  to  hope  and  to  dare. 
Yet  while  rarely  feeling  despondency  and  never  despair,  he  did 
not  deceive  himself  with  false  or  impossible  expectations.  He 
was  quick  to  perceive  the  real  and  the  practical,  and  while  enter 
prising  in  the  extreme  he  was  not  in  the  least  visionary.  His 
nerve,  his  powers  of  discrimination,  the  readiness  with  which 
he  could  surrender  schemes  found  to  be  impracticable,  if  by 
chance  he  became  involved  in  them,  and  his  energy  and  close 
attention  to  his  affairs,  made  him  very  successful  in  business, 
and  undoubtedly  the  same  qualities,  intensified  by  the  demand 
that  war  made  upon  them,  contributed  greatly  to  his  military 
success. 

But  it  can  not  be  denied  that  not  only  the  reputation  which 
he  wron,  but  the  talent  which  he  displayed,  astonished  none  more 
than  his  old  friends.  He  would,  I  think,  have  been  regarded  as 
a  remarkable  man  under  any  circumstances,  by  all  who  would 
have  intimately  known  him,  but  he  was  born  to  be  great  in  the 
career  in  which  he  wTas  so  successful.  It  is  true  that  war  fully 
developed  many  qualities  which  had  been  observed  in  him  pre 
viously,  and  (surest  sign  of  real  capacity)  he  to  the  last  contin 
ued  to  grow  with  every  call  that  was  made  upon  him.  But  he 
manifested  an  aptitude  for  the  peculiar  service  in  which  he  ac 
quired  so  much  distinction,  an  instinctive  appreciation  of  the 
requisites  for  success,  and  a  genius  for  command,  which  made 
themselves  immediately  recognized,  but  which  no  one  had  ex 
pected.  Nature  had  certainly  endowed  him  with  some  gifts 
which  she  very  rarely  bestows,  and  which  give  the  soldier  who 

khas  them  vast  advantages;  a  quickness  of  perception  and 
of  thought,  amounting  almost  to  intuition,  an  almost  unerring 
sagacity  in  foreseeing  the  operations  of  an  adversary  and  in 
calculating  the  effect  of  his  own  movements  upon  him,  wonder 
ful  control  over  men,  as  individuals  and  in  masses,  and  moral 
courage  and  energy  almost  preternatural. 


DECISION    OF   CHARACTER.  23 

He  did  not  seem  to  reason  like  other  men,  at  least  no  one 
could  discover  the  logical  process,  if  there  was  one,  by  which 
his  conclusions  were  reached.  His  mind  worked  most  accurately 
when  it  worked  most  rapidly,  and  sight  or  sound  were  scarcely 
so  swift  as  were  its  operations  in  an  emergency. 

This  peculiar  faculty  and  habit  of  thought  enabled  him  to 
plan  with  a  rapidity  almost  inconceivable.  Apparently  his 
combinations  were  instantaneously  commenced  and  perfected, 
and,  if  provided  with  the  necessary  information,  he  matured  an 
enterprise  almost  as  soon  as  he  conceived  it.  His  language 
and  manner  were  often  very  expressive  of  this  peculiar  consti 
tution  of  mind.  In  consultation  with  those  whom  he  admitted 
to  his  confidence,  he  never  cared  to  hear  arguments,  he  would 
listen  only  to  opinions.  In  stating  his  plans,  he  entered  into  no 
explanations,  and  his  expressions  of  his  views  and  declaration 
of  his  purposes  sounded  like  predictions.  At  such  times  his 
speech  would  become  hurried  and  vehement,  and  his  manner 
excited  but  remarkably  impressive. 

He  evidently  felt  the  most  thorough  and  intense  conviction 
himself,  and  he  seldom  failed  to  convince  his  hearers.  Advice 
volunteered,  even  by  those  he  most  liked  and  relied  on,  was 
never  well  received,  and  when  he  asked  counsel  of  them  he  re 
quired  that  it  should  be  concise  and  definite,  and  resented  hesita 
tion  or  evasion.  Without  being  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term 
an  excellent  judge  of  character,  he  possessed,  in  a  greater  degree 
than  any  of  his  military  associates,  the  faculty  of  judging  how 
various  circumstances  (especially  the  events  and  vicissitudes  of 
war)  would  affect  other  men,  and  of  anticipating  in  all  contin 
gencies  their  thoughts  and  action.  He  seemed,  if  I  may  use 
such  expressions,  capable  of  imagining  himself  exactly  in  the 
situations  of  other  men,  of  identifying  his  own  mind  with 
theirs,  and  thinking  what  they  thought.  He  could  certainly, 
with  more  accuracy  than  any  one,  divine  the  plans  and  wishes 
of  an  enemy.  This  was  universally  remarked,  and  he  exhibited 
it,  not  only  in  correctly  surmising  the  intentions  of  his  own  im- 


24  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

mediate  opponents,  but  also  in  the  opinions  which  he  gave  re 
garding  the  movements  of  the  grand  armies.  He  sought  all 
the  information  which  could  however  remotely  affect  his  inter 
ests  and  designs  with  untiring  avidity,  and  the  novel  and  in 
genious  expedients  he  sometimes  resorted  to  in  order  to  obtain 
it,  would  perhaps  furnish  materials  for  the  most  interesting 
chapter  of  his  history.  It  was  a  common  saying  among  his 
men,  that  "  no  lawyer  can  cross-examine  like  General  Morgan," 
and  indeed  the  skill  with  which  he  could  elicit  intelligence  from 
the  evasive  or  treacherous  answers  of  men  unwilling  to  aid,  or 
seeking  to  deceive  him,  was  only  less  astonishing  than  the  con 
fidence  with  which  he  would  act  upon  information  so  acquired. 
In  army  phrase,  he  was  a  capital  ujudge  of  information,"  that 
is,  he  could  almost  infallibly  detect  the  true  from  the  false,  and 
determine  the  precise  value  of  all  that  he  heard.  His  quickness 
and  accuracy,  in  this  respect,  amounted  almost  to  another  sense; 
reports,  which  to  others  appeared  meager  and  unsatisfactory, 
and  circumstances  devoid  of  meaning  to  all  but  himself,  fre 
quently  afforded  him  a  significant  and  lively  understanding  of 
the  matters  which  he  wished  to  know. 

He  had  another  faculty  which  is  very  essential  to  military 
success,  indispensably  necessary,  at  any  rate,  to  a  cavalry  com 
mander  who  acts  independently  and  at  such  distances  from  any 
base  or  support  as  he  almost  constantly  did.  I  believe  the  Eng 
lish  term  it,  having  "  a  good  eye  for  a  country."  It  is  the  fac 
ulty  of  rapidly  acquiring  a  correct  idea  of  the  nature  and  pe 
culiar  features  of  any  country  in  which  military  operations  are 
to  be  conducted.  He  neglected  nothing  that  a  close  study  of 
maps  and  careful  inquiry  could  furnish  of  this  sort  of  knowl 
edge,  but  after  a  brief  investigation  or  experience,  he  generally 
had  a  better  understanding  of  the  subject  than  either  map- 
makers  or  natives  could  give  him. 

However  imperfect  might  be  his  ajj^tttsrsieTres  with  a  country, 
it  was  nearly  impossible  for  a  guide  to  deceive  him.  What  he 
had  once  learned  in  this  respect  he  never  forgot.  A  road  once 

/ 


QUALIFICATIONS    FOR   COMMAND.  25 

traveled  was  always  afterward  familiar  to  him,  with  distances, 
localities  and  the  adjacent  country.  Thus,  always  having  in  his 
mind  a  perfect  idea  of  the  region  where  he  principally  operated, 
he  could  move  with  as  much  facility  and  confidence  (when  there) 
without  maps  and  guides  as  with  them.  His  favorite  strategy, 
in  his  important  expeditions  or  "raids,"  was  to  place  himself  by 
long  and  swift  marches — moving  sometimes  for  days  and  nights 
without  a  halt  except  to  feed  the  horses — in  the  very  heart  of 
the  territory  where  were  the  objects  of  his  enterprise.  He  re 
lied  upon  this  method  to  confuse  if  not  to  supprise  his  enemy, 
and  prevent  a  concentration  of  his  forces.  He  would  then  strike 
right  and  left.  He  rarely  declined  upon  such  expeditions  to 
fight  when  advancing,  for  it  was  his  theory  that  then,  a  concen-  ^/ 
tration  of  superior  forces  against  him  was  more  difficult,  and  Jl 
that  the  vigor  of  his  enemy  was  to  a  certain  extent  paralyzed  j 
by  the  celerity  of  his  own  movements  and  the  mystery  which 
involved  them.  But  after  commencing  his  retreat,  he  would 
use  every  effort  and  stratagem  to  avoid  battle,  fearing  that  while 
fighting  one  enemy  others  might  also  overtake  him,  and  believ 
ing  that  at  such  times  the  morale  of  his  own  troops  was  some 
what  impaired.  No  leader  could  make  more  skillful  use  of  de 
tachments.  He  would  throw  them  out  to  great  distances,  even 
when  surrounded  by  superior  and  active  forces,  and  yet  in  no 
instance  was  one  of  them  (commanded  by  a  competent  officer 
and  who  obeyed  instructions)  overwhelmed  or  cut  off.  It  very 
rarely  happened  that  they  failed  to  accomplish  the  purposes  for 
which  they  were  dispatched,  or  to  rejoin  the  main  body  in  time 
to  assist  in  decisive  action.  He  could  widely  separate  and  ap 
parently  scatter  his  forces,  and  yet  maintain  such  a  disposition 
of  them  as  to  have  all  well  in  hand.  When  pushing  into  the 
enemy's  lines  he  would  send  these  detachments  in  every  direc 
tion,  until  it  was  impossible  to  conjecture  his  real  intentions — 
causing,  generally,  the  shifting  of  troops  from  point  to  point  as 
each  was  (threatened;  until  the  one  he  wished  to  attack  was 
weakened,  when  he  would  strike  at  it  like  lightning. 


26  ,/HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

He  was  a  better  strategist  than  tactician.  He  excelled  in  the 
arts  which  enable  a  commander  to  make  successful  campaigns 
and  gain  advantages  without  much  fighting,  rather  than  in  skill 
ful  maneuvering  on  the  field. 

lie  knew  how  to  thoroughly  confuse  and  deceive  an  enemy, 
and  induce  in  him  (as  he  desired)  false  confidence  or  undue  cau 
tion  ;  how  to  isolate  and  persuade  or  compel  him  to  surrender 
without  giving  battle  ;  and  he  could  usually  manage,  although 
inferior  to  the  aggregate  of  the  hostile  forces  around  him,  to  be 
stronger  or  as  strong  at  the  point  and  moment  of  encounter. 

The  tactics  he  preferred,  when  he  chose  to  fight,  were  attempts 
at  surprise  and  a  concentration  of  his  strength  for  headlong 
dashing  attacks. 

To  this  latter  method  there  were  some  objections.  These 
attacks  were  made  with  a  vigor,  and  inspired  in  the  men  a  reck 
less  enthusiasm,  which  generally  rendered  them  successful. 
But  if  the  enemy  was  too  strong,  or  holding  defensible  posi 
tions,  was  resolute  and  stubborn  in  resistance,  and  the  first  two 
or  three  rushes  failed  to  drive  him,  the  attack  was  apt  to  fail 
altogether,  and  the  reaction  was  correspondent  to  the  energy  of 
the  onset. 

He  did  not  display  so  much  ability  when  operating  immedi 
ately  with  the  army,  as  when  upon  detached  service.  He 
would  not  hesitate  to  remain  for  days  closely  confronting  the 
main  forces  of  the  enemy,  keeping  his  videttes  constantly  in 
sight  of  his  cantonments,  observing  his  every  movement,  and 
attacking  every  detachment  and  foraging  party  which  he  could 
expect  to  defeat.  But  when  a  grand  advance  of  the  enemy  was 
commenced  he  preferred  making  a  timely  and  long  retreat,  fol 
lowed  by  a  dash  in  some  quarter  where  he  was  not  expected, 
rather  than  to  stubbornly  contest  their  progress. 

He  could  actively  and  efficiently  harass  a  retreating  army, 
multiplying  and  continuing  his  assaults  until  he  seemed  ubiquit 
ous  ;  but  he  was  not  equally  efficient  in  covering  a  retreat  or 
retarding  an  advance  in  force.  Upon  one  or  two  occasions, 


DELINEATION   OF   CHARACTER.  27 


when  the  emergency  was  imminent,  he  performed  this  sort  of 
service  cheerfully  and  well,  but  he  did  not  like  it,  nor  was  he 
eminently  fitted  for  it.  He  had  little  of  that  peculiar  skill  with 
which  Forrest  would  so  wonderfully  embarrass  an  enemy's  ad 
vance,  and  contesting  every  inch  of  his  march,  and  pressing 
upon  him  if  he  hesitated  or  receded,  convert  every  mistake  that 
he  made  into  a  disaster. 

In  attempting  a  delineation  of  General  Morgan's  character, 
mention  ought  not  to  be  omitted  of  certain  peculiarities,  which  to 
some  extent,  affected  his  military  and  official  conduct. 

Although  by  no  means  a  capricious  or  inconsistent  man,  for 
he  entertained  profound  convictions  and  adhered  to  opinions 
with  a  tenacity  that  often  amounted  to  prejudice,  he  frequently 
acted  very  much  like  one. 

Not  even  those  who  knew  him  best  could  calculate  how  un 
usual  occurrences  would  affect  him,  or  induce  him  to  act. 

It  frequently  happened  that  men  for  whose  understandings 
and  characters  he  had  little  respect,  but  who  were  much  about 
his  person,  obtained  a  certain  sort  of  influence  with  him,  but 
they  could  keep  it  only  by  a  complete  acquiescence  in  his  will 
when  it  became  aroused.  He  sometimes  permitted  and  even 
encouraged  suggestions  from  all  around  him,  listening  to  the 
most  contradictory  opinions  with  an  air  of  thorough  acquies 
cence  in  all.  It  was  impossible,  on  such  occasions,  to  determine 
whether  this  was  done  to  flatter  the  speakers,  to  mislead  as  to 
his  real  intentions,  or  if  he  was  in  fact  undecided. 

He  generally  ended  such  moments  of  doubt  by  his  most  orig 
inal  and  unexpected  resolutions,  which  he  would  declare  exactly 
as  if  they  were  suggestions  just  made  by  some  one  else,  almost 
persuading  the  parties  to  whom  they  were  attributed  that  they 
had  really  advanced  them.  In  his  judgment  of  the  men  with 
whom  he  had  to  deal,  he  showed  a  strange  mixture  of  shrewd 
ness  and  simplicity.  He  seldom  failed  to  discern  and  to  take 
advantage  of  the  ruling  characteristics  of  those  who  approached 
him,  and  he  could  subsidize  the  knowledge  and  talents  of  other 


28  (  HISTORY  tyF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

men  with  rare  skill.  He  especially  excelled  in  judging  men 
collectively.  He  knew  exactly  how  to  appeal  to  the  feelings  of 
his  men,  to  excite  their  enthusiasm,  and  stimulate  them  to  dare 
any  danger  and  endure  any  fatigue  and  hardship.  But  he  some 
times  committed  the  gravest  errors  in  his  estimation  of  individ 
ual  character.  He  more  than  once  imposed  implicit  confidence 
in  men  whom  no  one  else  would  have  trusted,  and  suffered  him 
self  to  be  deceived  by  the  shallowest  imposters.  He  obtained 
credit  for  profound  insight  into  character  by  his  possession  of 
another  and  very  different  quality.  The  unbounded  influence 
he  at  once  acquired  over  almost  every  one  who  approached  him, 
enabled  him  to  make  men  do  the  most  uncharacteristic  things, 
and  created  the  impression  that  he  discovered  traits  of  character 
hidden  from  others. 

General  Morgan  had  more  of  those  personal  qualities  which 
make  a  man's  friends  devoted  to  him,  than  any  one  I  have  ever 
known. 

He  was  himself  very  warm  and  constant  in  the  friendships 
which  he  formed.  It  seemed  impossible  for  him  to  do  enough 
for  those  to  whom  he  was  attached,  or  to  ever  give  them  up. 
His  manner -when  he  wished,  prepossessed  every  one  in  his 
favor.  He  was  generally  more  courteous  and  attentive  to  his 
inferiors  than  to  his  equals  and  superiors.  This  may  have 
proceeded  in  a  great  measure  from  his  jealousy  of  dictation  and 
impatience  of  restraint,  but  was  the  result  also  of  warm  and 
generous  feelings.  His  greatest  faults  arose  out  of  his  kind 
ness  and  easiness  of  disposition,  which  rendered  it  impossible 
for  him  to  say  or  do  unpleasant  things,  unless  when  under  the 
influence  of  strong  prejudice  or  resentment.  This  temperament 
made  him  a  too  lax  disciplinarian,  and  caused  him  to  be  fre 
quently  imposed  upon.  He  was  exceedingly  and  unfeignedly 
modest.  For  a  long  time  he  sought,  in  every  way,  to  avoid  the 
applause  and  ovations  which  met  him  every  where  in  the  South, 
and  he  never  learned  to  keep  a  bold  countenance  when  receiving 
them. 


PERSONAL   APPEARANCE.  29 

It  was  distressing  to  see  him  called  on  (as  was  of  course  often 
the  case)  for  a  speech — nature  certainly  never  intended  that  he 
should  win  either  fame  or  bread  by  oratory. 

When  complimented  for  any  achievement  he  always  gave  the 
credit  of  it  to  some  favorite  officer,  or  attributed  it  to  the  ex 
cellence  of  his  troops.  Nothing  seemed  to  give  him  more  sin 
cere  pleasure  than  to  publicly  acknowledge  meritorious  service 
in  a  subaltern  officer  or  private,  and  he  would  do  it  in  a  manner 
that  made  it  a  life  long  remembrance  with  the  recipient  of  the 
compliment. 

When  displeased,  he  rarely  reprimanded,  but  expressed  his 
displeasure  by  satirically  complimenting  the  offender ;  frequently 
the  only  evidence  of  dissatisfaction  which  he  would  show  was  a 
peculiar  smile,  which  was  exceeding  significant,  and  any  thing  but 
agreeable  to  the  individual  conscious  of  having  offended  him. 

His  personal  appearance  and  carriage  were  striking  and 
graceful.  His  features  were  eminently  handsome  and  adapted 
to  the  most  pleasing  expressions.  His  eyes  were  small,  of  a 
grayish  blue  color,  and  their  glances  keen  and  thoughtful.  His 
figure  on  foot  or  on  horse-back  was  superb. 

He  was  exactly  six  feet  in  higlit,  and  although  not  at  all 
corpulent,  weighed  one  hundred  and  eighty-five  pounds. 

His  form  was  perfect,  and  the  rarest  combination  of  strength, 
activity  and  grace.  His  constitution  seemed  impervious  to  the 
effects  of  privation  and  exposure,  and  it  was  scarcely  possible 
to  perceive  that  he  suffered  from  fatigue  or  lack  of  sleep.  After 
marching  for  days  and  nights  without  intermission,  until  the 
hardiest  men  in  his  division  were  exhausted,  I  have  known 
him,  as  soon  as  a  halt  was  called,  and  he  could  safely  leave  his 
command,  ride  fifty  miles  to  see  his  wife.  Although  a  most 
practical  man  in  all  of  his  ideas,  he  irresistibly  reminded  one 
of  the  heroes  of  romance.  He  seemed  the  Fra-Moreale  come  to 
life  again,  and,  doubtless,  was  as  much  feared  and  as  bitterly 
denounced  as  was  that  distinguished  officer. 

Men  are  not  often  born  who  can  wield  such  an  influence  as 


30 

he  exerted,  apparently  without  an  effort — who  can  so  win  men's 
hearts  and  stir  their  blood.  He  will,  at  least,  be  remembered 
until  the  Western  cavalry-men  and  their  children  have  all  died. 
The  bold  riders  who  live  in  the  border-land,  whose  every  acre 
he  made  historic,  will  leave  many  a  story  of  his  audacity  and 
wily  skill.  They  will  name  but  one  man  as  his  equal,  "The 
wizard  of  the  saddle,"  the  man  of  revolutionary  force  and  fire, 
strong,  sagacious,  indomitable  Forrest,  and  the  two  will  go  down 
in  tradition  together,  twin-brothers  in  arms  and  in  fame. 


C  II  A  P  T  E  11    III. 

THE  position  assumed  by  Kentucky,  at  the  inception  of  the 
late  struggle,  and  her  conduct  throughout,  excited  the  surprise, 
and,  in  no  small  degree,  incurred  for  her  the  dislike  of  both  the 
contending  sections. 

But  while  both  North  and  South,  at  some  time,  doubted  her 
good  faith  and  complained  of  her  action,  all  such  sentiments 
have  been  entirely  forgotten  by  the  latter,  and  have  become  in 
tensified  into  bitter  and  undisguised  animosity  upon  the  part  of 
a  large  share  of  the  population  of  the  former. 

The  reason  is  patent.  It  is  the  same  which,  during  the  war, 
influenced  the  Confederates  to  hope  confidently  for  large  as 
sistance  from  Kentucky,  if  once  enabled  to  obtain  a  foot-hold 
upon  her  territory,  and  caused  the  Federals,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  regard  even  the  loudest  and  most  zealous  professors  of  loyalty 
as  Secessionists  in  disguise,  or,  at  best,  Unionists  only  to  save 
their  property.  It  is  the  instinctive  feeling  that  the  people  of 
Kentucky,  on  account  of  kindred  blood,  common  interests,  and 
identity  of  ideas  in  all  that  relates  to  political  rights  and  the 
objects  of  political  institutions,  may  be  supposed  likely  to  sym 
pathize  and  to  act  with  the  people  of  the  South.  But  a  variety 
of  causes  and  influences  combined  to  prevent  Kentucky  from 
taking  a  decided  stand  with  either  of  the  combatants,  and  pro 
duced  the  vacillation  and  inconsistency  which  so  notably  char 
acterized  her  councils  and  paralyzed  her  efforts  in  either  direc 
tion,  and,  alas,  it  may  be  added,  so  seriously  affected  her  fair 
fame. 

Her  geographical  situation,  presenting  a  frontier  accessible 
for  several  hundreds  of  miles  to  an  assailant  coming  either  from 
the  North  or  South,  caused  her  people  great  apprehension,  es- 


pecially  as  it  was  accounted  an  absolute  certainty  that  her  ter 
ritory  (if  she  took  part  with  the  South)  would  be  made  the 
battle-ground  and  subjected  to  the  last  horrors  and  desolation 
of  war.  The  political  education  of  the  Kentuckians,  also,  dis 
posed  them  to  enter  upon  such  a  contest  with  extreme  reluc 
tance  and  hesitation. 

Originally  a  portion  of  Virginia,  settled  chiefly  by  emigration 
from  that  State,  her  population  partook  of  the  characteristics 
and  were  imbued  with  the  feelings  which  so  strongly  prevailed 
in  the  mother  commonwealth. 

From  Virginia,  the  first  generation  of  Kentucky  statesmen 
derived  those  opinions  which  became  the  political  creed  of  the 
Southern  people,  and  were  promulgated  in  the  celebrated 
resolutions  of  '98,  which  gave  shape  and  consistency  to  the 
doctrine  of  States'  Rights,  and  popular  expression  to  that  con 
struction  of  the  relations  of  the  several  States  to  the  General 
Government  (under  the  Federal  Constitution),  so  earnestly  in 
sisted  upon  by  the  master-minds  of  Virginia.  The  earlier  pop 
ulation  of  Kentucky  was  peculiarly  inclined  to  adopt  and  cher 
ish  such  opinions,  by  the  promptings  of  that  nature  which  seems 
common  to  all  men  descended  from  the  stock  of  the  "  Old  Do 
minion,"  that  craving  for  the  largest  individual  independence, 
and  disposition  to  assert  and  maintain  in  full  measure  every  per 
sonal  right,  which  has  always  made  the  people  of  the  Southern 
and  Western  States  so  jealous  of  outside  interference  with  their 
local  affairs.  It  was  natural  that  a  people,  animated  by  such  a 
spirit,  should  push  their  preference  for  self-government  even  to 
extremes ;  that  they  should  esteem  their  most  valued  franchises 
only  safe  when  under  their  own  entire  custody  and  control ; 
that  they  should  prefer  that  their  peculiar  institutions  should 
be  submitted  only  to  domestic  regulation,  and  that  the  personal 
liberty,  which  they  prized  above  all  their  possessions,  should  be 
restrained  only  by  laws  enacted  by  legislators  chosen  from  among 
themselves,  and  executed  by  magistrates  equally  identified  with 
themselves  and  appreciative  of  their  instincts. 


EARLY   POLITICAL   VIEWS   OF   KENTUCKY.  33 

In  short,  they  were  strongly  attached  to  their  State  Govern 
ments,  and  were  not  inclined  to  regard  as  beneficient,  nor,  even 
exactly  legitimate,  any  interference  with  them,  upon  the  part 
of  the  General  Government,  and  desired  to  see  the  powers  of-the.^ 
latter  exercised  only  for  the  "  common  defense  and_^eneral 
welfare." 

Without  presuming  to  declare  them  correct  or  erroneous,  it 
may  be  safely  asserted  that  such  were  the  views  which  prevailed 
in  Kentucky  at  a  period  a  little  subsequent  to  her  settlement. 

This  decided  and  almost  universal  sentiment  was  first  shaken, 
and  the  minds  of  the  people  began  to  undergo  some  change, 
about  the  time  of,  and  doubtless  in  consequence  of,  the  detection 
of  tho  Burr  conspiracy.  Burr  had  been  identified  with  the 
party  which  advocated  the  extreme  State  Rights  doctrines,  and 
his  principal  confederates  were  men  of  the  same  political  com 
plexion. 

The  utter  uselessness  of  his  scheme,  even  if  successful,  and 
the  little  prospect  of  any  benefit  accruing  from  it,  unless  to  the 
leading  adventurers,  had  disposed  all  the  more  sober  minded  to 
regard  it  with  distrust.  And  when  it  became  apparent  that 
it  had  been  concocted  for  the  gratification  of  one  man's  ambi 
tion,  the  very  people  whom  it  had  been  part  of  the  plan  to  flat 
ter  with  hopes  of  the  most  brilliant  advantages,  immediately 
conceived  for  it  the  most  intense  aversion. 

The  odium  into  which  Burr  and  his  associates  immediately 
fell,  became,  in  some  measure,  attached  to  the  political  school  to 
which  they  had  belonged,  and  men's  minds  began  to  be  un 
settled  upon  the  very  political  tenets,  in  the  propriety  and  va 
lidity  of  which  they  had  previously  so  implicitly  believed.  The 
able  Federalist  leaders  in  the  State,  pursued  and  improved  the 
advantage  thus  offered  them,  and  for  the  first  time  in  the  history 
of  Kentucky,  that  party  showed  evidence  of  ability  to  cope  with 
its  rival.  Doubtless,  also,  the  effect  of  Mr.  Madison's  attempt 
to  explain  away  the  marrow  and  substance  of  the  famous  resolu 
tions,  which  told  so  injuriously  against  the  State  Rights  party 
3 


34 

every  where,  contributed,  at  a  still  later  day,  to  weaken  that 
party  in  Kentucky ;  but  the  vital  change  in  the  political  faith 
of  Kentucky,  was  wrought  by  Henry  Clay.  All  previous  in 
terruptions  to  the  opinions  which  she  had  acquired  as  her  birth 
right  from  Virginia,  were  but  partial,  and  would  have  been 
ephemeral,  but  the  spell  which  the  great  magician  cast  over  his 
people  was  like  the  glamour  of  mediaeval  enchantment.  It  bound 
them  in  helpless  but  delighted  acquiescence  in  the  will  of  the 
master.  Their  vision  informed  them,  not  of  objects  as  they 
were,  but  as  he  willed  that  they  should  seem,  and  his  patients 
received,  at  his  pleasure  and  with  equal  confidence,  the  true  and 
the  unreal.  In  fact,  the  undoubted  patriotism  and  spotless  in 
tegrity  of  Mr.  Clay,  so  aided  the  effect  of  his  haughty  will  and 
superb  genius,  that  his  influence  amounted  to  fascination.  Al 
though  himself,  in  early  life,  an  advocate  of  the  principles  of 
(what  has  been  since  styled)  the  Jeffersonian  school  of  Democ 
racy,  he.  became  gradually,  but  thoroughly,  weaned  from  his  first 
opinions,  and  a  convert  to  the  dogmas  of  the  school  of  pol 
itics  which  he  had  once  so  ably  combatted.  The  author  of 
the  American  System,  the  advocate  of  the  United  States  Bank, 
the  champion  of  the  New  England  manufacturing  and  com 
mercial  interests,  with  their  appropriate  and  necessary  train  of 
protective  tariffs,  bounties  and  monopolies,  could  have  little 
sympathy  with  the  ideas  that  the  several  States  could,  and 
should,  protect  and  develope  their  own  interests  without  Federal 
assistance,  that  the  General  Government  was  the  servant  of  all 
the  States  and  not  the  guardian  and  dry  nurse  of  a  few — the 
doctrine,  in  short,  of  "  State  Sovereignty  and  Federal  Agency." 
Mr.  Clay  fairly  and  emphatically  announced  his  political  faith 
in  word  and  deed.  He  declared  that  he  "  owed  a  paramount 
allegiance  to  the  whole  Union  :  a  subordinate  one  to  his  own 
State,"  arid,  throughout  the  best  part  of  his  long  political  life, 
he  wrought  faithfully  for  interests  distinct  from,  if  not  adverse 
to,  those  of  his  own  State  and  section.  His  influence,  however, 
in  his  own  State,  has  determined,  perhaps  forever,  her  destiny. 


MR.  CLAY'S  INFLUENCE.  35 

If  he  did  not  educate  the  people  of  Kentucky  (as  has  been  so 
often  charged)  to  "  defer  principle  fro  expediency,"  he  at  least 
taught  them  to  study  the  immediate  policy  rather  than  the  ul 
timate  effect  of  every  measure  that  they  were  called  to  consider, 
and  to  seek  the  material  prosperity  of  the  hour  at  the  expense, 
even,  of  future  safety.  He  taught  his  generation  to  love  the 
Union,  not  as  an  "  agency "  through  which  certain  benefits 
were  to  be  derived,  but  as  an  "  end  "  which  was  to  be  adhered 
to,  no  matter  what  results  flowed  from  it. 

Mr.  Clay  sincerely  believed  that  in  the  union  of  the  States 
resided  the  surest  guarantees  of  the  safety,  honor,  and  prosper 
ity  of  each,  and  he  contemplated  with  horror  and  aversion  any 
thought  of  disunion.  His  own  lofty  and  heroic  nature  could 
harbor  no  feeling  which  was  not  manly  and  brave,  but,  in  striving 
to  stimulate  and  fortify  in  his  people  the  same  love  of  union 
which  he  entertained  himself,  he  taught  many  Kentuckians  to  so 
dread  the  evils  of  war,  as  to  lose  all  fear  of  other  and  as  great 
evils,  and  to  be  willing  to  purchase  exemption  from  civil  strife 
by  facile  and  voluntary  submission.  After  the  death  of  Mr. 
Clay,  Kentucky,  no  longer  subjected  to  his  personal  influence, 
began  to  forget  it. 

In  1851,  John  C.  Breckinridge  had  been  elected  to  Congress 
from  Mr.  Clay's  district,  while  the  latter  still  lived,  and  beating 
one  of  his  warmest  friends  and  supporters.  Under  the  leadership 
of  Mr.  Breckinridge,  the  Democratic  party  in  Kentucky  rallied 
and  rapidly  gained  ground.  During  the  "Know-nothing"  ex 
citement,  the  old  Whigs,  who  had  nearly  all  joined  the  Know- 
nothing  or  American  party,  seemed  about  to  regain  their  as 
cendency,  but  that  excitement  ebbing  as  suddenly  as  it  had 
arisen,  left  the  Democracy  in  indisputable  power.  In  1856, 
Kentucky  cast  her  Presidential  vote  for  Buchanan  and  Breckin 
ridge  by  nearly  seven  thousand  majority.  Mr.  Breckinridge's 
influence  had,  by  this  time,  become  predominant  in  the  State, 
and  was  felt  in  every  election.  The  troubles  in  Kansas  and  the 
agitation  in  Congress  had  rendered  the  Democratic  element  in 


36  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Kentucky  more  determined,  and  inclined  them  more  strongly  to 
take  a  Southern  view  of  all  the  debated  questions.  The  John 
Brown  affair  exasperated  her  people  in  common  with  that  of 
every  other  slaveholding  community,  and  led  to  the  organiza 
tion  of  the  State-guard. 

Created  because  of  the  strong  belief  that  similar  attempts 
would  be  repeated,  and  upon  a  larger  scale,  and  that,  quite 
likely,  Kentucky  would  be  selected  as  a  field  of  operations,  it  is 
not  surprising  that  the  State-guard  should  have  expected  an 
enemy  only  from  the  North,  whence,  alone,  would  come  the  ag 
gressions  it  was  organized  to  resist,  and  that  it  should  have 
conceived  a  feeling  of  antagonism  for  the  Northern,  and  an  in 
stinctive  sympathy  for  the  Southern,  people. 

These  sentiments  were  intensified  by  the  language  of  the 
Northern  press  and  pulpit,  and  the  commendation  and  encour 
agement  of  such  enterprises  as  the  Harper's  Ferry  raid,  which 
were  to  be  heard  throughout  the  North. 

In  the  Presidential  election  of  I860,  the  Kentucky  Democracy 
divided  on  Douglas  and  Breckinridge,  thereby  losing  the  State. 
After  the  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  passage  of  ordinances 
of  secession  by  several  Southern  States,  when  the  most  im 
portant  question  which  the  people  of  Kentucky  had  ever  been 
required  to  determine,  was  presented  for  their  consideration, 
their  sentiments  and  wishes  were  so  various  and  conflicting,  as 
to  render  its  decision  by  themselves  impossible,  and  it  was 
finally  settled  for  them  by  the  Federal  Government. 

The  Breckinridge  wing  of  the  Democracy  was  decidedly 
Southern  in  feelings  and  opinions,  and  anxious  to  espouse  the 
Southern  cause. 

The  Douglas  wing  strongly  sympathized  with  the  South,  but 
opposed  secession  and  disunion. 

The  Bell-Everett  party,  composed  chiefly  of  old  Clay  Whigs, 
was  decidedly  in  favor  of  Union.  Such  was  the  attitude  of  par 
ties,  with  occasional  individual  exceptions.  The  very  young  men 
of  the  State  were  generally  intense  Southern  sympathizers,  and 


"UNION"  SENTIMENT.  37 

were,  with  few  exceptions,  connected  with  the  State-guard. 
Indeed,  divided  as  were  the  people  of  Kentucky  at  that  time, 
sympathy  with  the  Southern  people  was  prevalent  among  all 
classes  of  them,  and  the  conviction  seemed  to  be  strong,  even 
in  the  most  determined  opponents  of  secession,  that  an  attack 
upon  the  Southern  people  was  an  attack  upon  themselves. 
Among  the  Union  men  it  was  common  to  hear  such  declarations 
as  that  "  When  it  becomes  a  direct  conflict  between  North  and 
South,  we  will  take  part  with  the  South,"  "  The  Northern  troops 
shall  not  march  over  our  soil  to  invade  the  South,"  "When  it 
becomes  apparent  that  the  war  is  an  abolition  crusade,  and 
waged  for  the  destruction  of  slavery,  Kentucky  will  arm  against 
the  Government,"  etc.;  each  man  had  some  saving  clause  with 
his  Unionism.  It  is  no  hazardous  assertion  that  the  Union 
party,  in  Kentucky,  condemned  the  secession  of  the  Southern 
States,  more  because  it  was  undertaken  without  consultation 
with  them,  and  because  they  regarded  it  as  a  blow  at  Ken 
tucky's  dignity  and  comfort,  than  because  it  endangered  "  the 
national  life."  Certainly  not  one  of  the  leading  politicians  of 
that  party  would  have  dared,  in  the  winter  and  spring  of  1861, 
to  have  openly  advocated  coercion,  no  matter  what  were  his 
secret  views  of  its  propriety. 

Upon  the  17th  February,  1861,  the  Legislature  met  in  extra 
session  at  the  summons  of  Governor  Magoffin.  Seven  Southern 
States  had  seceded,  the  Confederate  Government  had  been  in 
augurated,  and  it  was  time  for  the  people  of  Kentucky  to  un 
derstand  what  they  were  going  to  do.  The  Governor  addressed 
a  message  to  the  Legislature  advising  the  call  of  a  State  Conven 
tion.  This  the  Legislature  declined  to  do,  but  suggested  the  pro 
priety  of  the  assembling  of  a  National  Convention  to  revise  and 
correct  the  Federal  Constitution,  and  recommended  the  "  Peace 
Conference,"  which  was  subsequently  held  at  Washington.  In 
certain  resolutions  passed  by  this  Legislature,  in  reference  to 
resolutions  passed  by  the  States  of  Maine,  New  York  and  Mas 
sachusetts,  this  language  occurs :  "  The  Governor  of  the  State 


HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

of  Kentucky  is  hereby  requested  to  inform  the  executives  of 
said  States,  that  it  is  the  opinion  of  this  General  Assembly  that 
whenever  the  authorities  of  these  States  shall  send  armed  forces 
to  the  South  for  the  purpose  indicated  in  said  resolutions,  the 
people  of  Kentucky,  uniting  with  their  brethren  of  the  South, 
will  as  one  man,  resist  such  invasion  of  the  soil  of  the  South, 
ut  all  hazards  and  to  the  last  extremity."  Rather  strong  lan 
guage  for  "  Union  "  men  and  a  "  loyal "  legislature  to  use.  It 
would  seem  that  Kentucky,  at  that  time,  supposed  herself  a 
"sovereign"  State  addressing  other  "sovereign"  States,  and  that 
she  entirely  ignored  the  "  Nation."  Her  Legislature  paid  as  lit 
tle  attention  to  the  "  proper  channel  of  communication  "  as  a 
militia  Captain  would  have  done.  The  Union  men  who  voted 
for  the  resolutions  in  which  this  language  was  embodied,  would 
be  justly  liable  to  censure,  if  it  were  not  positively  certain  that 
they  were  insincere;  and  that  they  ivere  insincere  is  abundantly 
proven  by  their  subsequent  action,  and  the  fact  that  many  of 
them  held  commissions  in  the  "armed  forces"  sent  to  invade 
the  South.  On  the  llth  of  February  the  Legislature  resolved, 
"That  we  protest  against  the  use  of  force  or  coercion  by  the 
General  Government  against  the  seceded  States,  as  unwise  and 
inexpedient,  and  tending  to  the  destruction  of  our  common 
country." 

At  the  Union  State  Convention,  held  at  Louisville  on  the  8th 
of  January,  certain  amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  were  "recommended,"  and  it  was  resolved,  "that,  if  the 
disorganization  of  the  present  Union  is  not  arrested,  that  the 
States  agreeing  to  these  amendments  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
shall  form  &  separate  Confederacy,  with  power  to  admit  new  States 
under  our  glorious  Constitution  thus  amended;"  it  was  resolved 
also  that  it  was  "  expedient  to  call  a  convention  of  the  border 
free  and  slave  States,"  and  that  "we  deplore  the  existence  of  a 
Union  to  be  held  together  by  the  sword." 

It  almost  takes  a  man's  breath  away  to  write  such  things 
about  the  most  loyal  men  of  the  loyal  State  of  Kentucky.  For 


INCONSISTENCIES   OF  UNION   MEN. 

a  Union  Convention  to  have  passed  them,  and  Union  men  to 
have  indorsed  them,  the  resolutions  whose  substance  has  been 
just  given,  have  rather  a  strange  sound.  They  ring  mightily 
like  secession. 

"If  the  disorganization  of  the  present  Union  is  not  arrested, 
the  Union  men  of  Kentucky  would  also  help  it  along.  A  mod- 
fied  phrase  much  in  vogue  with  them,  "separate  State  action" 
expressed  their  "conservative"  plan  of  seceding.  Unless  the 
proper  distinctions  are  drawn,  however,  the  action  of  this  class 
of  politicians  will  always  be  misunderstood.  They  indignantly 
condemned  the  secession  of  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  No 
language  was  strong  enough  to  express  their  abhorrence  and 
condemnation  of  the  wickedness  of  those  who  would  inaugurate 
"the  disorganization  of  the  present  Union."  But  they  did  not, 
vith  ordinary  consistency, 

'•  Compound  for  sins  they  were  inclined  to 
By  damning  those  they  had  no  mind  to!  " 

They  committed  the  same  sin  under  another  name,  and  advo 
cated  the  "  separate  Confederacy"  of  "  the  border  free  and  slave 
States,"  under  our  glorious  Constitution  thus  amended." 

"  Orthodoxy,"  was  their  "doxy  ;"  "  Heterodoxy,"  was  "  another 
man's  doxy."  Every  candid  man,  who  remembers  the  political 
status  of  Kentucky  at  that  period,  will  admit  that  the  Union 
party  propounded  no  definite  and  positive  creed,  and  that  its  lead 
ers  frequently  gave  formal  expression  to  views  which  strangely 
resembled  the  "  damnable  heresies  of  secession."  Indeed,  the 
neglect  of  the  seceding  States  to  "  consult  Kentucky,"  previously 
to  having  gone  out.  seemed  to  be,  in  the  eyes  of  these  gentle 
men,  not  so  much  an  aggravation  of  the  crime  of  secession,  as, 
in  itself,  a  crime  infinitely  graver.  There  were  many  who  would 
condemn  secession,  and  in  the  same  breath  indicate  the  propriety 
of  "co-operation."  These  subtle  distinctions,  satisfactory, 
doubtless,  to  the  intellects  which  generated  them,  were  not  aptly 
received  by  common  minds,  and  their  promulgation  induced,  per 
haps  very  unjustly,  a  very  general  belief  that  the  Union  party 


40  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRJ. 

was  actuated  not  more  by  a  love  of  the  Union,  than  by  a  sal 
utary  regard  for  personal  security  and  comfort.  It  seemed  that 
the  crime  was  not  in  "  breaking  up  the  Union,"  but  in  going 
about  it  in  the  wrong  way. 

The  people  of  Kentucky  heard,  it  is  true,  from  these  leaders 
indignant  and  patriotic  denunciations  of  "  secession,"  and,  yet, 
they  could  listen  to  suggestions  amounting  almost  to  advocacy, 
from  the  same  lips,  of  "  central  confederacies  "  or  "  co-opera 
tions." 

Is  it  surprising,  then,  that  no  very  holy  horror  of  disunion 
should  have  prevailed  in  Kentucky  ? 

But  any  inclination  to  tax  these  gentlemen  with  inconsistency 
should  be  checked  by  the  reflection  that  they  were  surrounded 
by  peculiar  circumstances.  It  appeared  to  be  by  no  mearis  cer 
tain,  just  then,  that  an  attempt  would  be  made  to  coerce  the  se 
ceding  States,  or  that  the  Southern  Confederacy  would  not  be 
established  without  a  war.  In  that  event,  Kentucky  would  have 
glided  naturally  and  certainly  into  it,  and  Kentucky  politicians 
who  had  approved  coercion,  would  have  felt  uncomfortable  as 
Confederate  citizens.  The  leaders  of  the  Union  party  were  men 
of  fine  ability,  but  they  were  not  endowed  with  prescience,  nor 
could  they  in  the  political  chaos  then  ruling,  instinctively  de 
tect  the  strong  side.  Let  it  be  remembered  that,  just  so  soon 
as  they  discerned  it,  they  enthusiastically  embraced  it  and  clave 
to  it,  with  a  few  immaterial  oscillations,  through  much  tribula 
tion.  As  was  explained  by  one  of  the  most  distinguished  among 
them  (in  the  United  States  Senate),  it  was  necessary  to  "  edu 
cate  the  people  of  Kentucky  to  loyalty."  It  is  true  that  in  this 
educational  process,  which  was  decidedly  novel  and  peculiar, 
many  Kentuckians,  not  clearly  seeing  the  object  in  view,  were 
made  rebels,  and  even  Confederate  soldiers,  although  not  orig 
inally  inclined  that  way. 

But  it  is  seldom  that  a  perfectly  new  and  original  system  works 
•trrAOOthly,  and  the  "  educators "  made  amends  for  all  their 
•Cf-xs>ra  by  inflexible  severity  toward  the  rebels  who  staid  at 


UNION   SENTIMENT.  41 

home,  and  by  "  expatriating"  and  confiscating  the  property  of 
those  who  fled.  A  "States  Rights  Convention "  was  called  to 
assemble  at  Frankfort  on  the  22d  of  March,  1861,  but  adjourned, 
having  accomplished  nothing. 

After  the  fall  of  Fort  Sumpter  and  the  issuing  of  the  proc 
lamation  of  April  15,  1861,  Governor  Magoffin  responded  to 
President  Lincoln's  call  for  troops  from  Kentucky  in  the  fol 
lowing  language : 

"FRANKFORT,  April  16,  1861. 
"  Hon.  Simon  Cameron,  Secretary  of  War  : 

"  Your  dispatch  is  received.  In  answer,  I  say,  emphatically, 
that  Kentucky  will  furnish  no  troops  for  the  wicked  purpose  of 
subduing  her  sister  Southern  States. 

"  B.  MAGOFFIN,  Governor  of  Kentucky" 

Governor  Magoffin  then  a  second  time  convened  the  Legis 
lature  in  extra  session,  to  consider  means  for  putting  the  State 
in  a  position  for  defense.  When  the  Legislature  met,  it  re 
solved, 

"  That  the  act  of  the  Governor  in  refusing  to  furnish  troops 
or  military  force  upon  the  call  of  the  Executive  authority  of  the 
United  States,  under  existing  circumstances,  is  approved."  Yeas, 
eighty-nine  ;  nays,  four. 

On  the  18th  of  April  a  large  Union  meeting  was  held  at 
Louisville,  at  which  the  most  prominent  and  influential  Union 
men  of  the  State  assisted.  Resolutions  were  adopted, 

"  That  as  the  Confederate  States  have,  by  overt  acts,  com 
menced  war  against  the  United  States,  without  consultation  with 
Kentucky  and  their  sister  Southern  States,  Kentucky  reserves  to 
herself  the  right  to  choose  her  own  position ;  and  that  while  her 
natural  sympathies  are  with  those  who  have  a  common  interest 
in  the  protection  of  slavery,  she  still  acknowledges  her  loyalty 
and  fealty  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  which  she 
will  cheerfully  render  until  that  Government  becomes  aggressive, 


42  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

tyrannical,  and  regardless  of  our  rights  in   slave  property  ;  " 
Resolved, 

"  That  the  National  Government  should  be  tried  by  its  acts, 
and  that  the  several  States,  as  its  peers  in  their  appropriate 
spheres,  will  hold  it  to  a  rigid  accountability,  and  require  that 
its  acts  should  be  fraternal  in  their  efforts  to  bring  back  the 
seceded  States,  and  not  sanguinary  or  coercive." 

The  Senate  resolved,  just  before  the  adjournment  of  the  Leg 
islature,  that  "  Kentucky  will  not  sever  her  connection  with  the 
National  Government,  nor  take  up  arms  for  either  belligerent 
party  ;  but  arm  herself  for  the  preservation  of  peace  within  her 
borders." 

This  was  the  first  authoritative  declaration  of  the  policy  of 
"Neutrality,"  which,  however,  had  been  previously  indicated  at 
a  Union  meeting  held  at  Louisville  on  the  10th  of  April,  in  the 
following  resolutions  : 

"  That  as  we  oppose  the  call  of  the  President  for  volunteers 
for  the  purpose  of  coercing  the  seceded  States,  so  we  oppose 
the  raising  of  troops  in  this  State  to  co-operate  with  the  South 
ern  Confederacy." 

"  That  the  present  duty  of  Kentucky  is  to  maintain  her 
present  independent  position,  taking  sides,  not  with  the  Admin 
istration  nor  with  the  seceding  States,  but  with  the  Union 
against  them  both,  declaring  her  soil  to  be  sacred  from  the  hos 
tile  tread  of  either,  and,  if  necessary,  to  make  the  declaration 
good  with  her  strong  right  arm." 

In  other  words,  Kentucky  would  remain  in  the  Union,  but . 
would  refuse  obedience  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
and  would  fight  its  armies  if  they  came  into  her  territory.     Was 
it  much  less   "  criminal  "   and  "  heretical "   to  do  this  than  to 
"  take  sides  with  the  seceding  States  ? " 

What  is  the  exact  shade  of  difference  between  the  guilt  of  a 
State  which  transfers  its  fealty  from  the  Union  to  a  Confederacy, 
and  that  of  a  State  which  declares  her  positive  and  absolute  in- 


ARMED    NEUTRALITY.  43 

dependence,  entering  into  no  new  compacts,  but  setting  at  de- 
fiance  the  old  one  ?  Where  was  the  boasted  "  loyalty  "  of  the 
Union  men  of  Kentucky  when  they  indorsed  the  above  given 
resolutions  ? 

In  May  of  that  year,  the  Louisville  Journal,  the  organ  of  the 
Union  party  of  Kentucky,  said,  in  reference  to  the  reponse 
which  it  was  proper  -for  Kentucky  to  make  to  the  President's 
call  for  troops  :  "  In  our  judgment,  the  people  of  Kentucky  have 
answered  this  question  in  advance,  and  the  answer  expressed  in 
every  conceivable  form  of  popular  expression,  and  finally,  clinched 
by  the  glorious  vote  of  Saturday,  is  :  arm  Kentucky  efficiently, 
but  rightfully,  and  fairly,  with  the  clear  declaration  that  the 
arming  is  not  for  offense  against  either  the  Government  or  the 
seceding  States,  but  purely  for  defense  against  whatever  power 
sets  hostile  foot  upon  the  actual  soil  of  the  Commonwealth.  In 
other  words,  the  Legislature,  according  to  the  manifest  will  of 
the  people,  should  declare  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky  in  this 
unnatural  and  accursed  war  of  brothers,  and  equip  the  State  for 
the  successful  maintenance  of  her  position  at  all  hazards?" 

It  is  well  known  that  loyalty  means  unqualified,  uncondition 
al,  eternal  devotion  and  adherence  to  the  Union,  with  a  prompt 
and  decorous  acquiescence  in  the  will  and  action  of  the  Admin 
istration.  Although  a  definition  of  the  term  has  been  frequently 
asked,  and  many  have  affected  not  to  understand  it,  it  is  posi 
tively  settled  that  every  man  is  a  traitor  who  doubts  that  this 
definition  is  the  correct  one.  It  is  impossible,  then,  to  avoid 
the  conviction  that  in  the  year  1861.  there  was  really  no  loyalty 
in  the  State  of  Kentucky.  A  good  deal  was  subsequently  con 
tracted  for,  and  a  superior  article  was  furnished  the  Govern-, 
inent  a  few  months  later. 

Had  their  been  during  the  winter  and  spring  of  1861,  a  reso 
lute  and  definite  purpose  upon  the  part  of  the  Southern  men 
of  Kentucky,  to  take  the  State  out  of  the  Union;  had  those  men 
adopted,  organized  and  determined  action,  at  any  time  previous 
ly  to  the  adjournment  of  the  Legislature,  on  the  24th  of  April, 


44  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

the  Union  party  of  Kentucky  would  have  proven  no  material 
obstacle. 

The  difficulty  which  was  felt  to  be  insuperable  by  all  who  ap 
proved  the  secession  of  Kentucky,  was  her  isolated  position. 
Not  only  did  the  long  hesitation  of  Virginia  and  Tennessee  ef 
fectually  abate  the  ardor  and  resolution  of  the  Kentuckians  who 
desired  to  unite  their  State  to  the  Southern  Confederacy,  but 
while  it  lasted  it  was  an  insurmountable,  physical  barrier  in  the 
way  of  such  an  undertaking.  With  those  States  antagonistic  to 
the  Southern  movement,  it  would  have  been  madness  for  Ken 
tucky  to  have  attempted  to  join  it.  When  at  length,  Virginia 
and  Tennessee  passed  their  ordinances  of  secession,  Kentucky 
had  become  infatuated  with  the  policy  of  "  neutrality."  With  the 
leaders  of  the  Union  party,  it  had  already  been  determined  upon 
as  part  of  their  system  for  the  "  education  "  of  the  people. 
The  Secessionists,  who  were  without  organization  and  leaders, 
regarded  it  as  something  infinitely  better  than  unconditional 
obedience  to  the  orders  and  coercive  policy  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  ;  and  the  large  class  of  the  timid  and  irresolute  of 
men,  who  are  by  nature  "  neutral "  in  times  of  trouble  and  dan 
ger,  accepted  it  joyfully,  as  such  men  always  accept  a  compro 
mise  which  promises  to  relieve  them  of  immediate  responsibility 
and  the  necessity  of  hazardous  decision.  Disconnected  from  the 
views  and  intentions  of  those  who  consented  to  it,  this  "  neu 
trality  "  will  scarcely  admit  of  serious  discussion.  Such  a  po 
sition  is  certainly  little  else  than  rebellion,  and  the  principle  or 
conditions  which  will  justify  it,  will  also  justify  secession.  If  a 
State  has  the  legal  and  constitutional  right  to  oppose  the  action, 
and  to  refuse  compliance  with  the  requisitions  of  the  Federal 
Government,  to  disobey  the  laws  of  Congress,  and  set  at  defi 
ance  the  proclamations  of  the  Executive,  to  decide  for  herself 
her  proper  policy  in  periods  of  war  and  insurrection,  and  levy 
armed  forces  to  prevent  the  occupation  of  her  territory  by  the 
forces  of  the  United  States,  then  she  can  quit  the  Union  when 
she  pleases,  and  is  competent  to  contract  any  alliance  which 


ATTITUDE    OF   KENTUCKY. 


45 


accords  with  her  wishes.  If,  however,  it  be  a  revolutionary 
right  which  she  may  justly  exercise  in  a  certain  condition  of 
affairs,  then  the  same  condition  of  affairs  will  justify  any  other 
phase  or  manner  of  revolution. 

The  practical  effects  of  such  a  position,  had  it  been  stubborn 
ly  maintained,  would  have   been  to  involve  Kentucky  in  more 
danger  than  she  would  have  incurred  by  secession  and  admis 
sion  into  the  Confederacy.     A  declaration  of  neutrality  in  such 
a  contest  was  almost  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war  against 
both  sides  ;  at  any  rate  it  was  a  proclamation  of  opposition  to 
the  Government,  while  it  discarded  the  friendship  of  the  South, 
and  seemed  at  once  to  invite  every  assailant.     The  Government 
of  the  United  States,  which  was  arming  to  coerce  seceded  States, 
would  certainly  not  permit  its  designs  to  be  frustrated  by  this 
attitude  of  Kentucky,  and  it  was   not  likely  that  the   States, 
about  to   be   attacked,  would  respect   a  neutrality,  which  they 
very  well  knew  would  be  no  hindrance  to  their  adversary.     But 
few  men  reason  clearly  in  periods  of  great  excitement,  or,  in 
situations  of  peril,  look  steadfastly  and  understandingly  at  the 
dangers  which  surround  them.     Nor,  it  may  be  added,  do  the 
few  who  possess  the  presence  of  mind  to  study  and  the  faculty 
of  appreciating  the  signs  of  such  a  political  tempest,  always 
honestly  interpret  them.     As  has  been  said,  a  large  class   ea 
gerly  welcomed  the  decision  that  Kentucky  should  remain  neu- 
tral  in  the  great  struggle  impending,  as  a  relief,  however  tem 
porary,  from  the  harassing  consideration  of  dangers  at  which 
they  shuddered.     Nine  men  out  of  ten,  will  shrink  from  mak 
ing  up  their  minds  upon  a  difficult  question,  and  yet  will  accept, 
with  joy,  a  determination  of  it,  however  paltry  and  inconclu 
sive,  from  any  one  who    has  the  nerve  to  urge  it.     A  great 
many  Union  men,  who  would  have  earnestly  opposed  -a  concur 
rence  of  Kentucky  in  the   action  of  the  seceding  States,  if  for 
no  other  reason  than  that  they  regarded  it  as  "  a  trick  of  the 
Democratic  party,"  and  yet  as  obstinately  opposed  the  policy 
and  action  of  the  Government,  thought  they  perceived  in  "  neu- 


46  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

tralijy "  a  solution  of  all  the  difficulties  which  embarrassed 
them.  A  few  of  the  more  sagacious  and  resolute  of  the  leaders 
of  the  Union  party,  who  were  perhaps  not  incommoded  with  a 
devotion  to  their  State,  their  section,  or  to  the  "  flag,"  but  who 
realized  that  they  could  get  into  power  only  by  crushing  the 
Democratic  party,  and  knew  that  in  the  event  of  Kentucky's 
going  South,  the  Democratic  party  would  dominate  in  the  State, 
these  men  saw  in  this  policy  of  neutrality  the  means  of  holding 
Kentucky  quiet,  until  the  Government  could  prepare  and  pour 
into  her  midst  an  overwhelming  force.  They  trusted,  and  as 
the  sequel  showed,  with  reason,  that  they  would  be  able  to  de 
moralize  their  opponents  after  having  once  reduced  them  to  in 
action.  The  Kentuckians  who  wished  that  their  State  should 
become  a  member  of  the  Confederacy,  but  who  saw  no  imme 
diate  hope  of  it,  consented  to  neutrality  as  the  best  arrangement 
that  they  could  make  under  the  circumstances.  They  knew 
that  if  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky  were  respected — a  vital  por 
tion  of  the  Confederacy,  a  border  of  four  or  five  hundred  miles 
would  be  safe  from  attack  and  invasion — that  the  forces  of  the 
Confederacy  could  be  concentrated  for  the  defense  of  the  other 
and  threatened  lines,  and  that  individual  Kentuckians  could 
flock  to  the  Southern  army.  They  believed  that  in  sucli  a  con 
dition  of  aifairs,  more  men  would  leave  Kentucky  to  take  part 
with  the  South  than  to  enlist  in  the  service  of  the  Govern 
ment. 

Some  time  in  the  early  part  of  the  summer,  General  S.  B. 
Buckner,  commanding  the  Kentucky  State-guard,  had  an  inter 
view  with  General  Geo.  B.  McClellan,  who  commanded  a  de 
partment  embracing  territory  contiguous  to  Kentucky — if,  in 
deed,  Kentucky  was  not  included  by  the  commission  given  him 
in  his  department.  General  Buckner  obtained,  as  he  supposed, 
a  guarantee  that  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky  would  be  observed 
by  the  military  authorities  of  the  United  States.  He  communi 
cated  the  result  of  this  interview  to  Governor  Magoffin,  and, 
immediately,  it  became  a  matter  of  official  as  well  as  popular  be- 


CAMP   DICK   ROBINSON.  47 

lief  that  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky   was   safe  for  all  time   to 
come. 

The  dream,  however,  was  a  short  one,  and  very  soon  after 
ward  the  Federal  Government  commenced  to  recruit  in  Ken 
tucky,  to  establish  camps  and  organize  armed  forces  in  the 
State. 

"Camp  Dick  Kobinson,"  some  twenty-six  miles  from  Lex 
ington,  was  the  largest,  first  formed,  and  most  noted  of  these 
establishments.  For  many  weeks  the  Kontuckians  were  in  a 
high  state  of  excitement  about  "  Camp  Dick,"  as  it  was  called. 
They  used  the  name  as  if  it  were  synonymous  with  the  Federal 
army,  and  spoke  of  the  rumors  that  "Camp  Dick"  was  to  be 
moved  from  point  to  point,  as  glibly  as  if  the  ground  it  occupied 
liad  possessed  the  properties  of  the  flying  carpet  of  the  fairy 
tale. 

The  Legislature,  notwithstanding  its  high-sounding  resolutions 
about  neutrality,  stood  this  very  quietly,  although  many  citizens 
(Union  men)  endeavored  to  have  these  camps  broken  up  and 
the  troops  removed.  Others,  again,  professed  to  desire  that  the 
Federal  troops  should  be  removed,  but  clandestinely  advised 
President  Lincoln  to  rather  increase  than  withdraw  the  forces, 
and  offered  their  services  to  introduce  into  Kentucky  guns  for 
the  armament  of  the  loyal  Home-guards.  These  men  were  of 
the  class  of  "Educators."  But  the  game  required  two  to  play 
it.  On  the  4th  of  September,  in  anticipation  of  a  Federal 
movement  upon  that  point,  General  Polk,  of  the  Confederate 
army,  occupied  Columbus,  in  Kentucky. 

In  the  midst  of  the  excitement  created  by  the  information  of 
the  occupation  of  Columbus,  Governor  Magoffin  sent  in  the  fol 
lowing  message : 

"!Ex.  DEP'T,  FRANKFORT,  Sept.  9,  1801. 
"Gentlemen  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives: 

"I  have  received  the  following  dispatches  by  telegraph  from 
General  Leonidas  Polk,  which  I  deem  proper' to  lay  before  you. 

"B.  MAGOFFIN." 


48  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

[If  any  answer  were  needed  to  the  outcries  of  those  who  so 
strongly  condemned  his  action,  General  Polk  certainly  furnished 
it.  His  first  dispatch  was  a  simple  intimation  to  Governor 
Magoffin  of  his  presence  upon  the  soil  of  Kentucky,  and  of  the 
authority  by  which  he  remained.] 

"  COLUMBUS,  KENTUCKY,  Sept.  9,  18(31. 
"Governor  B.  Magoffin: 

A  military  necessity  having  required  me  to  occupy  this  town, 
I  have  taken  possession  of  it  by  the  forces  under  my  command. 
The  circumstances  leading  to  this  act  we  reported  promptly  to 
the  President  of  the  Confederate  States.  His  reply  was,  the 
necessity  justified  the  action.  A  copy  of  my  proclamation  I 
have  the  honor  to  transmit  you  by  mail. . 

"Respectfully, 
"LEONIDAS  POLK,  Major- General  Commanding" 

In  a  letter  of  the  same  date,  inclosing  his  proclamation,  Gen 
eral  Polk  said,  after  explaining  the  cause  of  his  delay  in  writing  : 

"It  will  be  sufficient  to  inform  you,  which  my  short  address 
here  will  do,  that  I  had  information,  on  which  I  could  rely,  that 
the  Federal  forces  intended,  and  were  preparing,  to  seize  Co 
lumbus.  I  need  not  describe  the  danger  resulting  to  West  Ten 
nessee  from  such  success,  nor  say  that  I  could  not  permit  the 
loss  of  so  important  a  position,  while  holding  the  command  in 
trusted  to  me  by  my  government.  In  evidence  of  the  informa 
tion  I  possessed,  I  will  state  that  as  the  Confederate  forces  occu 
pied  this  place,  the  Federal  troops  were  formed,  in  formidable 
numbers,  in  position  upon  the  opposite  bank,  with  their  cannon 
turned  upon  Columbus.  The  citizens  of  the  town  had  fled  with 
terror,  and  not  a  word  of  assurance  of  safety  or  protection  had 
been  addressed  to  them." 

General  Polk  concluded  with  this  language : 

"I  am  prepared  to  say  that  I  will  agree  to  withdraw  the  Con 
federate  troops  from  Kentucky,  provided  that  she  will  agree 


OCCUPATION   OF   COLUMBUS.  49 

that  the  troops  of  the  Federal  Government  be  withdrawn  simul 
taneously  ;  with  a  guarantee,  which  I  will  give  reciprocally  for 
the  Confederate  Government,  that  the  Federals  shall  not  be  al 
lowed  to  enter,  or  occupy  any  point  of  Kentucky  in  the  future. 
"I  have  the  honor  to  be 

"Your  obedient  servant,  respectfully, 

"LEONID  AS  POLK,  Major -Gen.  Com. 

General  Folk's  proclamation  was  as  follows : 

"  COLUMBUS,  Sept.  14,  1861. 

''The  Federal  Government  having  in  defiance  of  the  wishes 
of  the  people  of  Kentucky,  disregarded  their  neutrality,  by  es 
tablishing  camps  and  depots  of  arms,  and  by  organizing  military 
companies  within  their  territory,  and  by  constructing  a  military 
work,  on  the  Missouri  shore,  immediately  opposite,  and  com 
manding  Columbus,  evidently  intended  to  cover  the  landing  of 
troops  for  the  seizure  of  the  town,  it  has  become  a  military 
necessity,  worth  the  defense  of  the  territory  of  the  Confederate 
States,  that  the  Confederate  forces  occupy  Columbus  in  advance. 
The  Major-General  commanding  has,  therefore,  not  felt  himself 
at  liberty  to  risk  the  loss  of  so  important  a  position,  but  has 
decided  to  occupy  it.  In  pursuance  of  this  decision,  he  has 
thrown  a  sufficient  force  into  the  town  and  ordered  fortifying  it. 
It  is  gratifying  to  know  that  the  presence  of  his  troops  is  ac- 
ceptible  to  the  people  of  Columbus,  and  on  this  occasion  they 
assure  them  that  every  precaution  will  be  taken  to  insure  their 
quiet,  the  protection  of  their  property,  with  their  personal  and 
corporate  rghts.  LEONIDAS  POLK." 

Dispatches,  concerning  the  peculiar  manner  in  which  Ken 
tucky  observed  her  neutrality  and  permitted  it  to  be  observed 
by  her  Federal  friends,  began  to  pour  in  on  the  Governor  about 
this  time.  He  had  already  received,  on  the  7th,  a  dispatch  from 
Lieutenant  Governor  Reynolds,  of  Missouri,  on  the  subject. 
Governor  Reynolds  stated  that,  "  The  Mississippi  river  below 
4 


50  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

the  mouth  of  the  Ohio,  is  the  property  of  Kentucky  and  Mis 
souri  conjointly."  He  then  alluded  to  the  "presence  of  United 
States  gunboats  in  the  river  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  to  protect 
the  forces  engaged  in  fortifying  the  Missouri  shore  immediately 
opposite."  "This,"  he  went  on  to  say,  "appears  to  me  to  be 
a  clear  violation  of  the  neutrality  Kentucky  proposes  to  observe 
in  the  present  war."  And  then  again  on  the  14th  came  a  dispatch 
from  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  as  follows : 

"  To  his  Excellency  B.  Magoffin : 

SIR  :  The  safety  of  Tennessee  requiring,  I  occupy  the  moun 
tain  passes  at  Cumberland,  and  the  three  long  mountains  in 
Kentucky.  For  weeks  I  have  known  that  the  Federal  com 
mander  at  Hoskin's  Cross  Roads  was  threatening  the  invasion 
of  East  Tennessee,  and  ruthlessly  urging  our  own  people  to  de 
stroy  their  own  road  bridges.  I  postponed  this  precaution  until 
the  despotic  Government  at  Washington,  refusing  to  recognize 
the  neutrality  of  Kentucky,  has  established  formidable  camps  in 
the  center  and  other  parts  of  the  State,  with  the  view  first  to 
subjugate  our  gallant  sister,  then  ourselves.  Tennessee  feels, 
and  has  ever  felt,  toward  Kentucky  as  a  twin  sister;  their  people, 
are  as  our  people  in  kindred,  sympathy,  valor,  and  patriotism  ;  we 
have  felt  and  still  feel  a  religious  respect  for  Kentucky's  neu 
trality  ;  we  will  respect  it  as  along  as  our  safety  will  permit. 
If  the  Federal  forces  will  now  withdraw  from  their  menacing 
positions,  the  forces  under  my  command  shall  be  immediately 
withdrawn.  Very  respectfully, 

F.  K.  ZOLLTCOFFER, 

Brigadier  General  Commanding" 

It  would  seem  that  each  one  of  these  communications  put  the 
case  very  clearly,  and  that,  Kentucky  having  permitted  her  neu 
trality  to  be  violated  by  the  one  side,  after  her  emphatic  and 
definite  declaration  that  it  was  meant  to  be  good  against  both, 
could  consistently  take  no  action,  unless  it  should  be  such  as  Gen- 


A   CHANGE    OF   VIEWS.  51 

crals  Polk  and  Zollicoffer  suggested,  viz  :  to  provide  for  a  simul 
taneous  withdrawal  of  both  Federal  and  Confederate  forces. 
Certainly  Kentucky  meant  that  neither  of  the  combatants 
should  occupy  her  soil — as  has  been  shown,  her  declarations 
upon  that  head  were  clear  and  vigorous.  If  she  intended  that 
troops  of  the  United  States  should  come  into  her  territory,  for 
any  purpose  whatever,  while  the  Confederate  forces  should  be 
excluded,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  she  selected  in  "  neu 
trality"  a  word,  which  very  inaccurately  and  lamely  expressed 
her  meaning.  The  people  of  Kentucky  had  long  since — two 
months  at  least,  a  long  time  in  such  a  period,  before  this  corres 
pondence  between  their  Governor  and  the  Confederate  Gene 
rals — ceased  to  do  anything  but  blindly  look  to  certain  leaders, 
and  blindly  follow  their  dictation.  The  Southern  men  of  the 
State,  and  their  peculiar  leaders,  were  sullen  and  inert ;  the 
mass  of  the  people  were  bewildered,  utterly  incompetent  to  ar 
rive  at  a  decision,  and  were  implicitly  led  by  the  Legislature  to 
which  all  the  politicians,  who  aspired  to  influence,  now  resorted. 
In  view  of  the  history  of  this  neutrality,  of  the  professions  made, 
only-a  few  weeks  previously,  by  the  same  men  who  returned  an 
answer  from  the  Capital  of  Kentucky  to  the  propositions  of  the 
Confederate  authorities  that  Kentucky  should  act  fairly,  and  not 
declare  one  policy  and  clandestinely  pursue  another — in  view 
of  the  facts  which  are  fastened  in  the  record — what  sort  of  men 
does  that  answer  prove  them  to  have  been  ?  This  was  the 
answer: 

Resolved,  By  the  General  Assembly  of  the  Commonwealth  of 
Kentucky,  that  his  Excellency,  Governor  Magoffin,  be,  and  he  is 
hereby  instructed  to  inform  those  concerned,  that  Kentucky  ex 
pects  the  Confederate  of  Tennessee  troops  to  be  withdrawn  from 
her  soil  unconditionally." 

This,  after  a  pledge  to  their  own  people,  and  a  proclamation 
to  both  sections,  of  neutrality  !  After  Federal  troops,  and 
Federal  encampments  had  been  for  weeks  upon  the  soil  of 


52  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Kentucky,  and  in  response  to  action  (which  their  own  had  in 
vited)  from  men  (to  wfyom  they  had  promised  assistance  in  just 
such  a  contingency  as  was  then  upon  them),  when  they  resolved 
the  previous  January,  that  Governor  Magoffin  should  inform  the 
Governors  of  New  York,  Maine  and  Massachusetts,  that  when 
Northern  troops  should  march  to  invade  the  South,  "the  people 
of  Kentucky,  uniting  with  their  brethren  of  the  South,  will  as 
one  man  resist  such  invasion  of  the  soil  of  the  South,  at  all 
hazards,  and  to  the  last  extremity!"  The  Committee  on  Federal 
Relations,  to  which  was  referred  the  communications  addressed 
to  Governor  Magoffin,  exerted  itself  to  outdo  the  resolutions 
given  above,  and  reported  resolutions  of  which  the  sub 
stance  was,  that  as  Kentucky  had  been  invaded  by  the 
Confederate  forces,  and  the  commanders  of  said  forces  had 
"insolently  prescribed  the  conditions  upon  which  they  will 
withdraw  ; "  u  that  the  invaders  must  be  expelled,  inasmuch  as 
there  are  now  in  Kentucky  Federal  troops  assembled  for  the  pur 
pose  of  preserving  the  tranquillity  of  the  State,  and  of  defending 
and  preserving  the  people  of  Kentucky  in  the  peaceful  enjoyment 
of  their  lives  and  properly."  A  candid  confession,  truly,  and 
one  which  it  required  nerve  to  make !  Brave,  honorable,  con 
sistent  men — fit  to  be  the  guardians  of  a  people's  honor !  De 
clare  neutrality,  and  warn  both  combatants  off  the  soil  of  their 
State  !  proclaim  that  Kentucky  can  and  will  take  care  of  herself, 
and  then  coolly  resolve,  when  the  issue  is  made,  "  that  as  there 
are  now  Federal  troops  in  Kentucky,  for  the  purpose,"  etc.,  that 
the  mask  shall  be  thrown  off,  and  deception  no  longer  practiced. 
But  the  cup  of  shame  was  not  yet  full;  this  unblushing  Legis 
lature  passed  yet  other  resolutions,  to  publish  to  the  world  the 
duplicity  and  dissimulation  which  had  characterized  their  entire, 
conduct.  After  going  on  to  set  forth  the  why  and  wherefore 
Kentucky  had  assumed  neutrality,  it  was  resolved,  u  that  when 
the  General  Government  occupies  our  soil  for  its  defense,  in 
pursuance  of  a  constitutional  right,  it  neither  compromises  our 
assumed  neutrality,  nor  gives  the  right  to  the  Confederate  forces 


MILITARY   BOARD   ESTABLISHED.  53 

to  invade  our  State  on  the  assumption  that  our  neutrality  has 
been  violated,  especially  when  they  first  set  foot  upon  our  soil  upon 
the  plea  of  military  necessity." 

"That  when  the  General  Government  occupies  our  soil  for  its 
defense,  it  neither  compromises  our  assumed  neutrality,"  etc. 
Well !  it  is  useless  to  attempt  comment  on  this — "it  is  impossi 
ble  to  do  the  subject  justice."  We  rebels  never  contended  that 
the  Government  was  bound  to  respect  Kentucky's  neutrality,  if 
it  had  the  right  to  coerce  the  seceded  States.  We  denied  the 
constitutional  right  and  power  of  coercion — but  if  the  Govern 
ment  had  that  power,  we  conceded  that  there  was  the  same  right 
and  reason  to  employ  it  against  Kentucky's  neutrality  as  against 
South  Carolina's  secession.  But  for  the  neutrality-mongers  to 
say  this — were  they  generously  striving  to  fool  themselves  also  ? 
And,  then,  in  hearing,  as  they  had  been  for  weeks,  of  the  morn 
ing  and  evening  guns  of  "  Camp  Dick  Robinson,"  to  speak  of 
the  Confederates  having  "first  set  foot  upon  our  soil."  Is  it  an 
unfair  construction  of  such  conduct,  to  suppose  that  the  men 
guilty  of  it  were,  in  part,  time-servers,  who  had  striven  all  the 
while  to  get  upon  the  strong  and  safe  side,  and  believed  that 
they  had  succeeded,  and,  in  part,  politicians  unscrupulous,  if 
in  plan  consistent,  who  had  deliberately  deceived  the  people  of 
Kentucky,  and  lulled  them  into  a  condition  in  which  they  would 
receive  the  handcuffs,  to  be  slipped  upon  them,  without  resist 
ance  ? 

But  now  that  the  men  of  purpose  saw  that  it  was  no  longer 
necessary  to  conceal  it,  and  the  wavering  had  become  satisfied 
which  side  it  was  safe  and  politic  to  adopt,  there  was  no  more 
dallying* 

The  Legislature  prepared  to  finally  crush  the  State-guard  and 
"  an  act  tc  enlarge  the  powers  of  the  Military  Board  of  this 
State,"  was  passed.  It  was  enacted,  "  That  the  Military  Board 
created  at  the  last  session  of  the  Legislature,  are  hereby  author 
ized  to  order  into  the  custody  of  said  Board  any  State  arms 
which  may  have  been  given  out  under  the  act  creating  said 


54  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Board,  or  other  law  of  the  State,  whenever  said  Board  shall 
deem  it  expedient  to  do  so  ;  said  Board  shall  have  like  power 
over  the  accouterments,  camp  equipage,  equipments,  and  ammu 
nition  of  the  State."  Willful  failure  or  refusal  "  to  return  any 
of  said  property  for  forty-eight  hours  after  the  receipt  of  the 
order  of  the  Board  to  that  effect,"  was  made  a  high  misde 
meanor,  and  punishable  by  fine  of  not  less  than  one  nor  more 
than  five  thousand  dollars,  and  imprisonment  until  the  fine  was 
paid,  and  the  arms  or  other  property  restored.  The  removal, 
concealment,  or  disposal  of  any  of  the  property,  mentioned  in 
the  first  section  of  the  act,  was  made  felony  and  punishable  by 
not  less  than  one  nor  .more  than  two  years  in  the  penitentiary. 
A  further  resolution  in  the  spirit  of  the  same  kind  o.f  neutrality 
was  approved  September  23d,  "  That  the  Military  Board  be, 
and  they  are  hereby  authorized  to  place  any  portion  of  the 
arms,  accouterments,  equipments,  camp  equipage,  baggage 
trains,  ammunition,  and  military  stores  of  the  State,  not  in  use, 
under  the  control  of  the  commander  of  the  Federal  forces  in 
Kentucky,"  etc. 

Having  once  gotten  on  the  right  track  (as  they  were  com 
pelled  to  believe  it,  inasmuch  as  it  was  clearly  the  one  which 
conducted  to  immediate  profit  and  safety)  these  gentlemen 
thought  they  could  not  go  too  fast.  "  The  people  were  educated 
to  loyalty,"  now,  and  it  was  high  time  to  commence  the  punish 
ment  of  those  who  had  shown  an  inaptness  to  receive  the  lessons, 
or  a  distaste  for  the  method  of  instruction.  The  dignity  of 
Kentucky  had  been  sacrificed  by  the  avarice  and  cowardice  of 
her  own  sons,  who  sat  in  her  councils — this  is  the  way  in  which 
these  legislative-panders  sought  to  assert  it  again.  They  passed 
an  act  entitled  "an  act  to  prohibit  and  prevent  rebellion  by 
citizens  of  Kentucky  and  others  in  this  State."  By  this  act  it 
was  provided  that  any  citizen  of  this  State,  who  as  a  soldier  or 
officer  of  the  Confederate  army,  should,  as  part  of  an  armed 
force,  enter  the  State  to  make  war  upon  it,  should  be  punished 
by  confinement  in  the  penitentiary.  "  Making  war  upon  the 


LEGISLATION   AGAINST   THE   SOUTH.  55 

State,"  doubtless  meant  any  attack  made  upon  the  "  Federal 
soldiers  assembled"  (in  the  State)  "for  the  purpose  of  preserv 
ing  the  tranquillity  of  the  State."  And  it  was  farther  enacted 
that,  "  any  person  who  shall,  within  the  limits  of  this  State, 
persuade  or  induce  any  person  to  enlist  or  take  service  in  the 
army  of  the  so-called  Confederate  States,  and  the  person  so 
persuaded  or  induced  does  enlist  or  take  service  in  the  same, 
shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  high  misdemeanor;  and  upon  con 
viction,  shall  be  fined  in  a  sum  not  exceeding  one  thousand 
dollars,  and  imprisonment  not  exceeding  six  months."  Whether, 
in  passing  this  act,  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky  was  treating  a 
question  involving  belligerent  rights,  is  a  matter  for  lawyers  to 
pass  upon ;  but  that  it  was  disgracing  the  State  is  patent.  Such 
action  might  have  been  proper  and  competent — against  both 
belligerents — had  Kentucky  adopted  it  as  a  measure  necessary 
to  the  maintenance  of  her  neutrality.  It  would  have  been,  at 
least,  dignified,  had  she  earnestly  and  unequivocally  declared, 
from  the  beginning,  an  adherence  to  the  Government,  and  a 
resolution  to  support  its  policy. 

But  under  all  the  circumstances,  and  after  the  repeated  dec 
larations  of  its  authors  that,  to  resist  coercion,  the  very  meas 
ures  ought  to  be  taken  (for  the  punishment  of  which  this  act 
was  now  passed),  it  is  difficult  to  stigmatize,  with  appropriate 
emphasis,  such  conduct. 

The  lapse  of  time  has  mitigated  the  hostility  of  the  actual 
combatants,  but  has  only  intensified  the  contempt,  and  deep 
ened  the  distrust  which  the  people  of  Kentucky  feel  for  these 
men. 

The  sincere  Union  men  of  Kentucky,  and  the  men  who  sin 
cerely  sympathized  with  the  Southern  movement  and  the  South 
ern  people,  can  mutually  respect  each  other.  The  Kentucky 
soldiers,  who  fought  against  each  other  in  the  contending  armies, 
can  appreciate  and  admire  the  devotion  to  the  chosen  cause,  the 
gallantry  which  each  displayed.  But  for  the  men  who  showed 
so  plainly  by  that  they  were  attached  to  no  cause  and  no  princi- 


56  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

pie,  but  were  ready  to  sell  and  barter  each  and  all,  who  mani 
fested  all  through  the  struggle,  that  they  were  moved  by 
the  most  groveling  ambition,  influenced  by  the  meanest  thirst 
for  self-aggrandisement — for  them  there  is  no  forgiveness. 

All  Kentucky  has  suffered  from  their  duplicity,  cowardice  and 
heartless  avarice  of  gold  and  power — now  they  have  neither,  and 
none  regret  it. 

But,  happily,  the  past  political  differences,  and  the  animosity 
engendered  by  the  long,  bitter  strife,  are  fast  being  forgotten 
by  the  Kentuckians  who  confronted  each  other  under  hostile 
banners.  The  sons  of  the  same  Mother  Commonwealth  (who 
in  all  sincerity  gave  their  blood  for  her  interests,  safety  and 
honor,  as  each  believed  they  could  be  best  conserved),  are  no 
longer  antagonists — and,  at  no  distant  day,  may  find  the  respect 
they  have  felt  for  each  other  as  foes,  replaced  by  the  cordial 
friendship  and  alliance,  which  the  same  blood  and  the  same 
views  should  induce.  May  Kentucky  have  learned  from  her 
lesson  in  the  past  few  years,  arid  may  she  remember,  that  safety 
is  never  best  consulted  by  giving  heed  to  the  suggestions  of 
timidity,  that  the  manliest  and  most  consistent  course,  is  also  the 
most  truly  expedient,  and  that  the  interest  and  honor  of  a  people 
go  hand-in-hand,  and  are  inseparable. 


JOHNSON   ASSUMES   COMMAND.  57 


CHAPTER    IV. 

WHEN  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  came  to  the  command 
of  the  great  Western  Department,  he  found  but  a  few  thousand 
troops  at  his  disposal  to  defend  a  territory  of  immense  extent, 
and  vulnerable  at  a  hundred  points. 

At  that  time  the  Trans-Mississippi  Confederate  States  were 
included  in  the  same  Department  with  the  States  of  Tennessee, 
Alabama,  and  Mississippi.  Missouri  on  the  Western  side  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  Kentucky  on  the  Eastern — respectively  the 
Northernmost  of  the  Western  and  Middle  Slaveholding  States — 
were  debateable  ground,  and  were  already  occupied,  the  former 
by  both,  the  latter  by  one  of  the  contending  forces. 

General  Johnston  assumed  command  about  the  latter  part  of 
August,  or  first  of  September,  1861,  and  at  once  commenced 
his  vast  labor  with  a  vigor  and  wisdom  which  were  neither  ap 
preciated  tfy  his  countrymen,  nor  were  fruitful  of  happy  results 
until  after  his  glorious  death.  Missouri  had  become  the  theater 
of  military  operations  some  months  previously.  The  people 
had  partially  responded  to  the  proclamation  of  Governor  Jack 
son,  issued  June  12,  1861,  which  called  on  them  to  resist  the 
military  authorities  appointed  in  the  State  by  President  Lincoln. 

Smarting  under  a  sense  of  the  aggressions  and  the  insolence 
of  these  officials,  believing  that  they  were  the  victims  of  intoler 
able  injustice  and  flagrant  faithlessness,  the  Missouri  rebels 
were  eager  to  take  the  field,  and  irregular  organizations,  par- 
tizan,  and  "State-guard"  were  formed  in  various  sections  of 
the  State.  Several  skirmishes,  the  most  important  of  which 
were  "Booneville"  and  "Carthage,"  occurred  between  these  or 
ganizations  and  the  Federal  troops,  before  any  troops  regularly 
in  the  Confederate  service  were  sent  into  the  State.  After 


58  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

•winning  the  battle  of  "  Carthage,"  and  forcing  Siegel  to  retreat 
until  he  affected  a  junction  with  Lyon,  General  Price  was  com 
pelled,  in  his  turn,  to  retreat  before  the  then  concentrated 
Federal  army  of  Missouri. 

On  the  7th  of  August,  Generals  Price  and  McCullough,  com 
manding  respectively  such  portions  of  the  Missouri  State-guard 
as  could  be  concentrated  at  that  time,  and  the  Confederate 
troops  destined  for  service  in  the  extreme  West,  making  an  ag 
gregate,  between  them,  of  some  six  thousand  effective  men,  es 
tablished  themselves  in  the  vicinity  of  Springfield,  a  small  town 
in  Southwestern  Missouri,  confronting  the  Federal  army  which 
had  pushed  on  to  that  point  in  pursuit  of  Price.  On  the  9th  of 
August,  the  battle,  called  by  the  one  side  "  Oak  Hill,"  and  by 
the  other  "Wilson's  Creek,"  was  fought.  The  Federal  army 
made  the  attack,  was  repulsed  and  routed  (with  the  exception 
of  that  portion  of  it  commanded  by  Sturges,  or  protected  by 
him  in  the  retreat),  and  its  commander,  General  Lyon,  was 
killed.  This  victory  laid  open,  and  placed  completely  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Rebel  commanders,  the  southwestern  and  middle 
portions  of  the  State.  Unhappily  Generals  Price  and  McCul 
lough  differed  totally  in  opinion  regarding  the  proper  policy  to 
be  pursued  after  the  battle,  and  the  result  of  their  disagreement 
was  a  separation  of  their  forces.  Price  pushed  forward  into  the 
interior  of  Missouri,  where  he  believed  that  the  fruits  of  the 
victory  just  gained  were  to  be  gleaned.  McCullough  remained 
upon  the  Arkansas  border.  The  campaign  which  General  Price 
then  made  is  well  known.  He  captured  Lexington,  taking  a 
large  number  of  prisoners,  and,  what  was  much  more  valuable 
to  him,  a  considerable  quantity  of  military  stores,  many  stand 
of  small  arms,  and  some  artillery.  He  placed  himself  in  a 
position  to  enable  the  scattered  detachments  of  his  State-guard 
to  join  him,  and,  encouraging  the  people,  friendly  to  the  South, 
by  his  bold  advance  into  the  heart  of  the  State  immediately 
after  they  had  received  the  news  of  the  victory  he  had  helped 
to  win,  he  obtained  recruits  and  abundant  supplies.  He  was 


GENERALS    PRICE,    MCQULLOUGII    AND    HARDEE.  59 

subsequently  compelled  to  retreat  before  a  vastly  superior  force, 
but  not  until,  taking  into  consideration  the  means  at  his  dis 
posal,  he  had  accomplished  wonders.  Not  only  were  his  men 
perfectly  raw,  upon  their  first  campaign,  but  no  attempt  was 
made  to  train  or  form  them.  Method,  administration,  dis 
cipline,  drill,  were  utterly  unknown  in  his  camps;  the  officers 
knew  only  how  to  set  a  gallant  example  to  their  men ;  the  men 
were  rendered  almost  invincible  by  their  native  courage  and  the 
devotion  they  felt  to  their  chief  and  their  cause.  Upon  this 
campaign  General  Price  exhibited,  perhaps,  more  strikingly 
than  ever  afterward,  his  two  great  qualities  as  a  commander — 
the  faculty  of  acquiring  the  affection  and  implicit  confidence  of 
his  men,  and  his  own  gallant  and  perfect  reliance  upon  them. 
Without  presuming  to  reflect  upon  General  McCullough,  who 
was  a  brave,  honest,  and  zealous  officer,  it  may  be  safely  as 
sumed  that  had  Price,  at  this  period,  been  backed  by  the  force 
which  McCullough  commanded  (much  superior  in  equipment 
and  organization  to  his  own),  he  could  have  effected  results 
which,  in  all  probability,  would  have  stamped  a  very  different 
character  upon  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the  war  in  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  States.  The  consequence  of  another  such  victory 
as  that  of  "  Oak  Hill "  gained  in  the  heart  of  the  State,  as  by 
their  combined  forces  might  very  readily  have  been  done,  at  the 
time  when  Price  was  forced  $o  retreat,  would  have  been  of  in 
calculable  value  to  the  Confederacy.  But  the  fate,  which 
throughout  the  contest,  rendered  Southern  prowess  unavailing, 
had  already  commenced  to  rule.  At  the  date  of  the  battle  of 
"  Oak  Hill,"  General  Hardee  was  advancing  through  South 
eastern  Missouri  with  about  thirty-five  hundred  effective 
men. 

His  base  was  the  little  village  of  Poeahontas,  situated,  nearly 
upon  the  Missouri  and  Arkansas  border,  and  at  the  head  of 
navigation  upon  the  Big  Black  river.  Here  General  Hardee 
had  collected  all  the  Arkansas  troops  which  were  available  for 
service  upon  that  line,  amounting  to  perhaps  six  or  seven 


60  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

thousand  men.  Various  causes  contributed  to  reduce  his  effect 
ive  total  to  about  one  half  of  that  number.  All  of  the  troops 
were  indifferently  armed,  some  were  entirely  unarmed.  The 
sickness  always  incidental  to  a  first  experience  of  camp  life,  in 
the  infantry,  had  prostrated  hundreds.  Change  of  diet  and  of 
habits,  and  the  monotony  of  the  camp  are  sufficient  of  them 
selves,  and  rarely  fail  to  induce  diseases  among  raw  troops,  but 
a  scourge  broke  out  among  the  troops  collected  at  Pocahontas 
which  confounded  all,  at  least  of  the  non-medical  observers. 
This  was  nothing  more  than  measles,  but  in  an  intensely  aggra 
vated  and  very  dangerous  form.  It  was  hard  to  believe  that 
there  was  such  a  proportion  of  adult  men  who  had  escaped  a 
malady  generally  thought  one  of  the  affections  of  childhood.  It 
was  so  virulent,  at  the  time  and  place  of  which  I  write,  and  in 
so  many  instances  fatal,  that  many  confidently  believed  it  to  be 
a  different  disease  from  the  ordinary  measles,  although  the  Sur 
geons  pronounced  it  the  same.  It  was  called  "  black  measles," 
and  was  certainly  a  most  malignant  type  of  the  disease.  I  have 
been  since  informed  that  it  raged  with  equal  fury  and  with  the 
same  characteristics  among  the  volunteers  just  called  into  the 
field  in  many  other  localities.  Its  victims  at  Pocahontas  were 
counted  by  the  scores. 

As  the  Big  Black  river  is  navigable  for  small  craft  at  all 
seasons,  General  Hardee  had  nq  difficulty  in  supplying  the 
troops  stationed  at  Pocahontas,  but  after  leaving  that  point  he 
was  compelled  to  depend  for  supplies  upon  wheel  transportation, 
with  which  he  was  very  indifferently  provided,  and  upon  the 
country,  which  was  sterile  and  sparsely  settled. 

The  only  line  of  advance  from  Pocahontas  which  gave  promise 
of  important  results,  or  which,  indeed,  was  practicable,  was  by 
Greenville,  distant  some  fifty-five  or  sixty  miles  from  Pocahontas, 
and  Frederickton,  to  Ironton,  and  thence  along  the  Iron 
Mountain  Railroad  by  the  most  practicable  roads  to  St.  Louis. 
The  country  between  Pocahontas  and  Ironton  is  rugged  and 
heavily  wooded.  It  is  penetrated  by  few  roads,  and,  in  1861. 


ADVANCE    ON   IRON  TON.  61 

by  no  means  abounded  in  supplies.  General  Hardee  advanced 
as  far  as  Greenville,  and  threatened  Ironton. 

This  latter  place,  the  terminus  of  the  Iron  Mountain  Railroad, 
is  ninety-seven  miles  from  St.  Louis.  It  is  a  place  of  great 
natural  strength,  and  was  already,  at  the  time  that  Hardee  ad 
vanced  toward  it,  partially  fortified.  General  Hardee  expected 
when  he  moved  from  Pocahontas  to  effect  a  junction  with  Gen 
eral  Pillow  at  Frederickton,  a  small  town  to  the  east  of  north 
of  Greenville,  twenty  miles  from  Ironton  and  on  the  line  between 
that  place  and  New  Madrid.  Pillow's  force  was  six  or  eight 
thousand  strong,  and  the  best  armed  and  accoutered  of  all  the 
western  Confederate  commands. 

General  Pillow  could  very  easily  have  reached  Frederickton 
from  New  Madrid,  as  soon  as  Hardee  could  have  gotten  to  the 
former  place  from  Pocahontas,  had  there  been  a  timely  and  def 
inite  understanding  between  them  to  that  effect.  And  the  united 
strength  of  the  two  Generals,  with  the  addition  of  some  two 
thousand  of  the  State-guard,  which  were  at  hand  under  General 
Jeff.  Thompson  (as  well  armed  and  better  organized  than  those 
which  had  already  done  such  excellent  service  under  Price), 
would  have  enabled  them,  most  probably,  to  take  Ironton.  At 
any  rate,  by  flanking  and  threatening  to  get  between  that  place 
and  St.  Louis,  they  would  certainly  have  compelled  its  evacu 
ation,  and  then,  either  defeating  the  garrison  in  the  open  field, 
or  driving  it  back  in  disorder  and  demoralization  upon  St.  Louis, 
they  would  have  become  masters  of  the  situation.  They  would 
have  cut  off  and  destroyed  the  defeated  and  routed  army  of 
Lyon,  then  in  full  flight  for  St.  Louis. 

General  Price  would  have  gladly  embraced  the  opportunity 
of  uniting  with  them — the  whole  State  would  have  risen  to  join 
them.  It  is  almost  certain,  when  the  number  and  condition  of 
the  Federal  troops  then  in  Missouri  are  taken  into  consider 
ation,  and  the  facts  that  but  fe\v  troops  were  available  from  the 
neighboring  States  for  the  defense  of  St.  Louis,  and  that  the 
city  was  not  fortified — it  is  almost  positively  certain,  that  St. 


62  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Louis  would  have  fallen  into  their  hands,  and  that  the  entire 
State  of  Missouri,  at  least  all  South  of  the  Missouri  river, 
would  have  passed  securely  into  their  possession.  At  all  events, 
General  Hardee  was  extremely  desirous  of  attempting  just  such 
a  campaign. 

It  was  deemed,  however,  more  important,  at  that  time,  to 
occupy  and  fortify  Columbus,  in  Kentucky,  situated  on  the 
Mississippi  river,  some  twenty-two  miles  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Ohio.  This  measure,  it  was  thought,  would  protect  the  States 
lying  along  the  Mississippi  from  invasion,  by  enabling  the  Con 
federates  to  hold  the  river,  as  it  was  by  the  river,  only,  that 
those  States  could  be  conveniently  reached.  General  Pillow's 
forces  were  consequently  ordered  to  that  .point.  Finding  that 
his  plans  were  rendered  impossible  of  execution,  on  account  of 
the  want  of  General  Pillow's  co-operation,  Hardee  returned  to 
Pocahontas,  and  was  shortly  afterward  transferred,  with  the 
greater  portion  of  the  troops  under  his  command,  to  the  eastern 
side  of  the  river,  and  was  ordered  to  Bowlinggreen  as  soon  as  that 
place  was  occupied.  Up  to  the  date  of  General  Johnston's  tak 
ing  command,  the  chief  difficulty  in  the  way  of  action  and  decisive 
operations  in  the  West  (independently  of  the  inferior  number  and 
miserable  equipment  of  the  troops)  was  the  lack  of  uniform 
ity  and  concert  in  the  plans  and  operations  of  the  various  com 
manders.  There  was  no  one  in  supreme  military  control  from 
whom  the  subordinate  Generals  could  receive  definite  instruc 
tions,  and  orders  which  they  felt  obliged  to  obey.  While  an 
immense  extent  of  country  was  included  in  one  Department, 
and  theoretically  under  one  chief,  yet  practically  every  officer, 
no  matter  what  was  the  strength  or  nature  of  his  command,  who 
happened  not  to  be  troubled  with  a  senior  immediately  at  his 
elbow,  planned  and  acted  for  himself  and  with  a  perfect  indif 
ference  to  the  operations  of  every  one  else.  The  President  and 
Secretary  of  War  were  too  distant  to  do  any  good,  if  such  in 
terference  ever  does  any  good,  and  a  ruling  mind  was  needed  at 
the  theater  of  events.  It  is  true  that  General  Polk,  whose 


WANT   OF   CO-OPERATION. 

headquarters  were  at  Memphis,  was  senior  to  the  others,  he 
being  a  Major-General,  and  all  the  rest  but  Brigadiers,  and  he 
was  ostensibly  in  chief  command  and  directed  to  a  certain  extent, 
the  movements  of  all. 

But,  whether  it  was  that,  in  a  period  when  nothing  was  fairly 
organized,  his  authority  was  not  clearly  denned,  or  that  he  felt 
some  hesitation  in  vigorously  exercising  it,  it  is  certain  that  each 
of  the  Generals,  who  have  been  here  mentioned,  acted  as  if  he 
knew  himself  to  be,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  in  independent 
command. 

This  evil  was  completely  remedied  by  the  appointment  to  the 
chief  command  in  the  West  of  General  Johnston,  and  the  prompt 
and  decided  measures  which  he  instituted.  General  Johnston's 
whole  life  had  been  one  of  the  most  thorough  military  training, 
and  no  officer  of  his  years  in  the  old  army  of  the  United  States 
had  seen  more  service;  but  more  than  that,  he  was  a  soldier 
by  instinct,  and  Nature  had  intended  him  for  military  com 
mand. 

He  felt  the  full  importance  of  careful  preparation,  and  the 
establishment  by  order  and  system  in  every  branch  and  depart 
ment  of  the  service.  No  martinet  of  the  schools  was  ever  more 
alive  to  the  necessity  of  rigid  method  and  exact  discipline,  for 
he  knew  that  without  their  inauguration  and  strict  observance, 
it  would  be  impossible  to  even  partially  discharge  the  duties  of 
his  vast  commission.  But  he  also  saw  clearly  the  vital  necessity 
of  maintaining  in  tact  the  spirit  which  animated  the  men  of  his 
army,  and  which  had  summoned  them  into  the  field.  He  knew 
that  to  impair  the  ardor  which  had  induced  them  to  become  sol 
diers  was  to  destroy  their  morale  ;  that  to  attempt  to  make  them 
machines  would  result  in  making  them  worthless. 

Although  the  troops  at  his  disposal  seriously  needed  instruc 
tion  and  more  perfect  organization,  he  did  not  waste  precious 
moments  in  seeking  to  impart  them  then.  He  did  not  permit 
the  high  spirit  of  his  gallant  army  to  sink  into  lethargy,  nor  the 
interest  which  th&  people  felt  in  the  conduct  of  military  affairs 


64  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

to  abate  by  remaining  inactive,  and  in  a  position  which  would 
reduce  him,  under  all  circumstances,  to  the  defensive.  A  con 
centration  of  his  forces  any  where  upon  .the  Tennessee  border 
would  not  only  have  placed  him  at  great  strategic  disadvantage, 
but  would  have  been  instantly  accepted  by  the  soldiery  and  the 
people  as  a  signal  of  his  intention  to  await  the  pleasure  and 
movements  of  his  adversary.  Almost  immediately  after  his  ar 
rival  at  Nashville,  the  troops  which  had  collected  at  Camp 
Boone,  the  rendezvous  of  the  Kentucky  regiments,  and  the  Ten 
nessee  troops  which  were  available,  were  pushed  into  Kentucky. 
Kentucky's  neutrality,  for  a  time  recognized  provisionally,  arid 
so  far  as  a  discreet  silence  upon  the  subject  amounted  to  rec 
ognition  by  the  Federal  Government,  had  already  been  exploded. 
The  Government  of  the  United  States,  having  made  the  neces 
sary  preparations,  was  not  disposed  to  abandon  a  line  of  inva 
sion  which  led  right  to  the  vitals  of  the  Confederacy,  and  prom 
ised  a  successful  reduction  of  the  rebellion  in  at  least  three  of 
the  seceded  States,  because  of  the  partially  rebellious  attitude 
assumed  by  Kentucky. 

Camp  Dick  Robinson  had  been  organized  and  put  into  success 
ful  operation  in  July.  General  Anderson  took  command  at 
Louisville  on  the  20th  of  September.  The  other  portions  of  the 
state  were  occupied,  and  definite  lines  were  established  by  the 
opposing  forces,  nearly  about  the  same  time.  General  Johnson 
advanced  as  far  as  Green  river,  making  it  his  line  of  defense  for 
his  center,  while  his  right  rested  on  the  Cumberland  and  the 
rugged  ranges  of  its  hills.  His  line  might  be  said  to  extend 
from  Columbus  through  Hopkinsville,  Munfordsville  and  Somer 
set  to  the  Virginia  border  somewhere  in  the  vicinity  of  Pound 
Gap.  The  Federal  forces  were  pushed  down,  almost  simulta 
neously  with  General  Johnson's  advance  to  Green  river,  to 
Elizabethtown,  and  in  a  few  days  afterward  to  Nolin  creek. 
Their  line  may  be  described  as  running  almost  directly  from 
Paducah  in  the  West,  to  Prestonburg  in  the  East.  This  line 
gave  them  possession  of  the  mouths  of  the  Tennessee,  Cumber- 


KL&IP  SEKD>WIM<& 


Kentucky  and  Tennessee, 

New  Madrid  1861. 

!  ! 


66 

land  and  Green  rivers,  of  the  Blue  grass  region,  and  of  a  greater 
share  of  the  central  and  eartern  portions  of  the  State. 

A  single  glance  at'  the  map  will  show  the  importance  of  Bow- 
linggreen  as  a  strategic  point.  It  will  be  seen  that  it  is  admir 
ably  adapted  for  a  base  of  operations,  offensive  or  defensive, 
in  such  a  campaign  as  General  Johnston  was  about  to  inaugurate 
at  the  time  of  its  occupation.  Situated  upon  the  bank  of  the 
.Barren  river,  it  has  that  river  and  the  Green  river  to  protect  it 
against  attack  from  the  front.  The  Barren  river  empties  into 
the  Green  some  twenty  miles  from  and  northwest  of  Bow- 
linggreen,  and  the  Green  floAving  in  a  northwesterly  direction, 
affords  an  admirable  line  of  defense  for  many  miles  to  the  left. 
There  are  few  fords  and  ferries  of  Green  river  after  its  junction 
with  the  Barren,  and  those  which  it  has  can  be  easily  held.  The 
danger  of  attack  from  the  extreme  left  flank  was  guarded 
against,  but  as  the  result  showed  imperfectly,  by  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson  constructed  respectively  upon  the  Tennessee 
and  Cumberland  rivers.  The  one  just  upon,  the  other  about  ten 
miles  from,  the  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  border.  As  there  was 
little  danger  to  be  apprehended  in  that  direction,  except  from 
forces  brought  up  those  rivers  and  established  in  the  rear  of 
Bowlinggreen,  these  forts,  whose  strength  was  overrated,  were 
thought  to  sufficiently  protect  that  flank.  The  Cumberland 
river  rising,  in  the  mountains  of  Southeastern  Kentucky,  flows 
nearly  due  East  and  West  and  upon  the  same  parallel  of  latitude 
on  which  Bowlinggreen  is  situated,  until  within  sixty  or  seventy 
miles  of  that  place,  when  it  inclines  to  the  Southwest.  The 
Green  river  affords  a  line  extending  eastward,  and  defensible, 
beyond  the  point  where  the  Cumberland  begins  to  bend  to  the 
Southwest.  At  this  point  the  two  rivers  are  about  thirty  miles 
apart.  The  country  throughout  this  section  of  the  State  is 
broken  but  accessible  to  the  march  of  large  bodies  of  troops. 
It  is  apparent,  however,  that  an  army,  with  Bowlinggreen  for 
its  base,  unless  immensely  outnumbered,  would  have  it  in  its 
power  to  take  advantage  of  an  opponent  advancing  upon  Bow- 


BOWLINGGREEN..  57 

linggreen  by  that  route.  Even  if  pressed  in  front,  it  could  hold 
the  river  with  detachments  until  with  the  bulk  of  its  strength  it 
struck  the  enemy  coming  from  the  East. 

The  line  of  march  of  the  latter  would  render  its  communi 
cations,  and  concert  of  action  with  its  friends,  very  difficult,  and 
liuble  at  any  time  to  be  entirely  destroyed;  while  the  General 
upon  the  defensive,  if  vigilant  and' active,  could  know  the  move 
ments  of  both  advancing  columns,  and  attack  either,  with  the 
mass  of  his  army,  when  he  pleased.  Moreover,  in  the  disposi 
tion  of  the  Confederate  forces,  General  Zollicoffer  with  some 
two  or  three  thousand  men,  was  stationed  at  Monticello,  about 
ninety-five  miles  from  Bowlinggreen,  and  a  little  to  the  south  of 
east.  Monticello  is  twenty-one  miles  from  the  Cumberland;  all 
the  neighboring  fords  were  in  Zollicoffer's  possession,  and  his 
scouts  explored  the  country  for  some  distance  beyond  the  river. 
It  is  plain  that  any  hostile  force  moving  upon  Bowlinggreen  by 
this  eastern  flank  would  have  exposed  itself  to  attack  by  Zolli 
coffer. 

An  army  strong  enough  to  hold  all  the  approaches  to  Bowling- 
green  might  rest  in  perfect  security  regarding  its  communica 
tions.  There  is  the  railroad  from  Bowlinggreen  to  Clarksville, 
running  through  many  important  points,  and  affording  communi 
cation  with  every  thing  upon  that  flank.  Excellent  roads  run 
from  Bowlinggreen  to  Monticello  upon  the  south  side  of  the 
Barren,  affording  secure  communication  with  the  right.  Were 
both  of  these  lines  interrupted,  there  would  remain  means  of 
certain  and  speedy  communication  with  both  flanks,,  in  the  rail 
road  and  turnpike  running  from  Bowlinggreen  to  Nashville,  the 
turnpike  from  Glasgow  to  Nashville,  and  the  Cumberland  river 
navigable  to  Fort  Donelson  on  the  one  side  and  Burkesville  on 
the  other. 

The  country  thus  commanded  is  fertile,  and  almost  exhaust- 
less  of  supplies.  The  railroad  from  Bowlinggreen  to  Louisville, 
and  the  two  turnpikes,  respectively,  from  Bowlinggreen  and 
from  Glasgow-  to  Louisville,  and  with  which  good  roads  running 


68 

in  every  direction  are  connected,  afford  admirable  facilities  for 
offensive  operations.  These  two  turnpikes  cross  Green  river 
within  eight  miles  of  each  other,  but  an  army,  once  on  the  north 
side  of  the  river,  and  in  possession  of  both  roads,  could  march 
with  perfect  ease  in  any  direction.  It  will  scarcely  be  denied 
that  if  General  Johnston  had  done  nothing  else  to  establish  Iris 
high  reputation  as  a  strategist,  his  selection  of  this  line  would 
be  enough  to  sustain  it.  In  this  advance  into  Kentucky,  the 
Kentucky  regiments  under  Buckner,  about  thirteen  hundred 
strong  in  all,  took  the  lead ;  the  2d  Kentucky  infantry  under 
Colonel  Roger  W.  Hanson,  to  which  were  temporarily  attached 
Byrne's  battery  of  four  pieces,  and  one  company  of  Tennessee 
cavalry,  was  pushed  on  to  Munfordsville  on  Green  river.  The 
rest  of  the  Kentuckians  and  two  or  three  thousand  Tennessee- 
ans  (and  some  odds  and  ends)  were  stopped  at  Bowlinggreen. 

All  the  cavalry  which  were  available  for  that  purpose,  were 
sent  to  scout  the  country  between  the  Cumberland  and  Green 
rivers,  and  subsequently  Forrest's  regiment  was  stationed  at 
Hopkinsville,  watching  the  country  in  that  vicinity.  Shortly 
after  he  was  sent  there,  Forrest  attacked  and  defeated  at  Sacra 
mento,  a  little  village  not  far  from  Hopkinsville,  a  regiment  of 
Federal  cavalry.  This  was  the  first  cavalry  fight  in  the  west, 
and  the  Federals  were  completely  routed. 

Zollicoffer  was  sent  to  take  position  at  Monticello,  as  has  been 
described  before,  at  or  nearly  about  the  same  time  of  the  ad 
vance  to  Bowlinggreen.  Thus,  it  will  be  seen,  that  all  the  im 
portant  points  of  the  line  were  almost  simultaneously  occupied. 

Columbus  was  occupied  by  General  Polk,  as  has  been  stated, 
on  the  4th,  some  days  earlier. 

It  was  generally  believed  that  General  Buckner,  who,  as  has 
been  already  stated,  led  the  van,  would  have  had  no  difficulty 
in  capturing  Louisville  had  he  pressed  on.  Very  little  doubt 
was  entertained,  then,  of  the  adequacy  of  his  command,  small 
as  it  was,  to  have  taken  the  place,  and,  I  presume,  no  one  doubts 
it  now.  An  impression  prevailed  that  General  Buckner  was 


ADVANCE   ON    LOUISVILLE.  69 

strongly  in  favor  of  continuing  his  advance  to  Louisville,  and 
that  he  urgently  solicited  permission  to  do  so.  But  whether  it 
was  suggested  or  not,  it  found  no  favor  with  General  Johnston. 
A  plan°  to  take  and  hold  Louisville,  without  any  provision  for 
the  occupation  of  other  portions  of  Kentucky  up  to  the  Ohio 
river,  would  have  been,  to  say  the  least,  a  very  rash  one,  and 
at  that  time  captures  with  a  view  only  to  temporary  occupation 
were  not  in  fashion.  To  hold  the  State,  an  army  would  have 
been  required  numerous  enough  to  furnish  strong  garrisons  for 
Paducah  and  Smithland,  at  the  mouths  of  the  Tennessee  and 
Cumberland  rivers,  for  the  protection  of  the  mouth  of  Green 
river  for  Carrollton,  at  the  mouth  of  Kentucky  river,  for  Louis 
ville,  Covington,  and  other  points  farther  eastward.  General 
Johnston  could  not  have  held  Kentucky  two  months  after  he  had 
occupied  her  northern  territory  (if  he  had  taken  possession  of 
it)  with  the  forces  which  he  had  at  his  disposal.  He  would 
either  have  had  to  establish  the  garrisons,  which  have  been  in 
dicated,  and  provide  the  supporting  force,  or  he  would  have 
been  compelled  to  adopt  another  plan,  perhaps  more  advisable, 
viz  :  to  have  organized  three  separate  corps,  one  for  the  west 
ern,  one  for  the'middle,  and  the  third  for  the  eastern  portion  of 
the  State,  each  charged  with  the  defense  of  a  certain  length  of 
river  line,  and  so  disposed  as  to  be  readily  concentrated,  at 
short  notice,  at  any  point  upon  it. 

To  properly  carry  into  effect  either  plan,  many  more  troops 
would  have  been  required  than  General  Johnston  had— it  would 
have  been  folly  to  have  attempted  either  with  his  handful  of  men. 

Another  line  in  advance  of  that  of  the  Green  river,  might 
have  been  taken,  which  would  have  secured  additional  and  very 
valuable  territory.  General  Johnson  might  have  established  one 
half  of  his  army  at  Muldraugh's  Hill,  thirty  miles  from  Louis 
ville,  and  upon  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad,  and  the 
other  half  in  the  country  about  Lexington  and  Frankfort,  and 
have  thus  obtained  possession  of  the  greater  part  of  central 
Kentucky,  and  the  Bluegrass  region.  The  country  between 


70  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

the  point  indicated  upon  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad, 
and  Frankfort,  and  also  in  front  of  the  line  thus  drawn,  is  ex 
tremely  rugged  and  difficult  of  access.  The  hills  of  Salt  river, 
the  Benson  and  Chaplin  Hills,  and  those  of  the  Kentucky, 
present  a  barrier  not  easily  forced.  Directly  in  front,  too,  of 
Frankfort  and  Lexington,  at  a  distance  of  from  twenty  to  forty 
miles  stretches  a  belt  of  broken  and  defensible  ground  from  the 
Kentucky  to  the  main  fork  of  the  Licking  river,  and  on  to  the 
eastward. 

A  thorough  tea  ring-up  of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  rail 
road,  which  would  deprive  the  enemy  of  the  use  of  the  Bards- 
town  and  Lebanon  junctions,  and  the  destruction  of  the  Lex 
ington  and  Louisville,  and  Lexington  and  Covington  railroads, 
would  have  rendered  this  line  secure  against  any  attack  from 
the  front,  while  the  excellent  roads  traversing  the  region  lying 
just  south  of  it,  would  have  made  communication  easy  between 
the  salient  positions.  But  the  left  flank  and  the  main  line  of  re 
treat  and  of  communication  with  Nashville,  would  have  been 
constantly  and  dangerously  exposed. 

These  were  all  matters  for  a  military  chief  to  study ;  but  far 
above  all  mere  strategic  considerations,  was  the  moral  effect  of 
these  movements,  and  that,  it  is  certain,  hud  been  profoundly 
pondered  by  General  Johnston.  The  idea  of  an  advance  to  the 
Ohio,  of  occupying  the  entire  slaveholding  territory  east  of  the 
Mississippi,  of  subsidizing  all  of  its  resources,  of  arousing  and 
recruiting  from  its  whole  population,  was  very  fascinating  then, 
and  opens  a  wide  field  for  speculation  now.  But  then  there 
was  the  reverse  of  the  picture  to  be  considered.  The  unsettled, 
bewildered  condition  of  the  Kentucky  mind,  has  already  been 
described.  There  were  many  who  confidently  predicted  that  the 
Kentuckians  would  flock  to  the  Confederate  standard  as  soon 
as  it  waved  upon  the  banks  of  the  Ohio,  and  innumerable  bitter 
objurgations  were  launched  against  them,  because  so  few  re 
sorted  to  it  when  it  was  planted  upon  the  bluffs  of  Green  river. 

The  patriotism  which  inspired,  alike,  the  prophesies  and  the 


VASCILLATION    OF    THE    PEOPLE.  71 

curses,  can  not  be  called  in  question.  But  Albert  Sidney  John- 
ston,while  he  felt  the  enthusiasm  which  was  the  concomitant  of  his 
perfect  courage  and  high  military  genius,  had  trained  himself  to 
coolly  examine,  and  carefully  calculate  every  influence  which 
could  affect  his  plans.  He  had  studied,  and,  I  believe,  he  rightly 
estimated  the  popular  feeling. 

Revolutions  may  be  inaugurated  and  accomplished  by  the 
unsworn,  unarmed,  unorganized  masses  ;  wars,  once  fairly  com 
menced,  must  be  won  by  soldiers.  An  entire  population  is  fre 
quently  ripe  for  revolution,  only  a  portion  of  it  is  available  for, 
and  will  enlist  for,  war.  Even  had  the  most  favorable  accounts 
of  the  unanimity  of  the  people  of  Kentucky,  and  their  devotion 
to  the  Southern  cause,  reached  General  Johnston  from  credible 
sources,  he  would  have  been  justified  in  still  doubting  that  he  would 
derive  immediate  benefit  from  it.  There  are  no  braver  men  than 
the  Tennesseeans,  they  were  then  practically  unanimous,  except 
in  the  eastern  portion  of  the  State,  they  were  very  ardent, 
and  yet  the  Tennesseeans  took  their  time  in  flocking  to  the  Con 
federate  standard. 

The  gallantry  and  patriotism  of  the  Mississippians  are  as 
bright  as  the  light  of  day  ;  and  yet,  in  September,  1861,  thou 
sands  of  young  Mississippians  who  afterward  bled  for  the  cause, 
were  at  home  dealing  out  fiery  denunciations  against  slavehold- 
ing  States  which  would  not  secede.  The  same  history  is  true 
of  every  other  seceding  State — States,  unlike  Kentucky,  already 
embarked  in  and  committed  to  the  war.  It  was  not  because 
the  men  of  these  States  lacked  purpose — throngs  of  them  who 
stayed  at  home  until  the  news  of  our  first  disasters  came,  then 
enlisted,  and  fought  and  died  with  the  quenchless  valor  which 
had  descended  to  them  from  unconquered  sires,  and  was  tra 
ditional  in  a  race  which  had  believed  itself  invincible.  It 
was  because  they  knew  little  of  war  at  all,  and  were  utterly 
ignorant  of  the  kind  of  war  that  was  coming.  The  mighty 
conviction  had  not  yet  forced  itself  upon  them.  It  is  true  that 
the  Confederate  Government  had  refused  regiments  raised  and 


72  HISTORY   OF   MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

tendered  by  these  States  some  time  previously.  Unable  to  arm 
them,  it  dismissed  them,  instead  of  placing  them  in  camps  of  in 
struction  until  arms  could  be  procured. 

If,  among  the  many  errors  which  have  been  attributed  to  the 
great  patriot,  hero  and  statesman  who  was  at  the  head  of  that 
Government,  there  was  one  really  grave  and  fatal  in  its  conse 
quences,  it  was  that  he  himself  failed  to  appreciate  the  danger, 
failed  to  comprehend  the  magnitude  of  the  struggle  when  it 
began,  and  failed  therefore  to  arouse  his  people  to  an  early  and 
tremendous  exertion,  which  might  have  triumphed.  The  abso 
lute  confidence  of  the  Government  blinded  the  people,  and  its 
policy  tended  rather  to  quiet,  than  to  excite  their  enthusiasm. 
But  whatever  may  have  been  the  causes,  it  was  for  General 
Johnston  to  consider  the  eifect.  If,  after  the  war  had  lasted 
four  months,  his  immense  department,  composed  of  seceded 
States,  could  furnish  him  only  six  thousand  troops,  when  he 
advanced  to  Bowlinggreen,  with  what  show  of  reason  could  he 
count  on  obtaining  from  Kentucky — Kentucky  that  had  not  yet 
seceded,  that  was  divided,  distracted  by  conflicting  opinions — 
the  vast  concourse  of  recruits,  which  so  many  professed  to 
expect  her  to  furnish,  and  which  she  was  so  indignantly  de 
nounced  for  not  furnishing  ? 

Could  General  Johnston  have  occupied  Northern  Kentucky  with 
out  opposition,  and  have  held  it  undisturbed  for  some  months, 
it  is  highly  probable  that  all  dissensions  would  have  been 
allayed,  that  the  revolutionary  fever  would  have  spread  through 
Kentucky  (perhaps  it  might  even  have  been  propagated  north 
of  the  Ohio),  and  thousands  of  Kentuckians  would  have  joined 
the  Confederate  army,  many  of  whom  were  subsequently  its 
most  formidable  foes.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Fed 
eral  Government  had  not  been  idle,  that  the  North  was  on  fire 
with  the  war  spirit,  that  a  host  of  sturdy  volunteers  had  been 
gathered  and  organized  for  the  special  purpose  of  holding  Ken 
tucky,  that,  with  the  abundant  means  at  its  command,  the  Fed 
eral  Government  had  already  efficiently  armed  its  soldiers,  and 


PROBABLE    RESULT    OF   JOHNSON'S    DEFEAT.  73 

provided    all    that   was    necessary   for   active    and   immediate 
service. 

In  forty-eight  hours  after  Louisville  had  fallen,  certainly 
before  he  could  have  brought  up  the  forces  to  dispute  its  entrance 
at  any  point,  an  army  from  the  North,  vastly  stronger  than 
General  Johnston's,  could  have  been  thrown  into  Kentucky. 
Could  General  Johnston  have  defeated  this  army  ?  If  defeated 
himself  in  such  a  situation,  what  would  have  been  the  conse 
quences,  not  only  to  his  hopes  of  revolutionizing  Kentucky,  not 
only  to  the  army  immediately  under  his  command,  but  to  the 
Confederate  cause  in  the  West  ?  Would  he,  then,  have  been 
warranted  in  risking  so  much  upon  this  throw  ?  If  General 
Johnston  had  been  constrained  to  fight  at  once,  and  had  been 
driven  back,  he  would  have  sustained  a  disaster,  perhaps  fatal. 
The  effect  it  would  have  had  in  Kentucky  can  easily  be  under 
stood,  and  it  would  have  had  some  and  not  a  very  cheering 
effect  in  more  Southern  latitudes.  The  patriotism  and  integrity 
of  the  mass  of  the  people  is  undeniable,  but  for  all  that,  "  there 
is  a  great  deal  of  human  nature  in  man."  Success  is  the  most 
eloquent  of  arguments.  lie  who  appeals  to  the  suffrages  of  an 
enlightened  community  after  a  victory  will  be  better  received 
then  he  who  canvasses  after  a  defeat.  Again  (it  is  a  truth  that 
will  bear  repetition)  in  revolutions,  popular  convulsions,  political 
agitations — a  method  may  be  safely  attempted  which  will  be 
hazardous  and  of  doubtful  policy  after  actual  war  has  com 
menced.  In  the  former  periods,  enthusiasm  runs  higher,  patriot 
ism  is  more  reckless  and  demonstrative  than  when  the  bayonets 
are  about.  The  danger  then  is  distant,  and  with  the  majority  of 
men,  when  a  general  excitement  is  prevailing,  the  remote  dan 
ger  excites  no  fear.  Many  a  patriot  is  willing  to  be  Brigadier 
General  of  the  peaceful  militia,  and  to  devote  himself  to  a 
cause,  from  the  stump,  who  would  feel  a  strong  and  very  natu 
ral  reluctance  to  leave  home,  wife,  children  and  property,  to 
accept  the  hardships  of  a  soldier's  life,  and  be  shot  at  whenever 
his  officers  feel  enterprising. 


74  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

If  the  sentiment  of  the  people  be  not  unanimous  and  very 
decided,  the  secret  of  success  in  revolutions  is  to  captivate  the 
popular  fancy,  give  the  first  direction  to  the  popular  current. 
It  is  a  struggle  between  the  leaders,  and  the  most  audacious, 
not  to  say  the  least  scrupulous,  are  apt  to  win. 

It  is  unsafe,  in  such  periods,  to  rely  surely  upon  any  sort  of 
action  from  the  people — it  would  be  the  mistake  of  supposing 
that  every  man,  unshaken  by  any  influence,  had  made  up  his 
mind,  and  knew  what  he  was  going  to  do,  and  that  the  majority 
by  some  instinct,  would  be  immediately  obeyed.  A  brave,  honest, 
intelligent  people  will  be  likely,  once  convinced  and  committed, 
to  abide  gallantly  by  their  decision.  If  their  education  has 
been  wholesome,  and  their  traditions  unique,  they  will  be  stimu 
lated  by  ordinary  perils  and  disasters  to  increased  energy  and 
exertions. 

But  whether  the  revolutionary  fermentation  be  in  process,  or 
the  stand  has  been  taken — it  is  easier  to  induce  the  masses  of 
a  people  to  vote  for  resolutions  than  to  become  soldiers. 

It  doubtless  would  have  proven  a  successful  policy,  to  have 
pushed  Buckner  instantly  to  Louisville,  and  Zollicoflfer  to  Lex 
ington,  to  stay  as  long  as  they  were  safe,  and  return  with  the 
recruits  and  the  supplies  that  they  could  have  collected,  leaving 
behind  them  the  positive  assurance  that  the  country  was  not  in 
accessible  to  Confederate  troops.  But  to  have  taken  the  army 
into  Northern  Kentucky,  upon  the  supposition  that  the  unarmed 
population  would  arise  and  enable  it  to  remain  there — in  the 
face  of  the  threatening  dangers  and  the  almost  positive  certainty 
of  instant  battle — would  have  been  a  blind,  unreasoning  daring, 
which  had  no  place  among  the  qualities  of -GeneralJohnston. 
The  wisdom  and  prescience  of  the  great  commander  were  after 
ward  so  abundantly  demonstrated,  that  we  may  be  pardoned 
for  believing  his  judgment  right  in  this  instance  also. 

In  establishing  his  base  at  Bowlinggreen,  he  secured,  as  has 
been  shown,  a  line  well  adapted  to  enable  him  to  assume  the 
offensive  so  soon  as  his  army  was  sufficiently  strong  to  do  so 


CONDITION   OF   TROOPS.  75 

with  effect.  The  very  fact  of  his  moving  into  Kentucky  at  all 
was  a  pledge  and  guarantee  to  the  people  of  his  department, 
that,  if  sustained  by  them,  he  would  keep  the  war  out  of  their 
territory,  and  encouraged  his  army  to  hope  for  an  active,  dash 
ing  campaign.  He  placed  himself  where  the  more  enterprising 
and  determined  of  the  Kentucky  rebels  could  join  him,  and  he 
spared  no  effort,  no  appeal,  which  could  stimulate  enlistment  in 
his  army  among  the  young  men  of  Kentucky,  or  of  the  States 
of  his  department. 

That  his  appeals  were  neglected  was  not  only  his,  but  the 
Confederacy's  deadly  misfortune.  Numerical  weakness  frus 
trated  in  September  1861,  his  plan  to  appear  before  the  people, 
not  only  of  Northern  Kentucky,  but  of  the  Northwestern  States, 
as  the  victor  of  a  decisive  battle,  and,  in  the  following  February, 
forced  him  to  retreat  from  Kentucky  altogether.  The  first  and 
most  golden  opportunity  was  lost ;  and  the  future  history  of  the 
war  in  the  West,  was  a  series  of  terrible  reverses  to  the  Con 
federate  arms,  or  of  victories  brilliant  indeed,  but,  in  the  end, 
fruitless. 

The  condition  of  the  Confederate  troops  was  far  better,  in 
many  respects,  at  this  time,  than  at  any  subsequent  period  of 
the  war. 

There  were,  then,  facilities  and  means  for  providing  them 
with  necessaries  and  comforts  which  more  latterly  did  not  exist. 
Provisions  were  abundant  everywhere,  and  were  regularly  sup 
plied. 

The  railroads,  which  were  then,  all  in  good  repair  and  well 
provided  with  rolling  stock,  afforded  sure  means  of  supplying 
the  troops  which  were  stationed  in  those  parts  of  the  country 
through  which  they  ran.  The  numerous  navigable  streams  also 
afforded  facilities,  and  practically  shortened  the  routes  of  supply. 

In  all  cases,  however,  in  which  neither  the  railways  nor  the 
rivers  could  be  used  to  supply  them,  troops  were  compelled  to 
depend  for  subsistence,  in  a  great  measure,  upon  the  country 
immediately  about  their  cantonments,  and  as  they  exhausted  the 


76  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

surplus  provisions  in  different  neighborhoods,  they  would  shift 
their  encampments.  This  was  owing  to  the  great  lack  of  wheel 
transportation.  It  was  very  difficult  to  procure  wagons,  except 
by  purchase  or  impressment  from  the  citizens,  and  those  so 
gotten  were  of  course  inferior.  Much  less  inconvenience  was 
subsequently  experienced  on  this  score,  after  they  began  to  be 
manufactured  in  the  Confederacy,  and  were  captured  in  great 
numbers  from  the  enemy.  At  this  time,  many  articles  such  as 
sugar,  coffee,  etc.,  indispensable  to  the  comfort  arid  conducive 
to  the  health  of  troops  in  the  field,  were  plentifully  furnished — 
after  the  first  year  of  the  war  they  were  known  among  us  only 
by  camp-fire  traditions.  The  men  rarely  suffered,  then,  from 
the  want  of  clothing,  blankets,  shoes,  etc.,  even  when  the 
quartermasters  could  not  furnish  them,  for  they  could  obtain 
them  from  home,  or  purchase  them,  wherever  they  happened  to 
be  quartered,  at  reasonable  prices.  There  was,  perhaps,  no 
regiment  in  the  army  which  had  not  its  full  complement  of  tents  ; 
they  were  manufactured  at  Memphis,  and  other  points,  in  num 
bers  adequate  to  the  wants  of  all  the  troops. 

Cooking  utensils,  also,  could  be  had  in  abundance — the 
marching  commands  suffered,  not  from  the  want  of  them,  but 
from  the  lack  of  transportation  for  them.  It  is  true  that  those 
which  were  furnished  us  were  not  of  the  kind  and  pattern  which 
experience  has  prescribed  as  most  fitting  for  military  use,  but 
they  were  capital  substitutes  for  flat  stones  and  forked  twigs. 

In  the  medical  department  there  was  an  almost  total  lack  of 
the  necessary  material.  The  supply  of  medicines  in  the  South 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  was  barely  sufficient  for  the  wants  of 
the  population  at  that  time.  Some  medicines  were  run  through 
the  blockade  from  the  North,  in  small  quantities,  during  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1801.  But  the  supply  thus  obtained  by 
no  means  met  the  demand.  The  volunteers  collected  together 
in  camps  and  crowded  cantonments,  subjected  to  a  sudden 
change  of  diet  and  mode  of  living,  sickened  in  great  numbers. 
Diseases  which  had  never  before,  or  but  in  rare  instances, 


SCARCITY    OF   GOOD    ARMS,    ETC.  77 

proven  dangerous,  now  assumed  alarming  types.  The  systems 
of  the  patients  may  have  been  relaxed  and  their  vitality 
partially  impaired,  during  the  early  period  of  camp  life,  when 
they  were  just  foregoing  their  old  habits  and  were  not  yet 
hardened  to  the  new,  or  it  may  be  that  when  men  are  con 
gregated  in  great  numbers,  certain  diseases,  by  transmission 
from  one  to  another,  may  be  cultivated  into  extraordinary  ma 
lignancy — at  any  rate  a  large  proportion  of  the  inmates  of  every 
camp  sickened  and  many  died.  At  Bowlinggreen  in  the  winter  of 
1861  and  1862,  the  mortality  was  dreadful,  measles,  typhoid  fever, 
pneumonia  and  diseases  of  the  bowels,  carried  off  a  host  of  vic 
tims — every  sickness,  however,  seemed  fatal  at  that  time. 

There  was,  consequently,  a  great  and  constantly  increas 
ing  need  of  medicines;  and,  perhaps,  some  waste  of  them, 
when  they  were  collected  in  large  quantities  and  shipped  from 
point  to  point,  was  unavoidable.  But  all  these  problems,  all  the 
difficulties  of  properly  supplying  the  army,  began  to  be  solved 
and  modified,  as  the  genius  of  adaptation  and  substitution  was 
developed  among  the  troops  themselves.  If  a  man  could  not 
get  a  blanket)  he  made  an  old  carpet,  cut  to  the  proper  size  and 
lined  on  one  side  with  a  piece  of  strong  cotton  cloth,  serve  him 
instead.  The  soldier  who  lacked  shoes  bid  defiance  to  the  rough 
roads,  or  the  weather,  in  a  pair  of  ox-hide  buskins,  or  with  com 
plicated  wrappings  of  rags  about  his  feet.  I  have  known  more 
than  one  orderly  sergeant  make  out  his  morning  report  upon  a 
shingle,  and  the  surgeon  who  lacked  a  tourniquet  used  a  twisted 
handkerchief.  Of  the  most  necessary  military  material,  arms 
and  ordnance  stores,  there  was  the  greatest  scarcity.  Perhaps 
one  half  of  the  entire  western  army  (of  all  the  troops  in  the  de 
partment)  were  armed  (at  the  time  that  GeneralJohnstoncame) 
with  shot-guns  and  squirrel  rifles,  and  the  majority  of  the  other 
half  with  scarcely  as  serviceable  flint-lock  muskets. 

The  troops  under  General  Bragg  at  Pensacola  were  perhaps 
better  armed,  but  the  rule  held  good  with  regard  to  the  others. 
A  few  companies  composed  of  young  men  from  the  cities,  and 


78  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

of  rich  planters,  were  armed  with  fancy  guns,  Maynard  rifles, 
etc.,  altogether  unsuitable  for  the  armament  of  infantry.  In 
September  of  1861,  there  were  probably  not  one  thousand 
Springfield  and  Enfield  rifles  in  the  army  which  GeneralJohnston 
was  trying  to  concentrate  in  Kentucky,  and  it  was  several 
months  later  before  these  unequaled  weapons  (the  right  arms  for 
soldiers  who  mean  to  fight)  could  be  supplied  in  numbers  at  all 
adequate  to  the  need  of  them.  In  the  advance  to  Bowlinggreen, 
more  than  three  hundred  able-bodied  men  of  the  Second  Ken 
tucky,  and  an  equal,  if  not  greater  number  of  the  Third  Kentucky 
were  left  in  the  rear  because  arms  could  not  be  gotten  for  them. 
In  November  one  or  two  regiments  of  the  Kentucky  brigade 
were  given  the  Belgian  in  place  of  the  flint-lock  musket,  and  in 
December  flint-lock  guns,  altered  to  percussion  locks,  were  given 
the  other  regiments  of  the  brigade.  Proper  accoutrements  were 
as  scarce  as  guns.  Cartridge-boxes,  knapsacks,  canteens,  when 
they  could  be  gotten  at  all,  were  very  inferior.  By  great  in 
dustry  and  effort,  a  considerable  quantity  of  ammunition  had 
been  prepared  and  worked  up  into  cartridges,  but  there  was 
such  a  scarcity  of  lead  and  powder  in  the  South,  and  such  in 
ferior  facilities  for  the  manufacture  of  the  latter,  that  appre 
hension  was  felt  lest,  when  the  supply  on  hand  was  exhausted, 
it  could  not  be  replaced. 

There  was  scarcely  a  percussion  cap  to  be  had  (in  the  early 
part  of  the  war)  in  the  department,  with  the  exception  of  some 
that  were  manufactured  by  an  enterprising  citizen  of  Nashville, 
and  zealous  Confederate,  Mr.  S.  D.  Morgan,  an  uncle  of  the 
General.  But  while  so  few  of  the  Confederate  soldiers  were 
efficiently  armed,  almost  every  man  of  them,  presuming  that  the 
Yankees  were  to  be  whipped  in  rough  and  tumble  style,  had  his 
bowie-knife  and  revolver.  The  Arkansas  and  Texas  troops, 
especially,  carried  enormous  knives,  that  might  have  made  a 
Malay's  blood  run  cold,  but  in  the  end  those  huge  weapons  did 
duty  far  oftener  as  cleavers  than  as  bayonets.  The  organization 
of  the  troops  first  put  in  the  field  was,  of  course,  to  some  extent, 


CHOICE   OF   OFFICERS.  79 

imperfect.  A  good  deal  has  been  said  about  the  evils  of  the 
system  of  electing  officers,  and  much  just  censure  has  been 
passed  upon  it.  It  has  been  claimed  that  it  gives  rise  to  a 
laxity  of  discipline,  and  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  officers,  who 
owe  their  positions  to  the  suffrages  of  the  men  they  command, 
to  wink  at  irregularities  and  pardon  gross  neglect  of  duty. 

This  is  undoubtedly  true,  in  a  great  measure,  and  what  is 
stranger,  but  equally  as  true,  is  the  fact  that  troops  which  have 
been  longest  in  the  service,  which  know  best  what  qualities  are 
necessary  to  constitute  a  good  officer,  which  appreciate  perfectly 
the  necessity  of  having  good  officers,  not  only  to  their  efficiency 
and  success  in  the  field,  but  to  their  well-being  at  all  times — 
just  such  troops  seem  least  able  to  resist  the  temptation  of 
electing  some  good-natured  fellow,  whom  they  will  never  respect, 
and  will,  perhaps,  grow  ashamed  of,  rather  than  men  who  will 
enforce  their  obedience,  but  promote  alike  their  efficiency  and 
their  comfort.  At  all  times  they  will  look  to  and  rely  upon  the 
good  officer,  but  when  they  come  to  elect,  the  love  of  doing  as 
they  please,  unchecked  by  the  irksome  restraints  of  discipline, 
is  apt  to  make  them  vote  for  the  man  who  will  indulge  them. 
But  I  believe  that  all  those  who  observed  these  matters  care 
fully  will  agree,  that  there  was  far  less  of  this  sort  of  feeling 
among  the  men  who  volunteered  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
than  there  was  later. 

The  officers  elected  by  the  regiments  first  raised  were,  gen 
erally,  about  the  best  men  that  could  have  been  selected.  The 
men,  at  that  time,  in  good  faith,  chose  those  they  believed  best 
qualified  for  the  duties  of  command,  and  elected  individuals  who 
had  manifested,  or  were  thought  to  possess,  courage,  energy, 
and  good  sense.  Of  course  some  mistakes  were  made,  and  ex 
perience  disclosed  the  fact,  now  well-established,  that  many 
men  who  figured  respectably  in  times  of  peace,  are  unfitted  for 
military  responsibility,  and  weaken  in  the  ordeal  of  military 
life. 

No  opportunity  had  been  afforded  then,  for  testing  and  dis- 


80  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

covering  those  qualified  for  positions  of  trust  and  importance — 
it  was  all  a  matter  of  experiment.  Many  injudicious  selections 
were  made,  but  it  quite  as  often  happened  that  the  appointing 
system  (as  it  was  exercised  at  the  beginning  of  the  war)  gave, 
incompetent  officers  to  the  army.  The  graduates  of  West  Point 
themselves,  and  even  those  officers  who  had  served  for  years  in 
the  "  Old  Army,"  knew  little  or  nothing  of  actual  war.  Their 
studies  at  the  academy,  and  the'  reading  appropriate  to  their 
profession,  had  instructed  them  in  the  theory  of  war. 

They  had  the  knowledge  which  the  routine  of  camp  and  gar 
rison  duty  teaches.  Most  of  them  had  seen  service  in  expedi 
tions  against  the  Indians  on  the  Western  plains.  Some  of  them 
had  served  with  distinction  and  benefit  to  themselves  in  Mexico, 
but  this  was  an  experience  which  they  shared  with  many  civil 
ians.  They  had  soldierly  habits.  They  were  well  acquainted 
with,  and  knew  the  importance  of  the  military  etiquette  and 
ceremonial  so  conducive  to  proper  subordination  and  discipline, 
and  without  which  neither  can  be  maintained  in  an  army.  But 
beyond  the  necessity  (permanently  impressed  upon  them,  and 
rendered  a  constant  influence  with  them  by  long  training  and 
habit)  of  strictly  obeying  all  the  rules  of  discipline  themselves, 
and  of  exacting  the  same  obedience  from  others,  they  knew 
nothing  which  a  quick  mind,  if  endowed  with  a  natural  military 
aptitude  and  appreciation  of  military  essentials,  can  not  readily 
acquire.  While  the  regulations  prescribed  clear  and  excellent 
rules  of  organization,  the  strictest  conformity  was  not  always 
had  to  them,  and  it  was  sometimes  difficult  to  strictly  apply 
them.  Companies  sometimes  overran  the  maximum  in  a  way 
that  rendered  them  as  embarrassing  to  the  regiments  in  which 
they  were  placed,  as  they  were  painfully  unwieldy  to  the  un 
learned  Captains  and  Lieutenants  who  immediately  commanded 
them. 

When  it  was  known  that  a  very  popular  man  was  recruiting, 
•the  number  of  enlistments  in  his  company  was  limited  only  by 
die  number  of  able  bodied  men  in  his  district  who  were  inclined 


ORGANIZATION   OF  ARMY.  81 

to  enlist.  As  each  volunteer  had  the  right  to  select  his  Captain 
and  company,  and  generally  objected  very  decidedly  to  being 
transferred  to  any  other,  it  was  a  delicate  and  difficult  task 
to  reduce  these  over-grown  companies  to  proper  proportions. 
Regiments  frequently,  on  account  of  the  popularity  of  their 
Colonels,  or  from  other  causes,  swelled  out  of  due  bounds 
also.  I  knew  one  regiment,  which  in  the  early  part  of  Septem 
ber,  1861,  had  in  it  seventeen  companies  and  numbered,  when 
all  answered  to  roll  call,  more  than  two  thousand  men.  There 
was  at  this  time  a  very  favorite,  and  very  anomalous  organiza 
tion,  known  as  the  "  Legion,"  which  fortunately  in  a  few  months 
entirely  disappeared.  It  was  something  between  a  regiment 
and  a  brigade,  with  all  of  a  hybrid's  vague  awkwardness  of 
conformation.  It  was  the  general  supposition,  too,  for  little 
was  ever  definitely  known  about  it,  that  it  was  to  be  somewhat 
of  an  independent  corps,  something  like  the  "  Partisan  Ranger  " 
regiment  of  later  date.  When  the  army  was  in  the  first  process 
of  organization,  these  "  Legions "  could  be  heard  of  every 
where. 

The  idea  doubtless  originated  with  some  officer  who  felt  that 
he  deserved  a  higher  grade  than  that  of  Colonel,  and  could  not 
obtain  a  Brigadier's  commission. 

As  organization  went  on,  and  system  prevailed,  the  "Legions," 
perhaps  according  to  the  merit  of  their  commanders,  or  their 
numerical  strength,  sank  into  companies,  were  regularly  organ 
ized  as  regiments,  or  were  elevated  into  brigades.  The  brigades 
were  from  three  to  seven  or  eight  thousand  strong,  and  all  arms 
of  the  service  were  represented  in  them ;  they  included  regiments 
of  infantry  and  cavalry  and  batteries  of  artillery.  It  was  in  a 
measure  necessary  that  this  organization  should  be  adopted, 
from  the  fact  that  for  some  months,  each  brigade  commander 
was  entrusted  with  supervision  and  defense  of  a  large  tract  of 
territory,  and  it  was  impossible  to  dispense  with  either  of  the 
three  arms.  Divisions  were  not  organized  until  late  in  the  fall 
of  1861 — the  strength  of  the  brigades  was  then,  to  some  extent, 
6 


82  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

equalized  by  the  reduction  of  the  larger  ones ;  Army  Corps 
were  of  still  later  creation. 

A  significant  custom  prevailed  of  denoting  the  companies  of 
the  first  regiments  which  were  raised,  not  by  letter,  but  by  some 
company  denomination  which  they  had  borne  in  the  militia  or 
ganization,  or  had  assumed  as  soon  as  mustered  as  an  indispen 
sable  nom-de-guerre.  They  seemed  to  vie  with  each  other  in  in 
venting  titles  of  thrilling  interest :  "  The  Yellow  Jackets," 
"The  Dead  Shots,"  "  The  Earthquakes,"  "The  Chickasaka  Des 
peradoes,"  "  The  Hell-roarers,"  are  a  few  which  made  the  news 
papers  of  that  day,  in  recording  their  movements,  read  like  the 
pages  of  popular  romance.  So  fondly  did  the  professors  of 
these  appellations  cling  to  them,  that  it  was  found  almost  as 
difficult  to  compel  their  exchange  for  the  proper  designations, 
as  to  effect  far  more  harassing  and  laborious  reforms.  The 
spirit  which  prompted  these  particular  organizations  to  adopt 
this  method  of  distinguishing  and  identifying  themselves,  re 
mained  to  the  last  characteristic  of  the  Southern  troops.  Reg 
iments,  especially  in  the  cavalry  service,  were  quite  as  often 
styled  by  the  names  of  their  commanders,  as  by  the  numbers 
which  they  properly  bore,  and,  if  the  commanders  were  popular, 
the  former  method  was  always  the  most  agreeable. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  after  every  effort  had  been  made 
to  do  away  with  this  feeling,  it  was  at  length  adjudged  expedient 
to  enjoin  such  a  designation  of  brigades,  by  the  names  of  their 
commanders,  by  order  from  the  War  Department.  This  pe 
culiar  affectation  was  but  one  form  in  which  the  temper  of  the 
Southern  people  was  manifested — a  temper  which  revolted 
against  complete  loss  of  individuality,  and  was  prone  to  self- 
assertion.  It  is  a  temper  which  ought  to  be  characteristic  of  a 
free  and  high  spirited  people,  which,  while  for  prudential  reasons 
it  will  consent  to  severe  restraints,  seeks  to  mark  the  fact  that 
the  restraint  is  self-imposed.  Few  will  doubt,  upon  reflection,' 
that  this  feeling  could  have  been  turned  to  better  account  in  the 
Southern  army ;  that  to  have  allowed  commands  to  win  distinc- 


WANT   OF    DISCIPLINE.  83 

live  and  honorable  appellations  by  extraordinary  bravery  would 
have  elevated  the  standard  of  morale,  as  much  as  did  promotion 
for  personal  gallantry  and  good  conduct.  The  excellence  of  a 
command  mentioned  in  general  orders  might  be  only  partially 
known,  but  the  fame  conferred  by  the  title  of  the  "  Stonewall 
Brigade"  is  universal.  For  the  first  year,  there  was,  in  the 
true  sense  of  the  word,  no  discipline  in  the  Western  army  at 
all.  The  good  sense  and  strong  feeling  of  duty  which  pervaded 
the  entire  soldiery  made  them  obedient,  zealous^  arid  tolerably 
patient.  High  courage  and  natural  resolution  made  them  fight 
well  from  the  first,  and,  long  exposure  to  the  storms  of  battle 
taught  them  coolness  in  the  midst  of  danger,  and  the  compara 
tive  indifference  to  it,  which  become  habitual  with  the  veteran, 
and  which  are  usually  confounded  with  the  eifects  of  discipline, 
although  they  frequently  exist  where  discipline  has  never  ob 
tained.  A  spirit  of  emulation  induced  them  to  readily  learn  the 
drill  and  all  the  more  ostentatious  duties  of  the  soldier.  A 
fortitude  which,  until  they  were  put  to  the  test,  they  were  not 
themselves  aware  of,  enabled  them  to  endure  without  diminution 
of  spirit,  great  hardship  and  privation.  Pride  and  patriotism,  in 
the  midst  of 'every  suffering  and  temptation,  kept  them  true  and 
patient  to  the  last.  While  all  these  influences  combined  to  make 
excellent  soldiers  of  the  material  of  which  that  army  was  com 
posed,  it  will  be  nearer  the  truth  to  say,  that  there  was,  in  the 
true  sense  of  the  word,  no  discipline  in  the  Western  army,  not 
only  in  the  first  year  of  the  war,  but  at  any  time  during  the 
war.  The  rigid  method  introduced  by  General  Bragg  un 
doubtedly  told  with  good  effect  upon  the  men  of  least  pride  and 
mettle,  and  kept  all  such  men  nearer  the  mark,  but  for  the  rest, 
Bragg's  discipline  improved  the  army  rather  by  its  operations 
upon  the  officers  than  upon  the  men. 

No  man  who  has  intimately  known  the  Southern  soldiery  can 
escape  the  conviction,  that,  while  capable  of  acquiring  any  de 
gree  of  instruction,  and,  if  the  word  may  be  used,  vcteranship, 
they  can  not  really  be  disciplined,  that  is,  be  converted,  by  the 


84  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

infliction  and  fear  of  punishment,  into  unreasoning  machines. 
If  there  were  no  other  proof  of  this,  the  reflection  which  was  in 
variably  shed  upon  the  morale  and  tone  of  every  command  hy 
the  personal  character,  prowess  and  skill  of  its  particular 
leader,  would  be  sufficient  proof  of  it,  and  'the  fact  that  the 
Southern  troops  almost  always  read  their  chances  of  success  or 
defeat,  not  in  the  odds  opposed  to  them,  but  in  the  reputation 
and  character  of  their  commander — it  would  be  as  wide  of  the 
truth  to  call  this  discipline,  as  it  would  be  to  speak  of  the  per 
fect  discipline  of  the  Norman  knights,  who  would  insult  a 
cowardly  and  indolent  Prince  upon  his  throne,  and  would,  yet, 
obey  with  "proud  humility"  an  heroic  adventurer. 

While  no  practical  soldier  will  underrate  the  value  of  disci 
pline  and  the  marvels  it  works— still  the  experience  of  the  late 
war  will  make  many  officers  believe  that  it  is  no  match  for  na 
tive  intelligence,  zeal,  and  pride — when  those  qualities  have  be 
come  trained  and  used  to  the  requirements  of  war.  Instruc 
tion  and  skill  in  military  duties,  are  indispensable,  although  dis 
cipline  is  not  always  so.  Give  the  high  strung  young  soldier 
who  has  brains  and  good  blood,  some  practice  and  knowledge 
of  actual  warfare,  and  the  unthinking  automaton,  formed  by 
routine  and  punishment,  can  no  more  stand  before  him  than  a 
tree  can  resist  the  stroke  of  the  lightning,  than  the  book  irene- 

O  O'  O 

eral  and  paper  tactician  can  resist  the  genius  which  throws  his 
plans  out  of  gear,  and  his  mind  into  convulsions. 

It  will  be  well  for  those  who  read  Southern  histories  of  the 
war  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  writers  mean,  when  they  use  the 
word  "  discipline,"  the  pride  which  stimulated  the  soldiers  to 
learn  their  duties  rather  than  incur  disgrace,  and  the  subordi 
nation  which  proceeded  from  self  respect,  and  respect  for  an 
officer  whom  they  thought  worthy  to  command  them.  It  was 
not  the  fault  of  the  Southern  men  who  took  the  field,  that  the  ef 
forts  of  the  Southern  people  failed  to  establish,  for  themselves, 
a  separate  and  independent  Government. 

Two  great  mistakes  were  made  at  the  outset  and  were  never 


MISTAKES    OF   THE   SOUTH.  85 

retrieved.  Mistakes  which  have  lost  battles  and  campaigns  in 
numerable,  and  in  this  instance  lost  a  war.  The  vigor  and  ir 
resistible  audacity  which  is  gained  by  "taking  the  start"  was 
lost  to  us  by  the  defensive  policy,  and  our  troops  were  scattered 
so  widely  that  even  an  energetic  defense  could  nowhere  be  made, 
except  in  Virginia.  The  Government  did  not  mass  the  troops 
for  attack  upon  vulnerable  points  in  the  enemy's  territory,  nor 
to  fall  upon  some  one  of  his  invading  columns.  Not  only  was 
the  defensive  strictly  maintained,  but  an  effort  was  made  to  de 
fend  every  inch  of  the  border.  In  the  face  of  superior  forces 
concentrating  for  invasion  at  certain  points,  a  skirmish  line, 
which  employed  all  of  our  forces,  was  thrown  out  to  hold  all 
points  from  Richmond  to  the  Western  prairies. 

But  one  original  and  cardinal  error  gave  birth  to  all  the  others. 
The  Confederate  Government  failed  to  invoke  the  only  spirit 
which  could  have  done  its  bidding.  It  ought,  without  delay,  to 
have  stimulated  the  ardor  and  turned  loose  the  tremendous  en 
ergies  of  revolution,  and  have  made  the  people  drunken  with 
its  inspiration.  The  time  was  propitious,  the  Government  was 
just  established  and  was  popular,  the  people  were,  practically, 
unanimous,  and  were  irretrievably  committed  to  the  movement — 
they  had  never  seen  hostile  troops  or  been  daunted  by  the  sights 
of  war.  The  presence  of  formidable  armed  foes  might  have 
aroused  prudence,  but  when  Sumpter  fell  and  war  became  inev 
itable,  there  were  no  armies  in  the  field  on  either  side.  When 
the  first  gun  boomed,  the  Government  ought  to  have  taken  ad 
vantage  of  the  glow  of  enthusiasm  which  was  as  yet  unchilled 
by  any  fear  of  the  yet  distant  danger.  It  ought  to  have  asked 
for  powers  which  the  people  in  their,  then,  thorough  confidence 
in  their  leaders  would  have  readily  granted.  They  felt,  that  if 
the  struggle  was  really  for  important  principles  and  vital  rights, 
it  was  better  to  make  rulers  of  their  own  choice,  omnipotent  for 
a  short  time,  than  to  run  the  risk  of  defeat  which  would  cause 
them  entire,  and,  perhaps  eternal,  loss  of  liberty.  The  leaders 
knew  that  the  temper  of  the  people  could  be  relied  on — that  if 


86  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

frankly  told  that  success  could  be  achieved  only  by  prompt  and 
enormous  efforts  and  sacrifices — the  efforts  and  sacrifices  would 
be  made.  They  were  made  later,  when  instead  of  universal 
hope  and  enthusiasm,  there  prevailed  a  feeling  of  almost  des 
pair.  The  strategy  of  revolution  is  identical,  in  principle,  with 
that  of  war — the  side  which  masses  and  marches  fast  wins. 
If,  while  it  was  yet  a  contest  of  peoples  and  not  yet  a  conflict 
of  armies,  the  entire  white  population  of  the  South  had  been 
aroused,  her  territory  converted  into  one  vast  camp,  every  male 
citizen  between  the  ages  of  sixteen  and  sixty  made  a  soldier, 
leaving  to  the  President  the  power  of  exempting  certain  classes, 
and  not  regulating  by  law  a  matter  so  essentially  discretionary, 
and  every  dollars  worth  of  property  had  been  pledged  to  the 
cause,  how  different  might  have  been  the  result  ?  All  this 
could  have  been  done  in  the  then  condition  of  public  sentiment ; 
not  a  dissentient  voice  would  have  been  heard.  It  would  have 
been  far  more  popular  than  the  "  Conscript  Act "  was  a  year 
later,  and  that  caused  little  complaint. 

Let  any  man  think  of  what  might  have  been  done  in  May, 
1861,  with  all  the  men,  which  were  subsequently  in  the  Confed 
erate  army,  arrayed  and  pressed  on  the  front.  If  unarmed,  they 
would  have  met  opponents  also  unarmed.  Men  followed  the 
armies  in  Missouri  and  picked  up  guns  on  the  battle  field,  while 
the  Government  was  rejecting  regiments  because  it  had  not 
arms  to  give  them.  Subsequently  it  found  arms  easier  to  be 
gotten  than  men. 

If  Jefferson  Davis  had  possessed  one  tithe  of  the  unscrupu 
lous  ambition  of  which  he  has  been  accused,  he  would  not  now 
be  the  inmate  of  a  prison.  He  could  have  made,  with  all  case 
his  Government  a  dictatorate — or  turning  off  the  useless  and 
clamorous  Congress,  as  an  incumbrance  to  a  Government  which 
(until  the  war  was  won)  was  an  experiment,  have  ruled  during 
the  war  with  a  "  committee  of  public  safety." 

To  excite  the  energies  of  the  people  to  the  utmost,  and  then 
direct  and  employ  them  by  means  of  some  such  machinery,  was 


THE    TURNING   POINT.  87 

the  way  to  win.  But  he  preferred  to  believe  that  the  danger 
was  not  great.  He  would  have  died  sooner  than  assume  uncon 
stitutional  power.  The  ardor  of  the  people  was  rebuffed,  and 
they  sank  into  an  apathy,  from  which  they  were  awakened  by 
terrible  disasters,  to  find  themselves  encompassed  by  fierce  and 
hostile  armies. 


88  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 


CHAPTER    V. 

IN  1857,  the  company  of  volunteer  militia  called  the  "  Lex- 
ton  Rifles  "  was  organized  with  John  H.  Morgan  as  Captain,  it 
subsequently,  upon  the  organization  of  the  State-guard,  became 
incorporated  in  that  body.  It  was  composed  of  the  finest  and 
most  spirited  young  men  of  Lexington,  and  soon  won  a  high 
reputation  for  proficiency  in  drill,  and  in  all  the  duties  taught 
in  the  camps  of  the  State-guards,  as  well  as  for  the  intelligence 
and  daring  of  its  members. 

From  the  hour  of  its  organization  the  men  of  this  company 
seemed  to  entertain  the  profoundest  love  and  admiration  for  their 
'"V'Captain,  and  the  influence  and  control  they  accorded  him  was 
not  too  strongly  expressed  in  the  words  of  their  motto,  which, 
written  in  large  letters,  framed  and  hung  up  in  their  armory, 
caught  the  eye  of  every  visitor  and  announced,  "  Our  laws  the 
commands  of  our  Captain." 

It  was  with  the  forty-five  or  fifty  men  of  this  company  who 
unhesitating  followed  his  fortunes  when  he  went  to  the  Southern 
army,  and  a  few  other  kindred  spirits  who  immediately  attached 
themselves  to  him,  before  he  had  won  rank  or  fame,  that  Morgan 
began  his  career,  and  around  them  as  a  nucleus  he  gathered  his 
gallant  command.  Although  thoroughly  Southern  in  sentiment, 
and  frank  to  the  last  degree  in  its  expression,  the  members  of 
the  company,  with  one  or  two  exceptions,  made  no  effort  to  go 
South  until  Captain  Morgan  signified  his  readiness  to  lead  them, 
in  this,  as  in  all  else,  they  awaited  his  decision  and  directions. 
The  extreme  illness  of  his  wife,  who  died  in  July,  1861,  required, 
during  the  early  summer,  his  constant  presence  in  Lexington, 
and  he  did  not  determine  to  act  until  after  the  troops,  posted  at 
Camp  Dick  Robinson  and  the  Home -guard  organizations,  began 


MORGAN  LEAVES  FOR  THE  SOUTH.  89 

to  give  unmistakable  evidences  of  hostility  to  all  persons  not 
"loyal." 

When  the  order  was  issued  for  the  disarming  of  the  State- 
guard,  Morgan  determined  to  save  his  guns  at  all  hazards.  The 
State-guard  was  by  this  time  virtually  disbanded,  many  of  its 
officers  of  high  rank,  elected  under  the  impression  that  they 
were  Southern  men,  had  declared  for  the  other  side,  and  various 
other  influences  tended  to  cripple  and  demoralize  it.  An  officer, 
then,  of  that  body,  who  decided  to  resist  the  edict,  disarming 
his  men  and  leaving  them  defenseless,  in  the  reach  of  armed 
and  bitter  political  opponents,  could  look  for  little  backing 
from  his  comrades.  His  best  chance  was  to  make  his  way  at 
once  to  the  Confederate  lines  in  Southern  Kentucky.  This 
Morgan  resolved  to  do. 

On  Friday  night,  September  20,  1861,  he  confided  to  a  few 
of  his  most  reliable  and  trusted  men  his  determination  and 
plans,  and  taking  the  guns  from  the  armory,  loaded  them  into 
two  wagons  and  started  them  out  of  Lexington  on  the  Versailles 
road  under  a  small  guard.  The  men  composing  this  guard  left 
on  such"  short  notice  that  few  of  them  had  time  to  prepare  and 
carry  with  them  even  necessary  clothing,  scarcely  time  to  take 
leave  of  their  families.  They  marched  out  of  town  with  their 
cartridge-boxes  belted  on,  their  rifles  on  their  shoulders,  loaded, 
and  their  bayonets  fixed.  A  regiment  of  Federal  troops  was 
encamped  that  night  at  the  fair  ground,  about  a  mile  from  town, 
and  many  of  the  officers  and  men  were  in  town  at  the  time  the 
guns  were  removed.  In  order  to  deceive  as  to  his  movements 
and  lull  any  suspicion  that  might  exist  of  his  design  to  move 
the  guns,  Captain  Morgan  caused  twelve  or  fifteen  men  to  pa 
rade  and  tramp  heavily  about  the  armory  for  an  hour  or  two 
after  the  wagons  had  been  loaded  and  started,  and  so  created  the 
impression  that  his  company  was  engaged  in  drilling. 

The  wagons  were  not  stopped  in  the  town,  and  only  one  sol 
dier  was  encountered  who  was  made  prisoner  by  the  escort,  car 
ried  off  some  twenty  miles,  and  then  released. 


90  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Morgan  accompanied  the  wagons  for  a  short  distance  until  it 
was  apparent  that  there  was  no  immediate  danger  to  be  appre 
hended,  and  returned  to  Lexington. 

On  the  next  day  when  it  was  ascertained  that  the  guns  had 
been  taken  away,  and  no  trace  of  them  could  be  discovered,  a 
great  excitement  was  gotten  up.  That  very  day  had  been  ap 
pointed  for  their  seizure  by  the  authorities,  and  the  authorities 
had  been  completely  tricked  and  baffled. 

The  loyal  citizens  who  had  calculated  upon  witnessing  the 
discomfiture  of  the  "  Rifles,"  and  of  all  their  backers,  were  dis 
appointed,  and  had  the  farther  mortification  of  learning  that  the 
wagons  containing  the  coveted  prizes  had  passed  the  night  be 
fore,  in  the  sight  of  them  all,  to  a  place  where  they  dared  not 
follow.  Of  course  many  taunts  were  flung  at  the  fooled  spies, 
and  disappointed  patriots  ;  and  at  length  the  angry  discussions 
brought  on  a  shooting  affray  between  some  of  the  "  Rifles,"  and 
a  part  of  the  troops  and  Home-guards.  The  regiment  stationed 
at  the  fair  grounds,  was  brought  into  town  to  quell  this  affair, 
and  two  pieces  of  artillery  were  planted  to  sweep  the  principal 
streets — and  from  that  date,  for  four  years,  Lexington  was  un 
der  military  rule. 

Captain  Morgan,  for  whose  arrest  an  order  was  immediately 
issued,  communicated  during  the  day  with  such  of  his  men  as 
desired  to  follow  him,  and  at  nightfall  left  Lexington  with  them 
and  rejoined  those  who  had  gone  before.  He  passed  through 
Anderson  county  to  Nelson,  and  halted  a  few  miles  from  Bards- 
town.  Here  he  was  joined  by  Captain  John  Cripps  Wickliffe, 
subsequently  Lieutenant  Colonel  of  the  Ninth  Kentucky  In 
fantry,  and  a  very  gallant  officer.  Captain  Wickliffe  had  deter 
mined  also  to  save  his  guns  and  take  his  company,  or  all  that 
would  follow  him,  to  the  Confederate  army.  The  greater  por 
tion  of  his  company,  one  of  the  finest  in  the  State-guards,  elected 
to  go  with  him.  Desirous,  while  about  it,  of  doing  a  brisk  busi 
ness  in  guns,  he  confiscated  those  of  a  neighboring  Home-guard 
company,  and  brought  them  to  Morgan's  camp — they  were  im- 


ROGER   HANSON.  01 

mediately  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  unarmed  men,  who,  finding 
an  organized  force  making  for  the  Confederate  lines,  attached 
themselves  to  it.  Many  such  men,  anxious  to  go  South,  but 
afraid  to  go  without  a  leader,  came  to  this  camp  during  the  four 
or  five  days  that  it  was  maintained. 

On  account  of  the  kindness  and  liberality  of  the  people  who 
lived  in  that  neighborhood,  and  who  supplied  its  inmates  with 
provisions  of  all  kinds,  this  camp  was  entitled  "  Camp  Charity," 
and  long  will  it  be  remembered. 

By  the  common  wish  and  consent,  Morgan  took  command  of 
all  the  forces,  and  when,  on  Saturday  evening,  September  28th, 
he  resumed  his  march,  he  was  at  the  head  of  some  two  hundred 
men.  He  encountered  no  enemy.  The  Home-guards,  who  mus 
tered  strong  in  the  region  through  which  he  passed,  thought  his 
force  too  formidable  to  attack  and  kept  out  of  his  path.  When  he 
wrould  hear  of  two  bodies  of  them,  likely  to  give  him  trouble  if 
united,  he  would  pass  between  them  Snd  scare  both. 

After  two  days  and  nights  hard  marching,  he  reached  Green 
river  on  Monday  evening,  September  30th.  He  received  an 
enthusiastic  welcome  from  the  Confederate  troops  stationed 
there,  most  of  whom  were  Kentuckians,  and  many  of  them  knew 
him  well. 

Colonel  Roger  AY.  Hanson,  the  officer  in  command,  was 
himself  from  Lexington,  and  was  a  warm  personal  friend  of 
Morgan. 

There  were,  at  Green  river,  encamped  on  the  Southern  side 
of  the  stream,  at  this  date,  the  Second  Kentucky  Infantry 
(Hanson's  own  regiment),  six  or  seven  hundred  strong,  Byrne's 
Battery,  and  four  companies  of  Tennessee  cavalry. 

Colonel  Thomas  Hunt,  an  uncle  of  Captain  Morgan,  was  also 
there  with  two  companies  of  the  regiment  he  was  then  organiz 
ing.  Of  all  the  general  officers  (he  was  made  a  General) 
which  Kentucky  gave  to  the  Confederate  service,  least  justice 
had  been  done  by  fame  to  Roger  Hanson,  and  it  is  strange  that 
such  should  be  the  case.  Not  only  was  he  well  known,  con- 


92  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

stantly  talked  of,  greatly  loved,  and  ardently  admired  by  the 
Kentuckians,  but  his  name  was  familiar  in  all  parts  of  the  army. 
It  is  true  that  his  early  death  blighted  the  reputation  he  was 
rapidly  winning,  but  it  is  hard  for  those  who  knew  him  to 
understand  how  such  a  man  could  have  failed  to  attract  more 
general  and  more  lively  interest.  While  a  very  young  man,  he 
served  with  distinction  in  Mexico,  returning  home  he  indulged 
for  a  short  period  in  an  erratic  career  which  astonished  even  the 
Kentuckians,  and  suddenly  quitted  it  to  beat  all  rivals  at  the 
bar,  and  become  a  leading  politician.  Friends  and  opponents 
agreed  in  pronouncing  him  one  of  the  most  effective  speakers  in 
the  State.  His  youth  was  too  much  occupied  in  more  agreea 
ble  pursuits,  to  admit  of  his  employing  profitably  the  educa 
tional  advantages  which  were  offered  him,  but  his  mind,  although 
unused  to  the  discipline  of  study,  mastered  all  that  it  grappled 
with.  He  read  less  and  comprehended  more  law  than  any 
member  of  the  profession*  in  Kentucky.  His  vigorous  native 
intellect  and  acute  sense,  were  perhaps  more  formidable,  for  this 
reason.  Want  of  science  made  his  method  of  attack  more  origi 
nal  and  irresistible.  In  the  contests  of  the  bar  and  the  hustings, 

O     / 

he  was  a  sort  of  heavy  armed  partisan,  his  irregular,  rapid 
onslaught  crushed  opposition.  The  learning  and  eloquence 
of  his  ablest  antagonists  availed  little  against  his  manly 
logic,  and  often  sounded  like  the  merest  folly  after  having 
been  subjected  to  his  telling  ridicule.  All  of  his  ideas 
seemed  clearly  defined ;  his  mind  was  never  in  a  mist.  His 
insight  into  character  was  extraordinary,  and  he  had  the 
most  remarkable  faculty  of  accurate  observation  and  life-like 
reproduction,  especially  of  ludicrous  traits  and  scenes.  His 
command  of  humorous,  graphic,  forcible  expression  was  un- 
equaled.  He  had  very  many  noble  traits  of  character.  He 
was  candid  and  truthful  to  bluntness.  His  scorn  of  dissimula 
tion  and  affectation  of  any  sort,  gave  his  manner  and  speech  a 
bluffness,  and  apparent  want  of  sympathy  with  the  feelings  of 
other  men,  which  caused  him  often  to  be  misunderstood.  I  be- 


ROGER   IIANSON.  93 

lieve  that  he  would  rather  that  the  whole  world  should  have 
thought  him  a  scoundrel,  than  have  seemed  for  one  moment,  in 
his  own  eyes,  a  hypocrite.  His  will  was  dauntless,  his  resolution 
inflexible,  his  courage  high.  He  had  little  opportunity,  during 
his  military  life,  to  show  the  stuff  that  was  in  him,  and  to  prove 
that  he  possessed  other  qualities  befitting  an  officer  beside 
courage  and  the  strictest  attention  to  the  instruction,  the  com 
fort,  and  the  discipline  of  his  men.  Notwithstanding  that  he 
was  a  very  strict  disciplinarian — and  Kentucky  troops  have 
little  love  of  discipline — he  was  very  popular  with  his  men. 
They  retaliated  by  nick-naming  him  "Bench-leg,"  or  "Old  flint 
lock,"  and  admired  him  all  the  more  intensely,  the  more  fre 
quently  that  he  showed  them  that  they  could  never  deceive  him 
nor  attempt  it  with  impunity.  Once,  thinking  that  the  health 
of  his  regiment  was  getting  too  bad,  and  that  many  cases  of 
illness,  reported  as  severe,  were  but  ruses  to  escape  doing  duty, 
he  published  an  order  that  from  that  date  "  there  should  be  but 
two  sick  men  at  the  same  time  in  each  company,'''  and  caused  it 
to  be  rigidly  enforced.  No  one  who  ever  saw  Hanson  can  forget 
him.  In  stature  he  was  a  little  under  the  medium  hight,  and  he 
was  powerfully  but  ungracefully  built.  His  bulky  and  ungainly 
form  indicated  great  but  awkward  strength.  His  shoulders 
were  huge,  round,  and  stooping,  and  he  sat  on  his  horse  in  the 
attitude  in  which  a  sick  man  bends  over  the  fire.  His  head 
was  large  and  perfectly  round.  His  complexion  was  fair  and 
florid,  and  his  eyes  gray  and  full  of  light.  His  strong  and 
marked  features,  when  he  became  excited,  worked  strangely 
and  apparently  without  being  moved  by  the  same  influences, 
and  the  alert  movement  of  his  head,  at  such  moments,  was  in 
singular  contrast  to  his  otherwise  heavy  inactive  manner.  His 
face,  when  he  was  calm  and  giving  careful  attention  to  any  thing 
said  to  him,  wore  a  look  of  exceeding  sternness,  enhanced  by  a 
peculiar  twitch  of  the  muscles  of  the  mouth  and  eye.  He  had 
a  German  face  with  all  the  Irish  expressions.  A  wound  received 
in  a  duel  had  shortened  one  leg  and  gave  him  a  singular  gait, 


94  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

something  between  a  jerk  and  a  roll.  His  voice  was  deep  and 
guttural,  and  his  utterance  rapid,  decided,  abrupt,  like  that  of  a 
man  who  meant  all  that  he  said,  and  knew  that  it  would  produce 
an  effect.  No  one  could  look  him  in  the  eye  and  fail  to  per 
ceive  that  he  was  every  inch  a  man — a  strong,  brave,  manly 
nature  looked  out  in  every  lineament  of  his  face.  Captain 
Wickliffe  attached  his  company  to  the  regiment  which  Colonel 
Hunt  was  organizing.  Of  the  stragglers  who  had  come  out  with 
Captain  Morgan,  some  went  one  way  and  some  another — only 
eight  or  ten  remained  with  him.  Although  not  yet  in  the  Con 
federate  service,  he  at  once  commenced  the  active  and  daring 
work  which  laid  the  foundation  of  his  celebrity  and  brought  him 
at  once  into  general  notice.  The  cavalry  which  had  been 
stationed  there  previously  to  his  coming,  had  confined  them 
selves  to  doing  picket  duty,  and  had  never  sought  or  been  re 
quired  to  do  other  service.  This  monotonous  work,  altogether 
devoid  of  excitement,  did  not  accord  with  his  nature,  which  de- 
•manded  the  stimulus  of  adventure  :  he,  moreover,  intuitively 
understood  then,  and  declared  the  fact  since  so  completely  de 
mo  R  s  t  r  ated^J^t^^^ 

nnt  upon  the  front  or  flanks  of  the  army  to 
which  it  belongs,  and  close  upo~n  the  enemy,  thaj 

te  sort  of  duty  which  can  just  as  well  be  performed  by  in 
fantry.  The  Federal  advanced  forces  were  then  stationed  at 
Elizabethtown,  and  were  soon  pushed  to  Nolin  Creek,  distant 
about  twenty-one  or  two  miles  from  Munfordsville.  Captain 
Morgan  had  at  first  not  more  than  twenty  mounted  men  of  his 
own  company,  but  with  these  and  with  volunteers  from  the 
other  cavalry  who  were  inspired  by  his  example,  he  made  fre 
quent  "scouts,"  and  watched  and  reported  every  thing  that 
transpired  upon  the  front.  These  "excursions"  were  under 
taken  about  four  or  five  times  in  every  week,  and  would  usually 
occupy  twenty-four  hours.  The  scouting  party  would  set  out 
at  or  a  little  before  dark;  before  reaching  the  lines  of  the 
enemy,  some  exciting  chases  would  be  had  after  the  country- 


s£cn**em.  95 

men  who  were  in  Federal  pay  or  sympathy,  and  who,  always  on 
the  look-out  for  us,  would  start  at  break-neck  speed  for  the  camp 
of  their  friends,  pursued  by  our  foremost  riders.  At  first  they 
tried  to  do  this  courier  duty  on  horse-back,  but  finding  that  we 
were  better  mounted  than  they  were,  and  that,  when  h;ird 
pressed  and  forced  to  take  to  the  brush,  their  horses  were 
abandoned  for  ever,  they  betook  themselves  to  a  less  expensive 
mode  of  conveying  information.  They  were  fleet  of  foot  and 
knew  the  paths  through  the  thickets  and  hills  perfectly,  and  it 
was  difficult  to  follow  and  impossible  to  catch  them.  We,  also, 
had  many  friends  among  the  country  people  living  near  the 
enemy's  camp,  and  as  we  would  prowl  all  night  around  and 
among  the  Federal  pickets  and  outposts,  seeking  to  entrap  the 
unwary,  many  were  the  secret  conferences  which  we  held  in  the 
shade  of  the  woods  with  faithful  informants,  who  generally  closed 
their  reports  with  emphatic  adjurations  that,  "For  the  love  of 
God,"  we  would  never  breathe  their  names. 

Once  or  twice  Captain  Morgan  passed  himself  as  a  Federal 
officer,  in  close  vicinity  to  their  camps,  but  this  ruse  could  not 
be  repeated  often  with  success.  Once  we  were  guided  safely  out 
of  a  very  dangerous  situation  by  an  intensely  "loyal"  man 
who.-tliought  he  was  assisting  some  friends  who  had  lost  their 
way.  When  day  returned  the  scouting  party  would  take  a  posi 
tion  on  the  "line  of  retreat"  at  a  convenient  but  safe  distance 
from  the  enemy,  rest  and  refresh  men  and  horses  observe,  closely 
if  there  was  any  unusual  movement  in  the  hostile  lines,  and  as 
the  day  declined  and  it  became  evident  that  all  was  likely  to  re 
main  quiet,  it  would  return  to  camp.  After  the  first  two  or  three 
weeks  of  this  sort  of  service,  and  its  advantages  had  become  ap 
parent,  an  order  was  given  to  turn  over  to  Captain  Morgan 
some  thirty  "condemned"  artillery  horses.  "With  a  little  care 
and  nursing  they  were  rendered  tolerably  fit  for  his  purposes, 
and  he  was  thus  enabled  to  mount  the  better  part  of  his  company. 
I  knew  a  scout  to  be  performed,  with  most  of  the  men  liding 
these  same  rejected  horses,  of  sixty-eight  miles  in  twenty  hours. 


96  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Although  these  scouts  and  expeditions  were  not  nearly  so  ex 
citing  as  were  subsequent  ones,  when  the  cavalry  of  both  armies 
had  become  more  accustomed  to  them  and  more  enterprising, 
yet  they  were  very  pleasant  episodes  in  the  dull  tedious  life  of 
the  camp,  and  excellent  preparation  for  really  hard  and  hazard 
ous  service.  Morgan  himself  derived  great  benefit  from  the 
experience  they  gave  him,  for  he  rarely  if  ever  missed  them. 
He  always  knew  how  to  direct  and  how  to  estimate  the  scouting 
duty  of  his  command,  one  of  the  most  important,  by  the  practi 
cal  knowledge  thus  acquired.  Nor  will  it  injure  any  man  who 
is  called  upon  to  exercise  the  duties  of  a  General  to  take  a  few 
lessons  in  this  school.  The  fatigue  and  discomfort  from  want  of 
sleep  attending  these  expeditions  to  those  who  went  constantly 
upon  them,  was  almost  as  great,  as  that  suffered  in  later  and  far 
more  difficult  service. 

The  first  skirmish  in  which  Morgan's  company  or  any  portion 
of  it  was  engaged,  was  a  very  insignificant  and  bloodless  one,  and 
served  only  to  illustrate  the  character  of  the  apprehensions 
which  are  apt  to  assail  raw  troops. 

It  was  upon  the  second  or  third  scout  that  Captain  Morgan 
had  taken,  that  we  for  the  first  time  met  the  enemy.  Contrary 
to  the  usual  practice,  the  scouting  party  had  started  out  early  in 
the  day;  it  consisted  of  some  fifteen  of  Morgan's  own  company, 
twenty-five  of  the  Tennessee  cavalry,  and  ten  or  fifteen  volun 
teers,  about  fifty  in  all.  After  proceeding  some  twelve  miles  in 
the  direction  of  Nolin  Creek,  the  advance  of  our  party  suddenly 
discovered  a  body  of  Federal  infantry  moving  down  the  road  to 
ward  us.  Their  bayonets  glistening  and  just  perceptible  above 
a  little  rise  three  or  four  hundred  yards  off  notified  the  videttes 
of  their  vicinity.  They  did  not  see  us,  and  we  immediately  dis 
mounted  and  posted  ourselves  in  the  thickets  on  both  sides  of  the 
road,  sending  the  horses  to  the  rear  under  charge  of  eight  or 
ten  men.  No  plan  of  battle  was  adopted,  although  many  were 
proposed — the  various  suggestions,  however,  that  were  thrown 
out,  in  the  inspiration  of  the  moment  are  lost  to  history.  I 


OUR   FIRST    SKIRMISH.  97 

remember,  however,  that  one  man  gave  it  as  his  decided  opinion, 
that  we  ought  to  charge  them  immediately  on  horseback,  and 
he  then  rode  rapidly  back  to  Green  river  to  report  the  situation 
to  Colonel  Hanson.  Enjoining  silence  on  the  talkative,  Captain 
Morgan  went  forward  on  foot  to  a  house,  about  one  hundred  and 
forty  or  fifty  yards  in  front  of  our  position,  and  looked  out  from 
a  window,  which  commanded  a  full  view  of  their  approach,  upon 
the  enemy.  He  saw  a  body  of  sixty  or  seventy,  but  this  came 
so  close  upon  him  that  he  was  compelled  to  leave  the  house  be 
fore  he  could  discover  whether  it  was  the  advance  of  another 
and  larger  body,  or  was  unsupported.  Fortunately  he  effected 
his  retreat  from  the  house  and  rejoined  his  party  without  dis 
covery  by  the  enemy.  The  latter  continued  to  march,  on,  past 
the  house,  and  toward  our  position,  until,  within  forty  or  fifty 
yards  of  us,  something  discovered  us  to  them  and  they  halted. 
Captain  Morgan  immediately  stepped  out  into  the  road,  fired  at 
and  shot  the  officer  riding  at  the  head  of  the  column.  Without 
returning  the  fire  his  men  fell  back  to  the  house  before  men 
tioned,  situated  on  a  long  low  knoll,  through  which,  to  the  left  of 
the  houise  as  we  faced,  was  a  cut  of  the  railroad.  This  afforded 
a  pretty  good  position  and  one  which  we  should  have  taken  our 
selves.  Here  they  deployed  and  opened  a  volley  upon  us,  which 
would  have  been  very  fatal  if  we  had  been  in  the  tops  of  instead 
of  behind  the  trees.  Both  sides  then  continued  to  load  and  fire 
rapidly.  With  us,  every  man  ought  to  have  behaved  well,  for 
each  acted  upon  his  own  responsibility.  Captain  Morgan  with  a 
few  of  the  more  enterprising,  and  one  or  two  personal  followers 
who  always  kept  close  to  him,  worked  his  way  very  nigh  to  the 
enemy,  and  did  the  only  shooting  that  was  effective.  We  had 
neither  drill  nor  any  understanding  among  ourselves.  The  fight 
was  much  like  a  camp-meeting,  or  an  election  row.  After  it  had 
lasted  about  ten  or  twelve  minutes,  an  intelligent  horse -holder 
came  up  from  the  rear,  breathless,  and  announced  that  the  enemy 
was  flanking  us,  and  that  he  had  been  largely  reinforced.  "  The 
receipt  of  this  important  intelligence  necessitated  the  withdrawal 
7 


98  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

of  the  forces,"  and  every  man  withdrew  after  his  own  fashion 
and  in  his  own  time."  "Our  loss,"  was  one  man  slightly  wounded 
and  several  shot  through  the  clothes.  It  was  as  bloody  as  an 
affair  between  Austrian  and  Italian  outposts. 

The  horse-holder  who  brought  the  information  which  led 
to  our  retreat,  was  evidently  one  who  had  carefully  studied 
the  military  articles  in  the  newspapers,  and  spoke  from  the 
influence  of  a. sudden  recollection  of  the  "science"  he  had  thus 
acquired,  rather  than  from  accurate  observation.  This  may  be 
safely  asserted,  as  we  were  not  pursued  by  the  enemy,  and  next 
day,  upon  returning,  learned  that  they  had  commenced  retreating 
about  the  same  time  that  we  did,  and  that  they  were  but  a  scouting 
party  like  ourselves.  Two  or  three  men  who  got  first  to  Green 
river;  before  Captain  Morgan's  report  was  received  there, 
stated  that  we^had  encountered  a  strong  Federal  column  ad 
vancing  to  drive  our  forces  away  from  "VVoodsonville ;  that  we 
had  attacked,  and  after  a  hard  fight  checked  it,  but  that  unless 
Captain  Morgan  was  immediately  reinforced  it  would  probably 
resume  its  march.  This  statement  created  much  excitement  at 
Woodsonville,  and  was  generally  credited.  But  Colonel  Hanson 
treated  the  gentlemen  who  .brought  it  rather  roughly,  and  said 
(with  an.  unnecessary  reflection  on  a  gallant  arm  of  the  service) 
that  it  was  a  "Cavalry  Story.." 

Several  days  after  this'  affair,  Morgan  made  his  first  narrow 
escape  of  capture.  Hanson  determined  to  send  &  force  to  the 
Nolin  outposts  sufficiently  strong  to  drive  them  in  and  create 
serious  confusion  and  alarm  in  the  Federal  camps.  He  accord 
ingly  ordered  the  Major  commanding  the  battalion  of  Tennes 
see  cavalry,  to  take  his  entire  force,  about  two  hundred  and 
forty  men,  and,  conducted  by  Morgan,  who  went  with  twenty 
of  his  men,  to  make  the  attack  upon  the  outposts.  This  force 
started  about  nightfall.  Morgan  thinking  that  there  wrere  now 
men  enough  upon  the  road  to  accomplish  some  of  his  most  fav 
orite  plans,'waS  in  high  spirits.  His  own  men,  who  had  never 


NARROW   ESCAPE.  99 

in  their  lives  seen  so  much  cavalry  on  the  march,  believed  the 
column  invincible. 

The  Tennesseeans  who  had  long  murmured  at  the  inaction  to 
•which  they  had  been  condemned,  were  anxious  for  a  fight.  The 
Mn j or  arranged  the  plan  with  Captain  Morgan — the  latter  was  to 
get,  with  his  twenty  men,  in  the  rear  of  the  pickets  on  post,  and 
then  fire  a  gun.  At  this  signal,  the  Major  was  to  dash  down 
with  his  battalion,  and,  picking  up  the  pickets,  charge  down 
upon  the  base  and  reserve.  In  the  meantime,  Morgan  ex 
pected  to  entertain  the  latter  with  an  unlooked-for  volley.  It 
was  proposed  to  push  the  plan  as  far  as  possible,  even,  if  the 
first  features  were  successfully  and  quickly  executed,  to  an 
attack  upon  the  camps. 

But  it  happened  that  some  five  miles  from  Nolin,  one  of  the 
country  fellows,  who  was  in  the  habit  of  running  into  the  Fed 
eral  lines  at  our  approach,  was  surprised  and  arrested  by  Cap 
tain  Morgan  who  was  in  the  advance. 

The  women  of  whom  there  wore  several  in  the  house  where 
he  was  taken,  made  a  terribly  outcry  and  noise,  and  would  not 
be  pacified. 

Captain  Morgan  moved  on,  but  was  shortly  afterward  in 
formed  by  one  of  the  men,  that  the  Tennessee  battalion  had 
turned  back.  He  rode  to  the  Major  and  urged,  but  unsuccess 
fully,  that  the  plan  should  not  be  abandoned.  Determined,  then, 
to  go  forward  himself,  he  proceeded  to  the  point  where  the 
pickets  on  the  extreme  front  had  usually  stood,  but  they  were 
gone.  He  halted  his  detachment  here,  and  taking  with  him  one  of 
his  best  and  most  trusted  men  (private,  afterward  Captain  John 
Sisson),  started  down  the  road  on  foot  to  reconnoiter.  He  had 
been  gone  but  a  short  time,  when  the  rear  guard  of  the  Tennes 
see  battalion,  about  twenty  strong,  came  up  ;  it  was  commanded 
by  Captain,  afterward  Colonel,  Eiffel.  It  seemed  that  the 
Major  had  conceived  that  the  shrieks  of  the  women  would  notify 
the  enemy  of  his  coming,  and  prevent  his  plan  of  surprising 
the  picket  posts  and  base  from  succeeding. 


100  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Finding  that  Morgan  had  still  gone  on,  Eiffel  took  advantage 
of  his  position  in  the  rear  of  the  returning  battalion  and  came 
to  support  him.  As  soon  as  he  got  up  and  learned  why  we 
were  halted,  he  turned  into  the  thicket  with  his  detachment,  on 
the  side  of  the  road,  opposite  to  that  occupied  by  Morgan's. 
Just  as  he  was  doing  this,  a  Federal  column  of  cavalry  came  up 
the  road,  and  hearing  the  noise  of  horses  forcing  they  way 
through  the  brush,  halted  about  one  hundred  yards  from  the 
point  where  we  lay.  The  night  was  clear,  and  we  could  easily 
distinguish  them  in  the  moonlight.  I  had  been  left  in  command 
of  the  detachment,  and  would  not  permit  the  men  to  fire,  lest  it 
should  endanger  Captain  Morgan's  safety,  who,  if  we  were 
driven  off,  would  probably  be  captured.  I  ordered,  therefore, 
that  not  a  shot  should  be  fired,  unless  they  resumed  their  march 
and  came  right  upon  us. 

They  remained  at  the  spot  where  they  had  halted  for  perhaps 
twenty  minutes,  apparently  in  consultation,  when  they  counter 
marched  and  went  off  rapidly.  In  a  few  minutes  after  they  had 
disappeared,  Captain  Morgan  and  Sisson  returned  and  gave  an 
account  of  what  had  happened  to  them.  They  had  walked 
along  the  road  for  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes,  when  suddenly  they 
heard  the  tramp  of  cavalry.  They  were  in  a  stretch  of  the 
road  darkened  for  some  distance  by  the  shade  of  heavy  timber. 
This  column  came  upon  them,  and  they  slipped  aside  some  ten 
or  fifteen  paces  into  the  woods.  Captain  Morgan  estimated  it 
at  about  one  hundred  and  twenty  men.  After  it  had  passed,  it 
occurred  to  him  that  his  men  would  be  attacked  by  it,  and  he 
started  back  rapidly  to  rejoin  them.  The  fatigue  of  running 
through  the  woods  was  soon  too  much  for  him  and  he  was  com 
pelled  to  desist. 

As  lie  drew  near  to  the  point  where  he  had  left  us  and  heard 
no  firing,  he  conceived  a  true  idea  of  the  situation.  Stealing 

O'  O 

cautiously  along,  he  came  upon  the  enemy,  who,  at  the  halt,  had 
gone  into  the  woods  also.  He  was  then  compelled  to  lie  closely 
concealed  and  perfectly  still  until  the  road  was  left  clear  by  the 


REGULARLY   MUSTERED.  101 

retreat  of  the  enemy.  Fortunately  his  proximity  was  not  dis 
covered  by  the  enemy  when  in  this  last  situation. 

Captain  Morgan  continued  actively  engaged  in  this  sort  of 
service  until  the  troops  were  withdrawn  from  Woodsonville,  when 
he  was  also  ordered  to  Bowlinggreen.  There  the  men  were 
sworn  into  the  service,  the  company  regularly  organized  and 
officers  elected.  John  H.  Morgan  was  of  course  elected  Cap 
tain  ;  I  was  elected  First  Lieutenant ;  James  Weal,  Second  Lieu 
tenant  ;  Van  Buren  Sellers,  Third,  or,  more  properly,  Brevet 
Second  Lieutenant.  The  strength  of  the  company  was  then  a 
little  above  the  "minimum"  required  for  organization,  number 
ing  sixty-seven  privates. 

Immediately  after  reaching  Bowlinggreen,  excellent  horses 
were  purchased  and  turned  over  to  the  company,  by  General 
Buckner's  order,  and  saddles,  bridles,  tents,  etc.,  were  issued  to 
it.  It  was  already  provided  with  the  best  guns  and  accouter- 
ments,  and  when  the  fitting  up  at  Bowlinggreen  was  completed, 
no  command  in  the  Confederate  service  was  better  equipped,  in 
any  respect. 

At  this  period  two  other  companies,  one  commanded  by  Cap 
tain  Thomas  Allen  of  Shelbyville,  Kentucky,  and  the  other  by 
Captain  James  Bowles  of  Louisville,  but  principally  recruited 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Glasgow,  were  assigned  to  Captain  Mor 
gan's  command  at  the  earnest  request  of  their  officers  and 
men.  Bowies'  company  was  not  full,  and  was  consolidated  with 
another  fragment  of  a  company  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Churchill — the  latter  becoming  First  Lieutenant  of  the  new  or 


ganization. 


The  three  companies  composed  "  Morgan's  Squadron,"  a  pop 
ular  misnomer  by  which,  however,  the  command  came,  in  a  short 
time,  to  be  regularly  designated.  Morgan's  company  became 
A,  of  this  organization;  Allen's,  B;  Bowies',  C.  The  squad 
ron  remained  quietly  in  camp,  at  Bowlinggreen,  for  two  or  three 
weeks  after  its  organization.  This  time  was  profitably  spent 
in  instructing  the  men  in  drill  and  teaching  them  something  of 


102  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

discipline.  The  first  expedition  taken  after  this,  was  to  Grayson 
county,  on  the  north  side  of  Green  river,  to  collect  and  bring 
to-  Bowlinggreen  a  large  drove  of  cattle  which  had  been  pur 
chased,  but  could  not  be  brought  out  without  a  guard. 

The  "Home-guards"  held  this  county  in  strong  force  ;  they 
had  long  expected  a  Confederate  inroad,  and  had  sternly  deter 
mined  to  punish  the  invaders  when  they  came.  The  squadron 
reached  the  ferry,  at  which  it  was  directed  to  cross  at  night. 
We  found  the  boats  sunken,  but  raised  them,  filled  up  the  holes 
bored  in  their  bottoms,  bailed  them  out,  and  by  eight  o'clock 
next  morning  we  had  one  company  across.  The  day  was  spent 
in  crossing  the  cattle  to  the  southern  side  of  the  river. 

On  the  following  evening,  the  entire  squadron  was  transferred 
to  the  north  side  of  the  river  and  passed  the  night  agreeably 
in  chasing  the  Home-guards,  who  did  not  make  a  hard  fight, 
but  ran  off  some  twenty  or  thirty  miles  to  a  neighboring  county 
to  "  rally." 

Shortly  after  his  return  to  fBowlinggreen,  from  this  expedi 
tion,  Captain  Morgan  was  ordered  to  the  front  again,  and 
reported  to  Brigadier  General  Hindman,  who  commanded  a 
brigade  of  infantry  and  a  strong  force  of  cavalry,  in  all  three 
thousand  or  thirty-five  hundred  men,  upon  the  extreme  front  of 
our  line. 

General  Hindman's  headquarters  were  at  Bell's  tavern, 
twenty-five  miles  from  Bowlinggreen,  and  thirteen  from  Wood- 
sonville,  then  occupied  by  the  enemy,  who  had  advanced  to 
Green  river,  ten  or  fifteen  days  after  we  left  there. 

It  would,  perhaps,  be  more  correct  to  say,  that  the  enemy 
held  Munfordsville,  for  although  Woodsonville  was  virtuallv  in 
his  possession,  and  completely  at  his  disposal,  there  were,  at 
that  date,  none  of  his  regiments  encamped  on  the  southern 
side  of  the  river. 

A  few  days  before  Morgan's  arrival,  had  occurred  the  fight, 
in  which  Colonel  Terry,  of  the  Eighth  Texas  Cavalry  (better 
known  then  as  Terry's  Rangers),  was  killed,  and  of  which  so 


DEATH  OF  COLONEL  TERRY.  103 

many  contradictory  versions  have  prevailed.  The  Northern 
account  has  often  been  published,  and  if  the  many  later  and 
more  important  events  have  not  crowded  it  out  of  memory,  is 
familiar  to  all  who  read  the  Northern  newspapers  at  that  time. 
Without  presuming  to  give  a  minute  account  of  the  fight,  for  I 
did  not  witness  it,  nor  have  I  ever  seen  a  report  of  it,  I  can 
present,  in  a  few  words,  the  idea  which  I  derived  from  the  des 
cription  of  men  who  were  present,  and  which  was  generally 
received,  just  after  the  fight,  in  our  army. 

General  Hindman  had  received  information  that  a  strong 
body  of  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  river,  and  desiring  to  as 
certain  if  this  movement  was  preliminary  to  an  advance  of  the 
entire  army,  he  moved  forward  with  the  greater  part  of  his 
infantry,  some  artillery  and  Terry's  regiment  of  cavalry,  to 
reconnoiter,  and,  perhaps,  contest  an  advance,  if  it  were  made. 
When  he  arrived  at  the  ground  upon  which  the  fight  commenced, 
about  three  miles  from  the  river,  he  discovered  the  enemy,  and, 
supposing  his  force  to  be  not  stronger  than  his  own,  determined 
to  engage  him. 

I  am  not  familiar  with  the  plan  or  details  of  the  fight,  but 
am  under  the  impression  that,  when  first,  seen,  the  enemy  was 
slowly  advancing,  unaware  of  Hindman's  vicinity,  and  that  the 
latter  screened  the  bulk  of  his  force  behind  a  large  hill,  upon  the 
eastern  side  of  the  Bowlinggreen  road,  the  summit  of  which 
he  occupied  with  skirmishers,  and  posted  his  artillery  some 
distance  farther  back,  where  it  was  partially  concealed,  and 
could  yet  sweep  the  road  and  the  ground  over  which,  the  enemy 
was  advancing. 

Terry  was  instructed  to  skirmish  in  the  enemy's  front,  and 
draw  him  on,  until  his  flank  should  be  exposed  to  the  infantry, 
that  was  masked  behind  the  hill.  It  was  the  intention  then,  I 
have  always  understood,  to  attack  vigorously  with  all  the  infan 
try,  throw  a  part  of  it  in  the  enemy's  rear,  and  between  him 
and  the  river,  while  Terry  charged  him  on  the  other  flank.  One 
part  of  Terry's  regiment,  under  his  own  immediate  command, 


104  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

was  on  the  right  of  the  road  at  a  considerable  distance  from 
any  support.  Another,  commanded  by  one  of  his  Captains,  was 
posted  nearer  the  infantry. 

Hiiidman's  plan  to  bring  his  whole  force  into  action  and  cut 
off  and  capture  a  part  of  the  enemy's,  if  such  was  his  plan,  was 
frustrated  by  the  impatient  ardor  of  Terry,  who,  after  a  very 
brief  retreat  before  Willich's  regiment  of  infantry,  turned  and 
charged  it  furiously.  The  regiment  was  deployed  in  skirmish 
order,  and  had  barely  time  to  "  rally  by  fours,"  when  Terry,  of 
whose  command  they  had,  up  to  that  moment,  seen  only  a  very 
few,  came  down  on  thorn.  The  Texians  rode  around  the  groups 
of  four,  shooting  the  men  down  with  their  revolvers  and  shot 
guns.  Seeing  his  Colonel  engaged,  the  officer  commanding  the 
other  portion  of  the  regiment,  charged  the  enemy  nighest  him 
with  similar  success.  Terry  and  six  of  his  men  were  killed,  arid 
perhaps  twice  that  number  wounded.  All  the  witnesses  on  the 
Confederate  side  concurred  in  saying  that  fifteen  or  twenty  of 
the  Federals  were  killed,  and  as  many  more,  at  least,  wounded. 
I  passed  over  the  ground  shortly  afterward  as  bearer  of  a  flag  of 
truce,  and  heard  the  same  account  from  the  citizens  living  near 
the  scene  of  the  fight.  Willich's  regiment  was  a  very  fine  one, 
and  its  commander  a  very  superior  officer. 

General  Hindman  was  an  officer  of  great  dash  and  energy, 
and  very  ambitious — he  was,  therefore,  just  the  man  to  encourage 
an  enterprising  subordinate,  and  give  him  free  rein  in  that  sort 
of  service  which  keeps  up  the  morale  of  an  army  at  a  time  when 
it  must  remain  inactive,  reflects  credit  upon  the  commanding 
officer  who  directs  it,  and  which  rank  and  duty  forbid  a  com 
manding  officer  to  undertake  himself.  Although  his  imperious 
.and  exacting  temper  made  him  many  enemies,  he  had  other 
qualities  which  gained  him  devoted  friends.  One  was  a  disposi 
tion  (proceeding  either  from  a  desire  to  attach  to  himself  men 
whose  friendship  he  thought  would  be  valuable,  or  from  a  real 
feeling  of  regard — perhaps  from  both)  to  go  all  lengths  for  a 
friend.  He  entered  heartily  into  all  of  Morgan's  plans,  encour- 


GENERAL 


105 


aged  and  gave  him  every  facility  to  extenOiS  enterprises,  and 
seemed  to  entertain  a  peculiar  pride  and  pleasure  in  his  success. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  there  was  something  in  his  nature  which 
made  him  cordially  sympathize  with  every  thing  that  was  daring 
and  adventurous.  Morgan  became  very  fond  of  him.  and  always 
spoke  with  pleasure  of  this  brief  service  with  him.  Although 
almost  constantly  close  upon  the  outposts  of  the  enemy,  some 
times  in  small  detachments,  and  occasionally  with  every  effective 
man,  the  squadron  had  no  engagement  except  the  picket  fights, 
which  were  of  constant  occurrence.  The  reason  of  this  was  that 
the  Federals  never  came  outside  of  their  lines,  except  for  very 
short  distances,  and  then  in  bodies  so  strong  that  we  dared  not 
attack  them.  The  practice  of  firing  upon  and  attacking 
pickets  was  then  much  condemned  by  the  Federal  officers,  but 
no  valid  reason  has  ever  been  assigned  for  this  condemnation. 
It  is  true  that  killing  and  annoying  pickets  does  not  decide  the 
result  of  campaigns,  neither  do  the  minor  skirmishes  and  partial 
battles  which  so  frequently  occur  in  all  wars,  yet  it  is  the  means 
of  affecting  the  general  result,  and  assisting  to  make  it  success 
ful  as  -much  as  any  other  method  of  harassing  an  enemy.  If 
war  is  to  be  confined  to  sieges,  pitched  battles,  etc.,  then  every 
method  of  wearying,  annoying  and  discouraging  an  adversary, 
of  keeping  him  in  doubt,  or  goading  him  to  desperation,  must 
be  equally  condemned.  All  stratagem  must  be  discarded,  and 
a  return  "may  as  well  be  had  to  the  polite  but  highly  ridiculous 
practice  of  lines  of  battle  saluting  each  other  and  refusing  to 
fire  first.  There  are  certain  rules  of  war  whose  observance 
humanity  and  the  spirit  of  the  age  demand.  Prisoners  ought 
not  to  be  killed  or  maltreated,  unless  in  retaliation ;  the  terms 
of  capitulations  and  surrenders  ought  to  be  honorably  fulfilled 
and  observed ;  war  ought  not  to  be  made  on  non-combatants. 
But  the  soldier  ought  to  be  content  to  take  his  chance.  It  is 
more  soldierly  to  teach  pickets  to  fight  when  attacked,  than  to 
complain  of  it,  and  a  picket  who  will  allow  himself  to  be  sur 
prised  on  his  post  ought  to  be  shot.  At  the  time  of  which  I 


HISTORY  OP  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

write  the  Federal  army  at  Green  river  was  provided  with  no 
cavalry,  or  cavalry  that  was  useless.  Its  commander,  therefore, 
unless  informed  by  his  spies,  whose  reports  were,  of  course,  in 
frequent,  was  ignorant  of  all  that  transpired  even  immediately 
outside  of  his  advance  videttes,  and  it  was  impossible  for  him  to 
know  whether  an  attack  on  his  picket  line  was  made  by  a  scout 
ing  part}*,  or  premised  a  serious  affair.  He  was,  then,  obliged 
either  to  prepare  for  battle  every  time  any  thing  of  the  kind 
occurred,  greatly  harassing  his  troops,  or  to  take  the  risk  of  an 
attack  when  unprepared.  It  was  an  excellent  means,  too,  of 
judging  of  the  strength  of  an  infantry  camp  and  the  changes 
made  from  time  to  time  in  it,  to  attack  the  picket  line  at  various 
points,  hear  the  "long  rolls"  beaten,  and  see  the  troops  turn 
out,  as  occasionally  could  be  done. 

One   or  two   adventures  of  Captain  Morgan  at    this   period 
attracted  a  good  deal  of  notice.     One  of  them,  the  burning  of 
Bacon  creek  bridge,  took  place  before  he  reported  to  Hindman. 
This  bridge  had  been  destroyed  at  the  time  our  forces  fell  back 
from  Woodsonville.    It  was  a  small  structure  and  easily  replaced, 
but  its  reparation  was  necessary  to  the  use  of  the  road.     The 
Federal   army   then   lay   encamped   between   Bacon   and  Kolin 
creeks,  the  advance  about  three  miles  from  Bacon  creek— the 
outposts  were  scarcely  half  a  mile  from  the  bridge.     A  few  days 
labor  served  to  erect  the  wood  work  of  the  bridge,  and  it  was 
ready  to  receive  the  iron  rails,  when  Morgan  asked  leave  to  des 
troy  it.     It  was  granted,  and  he  started  from  Bowlinggrcen  on 
the  same  night  with  his  entire  command,  for  he  believed  that  he 
would  find  the  bridge  strongly  guarded  and  would  have  to  fight 
for  it.     Halting  at  daybreak  a  short  distance  from  the  river,°he 
waited  until  night  fell  again  before  resuming  his  march.    'lie 
crossed  the   ford  at   Woodsonville,  which   was  fortunately  not 
guarded,  and  dispersed  a  party  of  Home-guards,  which,  ignorant 
of  his  vicinity,  had  assembled  at  Munfordsville  to  carry  off  some 
Southern  sympathizers  of  that  place. 

Pressing  on  vigorously  he  reached  the  bridge  at  midnight,  and 


DESTRO 


WOODSOXVILLE. 


107 


to  Ins  surprise  and  satisfaction  found  it  without  a  guard;  that 
which  protected  the  workmen  during  the  day,  having  been  with 
drawn  at  night.  The  bridge  was  set  on  fire  and  in  three  hours 
thoroughly  destroyed— no  interruption  to  the  work  was  at 
tempted  by  the  enemy.  The  damage  inflicted  was  trifling,  and 
the  delay  occasioned  of  little  consequence.  The  benefit  derived 

from  it  by  Morgan  was  t^^-^^-^J"2I2^SJ-tlie  nardillood  of 
his  men  in  that  species  of  s^ce,inTga7eT^iself^s^^ 

his_own  tactics. .^Shortly  after  Woodsonville  had 
been  included  within  the  pickeTlines  of  the  enemy  and  occupied 
with  troops,  Captain  Morgan  with  two  men  went  at  night  to 
Hewlett's  station,  on  the  railroad,  about  two  hundred  yards  from 
the  picket  line,  and  found  the  small  building  which  was  used  as 
a  depot  in  the  possession  of  five  or  six  stragglers,  who  were 
playing  cards  and  making  merry,  and  captured  them.  He  set 
fire  to  the  building,  and  when  the  troops  had  been  called  out  by 
the  bright  light,  he  sent  in  a  message  by  one  of  his  prisoners  to 
the  effect  that  in  the  following  week  he  would  come  and  burn 
them  out  of  \Yoodsonville. 

On  the  evening  of  the  20th  or  21st  of  January,  Captain  Mor 
gan  with  five  men  left  his  camp  at  Bell's  tavern,  crossed  the 
Green  river  at  an  unguarded  ferry,  and  on  the  following  day 
rode  into  Lebanon,  some  sixty  miles  from  his  point  of  departure. 
Several  hundred  troops  were  encamped  near  this  place,  and  a 
great  many  stores  were  in  the  town  and  in  a  large  building  be 
tween  the  town  and  the  nearest  camp.  The  soldiers  off  or  on 
duty  were  frequently  passing  to  and  fro  through  the  town. 
Morgan  destroyed  the  stores,  and  made  all  the  stragglers  pris 
oners  ;  some  of  them  he  was  obliged  to  release  after  taking  their 
overcoats,  with  which  he  disguised  his  own  men  and  was  thus 
enabled  to  get  quietly  through  some  dangerous  situations.  He 
brought  back  with  him  nine  prisoners,  a  large  flag  and  several 

other  trophies.     Two  companies  of  cavalry  followed  him  closely, 
but  he  gained  the  river  first,  crossed  and  turned  the  boat  adrift, 

just  as  his  pursuers  reached  the  bank.     Next  day  he  marched 


108  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

into  Glasgow  with  his  five  men  and  nine  prisoners  in  column, 
and  the  United  States  flag  flying  at  the  front.  He  scared  the 
citizens  of  the  place  and  two  or  three  straggling  Confederates, 
who  were  there,  horribly.  The  flag  and  blue  overcoats  demor 
alized  them. 

When  he  reached  his  own  camp  the  prisoners  were  quartered 
with  different  "messes,"  but  were  not  placed  under  regular 
guard.  The  inmates  of  each  tent,  in  which  prisoners  were 
placed,  were  held  responsible  for  them.  On  this  occasion  it 
happened  that  some  of  the  men  (by  means  in  which  they  were 
learned  and  adroit)  had  obtained  several  bottles  of  wine — spark 
ling  catawba — and  the  prisoners  were  assured  that  this  sort  of 
wine  was  regularly  issued  to  the  Confederate  cavalry  by  their 
commissaries.  They  approved  the  wine  and  the  practice  of 
including  it  in  soldiers'  rations,  and  five  of  them  next  morning 
begged,  with  tears  in  their  eyes,  to  be  received  into  the  Con 
federate  service.  These  adventures  are  not  related  because  it 
is  thought  that  they  will  excite  any  especial  interest,  but  be 
cause  they  fairly  represent  the  nature  of  the  service  in  which 
Morgan  was  constantly  engaged  during  the  occupation  of  South 
ern  Kentucky  by  the  Confederate  army,  in  the  fall  of  1861,  and 
the  greater  part  of  the  succeeding  winter. 

Although  greatly  inferior  in  dash  and  execution  to  the  subse 
quent  cavalry  operations  of  the  "West,  this  service  of  Morgan's 
was  much  superior,  in  both,  to  any  thing  which  had,  up  to  that 
time,  been  attempted  by  either  side,  and  it  served  to  educate 
Morgan's  men  and  Morgan  himself  for  the  successful  conduct  of 
more  daring  and  far  more  important  enterprises. 

A  strong  and  mutual  feeling  of  regard  and  friendship  com 
menced  (during  the  period  that  we  served  with  General  Hind- 
man),  between  the  Eighth  Texas  (Terry's  Rangers),  and  the 
squadron,  which  continued  to  the  close  of  the  war,  growing 
warmer  as  Morgan's  command  grew  in  numbers,  and,  doubtless, 
it  exists,  now,  in  the  hearts  of  the  men,  who  composed  the  two 
organizations.  This  feeling  interfered  in  some  decree  with 


FRIENDSHIP   FOR   TERRY'S   RANGERS. 

discipline,  for  most  of  the  men  of  both  were  young  and  wild, 
and  inclined,  when  they  could  evade  the  vigilance  of  camp 
guards,  to  rove  nocturnally  and  extensively,  and  neither,  when 
on  picket,  would  arrest  or  stop  their  friends  from  the  other  com 
mand. 

The  gallant  Rangers  paid  dearly  for  their  proud  record,  arid 
few  of  those  who  used  to  roam  and  fight  so  recklessly  then,  are, 
I  fear,  living  now,  to  recall  the  events  which  we  witnessed  to 
gether.     The  squadron  remained  with  the  forces  under  command 
of  General  Hindman  until  the  evacuation  of  Bowlinggreen  and 
the  retreat  from  Kentucky.     Then  we  left  the  scenes  and  the 
region  with  which  we  had  become  so  familiar  with  sad  hearts. 
We  had  hoped  that  when  the  signal  for  departure  was  sounded, 
it  would  be  also  the  order  to  advance  ;  that  we  would  press  on 
to  recover  the  whole  of  Kentucky,  and  win  victories  that  would 
give  her  to  us  forever,  and  the  retreat  seemed  to  us  like  a  march 
to  our  graves.     But  a  feeling  of  regret  at  leaving  the  country 
in  which  we  had  passed  months  of  such  pleasant  and  stirring 
service,  was  natural,  even  without  other  reasons  for  it.-   Men 
are  apt' to  become  attached  to  the  localities  where  they  have  led 
free  and  active  lives,  and  to  connect  with  them  agreeable  asso 
ciations.     This  country  had  many  such  for  us,  and  that  part 
especially  between  Bell's  tavern  on  the  one  side  of  Green  river, 
and  Nolin  on  the  other.     For  many  miles  to  the  right  and  left 
there  was  scarcely  a  foot  of  the  ground  which  we  had  not  trav 
ersed,  nor  a  thicket  in  which  we  had  not  hidden ;  from  almost 
every  hill  we  had  watched  the  enemy,  and  at  almost  every  turn 
in  the  road  shot  at  him.     These  are  not  precisely  the  kind  of 
reminiscences  that   the   poetical  and  romantic   sigh   over,  but 
every  man  has  a  right  to  be  sentimental  after  his  own  fashion, 
and  Morgan's  men  were  always  mightily  so  about  the  Green 
river  country. 


110 


CHAPTER  VI. 

IN  the  latter  part  of  January,  1862,  it  became  evident ^ 
General  Johnston,  with  the  inferior  force  at  his  disposal,  could  not 
hold  his  line  in  Kentucky.  Crittenden,  upon  the  right  flank, 
had  sustained  a  serious  disaster  at  Mill  Springs,  near  Somerset, 
and  had  heen  forced  back  across  the. Cumberland,  which  he  had 
crossed  to  attack  Thomas.  In  this  battle  General  Zollicoffer  was 
killed— his  death  was  in  itself  an  irreparable  loss.  Crittenden 
retreated  first  upon  Monticello  and  subsequently  to  Gainesville 
in  Tennessee.  He  lost  his  artillery  and  trains,  and  his  troops 
could  be  relied  on  to  oppose  no  effective  resistance — for  the 
time — to  the  farther  advance  of  the  enemy.  .  The  superiority  of 
the  latter  in  numbers  had  been  not  more  marked  than  their  su 
periority  in  arms  and  equipment.  The  fatigue  and  privation 
endured  by  Crittenden's  men  upon  their  retreat  had  contributed 
greatly  to  impair  their  efficiency.  The  expeditions  against  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  were  vigorously  pressed,  and  scarcely  had 
full  confirmation  arrived  of  the  defeat  of  Crittenden,  when  we 
got  the  first  rumors  of  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry.  General  John 
ston  had  never  been  able  to  collect  at  all  the  points  of  defense 
in  Kentucky,  exclusive  of  Columbus,  more  than  twenty-four 
thousand  men.  In  this  force  were  included  sixty-days'  men  and 
all  the  minor  garrisons.  He  had  at  Bowlinggreen  in  January 
and  the  first  of  February  about  ten  thousand. 

Buell  had  organized,  during  the  period  that  the  two  armies 
lay  inactive  and  confronting  each  other,  fifty  or  sixty  thousand 
men,  and  they  were,  at  the  time  when  General  Johnston  com 
menced  his  retreat,  concentrated,  mobilized,  and  ready  to  fall 
upon  him.  Therefore,  even  before  it  became  evident  that  Don- 


RETREAT  FROM  BOWLINGGREEN.  Ill 

elson  must  fall,  before  the  capture  of  Nashville  was  /mminent, 
by  an  enemy  moving  from  either  flank,  and  before  his  line  of 
retreat  was  endangered,  but  just  so  soon  as  Buell  put  his  army 
in  motion  General  Johnston  evacuated  Bowlinggreen.  Then 
began  the  campaign,  in  which  more  than  in  any  other  of  the 
war,  was  displayed  the  profoundest  strategy,  the  most  heroic 
decision,  the  highest  order  of  generalship. 

General  Johnston  had  long  foreseen  the  storm  of  difficulties 
which  now  assailed  him.  His  resources  were  scanty, and  the 
emergency  was  terrible,  but  he  did  not  despair  of  fighting  through 
it  to  victory.  Upon  one  flank  of  his  line,  he  had  sustained  a 
crushing  defeat,  the  forces  protecting  it  had  been  driven  off. 
Nashville  might  be  taken  by  the  victors.  One  of  the  forts  pro 
tecting  the  great  water  lines  which  led  right  into  the  heart  of 
his  department,  and  away  to  the  rear  of  his  army,  had  been 
taken.  If  the  other  fell  the  fate  of  Nashville  was  sealed,  but 
far  worse,  he  would  be  inclosed  at  Bowlinggreen,  should  he 
remain  there,  between  three  armies  each  much  stronger  than  his 
own.  If  he  lingered  around  Nashville,  he  could  not  protect  the 
city,  but  gave  his  enemy  the  opportunity  of  cutting  him  off 
completely  from  the  only  territory  whence  he  could  hope  to 
obtain  recruits,  and  of  preventing  his  junction  with  the  rein 
forcements  which  he  had  ordered  to  his  assistance.  He  did  not 
hesitate  a  moment. 

Price  and  Van  Dora  were  ordered  from  Arkansas,  Bragg 
was  ordered  from  Pensacola,  all  the  available  troops  at  New 
Orleans,  and  every  point  in  the  department  where  troops  were 
stationed,  were  called  into  the  field,  and  the  concentration  of  all 
at  Corinth,  in  Northern  Mississippi,  was  arranged.  Here  he 
would  have  every  thing  massed  and  in  hand,  and  in  his  rear 
would  be  no  danger,  nor  indefensible  line  by  which  danger  could 
menace  him.  His  adversaries  on  the  contrary  would  be  sepa 
rated  from  each  other ;  rivers  and  all  the  perils  of  a  hostile 
population  would  be  between  them  and  safety,  if  they  were 
defeated  or  forced  to  turn  and  retreat ;  energy  and  promptness 


112  IIISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

would  enable  him  to  strike  them  heavy  blows  before  they  could 
unite ;  if  every  detail  of  his  plan  worked  right,  he  might  hope 
to  outnumber  them  at  every  collision. 

This  plan  would  require  the  evacuation  of  Columbus,  even  if 
the  occupation  of  New  Madrid  did  not ;  but  there  was  no  longer 
any  use  of  holding  Columbus,  after  a  retreat  to  Mississippi  had 
been  decided  upon.  Its  garrison  would  help  to  swell  the  ranks 
of  the  army  for  the  decisive  battle — and  if  that  battle  were  won, 
territory  far  North  of  Columbus  would  be  gained.  Therefore, 
braving  censure  and  remonstrance  more  general,  energetic,  and 
daring,  than  was  ever  encountered  by  any  Confederate  officer, 
before  or  since,  GreneralJohnston  turned  his  back  upon  Kentucky 
and  commenced  the  retreat  which  culminated  in  the  battle  of 
Shiloh.  When  the  dangers  from  which  this  retreat  extricated 
him,  the  favorable  position  in  which  it  placed  him  for  offensive 
operations,  the  exact  calculation  of  the  proper  time  to  turn 
retreat  into  attack,  and  the  electric  rapidity  and  courage  with 
which  the  latter  was  done — when  all  the  features  are  considered, 
is  it  claiming  too  much  to  say  that  no  conception  of  the  war  was 
more  magnificent  ? 

The  evacuation  of  Bowlinggreen  was  commenced  on  the  14th 
of  February,  and  notwithstanding  the  discontent  of  the  troops, 
was  accomplished  in  perfect  order.  On  the  day  after  it  was  all 
over,  the  enemy  arrived  upon  the  opposite  bank  of  Barren  river — 
the  bridges  had  all,  of  course,  been  burned — and  shelled  the 
town  which  he  could  not  immediately  enter. 

The  weather  for  the  week  following  the  evacuation,  was  in 
tensely  cold,  and  the  troops  accustomed,  for  the  most  part,  to 
comfortable  quarters  during  the  winter,  and  exposed  for  the  first 
time  to  real  hardships,  suffered  severely.  Still,  after  the  first 
murmuring  was  over,  they  were  kept  in  high  spirits  by  the  impres 
sion,  assiduously  cultivated  by  their  officers,  that  they  were  march 
ing  to  surprise  and  attack  Thomas,  who  was  supposed  to  have 
compromised  himself  by  an  imprudent  pursuit  of  Crittenden. 

The  news  from  Donelson,  where  the  fight  was  then  raging 


EFFECT  OF  THE  FALL  OF  DONELSON.          113 

\vas  very  favorable,  and  the  successful  defense  of  the  fort  for 
several  days  encouraged  even  General  Johnston  to  hope  that  it 
•would  be  held  and  the  assailants  completely  beaten  off. 

As  the  army  neared  Nashville,  some  doubts  of  the  truth  of  the 
programme  which  the  men  had  arranged  in  their  imaginations 
began  to  intrude,  and  they  began  to  believe  that  the  retreat 
meant  in  good  earnest  the  giving  up  of  Kentucky — perhaps 
something  more  which  they  were  unwilling  to  contemplate. 
While  they  were  in  this  state  of  doubt  and  anxiety,  like  a 
thunder-clap  came  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Donelson — the  news 
that  seven  thousand  Confederate  were  prisoners  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy. 

General  Johnston,  himself,  was  thoroughly  surprised  by  the 
suddenness  of  the  disaster,  for,  six  hours  before  he  received 
information  of  the  surrender,  he  had  been  dispatched  that  the 
enemy  had  been  signally  repulsed,  and  were  drawing  off,  and 
until  the  intelligence  came  of  the  fate  of  the  garrison,  he  had 
learned  of  no  new  attack.  The  depression,  which  this  informa 
tion  produced,  was  deepened  by  the  gloom  which  hung  over 
Nashville  when  the  troops  entered.  It  is  impossible  to  describe 
the  scene.  Disasters  were  then  new  to  us,  and  our  people  had 
been  taught  to  believe  them  impossible.  No  subsequent  reverse, 
although  fraught  with  far  more  real  calamity,  ever  created  the 
shame,  sorrow,  and  wild  consternation  which  swept  over  the  South 
with  the  news  of  the  surrender  of  Donelson.  And  in  Nashville, 
itself  sure  to  fall  next  and  speedily,  an  anguish  and  terror  were 
felt  and  expressed,  scarcely  to  be  conceived  by  those  who  have 
not  witnessed  a  similar  scene.  All  the  worst  evils  which  follow 
in  the  train  of  war  and  subjugation  seemed  to  be  anticipated  by 
the  terrified  people,  and  the  feeling  was  quickly  communicated  to 
the  troops,  and  grew  with  every  hour  until  it  assumed  almost  the 
proportions  of  a  panic.  The  Tennessee  troops  were  naturally 
most  influenced  by  the  considerations  which  affected  the  citizens, 
but  all  shared  the  feeling.  Some  wept  at  the  thought  of  aban 
doning  the  city  to  a  fate  which  they  esteemed  as  dreadful  as  utter 
8 


114  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

destruction,  and  many,  infuriated,  loudly  advocated  burning  it 
to  the  ground  that  the  enemy  might  have  nothing  of  it  but  its 
ashes. 

During  the  first  night  after  the  army  reached  Nashville,  when 
the  excitement  and  fury  were  at  the  highest  pitch,  and  officers 
and  privates  were  alike  influenced  by  it,  it  seemed  as  if  the 
bonds  of  discipline  would  be  cast  off  altogether.  Crowds  of 
soldiers  were  mingled  with  the  citizens  who  thronged  the  streets 
all  night,  and  yells,  curses,  shots  rang  on  all  sides.  In  some 
houses  the  women  were  pale  and  sobbing,  and  in  others  there 
was  even  merriment,  as  if  in  defiance  of  the  worst.  Very  soon 
all  those  who  had  escaped  from  Donelson  began  to  arrive. 

Forrest  had  cut  his  way  through  the  beleaguering  lines  and 
brought  off  his  entire  regiment.  He  -reached  Nashville  on  the 
day  after  it  was  entered  by  the  army.  It  was  impossible  for  the 
infantry  men  who  escaped  to  make  their  way  from  the  scene 
of  disaster,  except  in  small  detachments.  They  were  neces 
sarily  scattered  all  over  the  country,  and  those  who  reached 
Nashville  in  time  to  accompany  the  army  upon  its  farther  march, 
came  in  as  stragglers  and  without  any  organization.  Neither 
men  nor  officers  had  an  idea  of  how  or  when  they  were  to  do 
duty  again.  The  arrival  of  these  disbanded  soldiers,  among 
whom  it  was  difficult  to  establish  and  enforce  order,  because  no 
immediate  disposition  could  be  made  of  them,  increased  the  con 
fusion  already  prevailing.  Rumors,  too,  of  the  near  approach 
of  the  enemy  were  circulated,  and  were  believed  even  by 
officers  of  high  rank. 

Buell's  army,  which  was  really  not  far  south  of  Bowlinggreen, 
was  reported  to  be  within  a  few  miles  of  the  city,  and  the  Fed 
eral  gunboats,  which  had  not  yet  reached  Clarksville,  wrere 
confidently  declared  to  be  within  sight  of  Fort  Zollicoffer,  only 
seven  miles  blow  Nashville. 

Upon  the  second  day  matters  had  arrived  at  such  a  state, 
and  the  excitement  and  disorder  were  so  extreme,  that  it  became 
necessary  to  take  other  precautions  to  repress  the  license  that 


PREPARING  TO  EVACUATE  NASHVILLE.         115 

was  prevailing,  besides  the  establishment  of  guards  and  senti 
nels  about  the  camps  where  the  troops  lay,andGeneralJohnston 
ordered  the  establishment  of  a  strong  military  police  in  Nash 
ville.  The  First  Missouri  infantry,  one  of  the  finest  and  best 
disciplined  regiments  in  the  service,  was  detailed  for  this  duty, 
and  Morgan's  squadron  was  sent  to  assist  it.  Our  duty  was  to 
patrol  the  city  and  suburbs,  and  we  were  constantly  engaged  at 
it  until  the  city  was  evacuated.  General  John  B.  Floyd,  of 
Virginia,  was  appointed  commandant  of  Nashville,  and  entrusted 
with  the  enforcement  of  discipline  and  with  all  the  details  of  the 
evacuation.  His  task  was  one  of  no  ordinary  difficulty.  It 
was  hard,  at  such  a  time,  to  know  how  to  begin  the  work.  In 
such  a  chaos,  with  such  passions  ruling,  it  seemed  folly  to  hope 
for  the  restoration  of  order.  Those  who  remember  the  event, 
will  recall  the  feeling  of  despair  which  had  seized  upon  the 
soldiery — the  entire  army  seemed,  for  the  time,  hopeless  of  any 
retrieval  of  our  fortunes,  an.d  every  man  was  thoroughly  reckless. 
Few  excesses  were  committed ;  but,  with  such  a  temper  prevail 
ing,  the  worst  consequences  were  to  be  apprehended,  if  the 
influence  of  the  officers  s-hould  be  entirely  lost  and  the  minds 
of  the  men  should  be  directed  to  mischief.  General  Floyd 
would  have  found  the  demoralization  and  license  which  had 
grown  apace  among  the  troops,  and  the  terrors  of  the  citizens, 
serious  impediments  to  his  eiforts  to  remove  the  valuable  stores 
which  had  t>een  collected  in  Nashville,  even  if  he  had  possessed 
abundant  facilities  for  their  removal.  But  of  such  facilities  he 
was  almost  entirely  destitute.  The  trains  with  the  army  were 
needed  for  transportation  of  supplies  for  immediate  use.  The 
scanty  wheel  transportation  which  belonged  to  captured  and 
disorganized  commands,  and  had  been  brought  to  the  city,  could 
scarcely  be  made  available.  When  it  could  be  discovered  and 
laid  hold  of,  the  wagons  and  teams  were  usually  found  to  be 
unserviceable.  General  Floyd's  first  care  (after  satisfying 
himself  by  active  scouting,  that  there  was  no  truth  in  the 
reports  of  the  proximity  of  the  enemy,  and  burning  the  bridge 


116  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

at  Edgefield  junction),  was  to  make  arrangements  for  saving  as 
many  of  the  stores  as  was  possible,  giving  the  preference  to 
ordnance  stores.  For  this  purpose  he  ordered  an  impressment 
of  transportation  in  Nashville  and  the  vicinity,  making  a  clean 
sweep  of  every  thing  that  ran  on  wheels.  In  this  manner  some 
eighty  or  ninety  vehicles  were  gotten  together,  with  teams,  and 
as  many  loads  of  ordnance  stores  were  saved  for  the  army.  He 
issued  orders  that  the  citizens  should  be  permitted  to  help 
themselves  to  the  remaining  stores,  and  a  promiscuous  scramble 
for  clothing,  blankets,  meat,  meal,  and  all  sorts  of  quarter 
master  and  commissary  stores,  commenced  and  lasted  three 
days.  Occasionally,  a  half-drunken,  straggling  soldier,  would 
walk  into  the  midst  of  the  snatchers,  with  gun  on  shoulder  and 
pistol  at  his  belt,  and  the  citizens  would  stand  back,  jackall  like, 
until  he  had  helped  himself.  Crowds  would  stand  upon  the 
pavements  underneath  the  tall  buildings  upon  the  Court  House 
Square,  while  out  of  their  fourth  and  fifth-story  windows  large 
bales  of  goods  were  pitched,  which  would  have  crushed  any  one 
upon  whom  they  had  fallen.  Yet  numbers  would  rush  and 
fasten  upon  them,  while  other  bales  were  already  in  the  air 
descending.  Excitement  and  avarice  seemed  to  stimulate  the 
people  to  preternatural  strength.  I  saw  an  old  woman,  whose 
appearance  indicated  the  extremest  decrepitude,  staggering  under 
a  load  of  meat  which  I  would  have  hardly  thought  a  quarter 
master's  mule  could  carry.  Twice  during  the  first  cto y  of  these 
scenes,  orders  were  received  by  a  portion  of  Forrest's  regiment, 
drawn  up  on  the  Square,  to  stop  the  appropriation  of  stores  by 
the  citizens,  and  they  accordingly  charged  the  crowd  (deaf  to 
any  less  forcible  reason)  with  drawn  sabers ;  several  men  were 
bounded  and  trampled  upon,  but  fortunately  none  were  killed. 
Nothing  could  have  been  more  admirable  than  the  fortitude, 
patience  and  good  sense  which  General  Floyd  displayed  in  his 
arduous  and  unenviable  task.  He  had,  already,  for  ten  days, 
endured  great  and  uninterrupted  excitement  and  fatigue;  without 
respite  or  rest,  he  was  called  to  this  responsibility  and  duty, 


GENERAL    FLOYD.  117 

Those  who  have  never  witnessed  nor  been  placed  in  such  situa 
tions,  can  not  understand  how  they  harass  the  mind  and  try  the 
temper. 

General  Floyd  soon  found  that  he  could  (with  no  exertion) 
maintain  perfect  order,  or  rescue  more  than  a  fragment  from  the 
wreck,  and  he  bent  all  his  energies  to  the  task  of  repressing 
serious  disorders,  preventing  the  worst  outrages,  and  preserving 
all  that  was  most  absolutely  required  for  the  use  of  the  army, 
and  that  it  was  practical  to  remove. 

It  was  easy  for  officers  who  respectively  saw  and  considered 
but  one  matter,  to  advise  attention  to  that  in  particular,  and  to 
censure  if  their  advice  was  not  taken.  But  the  very  multi 
plicity  of  such  counsellors,  embarrassed  rather  than  assisted,  and 
showed  the  utter  impossibility,  in  the  brief  time  allowed,  of  at 
tending  to  every  thing.  I  saw  a  great  deal  of  General  Floyd, 
while  he  was  commanding  in  Nashville,  and  I  was  remarkably 
impressed  by  him.  I  was  required  to  report  to  him  almost 
every  hour  in  the  twenty-four,  and  he  was  always  surrounded 
by  a  crowd  of  applicants  for  all  sorts  of  favors,  and  couriers 
bringing,  all  sorts  of  news.  It  was  impossible  in  the  state  of 
confusion  which  prevailed  to  prohibit  or  regulate  this  pressing 
and  noisy  attendance,  or  to  judge,  without  examination,  of  what 
was  important  to  be  considered.  Many  matters  which  ordinarily 
a  general  officer  would  not  permit  himself  to  be  troubled  with, 
might  need  attention  and  action  from  him  at  such  a  time.  Iras 
cible  and  impetuous  as  General  Floyd  seemed  to  be  by  nature — 
his  nerves  unstrung,  too,  by  the  fatigues  of  so  many  busy  days 
and  sleepless  nights — arid  galled  as  he  must  have  been  by  the 
constant  annoyances,  he  yet  showed  no  sign  of  impatience.  I 
saw  him  give  way  but  once  to  anger,  which  was,  then,  provoked 
by  the  most  stupid  and  insolent  pertinacity.  It  was  interesting 
to  watch  the  struggle  which  would  sometimes  occur  between  his 
naturally  violent  temper  and  the  restraint  he  imposed  upon  it. 
His  eye  would  glow,  his  face  and  his  lips  turn  pale,  and  his 
frame  shake  with  passion ;  he  would  be  silent  for  minutes,  as  if 


118  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

not  daring  to  trust  himself  to  speak,  looking  all  the  while  upon 
•the  ground,  and  he  would  then  address  the  man,  whose  brusque- 
ness  or  obstinacy  had  provoked  him,  in  the  mildest  tone  and 
manner.  He  was  evidently  endowed  with  no  common  nerve, 
will,  and  judgment. 

At  last  the  evacuation  was  completed,  the  army  was*  gotten 
clear  of  Nashville,  the  last  straggler  driven  out,  all  the  stores 
which  could  not  be  carried  off,  nor  distributed  to  the  citizens, 
burned,  and  the  capitol  of  Tennessee  (although  we  did  not  know 
it  then)  was  abandoned  finally  to  the  enemy.  Morgan's  squadron 
was  the  last  to  leave,  as  it  was  required  to  remain  in  the  ex 
treme  rear  of  the  army  and  pick  up  all  the  stragglers  that 
evaded  the  rear  guards  of  the  infantry.  Our  scouts  left  behind, 
when  we,  in  our  turn,  departed,  witnessed  the  arrival  of  the 
Federals  and  their  occupation  of  the  city. 

The  army  was  halted  at  Murfreesboro',  thirty  miles  from 
Nashville,  where  it  remained  for  nearly  a  week.  Here  it  was 
joined  by  the  remnant  of  Crittenden's  forces.  After  a  few  days 
given  to  repose,  reorganization  and  the  re-establishment  of  dis 
cipline,  General  Johnston  resumed  his  retreat.  He  concluded  it 
with  a  battle  in  which  he  himself  was  the  assailant,  and  which, 
but  for  his  death,  would  have  advanced  our  banners  to  the  Ohio. 
It  was  fruitless  of  apparent  and  immediate  results,  but  it  checked 
for  more  than  a  year  the  career  of  Federal  conquest,  infused 
fresh  courage  into  the  Southern  people,  and  gave  them  breathing 
time  to  rally  for  farther  contest.  His  death  upon  the  field  pre 
vented  vast  and  triumphant  results  from  following  it  then — the 
incompetency  of  his  successors  squandered  glorious  chances 
(months  afterward)  which  this  battle  directly  gave  to  the  Con 
federacy.  When  the  line  of  march  was  taken  up,  and  the  heads 
of  the  columns  were  still  turned  southward,  the  dissatisfaction 
of  the  troops  broke  out  into  fresh  and  frequent  murmurs.  Dis 
cipline,  somewhat  restored  at  Murfreesboro',  had  been  too  much 
relaxed  by  the  scenes  witnessed  at  Nashville,  to  impose  much 
restraint  upon  them.  Unjust  as  it  was,  officers  and  men  con- 


f 
CONCENTRATION   OF   FORCES   AT   CORINTH.  119 

curred  in  laying  the  whofe  burden  of  blame  upon  General  John 
ston.  Many  a  voice  was  then  raised  to  denounce  him,  which  has 
since  been  enthusiastic  in  his  praise,  and  many  joined  in  the 
clamor,  then  almost  universal  against  him,  who,  a  few  weeks 
later,  when  he  lay  dead  upon  the  field  he  had  so  gallantly  fought, 
would  have  given  their  own  lives  to  recall  him. 

Crossing  the  Tennessee  river  at  Decatur,  Alabama,  and  de 
stroying  the  immense  railroad  bridge  at  that  point,  General 
Johnston  pressed  on  down  through  the  valley,  through  Courtlund, 
Tuscumbia,  and  luca.  to  Corinth.  This  was  for  a  short  time, 
until  he  could  concentrate  for  battle,  the  goal  of  his  march. 
Here  all  the  reinforcements  at  his  command  could  reach  him, 
coming  from  every  direction.  He  only  awaited  their  arrival  to 
attack  the  enemy,  which,  flushed  with  the  successes  at  Henry 
and  Donelson,  lay  exposed  to  his  blows,  ignorant  of  his  vicinity. 

The  force  with  which  he  crossed  the  Tennessee  river  was  a 
little  over  twenty  thousand  men.  It  was  composed  of  the  troops 
which  had  held  the  lines  in  Kentucky — those  which  had  been 
stationed  at  Bowlinggreen,  all  that  was  left  of  Crittenden's 
command,  all  that  were  left  of  the  garrisons  of  Donelson  and 
and  Henry.  The  garrisons  of  minor  importance  in  Tennessee 
contributed,  as  the  State  was  evacuated,  to  strengthen  the  army. 
He  was  very  soon  joined  by  the  forces  from  Pensacola,  about 
ten  thousand  strong,  and  a  splendid  body  of  men.  They  were 
superior  in  arms,  equipment,  instruction  and  dress,  to  all  of  the 
western  troops,  and  presented  an  imposing  appearance  and 
striking;,contrast  to  their  weather-stained,  dusty  and  travel-worn 
comrades.  Nothing  had  ever  occurred  to  them  to  impair  their 
morale;  they  seemed  animated  by  the  stern  spirit  and  discipline 
which  characterized  their  commander,  and  a  fit  reserve  with  which 
to  turn  the  tide  of  fortune.  Beauregard  brought  with  him 
some  troops  from  New  Orleans  and  other  parts  of  Louisiana. 
General  Polk  came  with  the  troops  which  had  held  Columbus. 
Several  hurriedly  raised  and  organized  regiments  came  from 
the  various  States  of  the  department.  Price  and  Van  Dorn, 


120  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

having  between  them  fifteen  thousand  veterans,  did  not  arrive 
in  season  to  participate  in  the  immediate  movements  which 
General  Johnston  had  determined  upon.  A  knowledge  that  the 
retreat  had  been  brought  to  a  close  and  that  a  battle  was  about 
to  be  fought  in  which  we  would  attack,  did  more  to  inspirit  the 
troops  and  restore  to  them  soldierly  feeling  and  bearing,  than 
any  efforts  in  behalf  of  discipline.  The  spirit  of  the  men  who 
had  come  from  Florida  and  other  points  not  surrendered  to  the 
enemy,  had  a  favorable  influence  upon  the  remainder,  whose 
pride  was  aroused  by  the  comparison  and  example.  The  sudden 
and  seemingly  magical  change  from  despondency  to  highest 
hope,  from  a  sullen  indifference  to  duty  to  the  most  cheerful 
alacrity  and  perfect  subordination,  showed  how  wonderfully 
susceptible  was  the  material  which  composed  our  army  to  the 
hopes  inspired  by  a  daring  policy.  The  same  men  who  had 
dragged  themselves  reluctantly  along,  as  if  careless  of  reputation 
and  forgetful  of  the  cause  they  had  to  fight  for.  were  now  full 
of  zeal,  energy  and  confidence.  Those  who  had  almost  broken 
out  into  open  mutiny,  now  rendered  the  promptest  obedience  to 
every  order.  The  denunciations  they  had  uttered  against  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  were  silenced  just  so  soon  as  they  learned  that  he 
was  about  to  lead  them  to  instant  battle,  and  his  name  was 
never  mentioned  except  with  becoming  respect,  and  often  with 
praise.  In  short,  every  trace  of  demoralization  disappeared — 
courage,  pride  and  efficiency,  returned;  arid,  from  a  condition 
not  much  better  than  that  of  an  armed  mob,  the  army  became 
again  disciplined,  valiant  and  reliable.  While  the  masterly 
ability  and  soldierly  vigor  and  decision  of  General  Johnston 
must  excite  the  profounclest  admiration,  those  who  remember  him 
may  be  pardoned  for  dwelling  quite  as  much  upon  the  grandeur, 
the  loftiness,  the  heroism  of  his  character.  In  this  we  may 
look  in  vain  for  his  peer,  except  to  the  great  Virginian,  his 
immortal  comrade,  the  man  whom  every  former  Southern  soldier 
must  feel  it  is  his  religious  duty  to  venerate.  Through  all  that 
period  of  sickening  doubt,  amidst  all  the  reverses,  in  the  wide 


NOBLE   QUALITIES   OF   GENERAL   JOHNSON.  121 

spread  demoralization  which  attacked  all  ranks,  General  John 
ston  towered  like  a  being  superior  to  the  fears  and  fate  of  other 
men.  The  bitter  censure  which  was  cast  at  him  from  all  sides, 
could  move  him  to  nothing  weak  or  unworthy  of  his  high  nature. 
He  gave  way  to  no  anger  or  scorn — he  deigned  no  argument  or 
apology.  When  the  President,  his  devoted  friend  and  warm 
admirer,  urged  him  to  supersede  the  officers  who  had  suffered 
defeat,  he  answered  that  they  were  brave,  although  inexperi 
enced  men,  and  that  he  preferred  to  trust  them  until  he  could 
find  better. 

He  defended  his  unsuccessful  generals  with  generous  warmth, 
and  reposed  in  them  a  confidence,  which  saved  them,  but  di 
rected  all  the  clamor  against  himself.  He  entertained  with 
courtesy  and  listened  with  patience,  to  importunate,  censorious 
civilians,  while  he  had  in  his  pocket  copies  of  dispatches  which 
they  had  sent  to  Richmond  furiously  denouncing  him.  Not  one 
word  was  he  ever  heard  to  say  in  comment  or  rebuke,  while  cen 
sure  and  detraction  were  most  frequent  against  him,  and  his 
zealous,  paternal  care  for  his  army  was  never  relaxed.  His  ma 
jestic  presence,  calm  and  noble  face  and  superb  dignity,  might 
themselves — it  would  seem — have  overawed  and  hushed  the 
cavilers.  Surely,  there  never  suffered  a  nobler,  purer,  braver 
martyr  to  senseless  prejudice  and  unjust,  inconsiderate  reproach. 

While  the  enemy  was  retreating  through  Tennessee,  Morgan's 
squadron  remained  in  the  neighborhood  of  Nashville  until  all 
the  detachments  which  had  been  left  in  the  rear  to  protect  and 
ship  off  by  rail  the  stores  and  supplies  (which  could  be  hastily 
collected)  at  Murfreesboro'.  Shelbyville,  and  other  points,  had 
gotten  through  with  their  work  and  departed  after  the  army. 
Morgan  encamped  his  command  at  La  Yergne,  a  station  upon 
the  railroad,  about  half  way  between  Nashville  and  Murfrees 
boro'.  This  little  place  became  quite  famous  in  the  subsequent 
annals  of  the  war.  Morgan  first  brought  its  name  into  men's 
mouths,  Forrest  and  Wheeler  kept  it  notorious. 

Here,  for  the  first  time,  we  met  the  Fourth  Ohio  Cavalry — our 


122  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

acquaintance  afterward  became  more  intimate,  and  lasted  as 
long  as  that  gallant  regiment  was  in  the  field.  The  Fourth  was 
encamped  at  the  "  Lunatic  Asylum" — I  asked  one  of  the  officers 
of  the  regiment  (subsequently)  why  they  were  sent  there,  but  he 
did  not  seem  to  know — eight  miles  from  Nashville,  on  the  Mur- 
freesboro  pike,  and  seven  miles  from  La  Yergne.  Our  respec 
tive  "bases"  were  consequently  pretty  close  to  each  other. 
Our  pickets  used  to  stand  in  sight  of  theirs  during  the  day,  and 
in  hearing  distance  at  night.  The  videttes  treated  each  other 
with  respect  and  consideration,  but  the  scouts  were  continually 
slipping  around  through  the  woods  and  shooting  some  one.  On 
one  occasion  an  officer  of  the  Fourth  placed  some  men  in  ambush 
in  a  thicket  upon  the  side  of  the  road,  and  then  with  a  small 
party  rode  down  near  to  our  pickets,  fired,  turned  and  galloped 
away  again,  hoping  that  some  of  us  would  be  induced  to  follow 
and  receive  the  fire  of  his  ambuscade.  The  night  was  dark,  and 
by  an  unaccountable  mistake  the  men  in  ambush  fired  into  their 
.own  friends  as  they  passed — no  damage  was  done,  I  believe,  ex 
cept  to  horses. 

One  morning  our  pickets  came  rushing  in  with  a  party  of  the 
enemy  in  pursuit  (no  unusual  occurrence),  and  as  we  stood  to 
arms,  we  noticed — they  were  three  or  four  hundred  yards  off — 
one  of  the  pickets  some  distance  in  the  rear  of  the  others,  and 
almost  in  the  clutches  of  the  enemy,  who  were  peppering  away 
at  him.  It  was  private  Sam  Murrill,  of  Co.  C.,  (afterward 
chief  of  my  couriers,  and  a  first  rate  soldier  to  the  end  of  the 
war),  his  horse  was  slow  and  blown,  and  the  foremost  pursuer 
had  gotten  along  side  of  him  and  presented  his  pistol  at  his 
head.  Murrill,  too  quick  for  him,  fired  first,  and  as  his  enemy 
dropped  dead  from  the  saddle,  seized  pistol  and  horse,  and,  al 
though  closely  pushed,  until  the  guns  of  his  comrades  drove 
back  his  daring  pursuers,  brought  both  in  triumph  into  camp. 
These  small  affairs  were  of  daily  occurrence,  but  at  last  our  op 
ponents  became  more  wary  and  circumspect,  and  to  obtain 
decided  advantages,  we  had  to  go  far  into  their  lines.  We 


OUR  FOURTH  OHIO  ACQUAINTANCES.          123 

noticed  finally  that  they  airopted  a  practice  of  withdrawing  their 
pickets  at  night,  from  the  points  where  they  stood  during  the 
day,  some  miles  to  the  rear.'  Captain  Morgan  after  making  this 
discovery,  resolved  to  anticipate  them  at  the  place  where  they 
made  their  picket  base  at  night.  He  remained  with  a  few  men 
demonstrating  all  day  in  sight  of  the  outpost  pickets,  and  just 
before  nightfall  made  a  circuit  which  carried  him  far  to  their 
rear,  previously  to  their  withdrawal.  He  reached  the  place 
(where  he  learned  that  a  party  of  twenty-five  or  thirty  stood 
nightly),  about  the  time  that  it  was  fairly  dark. 

It  was  a  small  house,  in  a  yard  some  eighty  or  ninety  feet 
square,  surrounded  by  a  picket  fence  of  cedar.  He  had  with 
him  nine  men,  of  these  he  detailed  five  to  hold  horses,  and  with 
the  other  four;  all  armed  with  shot  guns  loaded  with  buck-shot, 
.he  lay  down  behind  the  low  fence.  The  horses  were  sent  back 
some  distance  into  the  bushes.  Captain  Morgan  instructed  his 
party  to  hold  their  fire  until  he  gave  the  signal.  It  was  his 
intention  to  permit  the  party,  which  wras  expected,  to  pass  and 
then  fire  upon  the  rear — hoping  thus  to  drive  it  down  the  road 
toward* his  own  camp  and,  following  rapidly,  capture  it.  When 
it  arrived,  however,  about  twrenty-five  strong,  the  officer  in  com 
mand  halted  it  before  it  reached  the  point  where  we  lay,  but  at  a 
distance  of  not  more  than  thirty  feet  from  us,  so  that  we  could 
distinctly  hear  every  word  which  was  uttered.  The  officer  in 
command  talked  with  his  guide  for  some  minutes,  sending  men  to 
reconnoiterupon  each  side  of  the  road  in  the  meantime.  At  length 
the  officer  ordered  his  men  to  enter  the  little  yard,  and  they 
came  right  up  to  the  fence,  and  just  upon  the  opposite  side  from 
our  position.  Captain  Morgan  shouted  the  wrord  "  Now,"  and 
each  man  arose  and  fired  one  barrel  of  his  gun.  The  roar  and 
the  flash  so  near,  must  have  been  terrible  to  men  taken  com 
pletely  by  surprise.  The  officer  fell  immediately,  and  his  party, 
panic  stricken,  filed  toward  their  camp.  Another  volley  wras 
delivered  upon  them  as  they  ran.  A  chain  picket  was  established 
between  the  point  where  this  happened  and  the  camp  at  the 


124  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

asylum ;  and  we  could  hear  shots  fired  at  rapid  intervals,  for 
minutes,  as  the  fleeing  party  passed  the  men  on  post.  Several 
wounded  men  fell  in  the  road,  after  they  had  fled  a  short  dis 
tance. 

A  short  time  before  he  left  La  Vergne,  Captain  Morgan 
selected  fifteen  men  for  an  expedition  to  Nashville.  Avoiding 
the  high  roads,  he  made  his  way  through  the  woods  to  the  Leb 
anon  pike,  which  he  struck  only  a  mile  from  the  city. 

The  vicinity  of  the  city  favored  rather  than  endangered  him, 
and  he  rode  down  into  the  streets  without  attracting  hostile 
observation.  A  patrol  of  twenty  or  thirty  cavalry,  were  making 
the  round  of  the  streets,  and  he  rode  in  the  rear  of  this  party. 
After  reconnoitering  for  a  short  time,  he  determined  on  his  plan 
of  operations.  He  sent  all  but  five  or  six  of  his  men  out  into  the 
thickets,  a  short  distance  from  the  city,  and,  with  those  whom  he, 
kept,  he  made  his  way,  dismounted  and  leading  the  horses  along 
the  river  bank,  until  he  came  near  the  reservoir,  about  opposite 
to  which,  and  a  little  out  in  the  river,  a  steamboat  was  anchored. 
This  boat  was  one  which  was  in  the  employ  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment.  '  It  was  Captain  Morgan's  desire  to  set  her  on  fire,  and 
let  her  drift  down  into  the  midst  of  a  number  of  other  transports, 
which  lay  a  few  hundred  yards  below,  and  were  crowded  with 
troops,  hoping  she  might  fire  them  also.  Three  gallant  young 
fellows  volunteered  to  do  the  work,  and  boarded  the  boat  in  an 
old  canoe,  which  was  found,  bottom  upward,  on  the  shore. 
They  fired  her,  but  could  riot  cut  her  adrift,  as  she  was  made 
fast  at  stem  and  stern,  with  chain  cables,  and  thus  the  best  part 
of  the  plan  was  frustrated.  The  work  was  done  in  full 
view  and  notice  of  the  troops  on  the  other  transports,  and 
the  engineer  and  workmen,  on  board  of  the  boat,  were 
brought  to  the  shore.  The  names  of  the  young  men,  or  rather 
boys,  who  did  this,  wore  Warfield,  Garrett  and  Buckner — the 
latter  was  soon  afterward  killed  at  Shiloh.  The  canoe  was  so 
unmanageable  that  its  crew  came  near  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy — but  accident  favored  them  at  the  most  perilous 


SCOUTING   NEAR  NASHVILLE.  125 

moment.  A  long  line  of  panel  fence  had  drifted  out  into  the 
river,  one  end  still  being  attached  to  the  bank.  When  their  pad 
dles  failed  them  in  the  swift  current,  they  fortunately  came  in 
reach  of  this,  and  they  were  enabled  to  pull  in  by  it  to  the  shore. 
As  soon  as  the  land  was  gained,  all  remounted  their  horses, 
watched  for  a  while  the  rising  flames  and  the  consternation  of 
the  fleet,  and  then,  with  three  cheers  for  Morgan,  rode  rapidly  to 
rejoin  their  comrades. 

Cavalry  was  sent  in  pursuit,  but  was  left  far  behind.  Cap 
tain  Morgan  went  straight  across  the  country  to  the  Murfrees- 
boro'  pike.  As  he  gained  it  he  encountered  a  small  a  small  body 
of  Federal  cavalry,  attacked  and  drove  it  into  town.  He  lost 
only  one  man,  but  he  was  a  capital  soldier,  Peter  Atherton  by 
name. 

He  got  back  to  La  Vergne  about  twelve  at  night.  After  the 
thorough  and  final  evacuation  of  Murfreesboro',  Captain  Mor 
gan  withdrew  to  that  place  with  his  command.  He  almost  di 
rectly  afterward  sent  the  bulk  of  it  to  the  Shelby ville  and  Nash 
ville  road,  with  instructions  to  encamp  about  twenty  miles  from 
Nashville,  and  picket  and  scout  the  adjacent  country,  and  all  the 
neighboring  roads.  He  retained  with  him  at  Murfreesboro', 
about  forty  of  his  own  men,  and  some  fifty  of  Colonel  Wirt 
Adams'  regiment  of  cavalry,  under  command  of  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Wood,  of  that  regiment.  This  officer  was  exceedingly 
fond  of  the  sort  of  service  which  Morgan  was  performing,  and 
had  been  with  him  constantly  for  ten  or  twelve  days.  He  pre 
ferred  to  remain  with  and  report  to  him,  although  his  superior 
in  rank,  rather  than  accompany  his  own  regiment  on  the  retreat 
of  the  army,  and  see  no  active  work. 

A  day  or  two  after  he  had  made  this  disposition  of  this  com 
mand,  Captain  Morgan  taking  with  him  thirty-two  of  the  men 
he  had  kept  at  Murfreesboro',  penetrated  by  bridle  paths  and 
traces  through  the  woods,  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  ene 
my's  encampments  at  the  Lunatic  Asylum. 

At  this  time,  Mitchell's  entire  brigade  was  encamped  there. 


126 

Stationing  his  men  in  the  thickets  along  the  road,  at  various 
points,  Captain  Morgan  went  systematically  to  work  to  catch 
every  thing  that  should  come  into  sight.  There  was,  of  course, 
a  great  deal  of  passing  to  and  from  the  headquarters  of  the 
commanding  officers  and  between  the  various  camps.  No  one 
anticipated  danger  there,  and  stragglers,  couriers,  escorts,  and 
guards,  went  carelessly  and  unsuspectingly  along,  into  the  same 
bag.  In  the  course  of  an  hour  or  two  eighty  odd  prisoners 
were  taken.  Colonel  Wood  went  off  with  twenty-eight  of  them, 
and,  by  some  oversight,  sixty  were  started  to  Murfreesboro', 
later,  guarded  by  only  ten  men.  A  number  of  wagons  had 
been  also  captured  and  burned.  The  teams  were  used  to  mount 
the  prisoners.  One  staff  officer  was  captured  and  sent  off  with 
the  large  batch  of  prisoners.  Captain  Morgan  remained  behind 
with  one  man,  after  he  had  sent  off  all  the  others.  This  sort  of 
service  always  gave  him  great  pleasure,  and  he  was  loth  to  give 
it  up.  As  the  number  of  passengers  fell  off,  he  rode  down  the 
road  with  his  companion,  dressed  like  himself  in  a  blue  overcoat, 
to  a  point  where  a  guard  of  ten  men  wrere  stationed  under  a 
Sergeant  for  some  purpose.  He  placed  himself  between  them 
and  their  guns,  made  his  follower  put  his  pistol  to  the  head  of 
the  Sergeant  and  began  to  rate  them  for  neglect  of  duty.  He 
represented  himself  as  a  Federal  officer  of  high  rank  and  re 
minded  them  sternly  and  reproachfully  that  such  careless  guard 
as  they  were  then  keeping  had  enabled  Morgan  to  play  all  of  his 
tricks.  They  had  been  careless  and  were  overwhelmed  with  just 
shame  and  mortification  at  his  rebuke.  He  at  length  ordered 
them  all  under  arrest,  and  taking  the  Sergeant's  weapons  from 
him  and  leaving  the  guns  stacked — he  could  not  have  carried 
them  off  without  entrusting  them  to  the  prisoners — he  marched 
the  whole  party  away.  They  were  under  the  impression  that 
that  they  were  going  to  Mitchell's  headquarters,  but  he  got  them 
mounted  and  carried  them  to  Murfreesboro'.  In  the  meantime 
the  smoke  from  the  wagons  which  were  burned  within  half  a 
mile  of  Mitchell's  headquarters,  attracted  attention  and  led  to 


TILTING   WITH    THE    FOURTH    OHIO.  127 

inquiry,  and  it  was  not  long  before  what  was  going  on  was  dis 
covered.  Troops  were  at  once  dispatched  to  put  a  stop  to  the 
mischief  and  beat  off  or  follow  the  perpetrators.  The  Fourth 
Ohio  got  on  the  track  of  the  party  guarding  the  sixty  prisoners, 
and,  as  its  progress  was  necessarily  slow,  it  was  soon  overtaken. 
Nothing  could  be  done  but  release  the  prisoners  and  run  for  it, 
and  the  whole  escort  went  off  in  rapid  flight.  One  prisoner  had, 
by  a  strange  mistake,  been  allowed  to  retain  a  loaded  gun.  As 
one  of  the  guard  who  had  been  in  the  extreme  rear  of  the  col 
umn  dashed  past  this  man,  the  latter  fired  and  grazed  his  face. 
The  other  turned  in  his  saddle,  fired  and  shot  his  unexpected 
assailant  dead.  The  pursuers  had  gotten  close  before  they  had 
been  perceived,  and  they  pressed  the  chase  vigorously.  Over 
fences  and  gulches,  through  fields  and  thickets,  as  hard  as  their 
horses  could  go,  fled  the  one  party  and  followed  the  other  for 
ten  miles.  One  of  our  men  wras  killed,  two  or  three  wounded, 
and  as  many  captured.  Thirty-eight  prisoners  were  secured  by 
Morgan — twenty-eight  brought  off  by  Wood,  and  ten  captured 
and  escorted  by  himself.  On  the  evening  of  the  same  day  a 
party  o'f  eighteen  men  were  dispatched  from  the  camp  on  the 
Shelbyville  road  to  push  as  close  to  Nashville  as  possible,  and 
learn  the  position  of  the  Federal  troops  in  that  quarter.  I  was 
myself  in  command  of  the  party,  and  had  an  accurate  knowledge 
of  the  points  at  which  guards  and  pickets  had  been  previously 
stationed.  On  arriving  in  the  vicinity  of  these  points — around 
which,  without  creating  an  alarm,  it  was  desirable  to  pass,  in 
order  to  get  near  to  the  encampments  and  observe  them  closely 
— they  were  found  unoccupied.  The  party  moved  some  three 
miles  further  down  the  road  without  coming  upon  an  enemy, 
although  a  day  or  two  before  the  picket  posts  had  been  thick 
in  this  quarter. 

It  was  apparent  that  some  plan  for  our  benefit  had  caused 
this  change,  and  unusual  caution  became  necessary.  I  had 
hoped  to  find  some  officers  quartered  at  the  houses  well  in  the 
rear  of  the  reserve  pickets,  where  they  would  believe  themselves 


128  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

secure,  and  to  capture  them,  but  I  now  approached  the  houses, 
not  with  the  expectation  of  making  prisoners,  but  of  getting  in 
formation.  None  of  the  citizens  in  that  neighborhood  had  ever 
seen  any  man  in  my  party,  and  they  would  tell  nothing,  but  their 
alarm  at  seeing  us,  and  evident  anxiety  to  get  rid  of  us,  showed 
plainly  that  they  knew  of  the  proximity  of  danger.  At  length, 
when  in  about  six  hundred  yards  of  the  Cross-roads  near  "Flat 
Rock,"  I  think  it  is  called,  four  miles  from  Nashville,  and  where 
it  was  confidently  reported  by  our  informants  that  McCook's 
division  was  encamped,  I  halted  and  secreted  men  and  horses 
in  the  thick  brush  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  road,  and,  with 
the  guide,  went  forward  on  foot  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  until 
I  suddenly  heard  the  challenge  of  a  picket.  I'judged  from  the 
words  I  caught  that  it  was  the  officer  of  the  day  making  his 
rounds.  Soon  a  negro  came  down  the  road  toward  us,  whom  we 
caught  and  questioned.  He  answered  very  glibly,  and  evinced 
too  little  fear,  not  to  excite  suspicion  that  he  came  out  to  be 
captured  with  a  made-up  tale.  He  said  that  there  were  ten 
men  on  picket  at  the  Cross-roads.  As  a  large  encampment  was 
only  a  few  hundred  yards  on  the  other  side  of  this  point,  his 
story  did  not  seem  credible.  However,  we  had  at  last  found 
an  enemy. 

Leaving  five  men  to  take  care  of  the  horses,  in  the  thicket 
where  they  were  already  concealed,  I  carried  the  others  through 
a  wide  meadow  on  the  right  of  the  road  which  we  had  traveled 
(the  Shelbyville  and  Nashville  pike)  to  the  road  which  crossed 
it  at  "Flat  Rock,"  striking  the  latter  about  two  hundred  yards 
from  the  point  of  intersection.  I  was  convinced  that  the  with 
drawal  of  the  pickets  was  part  of  a  plan  to  entrap  just  such 
scouting  parties  as  ours,  and  that  a  strong  force  was  in  ambush 
at  the  Cross-roads.  There  was  little  hope  of  accomplishing  the 
objects  of  the  expedition,  but  the  trap  could,  at  least,  be  sprung, 
and  there  was  a  chance  of  surprising  the  ambuscade.  My  men 
were  armed  with  shot-guns  and  pistols,  the  proper  weapons  for 
such  an  affair.  I  ordered  them  to  follow  me  in  sino;le-file  in  the 


A  NIGHT   ATTACK.  129 

direction  of  the  enemy,  instructing  them  to  hold  their  fire  until 
we  were  challenged,  and  to  then  discharge  their  weapons,  and, 
without  stopping  to  reload,  make  their  way  back  to  the  horses. 
The  moon  had  just  gone  down  as  we  began  to  move  slowly  down 
the  road.  We  made  little  noise,  and  were  soon  convinced  by  a 
chorus  of  coughing,  which  broke  on  our  ears  as  we  neared  them, 
that  a  pretty  good  crowd  was  before  us.  When  we  had  almost 
reached  the  point  where  the  roads  cross,  a  Sergeant,  with  five  or 
six  men  at  his  back,  sprang  up,  so  near  to  us  that  I  could  have 
touched  him  by  making  another  step,  and  ordered  "halt,"  in  a 
low  voice,  evidently  taking  us  for  friends.  Our  answer  was  a 
shot,  and  he  fell  dead.  His  comrades  returned  our  fire,  and  at 
once  a  line  of  men  rose  from  the  fence  corners  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  road  which  we  had  just  descended — we  had  passed  them 
unseen  in  the  darkness.  Many  of  them  must  have  been  asleep 
until  alarmed  by  the  firing.  The  bulk  of  the  force,  however, 
was  stationed  upon  the  other  road,  and,  as  they  sprang  up  at 
the  sudden  uproar,  and  aimed  at  the  blaze  of  the  guns,  they  en 
dangered  their  own  friends  more  than  us.  My  men  sank  at 
once  upon  their  knees,  and  the  enemy  firing  wildly  and  high, 
did  not  touch  one  of  them.  They  pointed  their  shot-guns  low, 
and  every  flash  was  followed  by  a  groan,  and,  by  the  quick  vivid 
light,  we  could  see  the  men  we  hit  writhing  on  the  ground. 
The  curses  and  commands  of  the  officers,  shouts  of  the  com 
batants,  and  yells  of  the  wounded  were  mingled  together.  The 
breadth  of  the  road,  only,  separated  us,  and  the  blaze  from  the 
guns  met.  When  our  weapons  were  emptied,  we  sprang  over 
the  fence  and  ran  at  top  speed  for  our  horses.  A  chain  picket 
which  had  been  posted  on  the  left  of  the  Shelbyville  road,  a 
short  distance  from  it,  rushed  forward  and  opened  upon  us,  and 
the  enemy  we  had  just  bidden  farewell  redoubled  his  fire. 
When  we  regained  the  horses,  we  were  nearly  surrounded. 
Parties  had  come  out  from  the  woods  behind  us,  as  we  passed 
down  the  road,  and  our  retreat  by  the  way  we  had  come  was 
blocked.  Our  signals  to  call  in  the  laggards,  as  we  prepared  to 
9 


130  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

leave,  were  answered  from  every  direction  by  the  enemy.  But 
the  woods  befriended  us,  as  they  had  often  done  before,  and  we 
escaped  under  its  shelter.  On  that  same  night  a  similar  adven 
ture  befell  some  Confederates  (I  think  of  Starne's  command)  on 
the  Franklin  pike,  and  some  pickets  were  killed  on  the  side  of 
Nashville  entirely  opposite  to  that  into  which  all  of  these  roads 
(which  have  been  mentioned)  run.  Of  course  every  thing  was 
attributed  to  Morgan,  and  the  Federals  were  puzzled  and  un 
certain,  whether  to  believe  him  really  ubiquitous,  or  the  com 
mander  of  two  or  three  thousand  men. 

A  day  or  two  after  these  occurrences,  Morgan  went  with  a  flag 
of  truce  to  Mitchell's  encampment  to  endeavor  to  exchange 
some  of  his  prisoners  for  his  own  men  who  had  been  captured. 
Colonel  Wood,  who  was  with  him,  was  asked  confidentially  how 
many  men  Morgan  had,  and  was  told  that  the  mischief  he 
was  doing  could  only  be  accounted  for  upon  the  supposition  that 
he  had  control  of  a  large  force.  Wood  answered,  also  in  confi 
dence,  that  although  he  had  co-operated  with  Morgan  for  two  or 
three  weeks,  he  was  entirely  ignorant  of  the  strength  of  his  com 
mand.  That  he  knew,  only,  that  Morgan  was  controlling  the 
motions  of  men  whom  he  (Morgan)  rarely  saw ;  and  that,  although 
he  himself  was  intimately  cognizant  of  all  that  occurred  under 
Morgan's  immediate  supervision,  he  was  frequently  astonished 
by  hearing  from  the  latter,  accounts  of  enterprises  which  had 
been  accomplished  by  his  orders  in  quarters  very  remote  from 
where  he  was  in  person  operating.  Wood  saw  the  impression 
which  prevailed,  and  shaped  his  answers  to  confirm  it.  In  re 
ality,  there  were  not  in  the  vicinity  of  Nashville,  at  that  time, 
on  all  sides,  more  than  three  hundred  Confederate  soldiers.  Of 
this  number,  Morgan  could  control  only  his  own  three  companies 
and  the  fifty  men  with  Wood,  although  the  others,  who  were 
stragglers,  and  furloughed  men  from  the  Texas  Rangers,  Starne's, 
McNairy's  and  other  cavalry  regiments,  often  joined  him  upon 
his  expeditions. 

Many  of  the  Federal  soldiers  killed  around  Nashville,  and 


FLAG   OF   TRUCE.  131 

whose  deaths  were  charged  to  Morgan's  men,  were  killed  by  the 
independent  partisans,  most  of  them  men  who  lived  in  the  neigh 
boring  country,  and  had  obtained  leave  to  linger,  for  a  while, 
about  their  homes.  Great  zeaj.  and  activity,  however,  was  dis 
played  by  all  parties. 

When  the  flag  of  truce  party  mentioned  above  got  to  the 
picket  line,  it  was  met  by  an  expedition  consisting  of  cavalry,  ar 
tillery  and  infantry,  riding  in  wagons,  en  route  for  Murfreesboro', 
with  the  expectation  of  capturing  Morgan's  entire  band.  Gene 
ral  Mitchell  was  very  angry  when  the  arrival  of  the  flag  was 
announced,  and  complained  that  Morgan  had  taken  that  method 
of  defeating  his  plans,  that  otherwise  would  have  been  assuredly 
successful.  This  charge  created  a  good  deal  of  amusement,  when 
Morgan  told  the  story  later  to  his  brother  officers  of  Johnston's 
army.  Even  if  Morgan  (as  Mitchell  thought),  had  known  that 
an  expedition  was  on  foot  for  his  capture,  he  still  would  have  had  a 
perfect  right  to  transact  at  that  time — if  listened  to — any  matter 
of  business  which  required  to  be  done  under  flag  of  truce.  It  is 
legitimate  to  send  them  even  while  battles  are  going  on. 

During  the  entire  war,  both  sides  used  to  send  flags  of  truce 
for  quite  other  purposes  than  the  ostensible  ones.  Morgan  was 
the  commanding  Confederate  officer  in  all  that  region,  and  had 
a  right  to  send  flags  of  truce  for  any  purpose  whatever,  so  long 
as  he  observed  the  usages  which  govern  them.  The  flag  of  truce 
need  not  have  stopped  the  expedition. 

It  was  Mitchell's  own  fault  if  it  was  allowed  to  go  far  enough  to 
see  what  he  wished  to  conceal.  It  is  the  right  and  positive  duty  of 
an  officer  in  charge  of  a  flag,  to  go  as  far  as  he  is  permitted.  Gene 
ral  Mitchell  could  have  refused  to  receive  it,  and  have  ordered  it 
back.  Morgan's  friends  somewhat  doubted  whether  this  expedi 
tion  (even  if  it  had  not  been  met  and  checked  by  the  flag  of 
truce),  would  have  resulted  in  Morgan's  capture.  General 
Mitchell  was  a  profound  strategist,  but  he  was  going  to  travel 
by  daylight  through  a  country  full  of  Morgan's  friends,  and 
upon  a  road  constantly  watched  by  his  scouts,  to  surprise  Mor- 


132 

gan.  At  any  rate,  it  may  be  safely  asserted  that  the  fond  hope 
which  General  Mitchell  cherished,  could  never  have  been  re 
alized,  after  Morgan  had  gotten  such  timely  information  of  an 
expedition  intended  for  his  capture,  that  he  was  able  to  meet  it 
with  a  flag  of  truce  as  it  was  just  setting  out. 

The  country  around  Nashville,  in  which  Morgan  did  the  ser 
vice,  which  I  have  attempted  to  describe-,  is  one  admirably 
adapted  to  it.  It  is  one  of  the  most  fertile  and  wealthy  portions 
of  Middle  Tennessee,  a  region  unsurpassed  in  productiveness. 
Yet  teeming  as  it  is  with  every  crop  which  the  farmer  wishes, 
one  would  think,  in  riding  along  the  fine  turnpikes  which 
enter  Nashville  upon  all  sides,  that  a  comparatively  small  pro 
portion  of  the  land  is  cultivated.  A  dense  growth  of  timber, 
principally  cedar,  stretches,  sometimes  for  miles,  along  the 
roads,  and  runs  back  from  them,  occasionally,  to  considerable 
distances.  The  cedar  glades,  are,  some  of  them,  of  great  ex 
tent,  and  are  penetrated  in  all  directions'  by  roads.  Springs, 
and  small  watercourses,  are  frequent.  It  is  indeed  a  beautiful 
country,  and  the  paradise  of  partisan  cavalry,  who  can  find  in 
it,  every  where,  supplies  for  men  and  horses,  shelter  to  hide  them, 
going  against  and  escaping  from  an  enemy,  and,  stop  where 
they  will,  all  that  makes  a  camp  happy. 

The  people  who  live  in  this  country  are  worthy  to  possess  it. 
They  are  brave,  frank,  generous  and  hospitable — true  t6  their 
friends,  kind  to  the  distressed.  They  are  just  and  honorable, 
and  uphold  through  all  trials  and  evils,  the  right,  as  they  under 
stand  it,  and  their  plighted  word.  Come  what  wrill  upon  this 
country,  may  God  bless  the  people  of  Middle  Tennessee. 

Two  or  three  days  after  the  flag  of  truce  affair,  Morgan  de 
termined  upon  an  expedition  to  a  different  quarter  from  that  in 
which  he  had  been  hitherto  employed.  It  was  high  time  that, 
in  accordance  with  the  instructions  he  had  received,  he  followed 
and  rejoined  the  army,  and  he  desired  to  leave  an  impression 
upon  the  enemy  of  his  "ubiquity,"  which  would  be  useful,  after 
he  himself  was  gone. 


CAPTURE    OF   GALLATIN.  133 

Upon  the  north  side  of  the  Cumberland,  and  about  eight 
miles  from  it  in  a  direct  line,  is  the  little  town  of  Gallatin,  in 
Suinner  County,  Tennessee.  It  is  situated  on  the  Louisville  and 
Nashville  road,  about  thirty  miles  from  Nashville.  This  place 
was  one  of  no  military  importance  at  that  time,  but  it  was  right 
upon  the  line  of  communication  between  Louisville  and  Nash 
ville — the  roads  running  from  Kentucky,  as  well  as  the  railroad, 
all  passing  through  it — and  the  line  of  telegraph.  This  place  is 
about  fifty  miles  from  Murfreesboro',  by  the  most  direct  route. 
Morgan  resolved  to  hold  this  place  for  a  day  or  two,  and  get 
the  benefit  of  the  "  communication"  himself.  He  left  Murfrees 
boro'  about  miday,  passed  through  Lebanon  that  evening,  and 
encamped  for  the  night  near  that  place.  Crossing  the  Cumber 
land  next  morning  at  Canoe-branch  ferry,  he  reached  Gallatin 
about  ten  o'clock.  He  found  the  town  ungarrisoned,  two  or 
three  clerks  to  take  care  of  unimportant  stores,  and  a  telegraph 
operator,  constituting  all  the  force  there  was  to  oppose  him. 
The  citizens  of  this  place  were  always  strongly  attached  to  the 
Confederate  cause,  and  devoted  friends  of  Morgan  and  his 
command1— for  which  they  subsequently  suffered  no  little — and 
they  received  him  enthusiastically.  This  neighborhood  was 
always  noted  for  good  cheer,  and,  on  this  occasion,  dainties  of  all 
kinds  appeared  as  if  by  magic,  and  boquets  were  showered  by 
the  score.  Desiring  the  latest  information  from  Nashville, 
Morgan,  accompanied  by  Colonel  Wood,  went  straight  to  the 
telegraph  office,  where  they  were  kindly  received  by  the  opera 
tor,  to  whom  they  introduced  themselves  as  Federal  officers  just 
from  the  interior  of  Kentucky.  The  operator  immediately  placed 
himself  in  communication  with  Nashville  and  got  the  last  news 
for  their  benefit.  The  conversation  then  turned  on  Morgan. 
"  The  clerk  of  the  lightning"  said  that  he  had  not  yet  disturbed 
them  at  Gallatin,  but  that  he  might  be  expected  any  day : 
."  However,"  he  continued,  "  let  him  come,  I,  for  one,  am  ready 
for  him."  He  told  the  story  of  Morgan's  coming  to  Mitchell's 
lines  with  the  flag  of  truce  (which,  it  seems,  had  raised  great 


L34 

excitement),  and  declared  that  lie  ought  to  have  been  shot  then 
and  there.  "Had  I  been  there,"  said  he,  fiercely,  and  brandish 
ing  his  revolver,  "  the  scoundrel  would  have  never  left  alive.'' 

'•Give  me  that  pistol,"  Morgan  said  quietly;  and,  taking  it, 
much  to  the  fellow's  surprise,  "  I  am  Morgan." 

The  consternation  of  the  operator  was  extreme,  and  his 
apology,  when  he  found  his  tongue,  polite.  It  was  accepted,  and 
so  was  he  and  placed  under  guard.  He  was  badly  scared,  at 
first,  but  he  was  treated  kindly,  and  in  a  few  days  became 
domesticated  and  even  playful.  An  engine  and  a  few  cars, 
found  standing  at  the  depot,  were  taken  possession  of  —  the  cars 
were  immediately  burned.  Morgan  got  on  the  engine  with  two 
or  three  companions,  and  run  some  miles  up  the  railroad  to  visit 
two  or  three  points  of  interest.  He  desired  especially  to  ascer 
tain  if  the  tunnel  could  readily  be  destroyed,  but  found  that  it 
would  be  a  work  of  more  time  than  he  had  to  spare.  While 
he  was  absent,  several  Federal  officers  and  soldiers  came  into 
the  town  and  were  made  prisoners.  When  he  returned,  the 
engine  was  run  off  the  track,  over  a  steep  bank,  and  destroyed. 
On  the  next  morning  he  sent  the  bulk  of  his  command  across 
the  river  again,  with  instructions  to  remain  near  and  guard  the 
ferry.  He,  himself,  with  ten  or  fifteen  men,  remained  at  Galla- 
tin  two  days  longer  with  the  hope  of  catching  some  of  the 
trains.  He  was  disappointed,  the  news  got  around  and  none 
came.  Twenty  or  thirty  wagons  which  were  coming  from 
Scottsville,  under  a  small  guard,  were  also  turned  back  —  the 
escort  getting  the  alarm  after  he  had  made  all  his  preparations 
to  capture  them  —  so  that  his  expedition  was  more  barren  of 
the  spoils  of  war  than  he  had  hoped.  But  his  main  object  —  to 
that  they  could  never  safely  count  upon  his 


being  "gone"  —  wapw&ctfy  accomplished.  While  his  men  on 
the  south  side  of  the  river  were  waiting  for  him,  six  transports, 
loaded  with  troops  from  Monticello,  passed  down  toward  Nash 
ville.  The  men  on  the  boats  did  not  know  who  the  cavalry 
were,  and  our  men  were  afraid  to  fire  upon  them,  lest  they 


STAMPEDE   OF    OUR   PICKETS.  135 

might  endanger  Captain  Morgan  and  their  comrades  with  him, 
on  the  other  side.  Immediately  after  his  return  to  Murfrees- 
boro',  he  set  out  to  rejoin  the  army,  and  met  at  Shelby ville  that 
portion  of  his  command  which  had  been  encamped  on  the 
Shelbyville  and  Nashville  road,  and  which,  in  obedience  to  his 
orders,  had  also  repaired  to  the  former  place. 

Here  we  remained  for  two  or  three  days  and  then  marched  on 
in  the  track  of  the  army.  While  at  Shelbyville,  the  first  and 
only  causeless  stampede  of  our  pickets  and  false  alarm  to  the 
camps  which  occurred  during  our  squadron  organization,  took 
place.  Ten  or  fifteen  men  were  posted  on  picket  some  eight 
miles  from  the  town  toward  Nashville,  near  a  small  bridge,  at 
the  southern  end  of  which  the  extreme  outpost  vidette  stood. 
From  tales  told  by  the  citizens,  these  pickets  had  conceived  the 
idea  that  the  enemy  contemplated  an  attack  to  surprise  and  cap 
ture  them,  and  (perhaps  for  the  very  reason  that  they  had  so 
often  played  the  same  game  themselves)  they  became  very  nerv 
ous  about  it.  Late  in  the  night,  two  men  came  down  the  road 
from  toward  Nashville  in  a  buggy,  and  drove  rapidly  upon  the 
bridge-without  heeding  the  vidette's  challenge — he,  taking  them 
to  be  the  enemy,  shot  both  barrels  of  his  gun  at  them  and  fled 
to  alarm  the  other  videttes  and  his  comrades  at  the  base.  The 
whole  party  became  so  alarmed  by  his  representation  of  the  im 
mense  number  and  headlong  advance  of  the  enemy,  that,  without 
stopping  to  fight  or  reconnoiter,  they  all  came  in  a  hand-gallop 
to  camp.  The  officer  in  charge  sent  the  vidette  who  had  given 
the  alarm,  in  advance,  to  report  to  me.  I  immediately  got  the 
command  under  arms  and  then  questioned  him.  He  stated  that 
the  enemy's  cavalry  came  on,  at  the  charge,  in  column  of  fours, 
that  they  paid  no  attention  to  his  challenge,  and  that  when  he 
fired,  they  dashed  at  him,  making  the  air  ring  with  their  yells 
and  curses.  He  said  that  ;'  the  road  seemed  perfectly  blue  for 
more  than  half  a  mile,"  so  great  was  their  number. 

It  was  a  moonless  night,  and  a  slight  rain  was  falling,  making 
the  darkness  intense.  I  asked  him  if  he  might  not  have  been 


136  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

deceived  and  if  he  was  not  scared.  "  No,  sir,"  said  he,  "  not  a 
bit,  but  I  was  somewhat  arrytated" 

Leaving  Shelbyville,  we  marched  through  Fayetteville  to 
Huntsville ;  every  where  along  the  route  the  people  flocked  to 
see  Morgan,  and  his  progress  was  one  continual  ovation.  When 
we  reached  Huntsville,  the  most  beautiful  town  in  Alabama  (and 
now  that  Columbia  is  in  ashes)  perhaps  in  the  entire  South,  we 
were  received  with  the  kindness  and  hospitality  which  character 
ize  that  generous,  warm-hearted  population.  Huntsville,  the 
birth-place  of  Morgan,  greeted  him  like  a  mother  indeed.  For 
ten  days  we  remained  there ;  every  man  in  the  command  the 
recipient  of  unwearying  .attention.  It  was  very  injurious  to 
good  soldierly  habits,  but  served,  as  many  other  such  instances 
did,  to  show  the  men  that  they  were  fighting  for  a  people  who 
loved  to  be  grateful,  and  to  prove  it — and  unavailing  as  the 
struggle  was,  it  is  still  a  thought  of  pride  and  satisfaction,  that 
the  labors  and  sacrifices  were  made  for  a  people  worthy  of 
them  all. 

Crossing  the  Tennessee  river  at  Decatur  and  marching  just 
in  the  track  of  the  army,  we  reached  Byrnesville,  a  few 
miles  from  Corinth,  on  the  third  of  April,  and  found 
there  the  division  of  General  Breckinridge,  to  which  we 
were  attached.  The  whole  army  was  then  astir,  and  formino- 
to  march  to  attack  the  enemy  who  lay  at  Pittsburg  Landing  on 
the  southern  bank  of  the  Tennessee  some  twenty  miles  from 
Corinth. 

Morgan's  services  were  much  talked  of,  and  he  was  compli 
mented  by  General  Johnson  in  terms  that  were  very  grateful  to 
him.  He  was  given  the  commission  of  Colonel,  to  take  effect 
from  the  fourth  of  April,  and  he  received  (what  he  valued  much 
more  highly)  an  assurance,  or  what  he  construed  to  be  such,  that 
he  would  be  permitted  to  act  independently  again,  and  fol 
low  his  favorite  service  with  a  stronger  force  and  upon  a 
larger  scale. 


PROMOTION   OF  MORGAN.  137 

None  among  the  many  ardent  and  high-strung  men  who  went 
with  so  much  zeal  into  that  fight,  felt  more  hope  and  enthusiasm 
than  Morgan,  for  he  saw  beyond  it,  a  career  of  excitement, 
success,  and  glory,  that  might  satisfy  the  most  energetic  and 
most  daring  nature. 


138  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

Ox  the  3d  of  April,  the  army,  leaving  its  cantonments  around 
Corinth,  commenced  its  advance,  and  the  heads  of  the  columns 
were  directed  toward  Pittsburg,  on  the  Tennessee  river,  where, 
unconscious  of  the  gathering  storm,  lay  the  Federal  host  under 
General  Grant,  which  had  conquered  at  Donelson.  Flushed 
with  that  victory  and  insolent  with  triumph,  the  enemy  rested 
for  the  long  march  of  invasion  which  he  believed  would  lead  him 
(unchecked,  even  if  opposed)  to  easy,  speedy  and  decisive  con 
quest.  No  thought  of  danger  to  himself,  disturbed  these  pleas 
ant  anticipations. 

The  suggestion  that  an  attack  from  the  Confederate  forces 
at  Corinth  was  imminent,  would  have  been  dismissed  as  the  idlest 
and  weakest  of  apprehensions.  The  different  corps  moved  from 
their  respective  positions,  on  the  railroads  which  enter  Corinth, 
by  the  most  direct  roads  to  the  point  indicated  for  their  concen 
tration. 

General  Johnston  had  declared,  some  weeks  previously,  with 
prophetic  judgment,  that  upon  that  very  spot,  "  the  great  battle 
of  the  Southwest  would  be  fought." 

Breckinridge's  division,  to  which  Morgan's  squadron  was  now 
attached,  moved  from  Byrnesville.  The  roads  were  narrow  and 
miry,  and  were  not  improved  by  a  heavy  rain  which  fell  during 
the  march,  and  by  the  passage  of  successive  trains  of  wagons 
and  batteries  of  artillery.  The  march  was  slow  and  toilsome. 
The  infantry  labored  along  with  mud-clogged  feet,  casting  sour 
looks  and  candid  curses  at  the  cavalry  and  couriers,  who  bespat 
tered  them.  The  artillery  often  stuck  fast,  and  the  struggling 
horses  failed  to  move  the  pieces,  until  the  cannoniers  applied 
themselves  and  pushed  and  strained  at  the  heavy  wheels. 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   THE   BATTLE    OF   SIIILOH.  139 

On  the  5th,  about  three  or  four  in  the  afternoon,  every  thing 
was  concentrated  upon  the  ground,  where  GeneralJohnston  pro 
posed  to  establish  his  line,  and  the  disposition  of  the  forces,  in 
accordance  with  the  plan  of  battle,  was  at  once  commenced.  On 
account  of  some  accident,  or  mistake,  this  concentration  was 
effected  one  day  later  than  had  been  contemplated,  causing  a 
corresponding  delay  in  the  attack.  It  has  frequently  been 
asserted  that  this  was  occasioned  by  the  failure  of  General  Polk's 
corps  to  arrive  at  the  appointed  time. 

General  Polk's  report  demonstrates  the  injustice  of  this  state 
ment,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  condition  of  the  roads  was  the 
sole  cause  of  the  delay. 

A  want  of  promptness  upon  the  part  of  General  Polk,  no 
doubt  would  have  produced  a  suspension  of  the  attack.  A 
corps  so  strong  and  efficient,  could  have  been  ill-spared  from  an 
army,  already  inferior  in  numbers  to  the  antagonist  it  was  about 
to  assail,  and  the  absence  of  the  brave  old  Bishop  from  the  field, 
would  have  been,  of  itself,  a  serious  loss.  This  delay  was  the 
cause  of  grave  apprehensions  to  many  of  the  Confederate  Gen 
erals,  and,  as  matters  were  managed,  was  really  unfortunate. 

It  was  known  that  Buell  was  marching  rapidly  to  the  support 
of  Grant,  and  GeneralJohnston  wished  to  crush  the  latter  before 
their  junction  was  eifected. 

General  Beauregard  was  of  opinion  that  the  attack,  having  been 
so  long  delayed,  ought  to  be  abandoned  altogether  ;  that  it  would 
now  be  extremely  hazardous,  and  that  the  safety  of  the  army 
would  be  compromised  if  it  did  not  retire  promptly  to  Corinth. 

General  Johnston  listened  courteously  to  every  argument,  but 
was  moved  by  none  to  relinquish  his  plan.  His  resolution  to 
fight,  after  placing  his  army  in  front  of  the  enemy,  was  fixed. 
He  believed,  "  the  offensive  once  assumed,  ought  to  be  main 
tained  at  all  hazards."  He  trusted  that  vigor  and  audacity 
would  enable  him  to  accomplish  victory  on  the  first  day,  before 
the  fresh  troops  came,  and  his  designs  were  too  profoundly  con 
sidered,  his  gallant  faith  in  his  soldiers,  too  earnest,  for  his 


Ai\V>° 


I 

140  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

purpose  to  be  shaken.  In  answer  to  an  anxious  inquiry  from 
his  aide,  Colonel  William  Preston,  he  said,  quietly,  "  I  would 
fight  them  were  they  a  million." 

The  ground  selected  for  battle  was  that  inclosed  between  Owl 

O 

and  Lick  creeks,  which  run  nearly  parallel  with  each  other,  and 
empty  into  the  Tennessee  river.  The  flanks  of  the  two  armies 
rested  upon  these  little  streams,  and  the  front  of  each  was  just 
the  distances,  at  their  respective  positions,  between  the  two 
creeks.  The  Confederate  front  was,  consequently,  a  little  more 
than  three  miles  long.  The  distance  between  the  creeks  widens 
somewhat,  as  they  approach  the  river,  and  the  Federal  army  had 
more  ground  upon  which  to  deploy.  The  position  which  the 
enemy  occupied  next  morning,  is  five  or  six  miles  from  the 
river,  and  his  advance  camp  was  perhaps  a  mile  southward  of 
Shiloh  Church.  He  had,  as  yet,  established  no  line  ;  the  attack 
next  morning  took  him  completely  by  surprise,  and  he  formed 
after  the  fight  had  commenced. 

General  Johnson's  effective  strength,  including  all  the  forces 
available  for  that  battle,  was  about  thirty-five  thousand  men. 
That  of  the  enemy  was,  perhaps,  forty-five  thousand  men.  The 
advantages  of  attack  and  surprise  would,  General  Johnston 
thought,  more  than  counterbalance  his  numerical  inferiority. 
If  Buell  brought  reinforcements  to  his  opponents,  by  forced 
marches,  in  advance  of  his  army,  he  would  feel  their  effect 
only  in  a  stronger  line,  and  more  stubborn  resistance  upon  the 
front — his  flanks  would  be  safe  in  any  event.  The  array  of 
his  forces  evinced  a  resolution  to  break  through  and  crush, 
at  any  cost,  whatever  should  confront  him  in  the  narrow  space 
where  the  whole  conflict  would  be  crowded. 

The  troops  were  bivouacked  that  night  upon  the  ground 
which  it  was  intended  that  they  should  occupy  in  line  of  bat 
tle,  No  disposition  which  could  be  made  that  evening  was 
delayed;  every  precaution  was  taken  to  guard  against  a  fur 
ther  procrastination  of  the  attack.  The  men  laid  down  to 
sleep  in  the  order  in  which  they  were  to  rush  upon  the  enemy. 


BATTLE   OF   SIIILOH.  141 

General  Hardee  had  command  of  the  first  line,  General  Bragg 
of  the  second,  and  General  Polk  of  the  third.  General  Hardee's 
line  extended  from  the  one  creek  to  the  other,  and  as  his  corps 
(fully  deployed)  could  not  properly  occupy  the  entire  distance, 
he  was  reinforced  by  a  fine  brigade  under  Brigadier  General 
Gladden.  To  Hardee  was  given  the  honor  of  commencing  the 
battle,  and  he  was  ordered  to  push  his  whole  line  rapidly  for 
ward,  at  early  dawn.  General  Bragg's  line  was  formed  similarly 
to  General  Hardee's,  and  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  its  rear. 
Bragg  was  ordered  to  advance  simultaneously  with  Hardee,  and 
to  support  him  when  he  needed  assistance.  Then,  at  the  distance 
of  eight  hundred  yards,  came  General  Folk's  corps,  not  deployed, 
but  formed  in  column  of  brigades.  General  Breckinridge's 
division  (over  six  thousand  strong)  constituted  the  reserve,  and 
was  close  in  the  rear  of  Folk's  corps.  The  cavalry  was  promis 
cuously  disposed — indeed,  no  one  in  authority  seemed  to  think 
it  could  win  the  battle.  Morgan's  squadron  was  formed  with 
the  Kentucky  troops,  and  occupied  the  extreme  left  of  Breck 
inridge's  division.  This  disposition  of  the  forces  and  the  ener 
getic  conduct  of  the  Confederate  commanders,  explain  the 
striking  features  of  the  battle,  which  have  been  so  often 
remarked — the  methodical  success  of  the  Confederates,  upon 
the  first  day,  the  certainty  with  which  they  won  their  way 
forward  against  the  most  determined  resistance ;  the  "  clock- 
like  "  regularity  of  their  advance,  the  desperate  struggle,  the 
Federal  retreat,  repeated  again  and  again  through  the  day. 
Taking  into  consideration  the  circumstances  under  which  the 
collision  occurred,  military  savants  will,  some  day,  demonstrate 
that  success  ought,  with  mathematical  certainty,  to  have  resulted 
from  the  tactics  of  General  Johnston.  An  army  moving  to  attack 
(an  enemy,  surprised  and  unprepared),  in  three  lines,  supported 
by  a  reserve,  and  with  its  flanks  perfectly  protected,  ought  to 
have  delivered  crushing  and  continuous  blows.  Such  a  forma 
tion,  directed  by  consummate  skill  and  the  finest  nerve  in  a 


142  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

commander,  of  troops  who  believed  that  to  fight  would  be  to 
win,  promised  an  onset  well  nigh  irresistible. 

The  afternoon  wore  away  and  no  sign  in  the  enemy's  camps 
indicated  that  he  had  discovered  our  presence.  The  night  fell, 
and,  the  stern  preparations  for  the  morrow,  having  been  all 
completed,  the  army  sank  to  rest.  The  forest  was  soon  almost 
as  still  as  before  it  had  been  tenanted  with  the  hosts  of  war. 
But,  before  the  day  broke,  the  army  was  astir ;  the  bugles 
sounded  the  reveille  on  all  sides,  and  the  long  lines  began  to 
form.  About  five  o'clock,  the  first  gun  rang  on  the  front — 
another  and  another,  succeeding,  as  our  skirmishers  pressed  on, 
until  the  musketry  grew  into  the  crackling,  labored  sound,  which 
precedes  the  roar  of  real  battle.  The  troops  seemed  excited  to 
frenzy  by  the  sound.  It  was  the  first  fight  in  which  the  majority 
of  them  had  ever  been  engaged,  and  they  had,  as  yet,  seen  and 
suffered  nothing  to  abate  the  ardor  with  which  the  high-spirited 
young  fellows  panted  for  battle.  Every  one  who  witnessed 
that  scene — the  marshaling  of  the  Confederate  army  for  attack 
upon  the  morning  of  the  sixth  of  April — must  remember  more 
distinctly  than  any  thing  else,  the  glowing  enthusiasm  of  the  men, 
their  buoyancy  and  spirited  impatience  to  close  with  the  enemy. 
As  each  regiment  formed  upon  the  ground  where  it  had  bivou 
acked,  the  voice  of  its  commander  might  be  heard  as  he  spoke 
high  words  of  encouragement  to  his  men,  and  it  would  ring 
clearer  as  he  appealed  to  their  regimental  pride,  and  bade  them 
think  of  the  fame  they  might  win.  When  the  lines  began  to 
advance,  the  wild  cheers  which  arose  made  the  woods  stir  as  if 
with  the  rush  of  a  mighty  wind.  No  where  was  there  any 
thought  of  fear — every  where  were  the  evidences  of  impetuous 
and  determined  valor. 

For  some  distance  the  woods  were  open  and  clear  of  under 
growth,  and  the  troops  passed  through,  preserving  their  array 
with  little  difficulty;  but  as  the  point,  where  the  fight  between 
the  pickets  had  commenced,  was  neared,  the  timber  became 
dwarfed  into  scrubby  brush,  and  at  some  places  dense  thickets 


BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  143 

impeded  the  advance.  The  ground,  too,  grew  rugged  and  diffi 
cult  of  passage  in  unbroken  line.  Frequent  halts  to  reform 
and  dress  the  ranks  became  necessary,  and  at  such  times  Gen 
eral  Johnson's  magnificent  battle  order  was  read  to  the  regi 
ments,  and  its  manly,  heroic  language  was  listened  to  with  the 
feeling  it  was  intended  to  evoke.  The  gray,  clear  morning  was, 
ere  long,  enlivened  with  a  radiant  sunrise.  As  the  great  light 
burst  in  full  splendor  above  the  horizon,  sending  brilliancy  over 
the  scene,  many  a  man  thought  of  the  great  conqueror's  augury 
and  pointed  in  exultation  and  hope  to  the  "  Sun  of  Shiloh." 
Breckinridge's  division  went  into  the  fight  last,  and,  of  course, 
saw  or  heard  a  great  deal  of  it,  before  becoming  itself  actively 
engaged.  Not  far  off,  on  the  left  and  center,  the  fight  soon  grew 
earnest,  as  Hardee  dashed  resolutely  on  ;  the  uneasy,  broken 
rattle  of  the  skirmishers  gave  way  to  the  sustained  volleys  of 
the  lines,  and  the  artillery  joined  in  the  clamor,  while  away  on 
the  right,  the  voice  of  the  strife  swelled  hoarser  and  angrier, 
like  the  growl  of  some  wounded  monster — furious  and  at  bay. 
Hardee's  line  carried  all  before  it.  At  the  first  encampment  it 
met  nat  even  the  semblance  of  a  check.  Following  close  and 
eager  upon  the  fleeing  pickets,  it  burst  upon  the  startled  inmates 
as  they  emerged,  half  clad,  from  their  tents,  giving  them  no  time 
to  form,  driving  them  in  rapid  panic,  bayoneting  the  dilatory — 
on  through  the  camp  swept,  together,  pursuers  and  pursued. 
But  now  the  alarm  was  thoroughly  given,  the  "  long  roll "  and 
the  bugle  were  calling  the  Federals  to  arms  ;  all  through  their 
thick  encampments  they  were  hastily  forming. 

As  Hardee,  close  upon  the  haunches  of  the  foe  he  had  first 
started,  broke  into  another  camp,  a  long  line  of  steel  and  flame 
met  him,  staggering,  and  for  a  little  while,  stopping  his  advance. 
Buthis  gallant  corps  was  still  too  fresh  for  an  enemy,  not  yet  re 
covered  from  the  enervating  effects  of  surprise,  to  hold  it  back 
long.  For  a  while  it  writhed  and  surged  before  the  stern  bar 
rier  suddenly  erected  in  its  front,  and  then,  gathering  itself, 
dashed  irresistibly  forward.  The  enemy  was  beaten  back,  but 


144  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

the  hardy  Western  men  who  filled  his  ranks  (although  raw  and 
for  the  first  time  under  fire)  could  not  be  forced  to  positive 
flight.  They  had  once  formed,  and  at  this  stage  of  the  battle, 
they  could  not  be  routed.  They  had  little  discipline,  but  plenty 
of  staunch  courage.  Soon  they  turned  for  another  stand,  and 
the  Confederates  were,  at  once,  upon  them.  Again  they  gave 
way,  but  strewed  the  path  of  their  stubborn  retreat  with  many 
a  corpse  in  gray  as  well  as  in  blue.  At  half  past  seven  the 
first  lines  began  to  give  signs  of  exhaustion,  and  its  march  over 
the  rough  ground  while  struggling  with  the  enemy,  had  thinned 
and  impaired  it.  It  was  time  for  Bragg's  corps  to  come  to  the 
relief,  and  that  superb  line  now  moved  up  in  serried  strength. 
The  first  sign  of  slackening  upon  the  part  of  the  Confederates 
seemed  to  add  vigor  to  the  enemy's  resistance.  But  bravely  as 
they  fought,  they  never  recovered  from  the  stun  of  the  surprise. 
Their  half  of  the  battle  was  out  of  joint  at  the  beginning,  and 
it  was  never  gotten  right  during  that  day.  They  were  making 
desperate  efforts  to  retrieve  their  lost  ground  when  Bragg's  dis 
ciplined  tornado  burst  upon  them.  The  shock  was  met  gallantly 
but  in  vain.  Another  bloody  grapple  was  followed  by  another 
retreat  of  the  Federals,  and  again  our  line  moved  on. 

Those  who  were  in  that  battle  will  remember  these  successive 
contests,  followed  by  short  periods  of  apparent  inaction,  going 
on  all  the  day.  To  use  the  illustration  of  one  well  acquainted 
with  its  plan  and  incidents :  "It  went  on  like  the  regular  stroke 
of  some  tremendous  machine."  There  would  be  a  rapid  charge 
and  fierce  fight — the  wild  yell  would  announce  a  Confederate 
success — then  would  ensue  a  comparative  lull,  broken  again  in 
a  few  minutes,  and  the  charge,  struggle  and  horrible  din  would 
recommence. 

About  half  past  ten  Folk's  corps  prepared  to  take  part  in  the 
fight.  He  had  previously,  by  order  personally  given  by  General 
Johnston  (who  was  all  the  time  in  the  front),  sent  one  brigade 
to  reinforce  General  Bragg's  right,  where  the  second  line  had 
been  most  hotly  engaged.  He  had  also  sent,  by  order  of  Gen- 


BATTLE    OF   SlilLOH.  145 

eral  Beauregard,  one  brigade  to  the  left.  The  fight  at  this  time 
was  joined  all  along  the  line,  and  urged  with  greater  fury,  than  at 
any  period  of  the  day.  Almost  immediately  after  parting  with 
these  two  brigades,  General  Polk  became  engaged  with  the  re 
mainder  of  his  corps.  The  enemy  had,  now,  disposed  his  entire 
force  for  resistance — the  men  fought  as  if  determined  not  to  ac 
cept  defeat — and  their  stern,  tenacious  leader  was  not  the  man 
to  relinquish  hope,  although  his  lines  had  been  repeatedly  broken 
and  the  ground  was  piled  with  his  slain.  The  corps  of  Hardee. 
Bragg  and  Polk,  were  now  striving  abreast,  or  mingled  with  each 
other. 

In  reading  the  reports  of  the  Confederate  Generals,  frequent 
allusion  will  be  found  to  regiments  and  brigades  fighting  without 
"head  or  orders."  One  commander  would  sometimes  direct 
the  movements  of  troops  belonging  to  another.  At  this  phase 
of  the  struggle,  the  narrative  should  dwell  more  upon  "the 
biographies  of  the  regiments  than  the  history  of  the  battle/'' 
Bat  the  wise  arrangement  of  the  lines  and  the  instructions  given 
subordinate  commanders,  ensured  harmonious  action  and  the 
desired  result. 

Each  brigade  commander  was  ordered  (when  he  became  dis 
engaged),  to  seek  and  attack  the  nearest  enemy,  to  press  the 
flank  of  every  stubborn  hostile  force  which  his  neighbors  could 
not  move,  and  at  all  hazards  to  press  forward.  General  John 
ston  seemed  to  have  adopted  the  spirit  of  the  motto,  "When 
fighting  in  the  dark,  strike  out  straight."  He  more  than  once 
assumed  command  of  brigades  which  knew  not  what  to  do,  and 
led  them  to  where  they  could  fight  with  effect.  Our  successes 
were  not  won  without  costly  sacrifices,  and  the  carnage  was  lav 
ish  upon  both  sides. 

While  all  this  was  going  on  in  front,  Morgan's  squadron  moved 
along  with  Breckinridge's  division,  and  we  listened  to  the  hid 
eous  noise,  and  thought  how  much  larger  the  affair  was  than  the 
skirmishes  on  Green  river  and  around  Nashville.  We  soon 
learned  to  distinguish  when  the  fight  was  sharp  and  hotly  con- 
10 


146  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

tested,  and  when  our  lines  were  triumphantly  advancing,  and  we 
wondered  if  those  before  us  would  finish  the  business  before  we 
got  in. 

We  had  not  marched  far,  before  we  saw  bloody  indications  of 
the  fierce  work  that  had  been  done  upon  the  ground  over  which 
we  were  passing.  The  dead  and  the  wounded  were  thick  in  the 
first  camp,  and,  thence,  onward.  Some  of  the  corpses  (of  men 
killed  by  artillery),  showed  ghastly  mutillation.  In  getting  up 
our  glowing  anticipation  of  the  day's  programme,  we  had  left 
these  items  out  of  the  account,  and  we  mournfully  recognized 
the  fact,  that  many  who  seek  military  distinction,  will  obtain  it 
posthumously,  if  they  get  it  at  all.  The  actual  sight  of  a  corpse 
immensely  chills  an  abstract  love  of  glory.  The  impression 
soon  wears  off,  however,  and  the  dead  are  very  little  noticed. 
Toward  ten  or  eleven  o'clock  we  wandered  away  from  the  in 
fantry  to  which  we  had  been  attached,  and  getting  no  orders  or 
instructions,  devoted  ourselves  to  an  examination  of  the  many 
interesting  scenes  of  the  field,  which  we  viewed  with  keen 
.relish. 

The  camps  whence  the  enemy  had  been  driven,  attracted  es- 
;pecial  and  admiring  attention.  There  was  a  profusion  of  all 
•the  necessaries,  and  many  of  the  luxuries  of  military  life.  How 
we  wondered  that  an  army  could  have  ever  permitted  itself  to  be 
.driven  away  from  them. 

While  we  were  curiously  inspecting  the  second  or  third  en- 
.campment,  and  had  gotten  closer,  than  at  any  time  previously, 
.to  the  scene  of  the  fighting,  a  slight  incident  interrupted,  for  a 
moment,  the  pleasure  of  the  investigation.  Some  of  the  enemy's 
shells  were  bursting  over  our  heads,  and  as  we  were  practically 
ignorant  of  artillery,  we  were  at  first  puzzled  to  know  what  they 
were.  In  the  general  thunder  of  the  figkt,  no  special  reports 
could  be  heard,  to  lead  to  a  solution  of  the  particular  phenomena. 
Suddenly  a  short  yell  of  mingled  indignation  and  amazement, 
announced  that  one  of  the  party  had  some  practical  information 
on  the  subject.  He  had  been  struck  by  a  fragment  on  the 


BATTLE    OF    SIIILOJI.  147 

shoulder,  inflicting  a  severe  gash  and  bruise.  Not  knowing  how 
the  missile  had  reached  him,  he  seemed  to  think  himself  a  very 
ill-treated  man. 

Just  as  Breckinridge's  division  was  going  into  action,  about 
12  M.,  we  came  upon  the  left  of  it,  where  the  Kentucky  troops 
were  formed.  The  bullets  were  beginning  to  fly  thick  about  us. 
Simultaneously,  the  squadron  and  the  regiment  nearest  to  us, 
struck  up  the  favorite  song  of  the  Kentuckians,  "  Cheer  Boys, 
Cheer" — the  eifect  was  animating  beyond  all  description. 

About  this  time  our  advance  was  receiving  its  first  serious 
check.  While  the  right  and  the  left  were  advancing,  the  left- 
center  was  repulsed  before  a  strong  position  which  the  enemy 
held  in  force.  They  were  posted  upon  an  eminence,  in  front 
of  which  were  thickets  and  underbrush.  Plenty  of  artillery 
strongly  supported,  crowned  this  eminence,  and  Hardee's  utmost 
efforts  to  carry  it  had  been  foiled.  So  furiously  played  the  bat 
teries  of  the  enemy,  that  nothing  could  be  seen  of  the  position,  but 
sheets  of  flame  and  clouds  of  smoke.  When  an  advance  was 
attempted  against  it,  a  shower  of  minnie  balls  would  be  felt.  It 
was  finally  taken,  after  the  impetus  given  the  line  by  the  arrival 
of  the  reserve  under  Breckinridge,  had  sent  our  forces  forward 
on  both  sides  so  far,  that  it  was  completely  flanked.  While  the 
advance,  at  this  point,  was  thus  suspended,  the  squadron  hap 
pened  to  approach,  and  General  Hardee  sent  an  aide  to  know 
"  what  cavalry  that  was  ?"  Upon  learning  that  it  was  Morgan's, 
he  expressed  himself  much  pleased,  and  said  that  he  would  use 
it  to  "  take  that  battery."  When  informed  of  this  truly  gratifying 
compliment,  the  men  bore  themselves  with  becoming  sobriety, 
and  as  they  formed  for  the  charge,  which  we  were  told  would  be 
immediately  ordered,  they  indulged  in  no  unseemly  or  extrava 
gant  expressions  of  joy.  Indeed,  it  is  an  historical  fact,  that 
while  we  were  ready  enough  to  go,  we  were  not  so  sanguine  of 
the  result  as  General  Hardee  seemed  to  be.  The  General  sat 
on  his  horse  near  Schoup's  gallant  battery  which  was  replying, 
but  ineffectually,  to  the  vicious  rain  of  grape  and  shell  which 


148  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

poured  from  the  hill.  He  seemed  indifferent  to  the  terrible  vol 
leys,  and  only  anxious  to  capture  the  guns. 

The  order,  we  were  expecting,  was  nevw  given  us.  At  the 
first  slackening  of  the  fire  from  the  hill,  some  of  the  infantry 
regiments,  which  were  lying  down,  dashed  forward,  but  the  enemy 
left  the  position  because  he  was  in  danger  of  being  surrounded. 
Many  of  the  guns  were  abandoned. 

The  right  was  now  checked,  meeting  the  fiercest  resistance. 
The  left  and  center  bore  rapidly  forward. 

From  a  passage  in  General  Bragg's  report,  it  would  seem  that 
it  had  been  part  of  the  plan  to  press  more  strongly  upon  our 
right  and  drive  the  enemy  down  the  river,  "  leaving  the  left 
open  for  him  to  escape."  But  it  was  already  apparent  that  he 
was  being  hemmed  in  and  forced  from  all  sides,  toward  Pitts- 
burg  Landing. 

General  Hardee,  at  this  time,  ordered  Colonel  Morgan  to  take 
his  command  to  the  extreme  left,  and  "  charge  the  first  enemy 
he  saw."  Colonel  Morgan  immediately  proceeded  in  the  direc 
tion  indicated  as  rapidly  as  his  column  could  gallop.  The  left 
of  our  line  was  moving  so  swiftly  to  the  front  that,  having  to  go 
some  distance  by  a  bridle  path  in  the  rear,  before  turning  to  over 
take  it,  we  did  not  reach  it  until  nearly  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
Just  as  we  approached,  we  saw,  on  the  extreme  left,  a  body  of 
men  dressed  in  blue  uniforms,  going  through  with  some  strange 
evolutions.  Their  dress  was  much  like  that  of  the  enemy,  but 
there  were  troops,  evidently  Confederate,  not  far  from  them  that 
were  paying  them  no  attention.  Colonel  Morgan  ordered  a 
platoon  of  Company  A,  to  dismount  and  approach  them  cau 
tiously,  to  fire  into  them  if  satisfied  that  they  were  the  enemy, 
and  it  was  his  intention  to  then  charge  them.  We  drew  very 
near  to  them  unnoticed.  A  little  man  flourishing  a  portentous 
saber,  was  directing  their  movements  with  off-hand  eloquence. 
We  forbore  to  fire,  because,  although  we  did  not  understand 
what  he  said,  we  thought  from  the  emphasis  of  the  speaker,  his 
volubility,  and  the  imprecatory  sound  of  the  language,  that  it 


BATTLE    OF    SI11L01I.  149 

was  French,  and  that  his  party  were  Louisianians.  This  sur 
mise  was  correct.  They  were  members  of  Colonel  Mouton's 
fine  regiment,  the  Eighteenth  Louisiana.  Their  uniform  cost 
them  dearly  before  the  fight  was  over.  They  were  frequently 
fired  into  by  Confederate  regiments,  and  received,  in  that  way, 
smart  loss.  At  length  they  retalliated  whenever  they  received 
a  volley.  This  caused  some  complaint,  but  it  is  related  that  the 
Louisianians  gave  sound  military  reasons  for  their  conduct,  say 
ing  :  "We  fire  at  any  body  what  fire  at  us — G-d  d-m."  Shortly 
after  we  made  this  discovery,  we  saw  this  regiment  and  a  portion 
or  the  Kentucky  brigade,  charge  across  a  wide  field  on  the  ex 
treme  left  of  our  line.  Here  a  ravine  which  had  protected  our 
left  flank  suddenly  terminated,  and  when  the  line  had  dashed 
across  this  field  and  had  entered  the  woods  beyond,  it  was  en 
tirely  uncovered.  A  strong  force  of  the  enemy  was  formed  in 
the  middle  of  this  field  (where  one  of  the  camps  was  situated), 
and  the  Confederates  rushed  so  closely  upon  them,  that  it  seemed 
as  if  the  bayonets  must  cross,  before  they  gave  way.  The 
volume  of  musketry  in  this  charge  was  tremendous,  and  drowned 
the  crash  of  the  artillery.  When  the  Federals  turned  to  retreat 
they  still  preserved  their  array,  and  went  off  in  perfect  order. 
They  frequently  faced  about  to  fire  on  their  pursuers,  who 
poured  continuous  volleys  into  them,  and  thus  fighting  they  dis 
appeared  in  the  woods.  Our  squadron  and  the  Texian  rangers — 
Eighth  Texas — were  following  behind  the  infantry,  and  had 
been  unable  to  get  past  them,  or  (on  account  of  the  ravine)  to 
the  left  of  them.  Now,  however,  an  opportunity  of  actively 
participating  in  the  battle  occurred,  which  we  had  not  expected. 
As  we  were  pressing  across  the  field,  some  Federal  skirmishers 
appeared  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  upon  the  left  of  the  field,  not 
more  than  eighty  yards  from  us.  They  directed  their  attention 
principally  to  Byrnes'  battery,  which  was  also  crossing  the  field, 
and  prevented  the  cannoneers  from  unlimbering  the  guns.  Col 
onel  Morgan  at  once  ordered  the  charge,  and  the  squadron 
dashed  at  full  gallop  into  the  woods.  The  skirmishers  ran  back, 


150  v     HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 


but  as  we  forced  our  way  in  a  crowded  mass  (all  line  lost) 
through  the  thickets,  we  came  suddenly  upon  the  infantry  regi 
ment  to  which  these  skirmishers  belonged.  Fortunately  for  us, 
this  regiment,  in  scrambling  through  the  brush,  had  lost  the 
compactness  of  its  formation.  We  came  close  upon  them  before 
the  Federals  fired — they  delivered  one  stunning  volley,  the 
blaze  almost  reaching  our  faces,  and  the  roar  rang  in  our  ears 
like  thunder.  The  next  moment  we  rode  right  through  them — 

o  o 

some  of  the  men  trying  to  cut  them  down  with  the  saber,  and 
making  ridiculous  failures,  others  doing  real  execution  with  gun 
and  pistol.  We  lost  only  three  men  killed,  but  they  were  noble, 
gallant  soldiers — Lieutenant  James  West  and  privates  Samuel 
Buckner  and  James  Ghiselin.  We  lost  several  others  wounded. 
Twelve  of  the  enemy  were  killed  and  a  few  made  prisoners. 
The  affair  was  over  directly,  and  the  Federals  retreated.  The 
Texians,  as  we  prepared  to  charge,  asked  what  we  were  going 
to  do.  "To  go  in,"  was  the  answer.  "Then  we  will  go  in,  too," 
they  shouted,  and  galloping  down  the  rear  of  our  line,  until 
they  reached  the  right  of  it,  they  turned  short  to  the  left  and 
charged  into  the  woods.  They  struck  the  rest  of  the  brigade 
to  which  the  regiment  we  had  met  belonged,  and  drove  it  back 
for  some  distance.  They  were  never  checked  until  they  reached 
a  high  fence,  which  they  could  not  pass.  Their  loss  was  then 
severe,  and  many  of  their  riderless  horses  came  galloping  over 
the  ground  where  our  wounded  lay. 

Our  infantry  had  pressed  on  beyond  this  point,  and  there  was 
no  Confederate  force  near  except  this  cavalry.  It  was  impos 
sible  to  conjecture  how  strong  the  enemy  was  just  here,  but 
Colonel  Morgan,  fearing  that  he  might  come  in  force  sufficient  to 
endanger  this  flank,  disposed  his  command  on  foot,  to  make  all 
possible  resistance  in  such  an  event.  Our  skirmishers,  thrown 
forward,  could  not  find  him,  and  the  receding  din  of  the  battle 
seemed  to  promise  perfect  safety  against  all  such  dangers. 
About  half-past  one  or  two  o'clock,  occurred  the  great  calamity 
which  rendered  unavailing  all  of  the  sacrifices  and  successes 


FALL    OF    JOHNSON.  151 

of  the  day.  General  Johnston  was  killed.  He  had  exposed  him 
self  with  almost  culpable  recklessness.  From  the  commence 
ment  of  the  fight  he  had  been  in  the  van — cheering  the  struggling 
men — adding  fresh  spirit  to  the  charge — stimulating  to  new 
energy  the  battalions  that  were  checked.  His  clothing  had  been 
torn  by  balls  which  were  unheeded. 

Once  he  had  ridden  along  the  rear  of  a  brave  Arkansas  Regi 
ment,  which  had  just  recoiled  from  a  terrible  fire.  "  Where 
now,"  he  said,  striking  some  of  the  men  encouragingly  upon  the 
shoulder,  "  are  the  Arkansas  boys,  who  boasted  that  they  would 
fight  with  their  bowie  knives  ?  You  have  a  nobler  weapon  in 
your  grasp — will  you  dare  to  use  it?"  He  spoke  to  men  who 
could  not  hear  such  words  in  vain — they  rushed  forward  and 
won  the  position. 

Statham's  magnificent  brigade  had  at  length  faltered.  Gene- 
ralJohnston, bare-headed  and  with  his  hand  elevated,  rode  out 
in  front  of  the  brigade,  and  called  on  it  to  follow.  His  dress, 
majestic  presence,  imposing  gesture  and  large  gray  horse,  made 
him  a  conspicuous  mark.  A  ball  pierced  his  leg,  severing  the 
artery.  "He  paid  no  notice  to  the  wound,  but  continued  to  fol 
low  the  troops,  who,  incited  by  his  example,  had  charged  suc 
cessfully.  Suddenly  he  grew  faint  and  reeled  in  his  saddle. 
His  staff  came  to  his  assistance,  but  too  late.  They  bore  him 
into  a  ravine  for  shelter,  and  in  a  few  moments  he  died.  I  can 
not  venture  to  speak  of  General  Johnston  in  the  ordinary  terms 
of  eulogy — such  applied  to  him  would  seem  frivolous  and  pro 
fane.  He  was  too  great  for  it  in  life — and  it  would  little  accord 
with  the  veneration,  silent,  but  profound,  with  which  we,  his  peo 
ple,  cherish  his  memory.  If  he  had  lived  but  a  few  days  more  ! 
Shortly  after  this  great  disaster  the  lines  were  pressed  forward 
rapidly  again  at  all  points.  Our  troops  were  still  instinct  with 
the  spirit  of  the  lost  leader.  His  genius  had  prepared  effects, 
accomplished  after  he  was  gone.  The  left  had  swept  far  around 
— the  center,  where  the  latest  check  had  been  felt,  was  a  little 
behind — the  right  driving  everything  before  it,  when,  by  hard 


152  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

fighting  the  resistance  opposed  to  it  at  noon  had  been  overcome, 
was  approaching  the  river. 

Now  the  word  was  passed  through  the  army,  "  Let  every 
order  be  forward."  In  the  last  determined  stand  which  the 
enemy  made,  Major  General  Prentice  and  two  thousand  of  his 
division  were  captured.  His  troops  stood,  until  the  advancing 
Confederates  closed  in  on  two  sides,  and  escape  had  become  im 
possible. 

Our  army  was  now  near  the  river,  and  a  victory  absolutely 
complete  and  decisive,  was  just  within  its  grasp.  The  fighting 
had  been  hard  and  our  success  blood-bought  but  brilliant.  For 
many  miles  (through  his  encampments,  piled  up  with  rich  spoils) 
we  had  driven  the  enemy.  His  brave  resistance  had  at  length 
been  completely  broken,  arid  after  immense  losses,  he  seemed 
ready  to  yield.  It  is  an  indisputable  fact,  that  for  an  hour,  at 
least,  before  the  Confederate  advance  was  checked  by  order  of 
the  Commanding  General,  it  was  meeting  with  no  sort  of  check 
from  the  enemy.  The  Northern  writers,  who  shortly  after  the 
battle  described  it,  one  and  all  depicted  a  scene  of  utter  confu 
sion  and  consternation  as  prevailing  in  the  Federal  army, 
crowded  upon  the  bank  of  the  river.  Scarcely  a  semblance  of 
resistance  (according  to  these  writers),  was  maintained — while 
thousands  (all  discipline  and  confidence  gone),  were  prepared  to 
surrender.  Hundreds,  unable  to  force  their  way  upon  the  boats, 
plunged  into  the  river  and  were  drowned. 

The  head  of  Buell's  column  commenced  to  arrive  late  in  the 
afternoon,  and  the  troops  were  crossed  as  rapidly  as  they  came 
up.  Nelson's  division  crossed  first.  The  leading  brigade  was 
compelled  to  force  its  way  through  the  mass  of  fugitives.  On 
that  afternoon,  the  second  chance  which  the  Confederacy  had 
to  win  the  war,  was  thrown  away. 

All  night  long,  the  huge  pieces  upon  the  gunboats  thundered 
at  intervals,  with  a  roar  which  seemed  like  that  of  a  bursting 
firmament.  They  had  been  opened  during  the  afternoon,  but, 
on  account  of  the  great  elevation  necessary  to  enable  them  to 


WITHDRAWAL   OF   CONFEDERATE   FORCES.  153 

shoot  over  the  bluffs,  the  shells  had  gone  high  in  the  air.  These 
huge  missiles  came  screaming  louder  than  a  steam  whistle,  strik 
ing  off  the  tops  of  trees,  and  filling  the  air  with  dense  clouds 
of  smoke  when  they  burst,  but  doing  no  damage. 

During  the  night  little  was  done  to  reorganize  the  Confeder 
ate  soldiery.  Only  Bragg's  corps  maintained  its  discipline. 
Thousands  of  stragglers  (from  the  other  corps)  roamed  over  the 
field  to  plunder  and  riot.  The  Federal  Generals  strained  every 
nerve  to  repair  their  disaster.  The  fugitives  were  collected  and 
placed  again  in  the  ranks.  The  boats  plied  steadily,  bringing 
over  Buell's  fresh  and  undiscouraged  forces,  and  at  six  o'clock 
next  morning  the  victors  were  in  their  turn  assailed  by  an  army 
larger  than  the  one  they  had  confronted  on  the  day  before,  and 
half  of  which  was  fresh  and  unwearied.  General  Beauregard 
disposed  his  tired  troops  to  receive  this  storm — and  although  his 
line  was  thin — weakened  (from  the  superb  array  of  the  day  be 
fore)  by  the  dead  and  wounded  and  those  who  had  straggled 
from  their  colors — it  could  not  be  driven. 

General  Beauregard  in  his  report  of  the  battle,  says  : 

"On  his  right  and  center  the  enemy  was  repulsed  in  every 
effort  he  made  with  his  heavy  columns  in  that  quarter  of  the 
field.  On  the  left,  our  line  was  weakest,  and  here  the  enemy 
drove  on  line  after  line  of  fresh  troops  with  unremitting  fury." 
Our  troops  stood  firm,  but  General  Beauregard  feared  that  they 
must  eventually  break,  and  at  12  M.  (all  of  his  scanty  reserves 
having  been  put  in)  he  ordered  a  withdrawal  of  the  line. 

After  a  repulse  of  a  desperate  attack  the  troops  began  to 
retire,  and  accomplished  the  movement  without  trouble.  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  says  :  "  The  lines  of  troops  established  to 
cover  this  movement  had  been  disposed  on  a  favorable  ridge — 
commanding  the  ground  of  Shiloh  Church,  from  this  position  our 
artillery  played  upon  the  woods  beyond,  but  upon  no  visible 
enemy,  and  without  a  reply.  Soon  satisfied  that  no  serious 
pursuit  was,  or  would  be  attempted,  this  last  line  was  withdrawn, 
and  never  did  troops  leave  a  battlefield  in  better  order." 


154  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

General  Breckinridge  (whose  heroic  conduct  on  both  days 
had  almost  repaid  the  Kentuckians — in  their  pride  in  it — for  the 
loss  of  the  battle)  was  left  as  rear  guard,  just  in  front  of  the 
intersection  of  the  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  roads — upon  the 
ground  occupied  by  the  army  upon  Saturday  night.  On  the 
next  day  he  was  withdrawn  three  miles  to  Mickey's,  and  re 
mained  there  undisturbed  for  five  or  six  days.  Our  cavalry 
occupied  the  ground  several  miles  further  to  the  north.  Mor 
gan's  squadron,  and  other  cavalry  commands,  were  posted  for 
more  than  a  week  upon  a  portion  of  the  field  won  from  the 
enemy  on  the  first  day,  during  which  time  only  two  or  three 
trifling  skirmishes  occurred. 

The  army  marched  to  Corinth  on  the  7th  and  8th. 
It  is  a  point  conceded,  now,  on  all  sides,  that  had  the  Confed 
erate  army  pursued  its  success  on  the  evening  of  the  first  day3 
the  army  under  General  Grant  would  have  been  annihilated,  and 
Buell  never  could  have  crossed  the  river.  Had  General  John 
ston  survived,  the  battle  would  have  been  pressed  vigorously  to 
that  consummation.  Then,  what  would  have  been  the  situation  ? 
The  army,  remaining  upon  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee  for  a  few 
days,  would  have  been  reorganized  and  recovered  from  the  ex 
hausting  effects  of  the  battle.  The  slightly  wounded  returning 
to  the  ranks  would  have  made  the  muster-roll  full  thirty  thousand 
effectives. 

Price  and  Van  Dorn  coming  with  about  fifteen  thousand  and 
the  levies  from  all  quarters,  which  were  hastening  to  Corinth, 
would  have  given  General  Johnston  nearly  sixty  thousand  in 
fantry.  Buell,  unable  to  cross  the  river  or  to  use  it  for  obtain 
ing  supplies,  his  communications  with  Nashville  in  constant 
danger,  and  hourly  interrupted  by  the  five  or  six  thousand  cav 
alry  which  General  Johnston  could  have  thrown  upon  them, 
would  have  been  suspended  without  the  ability  to  obtain 
foothold  or  prop  anywhere.  If  nothing  else  could  have  made 
him  retreat,  a  menace  to  Nashville,  from  the  troops  in  East 
Tennessee,  would  have  served  the  purpose.  Then  General 


RESULT    OF   BATTLE    OF    SUILOII.  155 

Johnston  could  have  crossed  the  river,  and  the  cavalry  have  been 
pushed  on  to  operate  between  Nashville  and  Louisville.  General 
Buell  would  not  have  halted  to  fight.  With  the  odds  against 
him,  to  do  that  (in  the  heart  of  a  hostile  population  and  far 
from  support)  would  have  been  too  hazardous.  But  retreat 
would  have  been  almost  as  disastrous  as  defeat,  and,  closely 
pressed,  would  have  resulted  in  the  partial  disintegration  of  his 
army.  Military  men,  who  understand  the  situation,  and  the 
topography  of  the  country,  will  concur  in  the  opinion  that  Gen 
eral  Buell  could  not  have  halted  with  safety  at  Nashville,  nor, 
indeed,  until  he  had  reached  Munfordsville. 

Gentlemen  who  were  upon  GeneralJohnston's  staff,  and  in  his 
confidence,  state  that  it  was  his  intention  to  have  attempted  no 
march  into  Kentucky,  but  that  if  Buell  retreated  beyond  the 
Cumberland  river,  he  designed  (while  keeping  his  cavalry  on 
the  railroad  between  Nashville  and  Louisville)  to  have  marched 
his  army,  rapidly,  along  the  South  bank  of  the  Cumberland  to 
the  Ohio  river,  and,  crossing  that  stream,  to  have  pushed  into 
Illinois,  and  (destroying  the  great  trunk  lines  of  railroads)  have 
marched  to  Kentucky  by  way  of  Ohio.  He  could  have  made 
the  march  in  less  time  than  troops  could  have  been  organized  to 
oppose  him.  The  plan  appeared  daring  to  rashness,  but  where 
were  the  forces  to  endanger  such  a  march?  The  militia  could 
not  have  stopped  it  a  moment.  General  Johnston  believed  that 
his  army  would  have  'increased  as  it  advanced,  and  that  vacil 
lation  and  disaffection  removed  from  Kentucky  and  Missouri, 
would  be  transferred  to  the  Northwestern  States,  and  that  ne 
gotiations  for  peace  would  be  entertained  by  those  States  sepa 
rately. 

But  the  battle  of  Shiloh  was,  after  all,  a  Confederate  success. 
The  army  of  invasion  was  crippled  and  reduced  to  a  cautious 
offensive,  little  better  than  inactivity.  The  Federal  arms  were 
stayed  and  blunted,  and  the  Southern  people,  reanimated,  pre 
pared  for  fresh  and  vigorous  resistance. 

When  relieved  from  duty  on  the  field  of  Shiloh,  Colonel  Mor- 


156  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

gan  sought  and  obtained  permission  to  dash  into  Tennessee, 
with  a  force  adequate  to  important  results.  While  the  army 
lay  in  the  entrenchments  around  Corinth,  which  the  Federal 
forces  under  Halleck  were  tediously  approaching,  he  wished  to 
pounce  upon  the  rich  prizes  in  their  rear.  He  assembled  the 
troops,  \vith  which  he  was  about  to  make  the  contemplated  ex 
pedition  at  Byrnesville,  on  or  about  the  twenty-third  of  April. 

His  own  command,  Companies  A,  B  and  C,  respectively  com 
manded  by  Lieutenants  Sellers,  Chadburn  and  Churchill,  had 
been  augmented  by  a  fourth  company,  or  rather  nucleus  of  a 
company,  some  twenty-five  strong,  commanded  by  Captain 
Brown — a  gallant  officer.  Detachments  from  Colonel  Wirt 
Adams'  regiment  and  McNairy's  battalion  had,  also,  been  as 
signed  him.  These  were  commanded  by  his  friend,  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Wood,  and  Captain  Harris.  The  entire  force  at  his  dis 
posal  numbered  three  hundred  and  twenty-five  effectives.  Colo 
nel  Morgan  was  detained  at  Byrnesville  for  several  days,  having 
his  horses  shod,  arms  put  in  order,  rations  cooked,  and  other 
necessary  arrangements  for  the  expedition  perfected.  When  all 
was  ready,  the  command  commenced  its  march  on  the  26th. 
Extra  ammunition  arid  rations  were  carried  on  pack  mules — one 
being  allowed  to  each  section,  or  four  to  a,  company. 

These  mules  were  led  by  men,  detailed  from  the  section  to 
which  they  were  attached,  and  the  "train"  was  placed  under 
charge  of  private  Frank  Leathers — called  by  courteous  reminis 
cence  of  his  former  rank  in  the  Kentucky  militia,  and  as  ex- 
legislator — Colonel.  This  gallant  gentleman  will  pardon  me  for 
complimenting  the  energy  and  diligence  he  displayed,  by  re 
cording  the  grumbling  acknowledgment  of  one  of  those  he  "put 
in  motion,"  who  declared  that  "he  made  a  bigger  row  in 
driving  his  mules  than  was  necessary  to  align  a  division  of 
cavalry  for  action." 

Passing  through  luka,  that  day,  the  command  encamped  six 
miles  from  the  Tennessee  river,  and  reaching  it  early  next 
morning,  immediately  commenced  to  cross.  The  river  was  hMi, 


OPERATING  ON  HALLECK'S  REAR.  157 

and  there  was  nothing  with  which  to  effect  the  crossing,  but  one 
boat — a  small  horse-ferry,  capable  of  holding  ten  or  twelve. 
Efforts  were  made  (unsuccessfully),  to  cross  a  portion  of  the 
command  at  other  points.  Two  days  and  nights  of  hard  work 
were  occupied  in  getting  every  thing  across.  One  of  the  men 
who  was  actively  engaged  in  the  work,  describes  an  apprehen 
sion  which  rendered  it  more  disagreeable.  "  We  had,"  he  says, 
"the  gun-boat  fever  very  badly,  at  that  time,  and  expected  every 
minute  to  see  one  come  in  sight,  for  they  were  patroling  the 
river  for  some  miles  above  this  point." 

Leaving  the  river  on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  Colonel  Morgan 
reached  Lawrenceburg,  in  Lawrence  county,  Tennessee,  on  that 
afternoon,  and  encamped  for  the  night.  It  was  a  fertile  country, 
settled  by  hospitable  people.  Rations  and  forage  in  abundance 
were  procured,  and  a  good  deal  more  whisky  than  was  good  for 
the  men.  Early  on  the  next  morning  the  march  was  resumed, 
and  about  10  A.  M.  (not  far  from  Pulaski),  Colonel  Morgan 
learned  that  four  hundred  Federal  troops  had  just  passed  through 
on  the  road  to  Columbia.  They  were  principally  convalescents, 
employed  in  putting  up  a  line  of  telegraph  from  Columbia  to 
Huntsville,  Alabama,  and  other  "  light  work."  Colonel  Morgan 
determined  to  relieve  them.  The  command  was  pressed  on  to 
the  town  in  a  gallop.  Captain  Mitchell  (son  of  the  Federal 
General  of  that  name),  was  captured  here,  and  paroled,  that  he 
might  effect  -his  exchange  for  Colonel  Morgan's  brother — 
Captain  Charlton  Morgan — who  had  been  wounded  at  Shiloh, 
and  captured  at  Huntsville — whither  he  had  gone  to  conva 
lesce  in  the  smiles  of  the  fair  ladies  of  that  beautiful  place. 
Moving  on  rapidly,  Colonel  Morgan  overtook  the  enemy  a  short 
distance  beyond  the  town,  and  at  once  attacked.  Learning  his 
approach,  the  Federals  had  hastily  thrown  up  some  slight 
breastworks  in  a  field  on  the  side  of  the  road  (in  which  a  part  of 
them  were  posted) — others  occupied  a  wood  on  the  left  of  the 
road.  Colonel  Morgan  formed  his  command,  and — the  ground 
permitting — charged  on  horseback,  carrying  the  entire  line. 


158  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

Many  prisoners  wore  captured,  the  remnant  of  the  Federal 
force  rallied  after  retreating  about  a  mile,  leaving  wagons* 
They  were  flanked  by  Co.  A,  and  surrendered. 

At  this  juncture,  a  body  of  cavalry  appeared,  approaching 
from  the  direction  of  Columbia.     Not  knowing  their  strength, 

o  o     y 

Colonel  Morgan  engaged  them  with  skirmishers.  Finding  them 
not  strong,  he  ordered  Captain  Brown  to  charge  them,  who 
routed  and  drove  them  six  or  seven  miles.  They  were  about 
fifty  strong.  Colonel  Morgan's  loss  in  this  affair  was  slight.  A 
few,  only,  of  the  enemy  were  killed.  The  prisoners  (nearly  four 
hundred),  were  taken  back  to  Pulaski.  The  citizens  were  en 
thusiastic  in  their  reception  of  Colonel  Morgan  and  his  soldiers 
— the  men  were  wild  writh  excitement,  .and  the  women  were  in 
tears.  Colonel  Morgan's  celebrated  mare,  "  Black  Bess" — 
came  in  for  her  share  of  admiration  and  attention.  The  ladies 
crowded  around  to  caress  and  feed  her  with  dainties  (for  which 
she  had  a  weakness),  and  her  glossy  tresses  were  in  great  re 
quest.  It  is  recorded  that  upon  this  occasion,  for  the  first  and 
only  time  in  his  life — Colonel  Morgan  opposed  the  wishes  of  his 
lady  friends.  Fearing  that  Bess  would  be  completely  shorn,  he 
"tore  her  away,"  and  sent  her  to  the  stable.  Guards  and  pickets 
were  posted,  and  the  command  encamped.  Twenty  wagons — 
six  loaded  with  cotton — were  captured,  here,  and  burned.  On 
the  next  morning — the  2nd — the  officer  commanding  pickets  on 
the  Huntsville  road,  reported  that  a  train  of  wagons  was  ap 
proaching.  The  command  was  drawn  up  to  receive  them,  but 
learning  that  they  were  escorted  by  a  strong  regiment,  Colonel 
Morgan  decided  not  to  attack.  Moving  on  in  the  direction  of 

^3  O 

Murfreesboro',  the  command  encamped  that  night  in  a  loyal 
neighborhood,  and  mindful  always  of  a  decorous  respect  for  the 
opinions  of  other  people,  Colonel  Morgan  made  all  of  his  men 
"play  Union."  They  were  consequently  treated  with  distin 
guished  consideration,  and  some  were  furnished  with  fresh  horses, 
for  which  they  gave  their  kind  friends  orders  (on  the  disburs 
ing  officers  at  Nashville),  for  their  back  pay. 


COTTON   BURNING    AND    TELEGRAPHING.  159 

On  the  3d  the  column  readied  Harrington — fifteen  miles  from 
Shelbyville.  Some  lots  of  cotton  were  burned  on  that  day. 
General  Beauregard  (in  accordance  with  the  instructions  of  the 
War  Department)  had  issued  orders  that  all  cotton  (likely  to 
fall  into  the  enemy's  hands)  should  be  burned.  The  command 
remained  at  Harrington  during  the  night.  Over  one  store  the 
stars  and  stripes  were  floating  resplendent.  The  men  were  so 
much  pleased  with  this  evidence  of  patriotism  that  they  would 
patronize  no  other  store  in  the  place.  Reaching  the  vicinity  of 
Murfreesboro',  on  the  night  of  the  4th,  Colonel  Morgan  drove 
in  all  the  pickets  (next  morning)  and  made  a  circuit  about  the 
town,  striking  the  Nashville  and  Murfreesboro'  pike,  about  five 
miles  from  Stone  river.  The  advance  guard  captured  a  few  of 
the  enemy's  videttes  on  this  road. 

Some  cotton  was  burned,  and  the  ^telegraph  wires  were  cut^^ 
after  a  dispatch  had  been  sent  to  Nashville  to  the  effect  that 
Morgan  had  captured  Shelbyville,  and  Murfreesboro'  wanted  re 
inforcements.  Colonel  Morgan  (anticipating  brilliant  feats  in 
that  line  in  the  future)  carried  a  telegraph  operator  (provided 
with  a  pocket  instrument)  upon  this  expedition.  That  night  (at 
dark)  the  column  reached  Lebanon,  in  Wilson  county.  The 
entire  command  was  quartered  in  the  town.  Companies  A, 
B  and  C  (of  the  Squadron)  were  placed  at  the  college.  The 
horses  were  tied  in  the  large  yard  and  the  men  occupied  the 
building.  The  detachmeats  under  Colonel  Wood,  Captain  Har 
ris  and  Captain  Brown  were  quartered  at  the  livery  stables. 
Colonel  Morgan's  headquarters  were  at  the  hotel.  Colonel  Wood, 
who  had  been  left  in  the  vicinity  of  Murfreesboro',  with  a  small 
party,  to  observe  if  the  enemy  followed,  came  in,  some  hours 
after  nightfall,  and  reported  that  all  was  quiet. 

It  was  Colonel  Morgan's  intention  to  have  moved  at  an  early 
hour  next  morning,  and  to  have  crossed  the  Cumberland  river 
at  Canoe-branch  ferry,  about  ten  miles  from  Lebanon.  Orders 
were  issued  that  the  men  should  saddle  their  horses  at  four 
o'clock,  and  that  the  command  should  form  immediately  after- 


160  .  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

ward.  Tfrese  orders  were  not  communicated  to  the  company 
commanders.  The  night  was  rainy  and  bleak.  The  enemy, 
advancing  upon  the  Murfreesboro'  road,  came  to  the  picket 
stands  a  little  before  daybreak. 

The  pickets  were  all  at  a  house.  This  criminal  neglect  of 
duty  was  disastrous.  Before  the  videttes  discovered  the  conse 
quences  of  their  bad  conduct,  at  least  one  whole  regiment  had 
passed.  Then  one  of  them,  named  Pleasant  Whitlow,  a  brave 
and  (always  before)  excellent  soldier,  declared  that  he  would 
retrieve  his  fault,  or  die.  He  was  mounted  upon  a'^eet  maix., 
and  dashed  at  full  speed  along  the  road,  passing  the  Federal 
column,  unstopped.  He  reached  the  hotel  where  Colonel  Mor 
gan  was  quartered,  just  as  the  foremost  Federal  approached  it. 
As  Whitlow  called  loudly  to  alarm  the  Colonel,  the  enemy  fired 
and  killed  him.  The  men  at  the  college  had  just  commenced  to 
saddle,  when  the  enemy  approached.  They  hurriedly  formed — 
Company  C,  which  was  quartered  in  the  part  of  the  grounds 
nearest  where  the  enemy  entered  the  town,  were  attacked  and 
driven  pell-mell  through  the  others,  before  it  was  fairly  aligned. 
The  three  companies  became  mingled  together,  and  fell  back 
into  the  town  arid  upon  the  road,  across  which  Company  A  (ex 
tricating  itself  from  the  others)  formed,  under  charge  of  its  cool 
and  gallant  Orderly  Sergeant,  Zelah  Bowyer. 

Colonel  Morgan  soon  came  up,  and  his  presence  reinspirited 
the  men.  He  desired  to  join  with  tte  other  detachments,  but 
the  enemy  occupied  the  intervening  space.  A  strong  column 
was  approaching  Company  A.  Colonel  Morgan  ordered  the 
men  to  dismount,  reserve  their  fire,  and  drive  it  back  when  they 
did  open.  When  the  enemy  was  close,  the  order  to  fire  was 
given.  A  good  many  men  and  horses  fell  and  the  column  re 
coiled.  Several  Federal  officers  in  the  confusion  of  this  fight 
rode  into  the  ranks  of  Colonel  Morgan's  command.  Colonel 
Woolford  was  made  a  prisoner  in  this  way.  General  Dumont, 
commanding  the  entire  force,  was  very  nearly  made  prisoner. 

A  Chaplain,  who  made  this  mistake,  asked,  upon  becoming 


DEFEAT    AT   LEBANON.  161 

undeceived,  that  he  might  be  permitted  to  rejoin  his  command — 
"to  pray  for  his  men.''  "  The  h-11  you  say,"  responded  a  mem 
ber  of  Co.  A ;  "  Don't  you  think  Morgan's  men  need  praying 
for  as  well  as  Woolford's?"  The  detachments  in  the  center  of  the 
~to\yjx .»«Efi_com£lctelj  surrounded.  Colonel  Morgan  made  his 
way,  with  about  oneHrnndred  Inen,  to  the  Rome  and  Carthage 
road,  upon  which  he  commenced  his  retreat  at  a  steady  gait. 
Suddenly  his  rear  was  attacked.  The  enemy  dashed  upon  it, 
sabering  the  men.  In  the  excitement,  Colonel  Morgan's  mare 
broke  the  curb  of  her  bridle,  and  he  was  unable  to  restrain  her, 
or  reform  his  men.  Two  or  three  taking  hold  of  the  reins 
strove  to  hold  her  in.  but  uselessly.  She  Kent  like,  a  toisiadg. 
No  effort  was  made,  then,  at  concerted ""resistance — a  few  men 
turned  and  fought,  and  then  resumed  their  flight.  A  horse 
falling  near  the  center  of  the  column,  caused  many  others  to 
fall,  and  added — if  any  thing  could  add — to  the  wild  confused 
rattling  hurricane  of  flight.  Colonel  Morgan  instructed  the 
men  (by  courier,  for  Black  Bess  would  not  let  him  go  in  person) 
to  take  to  the  woods  when  their  horses  gave  out.  Many  escaped 
in  this  .way.  The  enemy  (Kentucky  regiments)  were  mounted 
on  fine  horses,  comparatively  fresh,  which  enabled  them  to  press 
the  pursuit  so  vigorously.  One  man  gives  a  graphic  account 
of  his 'part  in  the  race.  "I  was  riding,"  he  says,  "a  horse  cap 
tured  from  General  Dumont,  and  kept  up  with  the  Colonel  until 
my  horse  threw  his  shoes,  which  put  me  in  the  rear.  The  men 
had  all  passed  me  with  the  exception  of  Ben  Drake.  When 
Ben  went  by,  he  said,  '  Tom,  Dumont  will  get  his  horse.'  I 
said,  'Yes,  catch  me  a  horse,  Ben.'  About  a  mile  from  that 
point,  I  found  Bole  Roberts'  horse,  with  the  saddle  under  his 
belly,  and  the  stirrups  broken  off.  As  I  did  not  have  time  to 
change  saddles,  I  fixed  Bole's  saddle,  led  the  horse  to  the  fence, 
jumped  on,  used  the  spurs,  and  soon  passed  Ben  again,  whose 
horse  was  now  played  out.  I  overtook  Colonel  Morgan,  passed 
him,  and  found  another  horse  with  a  saddle  on.  I  stopped  and 
changed  saddles.  When  we  got  to  Rome,  thirteen  miles  from 
11 


162  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Lebanon,  I  traded  horses  again,  and  stayed  in  the  rear  with 
Colonel  Morgan,  who  had  gotten  Black  Bess  pulled  up.  A 
short  distance  from  Rome,  the  Yanks  came  within  about  one 
hundred  yards  of  us,  and  told  us  to  stop.  I  told  them  'to  go 

to -.'     The  Colonel  then  told  me  to  ride  forward  and  make 

the  men  push  on,  as  fast  as  possible.  I  was  the  first  to  reach 
the  ferry,  twenty-one  miles  from  Lebanon.  The  boat  was  luckily 
on  our  side  of  the  river.  We  got  into  it,  as  quickly  as  possible, 
and  left  our  horses  on  the  shore.  We  wanted  the  Colonel  to 
take  Black  Bess,  but  he  said  no,  if  time  was  allowed  he  would 
send  for  all."  This  magnificent  animal  has  never  been  mentioned, 
as  I  am  aware,  in  any  official  report,  and  she  was  too  com 
pletely  identified  with  Morgan's  early  career,  to  be  dismissed 
without  a  description.  She  was  the  most  perfect  beauty  I  have 
ever  beheld — even  in  Kentucky.  Not  fifteen  hands  high,  the 
immense  power  of  her  short  back,  broad  tilted  loins,  and  thighs 
— all  muscle — enabled  her  to  carry  Colonel  Morgan's  one  hun 
dred  and  eighty-five  pounds  as  if  he  were  a  feather-weight. 
Her  head  was  as  beautiful  as  a  "poet's  dream" — is  popularly 
supposed  to  be.  Wide  between  the  eyes,  it  tapered  down,  until 
her  muzzle  was  small  enough  to  have  picked  a  lady's  pocket. 

The  way  it  was  set  on  her  matchless  throttle,  might  well 
"  haunt  the  imagination  for  years."  Her  straight  superbly 
proportioned  neck,  her  shoulder  and  girth,  might  have  fascinated 
the  eye  for  ever! — but  for  her  beautiful  hind  quarters  and  the 
speed  and  power  they  indicated !  The  arch  of  her  back  rib, 
her  flank,  her  clean  legs,  with  firm,  dry  muscle,  and  tendons 
like  steel  wires,  her  hoofs,  almost  as  small  as  a  clenched  fist, 
but  open  and  hard  as  flint,  all  these  utterly  baffle  description. 
Her  hide  was  glossy  black,  without  a  hair  of  white.  From  her 
Canadian  sire  she  had  inherited  the  staunchest  constitution,  and 
her  thoroughbred  dam  dowered  her  with  speed,  game,  intelli 
gence  and  grace.  An  anchorite  might  have  coveted  such  an 
animal.  When  Colonel  Morgan  lost  her,  on  this  day,  he  na 
turally  hoped  that  she  would  be  subjected  to  no  ignoble  use. 


LOSS  OF  BLACK  BESS.  163 

The  civilized  world  will  scarcely  credit  that  a  Yankee  subse 
quently  traveled  her  about  the  country,  showing  her  at  twenty- 
five  cents  a  sight.  Poor  Bess — her  spirit  must  have  been 
broken,  or  she  would  have  kicked  the  brute's  brains  out. 

Some  fifteen  men  crossed  in  the  ferry-boat.  Sergeant  Tom 
Quirk  sprang  into  a  canoe  and  paddled  back  to  bring  the  mare 
over.  When  about  half  way  across,  the  enemy  arrived  on  the 
shore  to  which  he  was  returning,  and  fired  upon  him,  riddling 
the  canoe  with  balls.  But  he  escaped  uninjured. 

Efforts  were  made  to  obtain  Colonel  Morgan  a  horse.  A  fine 
one  was  selected,  but  an  old  woman  (the  owner)  stood  in  the 
door- way  with  an  ax,  and  prevented  all  attempts  "to  trade." 
In  vain  was  it  represented  to  her  that  she  should  certainly  be 
paid — she  declared  that  "unless  she  were  first  shot,  the  horse 
should  not  be  taken,"  and  the  "  assessors  "  were  compelled  to 
beat  a  retreat.  When  Colonel  Morgan  halted  that  night,  he  had 
scarcely  twenty  men  with  him,  and  shed  tears,  as  he  speculated 
upon  the  probable  fate  of  the  rest.  Only  six  men  were  killed. 
A  number  of  others  were  wounded,  and  some  one  hundred  and 
twenty  Avere  captured.  The  men  of  the  detachments  (which 
were  surrounded  in  Lebanon)  were  nearly  all  made  prisoners. 
Colonel  Wood  held  out  for  hours,  until  the  enemy  threatened  to 
burn  the  town,  if  he  did  not  surrender.  Among  the  killed  was 
Captain  Brown.  The  enemy  lost  more  in  killed  and  wounded 
than  did  Colonel  Morgan. 

On  the  6th,  Colonel  Morgan  reached  Sparta,  Tennessee,  and 
remained  there  until  the  9th.  In  those  three  days  a  good  many 
of  his  men  came  in.  This  inspirited  and  decided  him  to  assume 
the  offensive.  Shoeing  the  horses  and  equipping  the  men  as  he 
best  could  (under  the  circumstances)  he  left  Sparta  on  the  9th 
with  nearly  one  hundred  and  fifty  men — for  the  most  part  badly 
armed.  He  directed  his  march  toward  the  territory  of  his  former 
service,  the  country  about  Bowlinggreen.  He  hoped  to  find 
points  of  importance,  slenderly  guarded,  and  the  garrisons  care 
less,  under  the  impression  that  his  severe  defeat — four  days 


164  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

previously — had  finished  him.  His  forces  were  miscellaneous. 
He  had  not  quite  fifty  of  his  own  men,  but  Captains  Bledsoe 
and  Hamilton  (commanding  companies  which  operated  exclus 
ively  in  that  district)  joined  him,  and  Champe  Ferguson  reported 
as  guide  with  four  or  five  men.  The  men  of  Hamilton's  and 
Bledsoe's  companies  were,  either  new  recruits  or  had  never  been 
subjected  to  any  sort  of  discipline.  Hamilton's  ferry,  sixty 
miles  from  Sparta,  was  reached  that  night,  and  the  command 
crossing  the  river,  encamped  on  the  northern  bank. 

Colonel  Morgan  had  no  difficulty  in  traveling  expeditiously, 
for  every  inch  of  the  ground,  for  many  miles  beyond  the  river, 
was  well  known  to  his  Tennessee  guides,  and  when  their  knowl 
edge  failed,  he  had  reached  a  country  familiar  to  many  of  his 
own  men.  Marching  by  roads  unfrequently  traversed,  and  bridle 
paths,  he  would  have  kept  his  motions  perfectly  secret  but  for  a 
system  of  communicating  intelligence  adopted  about  this  time, 
by  the  Home-guards  of  Southern  Kentucky.  Conch  shells  and 
horns  were  blown,  all  along  his  route,  by  these  fellows,  the  sound 
of  which,  transmitted  a  long  distance,  traveled  faster  than  his 
column. 

On  the  next  day,  reaching  the  vicinity  of  Glasgow,  the  com 
mand  was  halted,  and  John  Hines,  a  clever,  daring  scout  and 
native  of  the  place,  was  sent  to  Bowlinggreen,  to  ascertain  the 
strength  of  the  garrison  and  condition  of  affairs  there. 

Colonel  Morgan  desired  to  capture  the  town  and  burn  the 
stores. 

Hines  returned  in  a  few  hours  with  the  information  that  five 
hundred  fine  troops  were  in  the  town,  and  it  was  determined  not 
to  attack.  Colonel  Morgan  immediately  determined  then,  to 
strike  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad  between  Bowling- 
green  and  the  river,  and  attack  and  capture,  at  all  hazards,  the 
first  train  which  passed.  He  was  not  likely  to  encounter  one 
with  many  troops  upon  it,  and  the  Bowlinggreen  garrison  would 
not  come  out  to  fight  him.  Traveling  all  night,  he  passed 
through  Glasgow,  and  early  next  day  reached  Cave  City,  twelve 


CAPTURE   AND   DESTRUCTION    OF    CARS.  165 

miles  distant — the  point  elected  at  which  to  make  his  venture. 
Going  in  advance,  himself,  with  five  men,  he  had  the  good  luck 
to  discover  a  long  train  approaching,  and  immediately  took 
measures  to  stop  it.  It  seemed  to  be  loaded  with  troops,  who 
turned  out,  upon  capture,  to  be  employees  on  the  road.  His 
entire  command  soon  arrived.  Forty  freight  cars  and  a  fine 
engine  were  captured  in  this  train,  and  destroyed. 

Colonel  Morgan  was  especially  hopeful  that  he  would  be  able 
to  catch  the  train  conveying  his  men — captured  at  Lebanon — to 
prison,  but  they  had  been  sent  off  by  the  river. 

In  a  short  time  the  passenger  train  from  Louisville  was  heard 
coming.  A  cow-gap  was  filled  with  upright  beams  to  stop  the 
train,  and  a  party  was  detailed  to  lie  in  ambush,  some  distance 
up  the  road,  and  throw  obstructions  on  the  road  as  soon  as  the 
train  had  passed,  to  prevent  its  return.  Some  women  notified 
the  conductor  of  his  danger,  but  instead  of  backing,  he  pressed 
on  more  rapidly.  Suddenly  becoming  aware  of  the  blockade  in 
front,  he  checked  his  train  and  tried  to  return,  but  there  was 
already  a  barrier  behind  him.  Some  Federal  officers  were  on  the 
train,  among  them  Majors  Coffee  and  Helveti,  of  Woolford's 
regiment. 

"  Major  Coffee,"  said  an  eye  witness,  "  came  out  upon  the 
platform  and  opened  upon  us  with  a  battery  of  Colt's  pistols. 
Ben  Bigstaff  dismounted  and  took  a  shot  at  him  with  his  min- 
nie  rifle ;  the  bullet  struck  within  an  inch  of  the  Major's  head 
and  silenced  his  battery."  A  great  many  women  were  upon  the 
train,  who  were  naturally  much  frightened.  Colonel  Morgan 
exerted  himself  to  reassure  them.  The  greatest  surprise  was 
manifested  by  the  passengers  when  they  learned  that  it  was 
Morgan  who  had  captured  them.  It  was  generally  believed  that 
he  had  been  killed,  and  his  command  utterly  destroyed. 

One  officer  captured,  was  accompanied  by  his  wife.  The  lady 
approached  Colonel  Morgan,  weeping,  and  implored  him  to  spare 
her  husband.  "  My  dear  Madam,"  he  replied,  bowing  debonairly, 
and  with  the  arch  smile  which  none  who  knew  him  can  forget, 


166  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

"  I  did  not  know  that  you  had  a  husband."  "  Yes,  sir,"  she 
said,  "I  have.  Here  he  is.  Don't  kill  him."  "He  is  no 
longer  my  prisoner,"  said  the  Colonel,  "  he  is  yours,"  and  he 
released  the  officer  unconditionally,  bidding  him  console  his  wife. 
About  eight  thousand  dollars  in  greenbacks — Government  funds 
— were  captured.  The  train  was  not  burned,  but  Colonel  Mor 
gan  begged  the  ladies  to  "  accept  it  as  a  small  token,"  etc. 

After  all  was  over,  the  men  sat  down  to  a  fine  dinner  pre 
pared  at  the  Cave  City  Hotel,  for  the  passengers. 

Colonel  Morgan  now  directed  his  march  toward  the  Cumberland 
again.  He  had  retaliated,  in  some  degree,  for  the  injury  he  had 
received,  and  could  meet  his  comrades  in  the  South,  fresh  from 
a  success  instead  of  a  disaster.  The  column  marched  steadily 
and  encamped  at  twelve  o'clock  at  night,  fifteen  miles  from 
Glasgow.  An  incident  happened  at  this  place  well  illustrative 
of  Colonel  Morgan's  kindness,  and  of  the  manner  in  which  he 
could  do  things  which  would  have  been  undignified  in  other 
officers  and  destructive  of  their  authority.  It  was  customary 
for  each  officer  of  rank,  to  have  his  horses  attended  to  by  his 
negro,  and  the  men  were  rarely  required  to  perform  such  duties. 
Colonel  Morgan's  groom,  however,  had  been  captured.  "  When 
we  dismounted,"  said  the  man  who  related  to  me  the  story, 
"Colonel  Morgan  gave  his  horse  to  Ben  Drake,  requesting  him 
to  unsaddle  and  feed  him.  As  Ben  had  ridden  twelve  hours 
longer  than  the  rest  of  us,  he  thought  this  very  unkind,  to  say 
the  least,  in  the  Colonel.  He,  however,  paid  no  attention  to 
Ben's  sour  looks,  as  the  latter  took  the  horse  and  obeyed  the 
order.  When  Ben  returned  to  the  house,  Colonel  Morgan  had 
reserved  a  place  by  the  fire  for  him  to  sleep  in.  The  next 
morning  Ben  was  awakened  by  the  Colonel,  who  told  him  to 
get  up  and  eat  his  breakfast,  as  the  command  was  ready  to 
move.  "Why  did  you  not  have  me  roused  sooner,  Colonel  ?  " 
asked  Ben,  "  my  horse  has  not  been  fed."  "  I  wished  you  to 
sleep  longer,"  answered  the  Colonel,  "  and  fed,  curried  and 


ADDITIONS   TO   MORGAN'S    COMMAND.  167 

saddled  your  horse,  myself."  Would  any  other  Colonel  in  the 
army  have  done  the  same  for  a  "  poor  private  ?  " 

Major  Coffee  was  paroled,  on  condition  that  he  would  exert 
himself  to  procure  his  own  exchange  for  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Wood,  and  that  he  would  report  again  as  prisoner  if  he  failed. 

Passing  through  Burkes  ville  on  county -court  day,  capturing 
a  few  Federals,  and  making  many  horse  trades,  the  command 
passed  on  to  a  ford  of  the  Cumberland,  twelve  miles  from  the 
little  town,  and  crossed.  Sparta  was  reached  on  the  next  day, 
where  the  Tennessee  companies  were  left — and  Colonel  Morgan 
marched  on  toward  Chattanooga,  which  place  he  reached  by 
easy  marches.  Some  twenty  or  thirty  more  refugees  and  sur 
vivors  of  the  "  Lebanon  races"  soon  joined  him  here.  Leaving 
these  men  at  Chattanooga — to  recruit  and  refit  as  well  as  was 
possible  there,  he  immediately  set  out  for  Corinth  to  see  what 
could  be  effected  in  the  way  of  obtaining  guns  and  the  necessary 
equipment  for  his  men,  and  to  obtain  permission  to  make 
another  expedition  into  Kentucky — that  he  might  recruit  his  re 
giment.  About  the  middle  of  May  two  fine  companies  of  Texas 
cavalry,  commanded  by  Captains  R.  M.  Gano  and  Jno.  Huffman, 
both  native  Kentuckians,  arrived  at  Corinth,  and  requested  to 
be  assigned  to  Morgan,  that  they  might  see  service  in  Ken 
tucky.  Their  application  was  granted,  and  they  at  once  marched 
for  Chattanooga. 

I  had  been  severely  wounded  at  Shiloh,  and  left  behind  when 
the  command  started  upon  the  expedition  just  described.  Upon 
my  return  to  Corinth,  I  collected  some  thirty  men  of  the  squad 
ron  (who  for  various  reasons  had  not  accompanied  Colonel 
Morgan  into  Tennessee),  and  marched  with  Captain  Gano  to 
Chattanooga.  We  marched  through  a  country,  where  the  people 
were  friendly  and  hospitable,  and  had  no  difficulty  in  supplying 
the  men  and  horses.  We  had  a  few  skirmishes  with  Federal 
troops  posted  along  the  Tennessee  river,  in  one  of  which  Captain 
Gano  took  some  prisoners,  and  burned  a  good  deal  of  cotton, 
collected  by  the  Federals  for  transportation  to  Iluntsville.  The 


168  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

last  two  days  of  our  march  showed  us  the  grandest  and  most 
beautiful  scenery.  We  traversed  the  ridgy  summit  of  the  moun 
tain  range,  which  runs  just  along  the  southern  bank  of  the  Ten 
nessee  and  connects  with  the  group  of  bold  mountains  around 
Chattanooga.  At  one  point  the  view  is  exceedingly  striking. 
From  the  immense  hight  we  occupied,  we  could  see  a  vast  and 
varied  expanse  of  country.  In  our  front  and  to  the  right,  the 
mountains  rose  like  blue  domes,  piled  closely  together a  tre 
mendous  gulf— the  bottom  of  which  eyesight  could  not  fathom 
—spread  between  the  range  (where  we  were),  and  their  hazy, 
azure  sides.  Directly  before  us  "  Lookout"— giant  chief  of  all 
— loomed  high  toward  heaven. 

Sheer  down,  hundreds  of  feet  beneath  us,  flowed  the  Ten 
nessee — I  could  almost  believe  that  my  horse  could  leap  from 
the  top  of  the  precipice  to  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river.  On 
the  other  side  the  land  was  low  and  nearly  level.  The  "Teen 
fields  ran  back  from  the  river's  brink,  in  a  gentle  imperceptible  ' 
ascent,  until  miles  away,  the  eye  lost  them  in  the  horizon.  The 
noisy  cavalrymen  were  hushed  by  the  scene,  and  the  grand  si 
lence  was  not  disturbed. 


RE- ORGANIZING  AT  CHATTANOOGA.  1C9 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

AT  Chattanooga  we  found  and  were  "welcomed  by  Colonel 
Morgan  and  our  gallant  comrades,  and  never  did  brothers  meet 
after  separation  and  danger,  with  more  hearty  joy.  For  the 
first  time,  then,  we  learned  who  had  been  lost,  and  as  we  talked 
it  over,  the  pleasure  and  congratulation,  so  natural  at  our  reunion, 
gave  way  to  sadness  as  we  named  the  dead  and  counted  up  the 
captives.  Although  much  reduced  in  numbers,  the  squadron 
was  unbroken  in  spirit  and  courage ;  the  men  who  had  safely 
gone  through  the  dangers  of  the  late  expedition,  were  more 
eager  than  ever  for  another,  and  burned  to  wipe  out  any  stain 
that  might  dim  their  reputation  and  to  avenge  their  comrades. 
They  had  completely  recovered  from  the  fatigue  of  the  raid,  and 
their  first  thought  (when  they  welcomed  the  accession  to  the 
command  that  we  brought),  was  of  instant  march  to  Kentucky. 

Gano  and  his  Texians  were  greeted  with  enthusiasm,  and  were 
delighted  with  the  choice  they  had  made  of  a  leader  and 
brothers-in-arms.  The  work  of  re-organization  was  immediately 
commenced.  The  three  companies  of  the  squadron,  much  de 
pleted,  were  filled  nearly  to  the  maximum  by  recruits  who  came 
in  rapidly — and  became  (of  course),  the  three  first  companies  of 
the  regiment  which  was  now  formed. 

Some  three  hundred  men  of  the  First  Kentucky  infantry  (which 
had  been  just  disbanded  in  Virginia,  their  term  of  service  hav 
ing  expired),  came  to  Chattanooga  to  join  Morgan.  A  good 
many  of  them  went  into  the  old  companies,  and  the  remainder 
formed  companies  under  officers  known  to  them  in  their  origi 
nal  regimental  organization.  Captain  Jacob  Cassel  was  ap 
pointed  by  Colonel  Morgan  (who  now  began  to  exercise  in  good 
earnest  the  appointing  power),  to  the  command  of  Company  A. 


170  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Captain  Thomas  Allen  resigned  (on  account  of  extreme  ill  health), 
the  Captaincy  of  Company  B.  and  his  brother,  John  Allen  (once 
Colonel  in  Nicarauga  under  Walker),  was  appointed  to  command 
it.  Captain  Bowles  remained  in  command  of  Company  C.  John 
B.  Castleman,  who  had  just  come  out  of  Kentucky  (fighting  as 
he  came)  with  a  number  of  recruits,  was  made  Captain  of  com 
pany  D.  John  Hutchinson,  formerly  Lieutenant  in  the  First 
Kentucky  infantry,  was  made  Captain  of  Company  E.  Captain 
Thomas  B.  Webber,  who  had  served  at  Pensacola,  under  Gen 
eral  Bragg,  during  the  past  year,  brought  with  him  from  Mis 
sissippi,  a  company  of  most  gallant  soldiers,  many  of  them  his 
former  comrades.  This  company  was  admitted  into  the  regi 
ment  as  Company  F.,  and  glad  was  Colonel  Morgan  to  welcome 
it.  Captain  McFarland,  of  Alabama,  brought  with  him  a  few 
men,  and  was  promised  that  so  soon  as  his  company  was  re 
cruited  to  the  proper  standard,  it  should  take  its  place  in  the 
regiment  as  Company  G. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  Morgan's  old  regiment  was  composed 
of  the  men  of  his  old  squadron,  of  veterans  from  Virginia,  and 
men  (from  nearly  all  the  Southern  States)  who  had,  with  few  ex 
ceptions,  seen  service.  These  six  companies,  and  the  fragment 
of  the  seventh,  numbered  in  all  not  quite  four  hundred  men. 
The  field  and  staff,  were  immediately  organized.  I  became 
Lieutenant  Colonel ;  G.  W.  Morgan,  formerly  of  the  Third  Ten 
nessee  infantry,  better  known  as  Major  Wash,  was  appointed 
Major.  Gordon  E.Niles  once  editor  of  a  New  York  paper,  and 
a  private  of  Company  A.,  was  appointed  Adjutant.  He  was  a 
gallant  soldier,  and  died,  not  long  afterward,  a  soldier's  death. 
Captain  Thomas  Allen,  formerly  of  Company  B.,  was  appointed 
Surgeon — Doctor  Edelin,  the  Assistant  Surgeon,  performed  for 
many  months  the  duties  of  both  offices,  on  account  of  the  illness 
of  the  former.  D.  H.  Llewellyn  and  Hiram  Reese,  both  mem 
bers  of  the  old  squadron,  were  appointed  respectively,  Quarter 
master  and  Commissary. 

While  we  were  at  Chattanooga,  General  Mitchell  came  to  the 


SHELLING    CHATTANOOGA.  171 

other  side  of  the  river  and  shelled  and  sharp-shot  at  the  town. 
The  commandant  of  the  place  General  Leadbctter,  had  two  or 
three  guns  in  battery,  and  replied — when  the  gunners,  who  were 
the  most  independent  fellows  I  ever  saw,  chose  to  work  tho 
guns.  The  defense  of  the  place  was  left  entirely  to  the  individ 
ual  efforts  of  those  who  chose  to  defend  it ;  nothing  prevented 
its  capture  but  the  fact  that  the  enemy  could  not  cross  the  river. 
Very  little  loss  was  sustained,  and  the  damage  done  the  town 
by  the  shells  was  immaterial.  We  tried  to  keep  our  men  in 
camp,  but  some  joined  in  the  fight;  one  only  was  hurt.  He 
volunteered  to  assist  in  working  one  of  the  guns  and  had  part 
of  his  tongue  shot  off  by  a  rifleman  upon  the  opposite  bank. 
About  five,  P.  M.,  the  enemy  seemed  to  be  withdrawing.  The 
artillery  was  still  playing  on  both  sides,  and  the  enemy  occupied 
the  hights  where  their  battery  was  planted,  but  the  infantry  and 
sharpshooters  had  disappeared  from  the  low  land,  just  opposite 
to  the  city.  Colonel  Morgan  (desirous  to  ascertain  certainly  if 
they  had  gone)  crossed  the  river  in  a  canoe.  I  was  unwilling  to 
see  him  go  alone,  and,  after  trying  in  vain  to  dissuade  him,  very 
regretfully  accompanied  him.  Several  shells  flew  over  the  canoe 
and  one  burst  just  above  it,  some  of  the  fragments  falling  in  it, 
We  landed  just  opposite  the  wharf,  and  stole  cautiously  through 
a  straggling  thicket  to  the  position  which  the  enemy  had  occu 
pied.  We  stood  upon  the  very  ground  which  they  had  held  only 
a  short  time  before,  and  as  nothing  could  be  seen  of  them,  we 
concluded  that  they  had  drawn  off  entirely.  I  was  very  much 
relieved  by  this  reflection.  Such  a  situation — without  a  horse — 
and  with  no  means  of  escape  but  a  canoe,  if  indeed  we  could 
have  gotten  back  to  the  river  at  all — was  not  to  my  taste,  and  I 
devoutly  thanked  Providence  that  the  enemy  had  left. 

As  we  returned,  we  met  Jack  Wilson  (the  trustiest  soldier  that 
ever  shouldered  a  rifle)  who  had  paddled  us  over,  on  his  way  to 
look  for  us  ;  unable  to  endure  the  suspense,  he  had  left  the  canoe, 
over  which  he  had  been  posted  as  guard. 

After  a  week  or  ten  days  sojourn  at  Chattanooga,  we  set  out 


172 

for  Knoxville.  The  better  part  of  the  men  were  mounted,  and 
those,  who  were  not,  had  great  hopes.  When  we  reached  Knox 
ville,  the  Second  Kentucky  (as  our  regiment  was  designated  in 
the  rolls  of  the  "War  Department)  and  the  Texas  squadron  were 
encamped  in  close  vicinity,  and  for  two  or  three  weeks  both  were 
drilled  strictly,  twice  a  day,  and  mightily  distressed  by  guard- 
mounting  and  dress-parades.  These  dress-parades  presented  a 
graceful  and  pleasing  spectacle  on  account  of  the  variegated  ap 
pearance  of  the  ranks. 

The  men  were  all  comfortably  clad,  but  their  clothing  was 
uniform,  only,  in  its  variety.  Strange  as  it  may  seem  to  the 
unexperienced,  dress  has  a  good  deal  to  do  with  the  spirit  of 
soldiers.  The  morale  of  troops  depends,  in  a  great  measure, 
upon  pride,  and  personal  appearance  has  something  to  do  with 
pride.  How  awful,  for  instance,  must  it  be  to  a  sensitive  young 
fellow,  accustomed  at  home  to  wear  good  clothes  and  appear  con 
fidently  before  the  ladies,  when  he  is  marching  through  a  town 
and  the  girls  come  out  to  wave  their  handkerchiefs,  to  feel  that 
the  rear  of  his  pantaloons  has  given  way  in  complete  disorder. 
The  cavalryman,  in  such  cases,  finds  protection  in  his  saddle, 
but  the  soldier  on  foot  is  defenseless :  and  thus  the  very  recog 
nition,  which,  if  he  has  a  stout  pair  of  breeches,  would  be  his 
dearest  recompense  for  all  his  toils,  becomes  his  most  terrible 
affliction.  Many  a  time,  have  I  seen  a  gallant  infantryman, 
who  would  have  faced  a  battery  double-shotted  with  grape  and 
canister  with  comparative  indifference,  groan  and  turn  pale  in 
this  fearful  ordeal.  It  was  a  touching  sight  to  see  them  seek  to 
dispose  their  knapsacks  in  such  a  manner  that  they  should  serve 
as  fortifications. 

The  ideas  which  the  experience  of  the  past  eight  months  had 
suggested,  regarding  the  peculiar  tactics  best  adapted  to  the 
service  and  the  kind  of  fighting  we  had  to  do,  were  now  put  into 
practical  shape.  A  specific  drill,  different  in  almost  every  re 
spect  from  every  other  employed  for  cavalry,  was  adopted.  It 
was  based  upon  a  drill  taught  in  the  old  army  for  Indian  fight- 


MAP  SHOWING  EOUTE 

TAKEN  UY  Tennesse<jJJ«« 

GfElNT.     3VE  O IR,  G- A.  3>T 

In  his  First  Itaid  into  the 

"Sill* 

Of  Kentucky,  July,  1862. 


Indicates  Oen.  Morgan's  route. 
laciicatea  Federals'  route. 


(173) 


ing,  called  "  Maury's  skirmish  tactics  for  cavalry,"  I  believe  ; 
but  as  that  drill  contemplated  the  employment  of  but  a  very  few 
men,  and  ours  had  to  provide  for  the  evolutions  of  regiments, 
and  eventually  brigades,  the  latter  was  necessarily  much  more 
comprehensive.  The  formation  of  the  company,  the  method  of 
counting  off  in  sets,  and  of  dismounting  and  deploying  to  the 
front,  flanks,  or  rear,  for  battle,  was  the  same  as  in  Maury's 
tactics ;  but  a  great  many  movements  necessary  to  the  change 
of  front,  as  the  kind  of  ground  or  other  circumstances  required 
it  to  be  made  in  various  ways,  to  the  formations  from  column 
into  line,  and  from  line  into  column,  the  methods  of  taking 
ground  to  the  front,  or  rear,  in  establishing  or  changing  line, 
the  various  methods  of  providing,  as  circumstances  might  re 
quire,  for  the  employment  of  all,  or  only  part  of  a  regiment  or 
brigade,  or  for  the  employment  of  supports  and  reserves,  all 
these  evolutions  had  to  be  added.  It  would  be  uninteresting  to 
all  but  the  practical  military  reader,  and  unnecessary,  as  well, 
to  enter  into  a  minute  explanation  of  these  matters. 

If  the  reader  will  only  imagine  a  regiment  drawn  up  in  single 
rank,  the  flank  companies  skirmishing,  sometimes  on  horse-back, 
and  then  thrown  out  as  skirmishers  on  foot,  and  so  deployed  as 
to  cover  the  whole  front  of  the  regiment,  the  rest  of  the  men 
dismounted  (one  out  of  each  set  of  four  and  the  corporals,  re 
maining  to  hold  horses)  and  deployed  as  circumstances  required, 
and  the  command  indicated,  to  the  front  of,  on  either  flank,  or 
to  the  rear  of  the  line  of  horses — the  files  two  yards  apart — and 
then  imagine  this  line  moved  forward  at  a  double-quick,  or 
oftener  a  half  run,  he  will  have  an  idea  of  Morgan's  style  of 
fighting. 

Exactly  the  same  evolutions  were  applicable  for  horse-back, 
or  foot  fighting,  but  the  latter  method  was  much  oftener  prac 
ticed — we  were,  in  fact,  not  cavalry,  but  mounted  riflemen.  A 
small  body  of  mounted  men  was  usually  kept  in  reserve  to  act 
on  the  flanks,  cover  a  retreat,  or  press  a  victory,  but  otherwise 
our  men  fought  very  little  on  horse-back,  except  on  scouting 


NATURE    OF    TilE   COMMi«D.  175 


expeditions.  Our  men  were  all  admirable  riders,  trained  from 
childhood  to  manage  the  wildest  horses  with  perfect  ease ;  but 
the  nature  of  the  ground  on  which  we  generally  fought,  covered 
with  dense  woods,  or  crossed  by  high  fences,  and  the  impossi 
bility  of  devoting  sufficient  time  to  the  training  of  the  horses, 
rendered  the  employment  of  large  bodies  of  mounted  men  to 
any  good  purpose,  very  difficult.  It  was  very  easy  to  charge 
down  a  road  in  column  of  fours,  but  very  hard  to  charge  across 
the  country  in  extended  line,  and  keep  any  sort  of  formation. 
Then  we  never  used  sabers,  and  long  guns  were  not  exactly  the 
weapons  for  cavalry  evolutions.  We  found  the  method  of  fight 
ing  on  foot  more  effective — we  could  maneuver  with  more  cer- 

o 

tainty,  and  sustain  less  and  inflict  more  loss.  "The  long  flexi 
ble  line  curving  forward  at  each  extremity,"  as  an  excellent 
writer  described  it,  was  very  hard  to  break ;  if  forced  back  at 
one  point,  a  withering  fire  from  every  other  would  be  poured  in 
on  the  assailant.  It  admitted,  too,  of  such  facility  of  maneuver 
ing,  it  could  be  thrown  about  like  a  rope,  and  by  simply  facing 
to  the  right  or  left,  and  double-quicking  in  the  same  direction, 
every  man  could  be  quickly  concentrated  at  any  point  where  it 
was  desirable  to  mass  them. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Morgan  very  rarely  fought  with 
the  army ;  he  had  to  make  his  command  a  self-sustaining  one.  If 
repulsed,  he  could  not  fall  back  and  reform  behind  the  infantry. 
He  had  to  fight  infantry,  cavalry,  artillery;  take  towns  when 
every  house  was  a  garrison,  and  attack  fortifications  with  noth 
ing  to  depend  on  but  his  own  immediate  command.  He  was 
obliged,  therefore,  to  adopt  a  method  which  enabled  him  to  do  a 
great  deal  in  a  short  time,  and  to  keep  his  men  always  in  hand, 
whether  successful  or  repulsed.  With  his  support  from  forty  to 
five  hundred  miles  distant,  an  officer  had  better  learn  to  rely  on 
himself. 

If  General  Morgan  had  ever  been  enabled  to  develope  his  plan 
of  organization  as  he  wished,  he  would  have  made  his  division 
of  mounted  riflemen  a  miniature  army.  With  his  regiments 


176  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

armed  as  he  wished  them — a  battalion  of  two  or  three  hundred 
men,  appropriately  armed,  and  attached  to  each  brigade,  to  be 
used  only  as  cavalry,  and  with  his  battery  of  three-inch  Parrots, 
and  train  of  mountain  howitzers,  he  could  have  met  any  contin 
gency.     The  ease  and  rapidity  with  which  this  simple  drill  was 
learned,  and  the  expedition  with  which  it  enabled  all  movements 
to  be  accomplished,  chiefly  recommended  it  to  Morgan,     I  have 
seen  his  division,  when  numbering  over  three  thousand  men,  and 
stretched  out  in  column,  put  into  line  of  battle  in  thirty  min 
utes.     Regular  cavalry  can  no  doubt  form  with  much  more  dis 
patch,  but  this  was  quicker  than  it  is  often  done  in  this  country. 
The  weapon  which  was  always  preferred  by  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  command,  was  the  rifle  known  as  the  "  medium  En- 
field."     The  short  Enfield  was  very  convenient  to  carry,  but 
was  deficient  both  in  length  of  range  and  accuracy.     The  long 
Enfield,  without  any  exception  the  best  of  all  rifles,  was  unwieldy 
either  to  carry  or  to  use,  as  sometimes  became  necessary,  on 
horseback.     The  Springfield  rifle,  nearly  equal  to  the  long  En- 
field,  was  liable  to  the  same  objections,  although  in  a  less  degree. 
Now   that  the  military  world  has  finally  decided  in  favor  of 
breech-loading  guns,  it   may  seem  presumptuous  to  condemn 
them  ;  but,  so  far  as  my  own  experience  goes,  they  are  decidedly 
inferior.     When  I  say  inferior,  I  mean  not  so  much  that  they 
will  not  carry  far,  nor  accurately,  although  a  fair  trial  of  every 
sort  I  could  lay  my  hands  upon  with  the  Enfield  and  Springfield, 
convinced  me  of  the  superiority,  in  these  respects,  of  the  two 
latter ;  but  that  for  other  reasons  they  are  not  so  effective  as  the 
muzzle-loading  guns.     Of  the  two  best  patterns,  the  Sharp  and 
the  Spencer — for  the  Maynard  is  a  pop-gun,  and  the  others  are 
so  contrived  that,  generally,  after  one  shot,  the  shell  of  the  car 
tridge  sticks  in  the  chamber — of  these  two,  I  have  seen  the  Sharp 
do  the  most  execution.     It  has  been  the  verdict  of  every  officer 
of  the  Western  Confederate  cavalry  with  whom  I  have  talked 
upon  the  subject,  and  it  certainly  has  been  my  experience,  that 
those  Federal  cavalry  regiments  which  were  armed  with  breech- 


RAPID   VERSUS   ACCURATE   FIRING.  177 

loading  guns  did  least  execution.  The  difference  in  the  rapidity 
with  which  men  dropped  when  exposed  to  the  fire  of  an  infantry 
regiment,  and  the  loss  from  that  of  a  cavalry  regiment  of  equal 
strength,  even  when  the  latter  fought  well,  ought  of  itself  to  go  far 
to  settle  the  question,  for  the  Federal  infantry  were  all  armed 
with  muzzle-loading  guns. 

A  close  study  of  the  subject  will  convince  any  man  that  the 
very  fact  of  having  to  load  his  gun  will  make  a  soldier  compar 
atively  cool  and  steady.  If  he  will  stay  to  load  at  all,  and  will  fix 
his  mind  upon  what  he  is  doing,  he  will  become  cool  enough  to 
take  aim.  While  if  he  has  only  to  stick  in  a  cartridge  and  shoot, 
or  turn  a  crank  and  pull  trigger,  he  will  fire  fast,  but  he  will  fire 
wildly.  I  have  seen  some  of  the  steadiest  soldiers  I  ever  knew, 
men  who  were  dead  shots  with  an  Enfield,  shoot  as  if  they  were 
aiming  at  the  sun  with  a  Spencer.  The  Spencer  rifle  would 
doubtless  be  an  excellent  weapon  for  a  weak  line  to  hold  works 
with,  where  the  men  were  accustomed  to  note  the  ground  ac 
curately,  and  would,  therefore,  be  apt  to  aim  low,  and  it  is  de 
sirable  to  pour  in  a  rapid,  continuous  fire  to  stagger  an  attack 
ing  line, 

It  is  perhaps  a  first-rate  gun  for  small  skirmishes  on  horse 
back,  although  for  those,  our  cavalry  decidedly  preferred  the 
revolver.  But  in  battle,  when  lines  and  numbers  are  engaged, 
accurate  and  not  rapid  firing  is  desirable.  If  one  fiftieth  of  the 
shots  from  either  side  were  to  take  effect  in  battle,  the  other 
would  be  annihilated.  If  rapid  firing  is  so  desirable,  why  do  the 
same  critics  who  advocate  it,  also  recommend  that  troops  shall 
hold  their  fire  until  they  can  pour  in  deadly  volleys?  Why  do 
they  deprecate  so  much  firing,  and  recommend  the  use  of  the 
bayonet  ? 

It  is  folly  to  talk  to  men  who  have  seen  battles,  about  the 
moral  effect  of  rapid  firing,  and  of  u  bullets  raining  around 
men's  heads  like  hail  stones."  That  is  like  the  straggler's  ex 
cuse  to  General  Lee  that  he  was  "stung  by  a  bomb."  Any 
man  who  has  ever  heard  lines  of  battle  engaged,  knows  that,  let 
12 


178 

the  men  fire  fast  or  slow,  the  nicest  ear  can  detect  no  interval 
between  the  shots  ;  the  musketry  sounds  like  the  incessant,  un- 
intermitted  crash  of  a  gong — even  cannonading,  when  one  or  two 
hundred  guns  are  working,  sounds  like  the  long  roll  of  a  drum 
— and  the  hiss  of  bullets  is  perfectly  ceaseless.  Good  troops 
will  fight  well  with  almost  any  sort  of  guns.  Mean  troops  will 
not  win,  no  matter  how  they  are  armed.  If  the  matter  were  in 
vestigated,  it  would  probably  be  found  that  the  regiments  which 
won  most  distinction,  in  the  late  war  on  this  continent,  on  both 
sides,  fired  the  fewest  number  of  rounds. 

At  one  time — when  Morgan's  command  was  somewhat  de 
moralized — the  men  were  loud  in  describing  the  terrific  effect  of 
the  Spencer  rifle,  when  it  was  notorious  that,  at  that  time,  it  was 
an  unusual  occurrence  to  lose  a  man — they  subsequently  became 
ashamed  of  their  panic,  and  met  the  troops  carrying  Spencer 
rifles,  with  more  confidence  than  those  armed  in  any  other  way. 
It  would  be  very  convenient  to  attribute  every  whipping  we  ever 
got  to  the  use  of  breach-loading  rifles  by  our  antagonists, 
but  it  would  be  very  wide  of  the  truth.  It  was  impossible,  how 
ever,  to  obtain,  when  we  were  organizing  at  Knoxville,  the  ex 
act  description  of  guns  we  wished.  One  company  was  armed 
with  the  long  Enfield,  another  had  the  medium,  and  Company  A 
got  the  short  Enfield.  Company  C  was  furnished  with  Missis 
sippi  rifles  and  Company  B  retained  the  shot-guns  which  they 
had  used  for  nearly  a  year.  Company  E  was  provided  with  a 
gun,  called  from  the  stamp  upon  the  barrel,  the  "  Tower  gun ;" 
it  was  of  English  make,  and  was  a  sort  of  Enfield  carbine.  Its 
barrel  was  rather  short  and  bore  immense ;  it  carried  a  ball 
larger  than  the  Belgian.  Its  range  and  accuracy  were  first  rate. 
The  roar  of  this  gun  was  almost  as  loud  as  that  of  a  field  piece 
and  the  tremendous  bullet  it  carried  would  almost  shatter  an 
ordinary  wall. 

It  was  some  months  before  each  company  of  the  regiment  was 
armed  with  the  same  or  similar  guns.  Nearly  every  man  had  a 
pistol,  and  some  two.  Shortly  afterward,  when  they  vrere  cap- 


LOSS   OF   OUR   HOWITZERS.  170 

turcd  in  sufficient  numbers,  eacli  man  was  provided  with  a  pair. 
The  pistol  preferred  and  usually  worn  by  the  men,  was  the  army  \  / 
Colt  furnished  to  the  Federal  cavalry  regiments — this  patent  is 
far  the  best  and  most  effective  of  any  I  have  ever  seen.  At  this 
time  two  mountain  howitzers  wrere  sent  from  Richmond  for  Mor 
gan's  use.  It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  a  piece  so  well  known, 
but  it  may  be  as  well  to  say,  that  no  gun  is  so  well  adapted  in 
all  respects  to  the  wants  of  cavalry,  as  these  little  guns.  With 
a  large  command,  it  is  always  well  enough  to  have  two  or  four 
pieces  of  longer  range  and  yet  of  light  draught,  such  as  the 
three-inch  Parrot — but  if  I  were  required  to  dispense  with  one  or 
the  other,  I  would  choose  to  retain  the  former.  They  can  be 
drawn  (with  a  good  supply  of  ammunition  in  the  limbers),  by 
two  horses  over  any  kind  of  road.  They  can  go  over  ravines, 
up  hills,  through  thickets,  almost  any  where,  in  short,  that  a 
horseman  can  go  ;  they  can  be  taken,  without  attracting  atten 
tion,  in  as  close  proximity  to  the  enemy  as  two  horsemen  can 
go — they  throw  shell  with  accuracy  eight  hundred  yards,  quite 
as  far  as  there  is  any  necessity  for,  generally  in  cavalry  fighting 
— they  throw  canister  and  grape,  two  and  three  hundred  yards, 
as  effectively  as  a  twelve  pounder — they  can  be  carried  by  hand 
right  along  with  the  line,  and  as  close  to  the  enemy  as  the  line 
goes — and  they  make  a  great  deal  more  noise  than  one  would 
suppose  from  their  size  and  appearance.  If  the  carriages  are 
well  made,  they  can  stand  very  hard  service,  and  they  are  easily 
repaired,  if  injured.  These  little  guns  were  attached  to  the  Se 
cond  Kentucky,  and  the  men  of  that  regiment  became  much 
attached  to  them.  They  called  them  familiarly  and  affection 
ately,  the  "bull  pups,"  and  cheered  them  whenever  they  were 
taken  into  a  fight.  They  remained  with  us,  doing  excellent  ser 
vice,  until  just  before  the  Ohio  raid ;  and,  then,  when  General 
Bragg's  ordnance  officer  arbitrarily  took  them  away  from  us,  it 
came  near  raising  a  mutiny  in  the  regiment.  I  would,  myself, 
have  gladly  seen  him  tied  to  the  muzzle  of  one  of  them  and  shot 


180  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

off.  They  were  captured  by  the  enemy  in  two  \vceks  after  they 
were  taken  from  us. 

Just  before  Morgan  left  Knoxville  to  go  on  the  expedition 
known  as  "  the  First  Kentucky  raid,"  he  was  joined  by  a  gen 
tleman  "  from  abroad,"  whose  history  had  been  a  curious  and 
extraordinary  series  of  exciting  adventures,  and  who  now  came 
to  see  something  of  our  war.  This  was  Lieutenant  Colonel  St. 
Leger  Greenfel,  of  the  English  service,  and  of  all  the  very  re 
markable  characters  who  have  figured  (outside  of  popular  novels) 
in  this  age,  he  will  receive  the  suffrages  of  our  Western  cavalry 
men,  for  pre-eminence  in  devil-may-care  eccentricity.  He 
had  commenced  life  (I  believe)  by  running  away  from  his  father, 
because  the  latter  would  not  permit  him  to  enter  the  army,  and 
in  doing  so,  he  showed  the  good  sense  that  he  really  possessed, 
for  the  army  was  the  proper  place  for  him — provided  they  went 
to  war  often  enough.  He  served  five  years  in  some  French  reg 
iment  in  Algeria,  and  then  quitting  the  service,  lived  for  a  num 
ber  of  years  in  Tangiers,  where  he  did  a  little  business  with  the 
Moorish  batteries,  when  the  French  bombarded  the  place.  He 
served  four  years  with  Abd-El  Kader,  of  whom  he  always  spoke 
in  the  highest  terms,  as  having  been  every  thing  that  he  ought 
to  have  been,  except  a  member  of  the  Church  of  England. 
Having  exhausted  life  in  Africa,  he  looked  elsewhere  for  excite 
ment,  and  passed  many  years  of  his  subsequent  life  in  great  hap 
piness  and  contentment,  amid  the  pleasant  scenes  of  the  Crimean 
war,  the  Sepoy  rebellion,  and  Garibaldi's  South  American  ser 
vice. 

When  the  war  broke  out  over  here  he  came  of  course — and 
taking  a  fancy  to  Morgan,  from  what  he  had  heard  of  him,  came 
to  join  him.  He  was  very  fond  of  discussing  military  matters, 
but  did  not  like  to  talk  about  himself,  and  although  I  talked 
with  him  daily,  it  was  months  before  he  told  any  thing  of  his 
history.  He  was  a  thorough  and  very  accomplished  soldier— 
and  may  have  encountered  something  in  early  life  that  he  feared, 
but  if  so,  it  had  ceased  to  exist. 


ACCESSION   TO   OUR    COMMAND.  181 

He  became  Morgan's  Adjutant  General  and  was  of  great  as 
sistance  to  him,  but  sometimes  gave  trouble  by  his  impracticable 
temper — he  persisted,  among  other  things,  in  making  out  all 
papers  in  the  style  he  had  learned  in  the  English  service,  the 
regulations  and  orders  of  the  War  Department  "  to  the  con 
trary  notwithstanding." 

He  was  always  in  a  good  temper  when  matters  were  active — 
I  never  saw  him  hilarious  but  once — and  that  was  the  day  after 
the  battle  of  Hartsville ;  he  had  just  thrashed  his  landlord,  and 
doubled  up  a  brother  Englishman,  in  a  "  set-to  "  about  a  mule, 
and  was  contemplating  an  expedition  on  the  morrow,  with  Gen 
eral  Morgan  to  Nashville.  He  was  the  only  gentleman,  I  ever 
knew,  who  liked  to  fight  with  his  fists,  and  he  was  always  cheer 
ful  and  contented  when  he  could  shoot  and  be  shot  at. 

After  he  left  Morgan  he  was  made  Chief  Inspector  of  Cav 
alry,  and  became  the  terror  of  the  entire  "  front."  He  would 
have  been  invaluable  as  commander  of  a  brigade  of  cavalry, 
composed  of  men  who  (unlike  our  volunteers)  appreciated  the 
"military  necessity"  of  occasionally  having  an  officer  to  knock 
them  in  the  head.  If  permitted  to  form,  discipline,  and  drill 
such  a  brigade  of  regular  cavalry  after  his  own  fashion,  he  would 
have  made  gaps  in  many  lines  of  battle,  or  have  gotten  his 
"blackguards  well  peppered"  in  trying. 

Sometime  in  the  latter  part  of  June,  Colonel  Hunt  of  Geor 
gia  arrived  at  Knoxville  with  a  "  Partisan  Ranger"  regiment 
between  three  and  four  hundred  strong,  to  accompany  Morgan 
upon  his  contemplated  raid. 

When  the  entire  force  of  able  bodied  and  mounted  men  was 
estimated,  it  was  found  eight  hundred  and  seventy-six  strong. 
Hunt's  regiment  numbering  about  three  hundred  and  fifty;  mine, 
the  Second  Kentucky,  about  three  hundred  and  seventy,  and 
Gano's  squadron  making  up  the  balance. 

Fifty  or  sixty  men,  from  all  the  commands,  were  left  at  Knox 
ville  for  lack  of  horses.  Perhaps  two  hundred  men  of  this  force, 
with  which  Morgan  commenced  the  expedition,  were  unarmed, 


182  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 


and  a  much  larger  number  were  badly  mounted  and  provided 
with  the  most  indifferent  saddles  and  equipments. 

The  command  set  out  from  Knoxville  on  the  morning  of  the 
4th  of  July.  1862,  and  took  the  road  to  Sparta  (a  little  place 
on  the  confines  of  the  rugged  mountainous  country  which  sep 
arates  Middle  Tennessee  from  the  rich  valley  of  East  Tennessee) 
in  which  Knoxville  is  situated.  Sparta  in  one  hundred  and  four 
miles  from  Knoxville.  We  reached  it,  after  tolerably  hard  march 
ing,  for  the  road  was  terribly  rough,  on  the  evening  of  the  third 
day,  and  encamped  five  miles  beyond  it  on  the  road  to  Living 
ston. 

While  traversing  the  region  between  Knoxville  and  Sparta,  we 
were  repeatedly  fired  upon  by  bush-whackers,  but  had  only  one 
man  killed  by  them — a  Texian  of  Gano's  squadron.  We  made 
many  unsuccessful  attempts  to  capture  them,  but  they  always 
chose  the  most  inaccessible  points  to  fire  from  and  we  could 
never  get  to  them.  Frequently  they  would  shoot  at  us  from  a 
ledge  of  rocks  not  forty  feet  above  our  heads,  and  yet  to  get  to 
it  we  would  have  had  to  go  hundreds  of  yards — they  consequently 
always  escaped. 

At  Sparta ?  Champe  Ferguson  reported  himself  as  a  guide,  and 
I,  for  the  first  time,  saw  him,  although  I  had  often  heard  of  him 
before.  He  had  the  reputation  of  never  giving  quarter,  and,  no 
doubt,  deserved  it  (when  upon  his  own  private  expeditions),  al 
though  when  with  Morgan  he  attempted  no  interference  with 
prisoners.  This  redoubted  personage  was  a  native  of  Clinton 
county,  Kentucky,  and  was  a  fair  specimen  of  the  kind  of  char 
acters  which  the  wild  mountain  country  produces.  He  was  a 
man  of  strong  sense,  although  totally  uneducated,  and  of  the 
intense  will  and  energy,  which,  in  men  of  his  stamp  and  mode 
of  life,  have  such  a  tendency  to  develope  into  ferocity,  when 
they  are  in  the  least  injured  or  opposed.  He  was  grateful  for 
kindness,  and  instinctively  attached  to  friends,  and  vindictive  to 
his  enemies.  He  was  known  as  a  desperate  man  before  the 
war,  and  ill-treatment  of  his  wife  and  daughter,  bv  some  soldiers 


CIIAMPE   FERGUSON.  183 

and  Home-guards  enlisted  in  his  own  neighborhood,  made  him 
relentless  in  his  hatred  of  all  Union  men  ;  he  killed  all  the  par 
ties  concerned  in  the  outrage  upon  his  family,  and,  becoming 
then  an  outlaw,  kept  up  that  style  of  warfare.  It  is  probable 
that,  at  the  close  of  the  war,  he  did  not  himself  know  how  many 
men  he  had  killed.  He  had  a  brother,  of  the  same  character  as 
liimself,  in  the  Union  army,  and  they  sought  each  other  persist 
ently,  mutually  bent  on  fratricide.  Champe  became  more  widely 
known  than  any  of  them,  but  the  mountains  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  were  filled  with  such  men,  who  murdered  every  pri 
soner  that  they  took,  and  they  took  part,  as  their  politics  in 
clined  them,  with  either  side.  For  a  long  time  Ferguson  hunted, 
or  was  hunted  by,  a  man  of  his  own  order  and  nearly  as  notorious 
on  the  other  side,  namely,  "Tinker  Dave  Beattie."  On  the 
evening  of  the  7th,  we  encamped  in  the  vicinity  of  Livingston. 
Leaving  early  next  morning,  by  midday  we  reached  the  Cumber 
land  river  at  the  ford  near  the  small  village  of  Selina.  .  Here 
Colonel  Morgan  received  positive  information  of  the  strength 
and  position  of  the  enemy  at  Tompkinsville,  eighteen  miles  from 
Selina.  He  had  learned  at  Knoxville  that  a  Federal  garrison 
was  at  this  place,  and  had  determined  to  attack  it.  One  bat 
talion  of  the  9th  Pennsylvania,  under  command  of  Major  Jordan, 
about  three  hundred  and  fifty  strong,  constituted  the  entire  force. 
It  was  Morgan's  object  to  surprise  and  capture  the  whole  of  it. 
He  accordingly  sent  forward  scouts  to  watch  and  report  every 
thing  going  on  at  their  camp,  while  he  halted  the  bulk  of  the 
command  until  night-fall.  The  men  employed  the  interval  of 
rest  in  attention  to  their  horses,  and  in  bathing  in  the  river.  At 
eleven  o'clock  the  March  was  resumed ;  the  road  was  rough  and 
incumbered  at  some  points  with  fallen  timber,  so  that  the  column 
made  slow  progress.  When  within  four  or  five  miles  of  Tom- 
kinsville,  Gano's  squadron  and  Hamilton's  company  of  Tennessee 
Partisan  Rangers,  which  had  joined  us  the  evening  before,  were 
sent  by  a  road  which  led  to  the  right  to  get  in  the  rear  of  the 
enemy  and  upon  his  line  of  retreat  toward  Glasgow.  The  rest  of 


184 

the  command  reached  Tomkinsville  at  five  o'clock.  It  was  con 
sequently  broad  daylight,  and  the  enemy  had  information  of  our 
approach  in  time  to  form  to  receive  us.  Colonel  Hunt  was 
formed  upon  the  left,  and  my  regiment  upon  the  right,  with  the 
howitzers  in  the  center.  It  was  altogether  unnecessary  to  form 
any  reserve,  and  as  our  numbers  were  so  superior,  our  only 
care  was  to  "lap  around"  far  enough  on  the  flanks  to  encircle 
the  game. 

The  enemy  were  posted  on  a  thickly  wooded  hill,  to  reach 
which  we  had  to  cross  open  fields.  They  fired,  therefore,  three 
or  four  volleys  while  we  were  closing  on  them.  The  Second 
Kentucky  did  not  fire  until  within  about  sixty  yards  of  them, 
and  one  volley  was  then  enough.  The  fight  did  not  last  ten 
minutes.  The  enemy  lost  about  twenty  killed  and  twenty  or 
thirty  wounded.  Thirty  prisoners,  only,  were  taken  on  the 
ground,  but  Gano  and  Hamilton  intercepted  and  captured  a 
good  many  more,  including  the  commander,  Major  Jordan.  Our 
force  was  too  much  superior  in  strength  for  them  to  have  made 
much  resistance,  as  we  outnumbered  them  more  than  two  to  one. 

Our  loss  was  only  in  wounded,  we  had  none  killed.  But  a 
severe  loss  was  sustained  in  Colonel  Hunt,  whose  leg  was  shat 
tered  and  it  was  necessary  to  leave  him ;  he  died  in  a  few  days 
of  the  wound.  Three  of  the  Texians  also  were  wounded  in 
their  chase  after  the  fugitives.  The  tents,  stores,  and  camp 
equipage  were  destroyed.  A  wagon  train  of  twenty  wagons 
and  fifty  mules  were  captured  and  a  number  of  cavalry  horses. 
Abundant  supplies  of  coffee,  sugar,  etc.,  etc.,  were  found  in  the 
camp.  The  guns  captured  were  useless  breech-loading  car 
bines,  which  were  thrown  away. 

Leaving  Tompkinsville  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  after 
paroling  the  prisoners,  we  reached  Glasgow  about  one  o'clock 
that  night.  This  town  was  unoccupied  by  any  garrison,  and  its 
people  were  very  friendly  to  us.  Company  C,  of  the  old  squad 
ron  had  been  principally  recruited  here.  The  command  rested 
at  Glasgow  until  9  A.  M.  next  day  ;  during  the  time,  the  ladies 


MARCH  ON   LEBANON.  185 

busied  themselves  in  preparing  breakfast  for  us,  and  before  we 
left,  every  man  had  taken  in  a  three  days'  supply.  A  straggler 
captured  at  Glasgow  gave  us  some  "  grape  vine  "  intelligence 
which  annoyed  us  no  little.  He  stated  that  McClellan  had 
taken  Richmond.  When  we  left  Knoxville,  the  battle  of  the 
seven  days  was  going  on,  and  we  had.  of  course,  heard  nothing 
after  we  started.  Our  prisoner,  however,  was  gravely  assured, 
just  before  he  was  paroled,  that  a  courier  had  just  reached  us 
with  the  information  that  McClellan  was  in  Richmond,  but  as  a 
prisoner,  and  with  half  his  army  in  the  same  condition.  This  fel 
low,  who  represented  himself  to  be  an  officer,  turned  out  to  be  one 
of  the  buglers  of  the  Ninth  Pennsylvania,  and  all  the  information 
he  gave  was  as  reliable  as  the  McClellan  story.  A  halt  of  two  or 
three  hours  was  made  at  Bear  Wallow,  to  enable  Mr.  Ellsworth 
(popularly  known  as  u  Lightning  "  ),  the  telegraphic  operator  on 
Colonel  Morgan's  staff,  to  tap  the  line  between  Louisville  and 
Nashville,  and  obtain  the  necessary  information  regarding  the  po 
sition  of  the  Federal  forces  in  Kentucky.  Connecting  his  own  in 
strument  and  wire  with  the  line,  Ellsworth  began  to  take  off  the 
dispatches.  Finding  the  news  come  slow  he  entered  into  a  con 
versation  with  Louisville  and  obtained  much  of  what  was  wanted. 
He  in  return  communicated  such  information  as  Colonel  Morgan 
desired  to  have  the  enemy  act  upon.  One  statement,  made  at 
hap  hazard,  and  with  no  other  knowledge  to  support  it,  except 
that  Forrest  was  in  Middle  Tennessee,  was  singularly  verified. 
Morgan  caused  Ellsworth  to  telegraph  that  Forrest  had  taken 
Murfreesboro'  and  had  captured  the  entire  garrison.  Forrest 
did  exactly  what  was  attributed  to  him  on  that  or  the  next  day. 
A  heavy  storm  coming  on  caused  them,  after  several  fruitless 
efforts  to  continue,  to  desist  telegraphing. 

The  column  was  put  in  motion  again  immediately  upon  Colonel 
Morgan's  return,  and  inarching  all  night  got  within  about  fifteen 
miles  of  Lebanon  by  11  A.  M.  next  morning.  Here  Company 
B  was  detached,  to  push  rapidly  to  the  railroad  between  Leb 
anon  and  Lebanon  junction,  and  ordered  to  destroy  it,  so  that 


186  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

troops  might  not  be  thrown  into  Lebanon  in  time  to  oppose  us. 
The  march  was  not  resumed  until  three  or  four  in  the  afternoon, 
so  that  when  we  reached  Rolling  Fork  river,  six  miles  from 
Lebanon,  it  was  dark.  Colonel  Morgan,  who  was  riding  with 
his  staff  in  front  of  the  advance  guard,  was  fired  upon  as  he 
entered  the  small  covered  bridge  across  the  stream,  by  a  party 
of  the  enemy  stationed  at  the  other  end  of  it.  His  hat  was 
shot  from  his  head,  but  neither  he  nor  any  of  his  staff  were 
touched.  One  of  the  howitzers  was  immediately  run  up  and  a 
shell  Avas  thrown  into  the  bridge.  A  platoon  of  the  leading 
company  was  dismounted  and  carried  at  a  double  quick  to  clear 
it.  When  they  reached  it,  the  enemy,  alarmed  by  the  shell, 
which  had  killed  one  man,  had  retreated,  the  bottom  of  the 
bridge  was  found  to  have  been  torn  up,  and  a  short  time  was 
spent  in  repairing  it.  This  was  a  strong  position  and  one 
which  the  enemy  ought,  by  all  means,  to  have  occupied  with  his 
entire  force. 

There  was  no  ford  for  six  or  eight  miles  above  or  below ;  the 
bridge  was  the  only  means  of  crossing  without  a  wide  detour; 
and  not  twenty  yards  from  the  mouth  of  the  bridge  (on  the  side 
held  by  the  enemy),  and  perfectly  commanding  it,  was  a  steep 
bluff  (not  too  high)  covered  with  timber,  and  affording  an  ad 
mirable  natural  fortification.  As  soon  as  the  bridge  was  re 
paired,  the  column  crossed  and  pressed  on  to  Lebanon.  Within 
a  mile  of  the  town,  skirmishing  commenced  with  the  force  which 
held  it.  Two  companies  (E  and  C  of  the  Second  Kentucky) 
were  thrown  out  on  foot,  and  advanced  at  a  brisk  pace,  driving 
the  enemy  before  them.  Two  or  three  of  the  enemy  were  killed  ; 
our  loss  was  nothing.  The  town  was  surrendered  by  its  com 
mandant  about  ten  o'clock ;  some  two  hundred  prisoners  were 
taken. 

Pickets  were  immediately  posted  on  every  road,  and  the  whole 
command  encamped  in  such  a  manner  that  it  could  be  immedi 
ately  established  in  line.  It  was  necessary  to  remain  at  Leb 
anon  until  the  large  quantity  of  stores  of  all  kinds,  which  were 


ARMS    AND    STORES    CAPTURED.  187 

there,  were  disposed  of,  and,  as  we  were  now  in  the  midst  of 
enemies,  no  precaution  could  be  omitted.  Captain  Allen,  who, 
as  has  been  mentioned,  was  detached  with  Company  B  of  the 
Second  Kentucky  to  prevent  the  train  from  bringing  reinforce 
ments  to  Lebanon,  struck  the  railroad  at  New  Hope  Church  and 
had  just  commenced  to  destroy  it,  when  a  train  came  with  a 
large  number  of  troops  on  board  for  Lebanon.  He  attacked  it, 
and  a  skirmish  of  a  few  minutes  resulted  in  the  train  going 
back.  The  night  was  very  dark,  and  little  loss,  if  any,  was  in 
flicted  on  either  side. 

On  the  next  day,  an  examination  of  the  stores  showed  an 
abundance  of  every  description.  A  sufficient  number  of  excel 
lent  guns  were  gotten  to  arm  every  man  efficiently,  and  some 
thousands  were  destroyed.  A  large  building  was  found  to  be 
filled  with  cartridges  and  fixed  ammunition.  An  abundant  sup 
ply  of  ammunition  for  small  arms  was  thus  obtained,  and  a  fresh 
supply  of  ammunition  was  also  gotten  for  the  howitzers.  After 
taking  what  was  needed,  all  this  was  destroyed.  There  was 
also  a  stone  magazine  not  far  from  the  depot,  which  was  full  of 
powder.  The  powder  was  all  taken  out  of  it,  and  thrown  into 
the  stream  near  by. 

Very  large  supplies  of  provisions  were  found — meat,  flour, 
sugar,  coffee,  etc. — which  were  turned  over  to  the  citizens,  arid 
when  they  had  helped  themselves,  the  remainder  was  burned. 
A  great  deal  of  clothing  had  also  been  collected  here,  and  the 
men  were  enabled  to  provide  themselves  with  every  thing  which 
they  needed  in  the  way  of  under-clothing.  While  at  Lebanon, 
copies  of  a  flaming  proclamation,  written  and  published  at  Glas 
gow,  were  circulated. 

After  the  destruction  of  the  stores  had  been  completed,  and 
Ellsworth  had  closed  his  business  at  the  telegraph  office,  the 
command  was  again  put  in  motion.  It  left  the  town  about  two 
p.  M.,  on  the  Springfield  road.  Before  leaving  Knoxville,  Cclonel 
Morgan,  appreciating  the  necessity  of  having  an  advance-guard 
which  could  be  thoroughly  relied  on,  and  disinclined  to  trust  to 


188  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

details,  changed  every  day,  for  that  duty,  had  organized  a  body 
of  twenty-five  men,  selected  with  great  care  from  the  entire 
force  under  his  command,  to  constitute  an  advance-guard  for  the 
expedition.  So  well  did  this  body  perform  the  service  assigned 
it,  that  the  men  composing  it,  -with  some  additions  to  make  up 
the  tale  as  others  were  taken  out,  were  permanently  detailed  for 
that  dutv,  and  it  became  an  honor  eagerly  sought,  and  a  reward 
for  gallantry  and  good  conduct  second  only  to  promotion,  to  be 
enrolled  in  "  the  advance."  The  non-commissioned  officers 
were  chosen  with  the  same  care,  and  First  Lieutenant  Charles 
W.  Rogers  of  Company  E,  formerly  of  the  First  Kentucky  In 
fantry,  was  appointed  to  command  it.  This  officer  possessed  in" 
an  eminent  degree  the  cool  judgment,  perfect  fearlessness,  com 
mand  of  men,  and  shrewdness  of  perception  requisite  for  such 
an  office. 

This  guard  habitually  marched  at  a  distance  of  four  hundred 
yards  in  front  of  the  column ;  three  videttes  were  posted  at  in 
tervals  of  one  hundred  yards  between  it  and  the  column.  Their 
duties  wrere  to  transmit  information  and  orders  between  the  col 
umn  and  the  guard,  and  to  regulate  the  gait  of  the  former,  so 
that  it  would  not  press  too  close  on  the  latter,  and,  also,  to  pre 
vent  any  straggling  between  the  two.  Six  videttes  were  thrown 
out  in  front  of  the  guard — four  at  intervals  of  fifty  yards,  and 
with  another  interval  of  the  same  distance  from  the  fourth  of 
these,  two  rode  together  in  the  extreme  front.  These  two  were 
consequently  at  a  distance  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  in 
front  of  the  body  of  the  guard.  At  first  these  videttes  wrere 
regularly  relieved,  but  it  was  afterward  judged  best  to  keep  the 
same  men  always  on  the  same  duty.  The  advance  videttes  were 
required  to  examine  carefully  on  all  sides,  and  report  to  the  of 
ficer  of  the  guard  the  slightest  indication  which  seemed  suspi 
cious.  When  they  came  to  by-roads  or  cross-roads  one  or  both, 
as  the  case  might  require,  immediately  galloped  some  two  or 
three  hundred  yards  down  them,  and  remained  until  relieved  by 


ARRIVAL    AT    HARROBSBURG.  189 


men  sent  for  that  purpose  from  the  head  of  the  column,  when 
they  returned  to  their  posts. 

As  soon  as  they  notified  the  officer  of  the  guard  (by  calling  to 
the  videttes  next  behind  them),  that  they  were  about  to  leave  their 
posts,  he  took  measures  to  supply  their  places.  The  two  videttes 
next  to  them  in  the  chain  galloped  to  the  front,  the  other  two, 
also,  moved  up,  respectively,  fifty  yards,  and  two  men  were  sent 
from  the  guard  to  fill  the  places  of  the  last. 

When  the  videttes,  regularly  in  advance,  returned,  the  original 
disposition  was  resumed.  If  an  enemy  was  encountered,  men 
were  dispatched  from  the  guard  to  the  assistance  of  the  videttes, 
or  the  latter  fell  back  on  the  guard,  as  circumstances  dictated. 
If  the  enemy  was  too  strong  to  be  driven  by  the  advance,  the 
latter  endeavored  to  hold  him  in  check  (and  was  reinforced  if  ne 
cessary),  until  the  command  could  be  formed  for  attack  or  de 
fense.  Scouting  parties  were  of  course  thrown  out  on  the  front 
and  flanks,  as  well  as  to  the  rear,  but  as  these  parties  were  often 
miles  away  in  search  of  information,  a  vigilant  advance  guard 
was  always  necessary.  During  an  engagement,  the  advance  was 
generally  kept  mounted  and  held  in  reserve. 

Passing  through  Springfield  without  a  halt,  the  column 
marched  in  the  direction  of  Harrodsburg.  Late  in  the  evening, 
some  of  the  scouts  had  an  engagement  at  a  little  place  called 
Macksville,  with  a  Home-guard  organization,  in  which  two  or 
three  were  wounded  and  two  captured.  During  the  night,  find 
ing  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  ferret  out  the  captors,  we  ne 
gotiated  an  exchange  of  prisoners.  On  the  next  morning,  about 
nine  o'clock  we  entered  Harrodsburg,  another  stronghold  of  our 
friends,  and  were  warmly  welcomed. 

It  was  Sunday,  and  a  large  concourse  of  people  were  in  town. 
We  found  that  the  ladies,  in  anticipation  of  our  coming,  had 
prepared  the  most  inviting  rations,  and  the  men  after  attending 
to  their  horses  and  supplying  them  with  forage,  a  "  super 
abundance  of  which,"  to  use  the  old  forage-master's  expression, 
was  stacked  close  by,  fell  to  themselves,  and  most  of  them  were 


190  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

eating,  with  short  intervals  employed  in  sleeping,  until  the  hour 
of  departure.  Harrodsburg  is  twenty-eight  miles  from  Lexing 
ton,  the  head-quarters  then  of  the  Federal  forces  of  the  region. 
Gano,  with  his  squadron,  was  detached  at  Harrodsburg  to  go 
around  Lexington  and  burn  the  bridges  on  the  Kentucky  Cen 
tral  Railroad,  in  order  to  prevent  troops  from  being  thrown  into 
Lexington  from  Cincinnati.  Captain  Allen  was  sent  to  destroy 
the  bridges  over  Benson  and  other  small  streams  on  the  Louis- 

O 

ville  and  Lexington  road,  to  prevent  the  transmission  of  troops 
by  that  road,  and  also  to  induce  the  impression  that  the  com 
mand  was  making  for  Louisville.  About  dark  the  column 
moved  from  Harrodsburg  on  the  Frankfort  pike.  It  was  Mor 
gan's  wish  to  induce  the  belief  that  he  intended  to  attack  Frank 
fort,  but  to  suddenly  turn  to  the  right  and  make  for  Lexington, 
capture  that  placo  if  he  could,  and  if  he  could  not,  at  least 
enjoy  the  fine  country  in  its  vicinity. 

At  one  P.  M.  that  night  we  encamped  at  LaAvrenceburg,  the 
county  seat  of  Anderson  county,  twenty  miles  from  Harrodsburg 
and  about  fifteen  from  Frankfort.  A  scouting  party  was  sent 
immediately  on  in  the  direction  of  Frankfort,  with  instructions 
to  drive  in  the  pickets  after  daybreak,  and  to  rejoin  us  at  Ver 
sailles.  The  command  had  now  marched  three  hundred  and  odd 
miles  in  eight  days,  but  the  men,  despite  the  fatigue  usually  re 
sulting  from  night  marching,  were  comparatively  fresh,  and  in 
the  most  exultant  spirits.  So  far,  every  thing  had  gone  well ; 
although  encompassed  by  superior  forces,  celerity  of  movement, 
and  skillful  selection  of  route,  had  enabled  us  to  elude  them  ;  a 
good  many  little  affairs  had  occurred  with  the  Home-guards, 
which  I  have  not  mentioned,  but  they  had  been  expected,  and 
the  damage  from  them  was  trifling.  Leaving  Lawrenceburg  next 
morning  at  daybreak,  the  column  took  the  road  to  Versailles,  but 
was  compelled  to  halt  at  Shryock's  ferry,  seven  miles  from  Ver 
sailles.  On  account  of  the  ferry-boat  having  been  sunk,  it  was 
necessary  to  raise  and  repair  it,  so  that  the  howitzers  might  be 
crossed.  This  delay  prevented  us  from  reaching  Versailles 


THREATENING  LEXINGTON  AND  FRANKFORT.       191 

before  night  fell.  It  was  now  deemed  good  policy  to  march  more 
slowly,  obtain  perfectly  accurate  information,  and  in  trease  the 
confusion  already  prevailing  by  threatening  all  points  of  impor 
tance.  This  policy  was  not  a  hazardous  one,  under  the  circum 
stances,  for  although  the  forces  surrounding  the  point  where  we 
now  were,  were  each  a  superior  to  our  own,  yet  by  getting  be 
tween  them  and  preventing  their  concentration,  and  industriously 
creating  the  impression  to  which  the  people  were,  at  any  rate 
disposed,  that  our  force  was  four  or  five  thousand  strong,  Mor 
gan  had  demoralized  them,  and  they  were  afraid  to  come  out 
and  meet  him.  The  ease  with  which  he  had,  hitherto,  pressed 
right  on,  without  a  momentary  check,  confirmed  the  belief  that 
he  was  very  strong. 

The  command  remained  encamped  at  Versailles  during  the 
night.  Scouts  were  sent  in  every  direction,  and  upon  their  re 
turn  next  day  reported  that  a  very  general  consternation  pre 
vailed,  as  well  as  uncertainty  regarding  our  movements.  The 
Home-guards  and  little  detachments  of  troops  were  running,  on 
the  one  side  for  Lexington,  and  on  the  other  for  Frankfort. 
Leaving  Versailles  next  day  about  10  A.  M.,  the  column  moved 
toward  Georgetown. 

Before  leaving  Versailles,  the  scouting  parties  which  had  been 
dispatched  to  Frankfort  rejoined  the  command.  Frankfort  was 
by  this  time  relieved  of  all  fear  of  immediate  attack,  and  Colonel 
Morgan  became  apprehensive  that  the  troops  there  might  be 
marched  out  after  him,  or  that  communication  might  be  opened 
with  Lexington  which  might  lead  to  a  simultaneous  attack  upon 
him  by  the  forces  of  the  two  points.  He  hoped  that  the  detach 
ment  under  Captain  Allen  returning,  after  the  destruction  of  the 
bridge  between  Frankfort  and  Louisville,  and  necessarily  march 
ing  close  to  the  former  (in  doing  so),  would  produce  the  impres 
sion  there,  that  an  attack  was  again  imminent.  We  reached 
Midway  (about  12  M.),  a  little  town  on  the  railroad,  and 
equi-distant  from  Lexington  and  Frankfort.  What  took  place 
at  Midway  is  best  described  in  Ellsworth's  language.  He  says, 


192 

"At  this  place  I  surprised  the  operator,  who  was  quietly  sitting 
on  the  platform  in  front  of  his  office,  enjoying  himself  hugely. 
Little  did  he  suspect  that  the  much-dreaded  Morgan  was  in  his 
vicinity.  I  demanded  of  him  to  call  Lexington  and  inquire  the 
time  of  day,  which  he  did.  This  I  did  for  the  purpose  of  getting 
his  style  of  handling  the  'key'  in  writing  dispatches.  My  first 
impression  of  his  style,  from  noting  the  paper  in  the  instrument, 
was  confirmed.  He  was,  to  use  a  telegraphic  term,  a  'plug7 
operator.  I  adopted  his  style  of  telegraphing,  and  commenced 
operations.  In  this  office  I  found  a  signal  book,  which  proved 
very  useful.  It  contained  the  calls  of  all  the  offices.  Dispatch 
after  dispatch  was  going  to  and  from  Lexington,  Georgetown, 
Paris  and  Frankfort,  all  containing  something  in  reference  to 
Morgan.  On  commencing  operations,  I  discovered  that  there 
were  two  wires  on  the  line  along  this  railroad.  One  was  what 
we  term  a  'through  wire,'  running  direct  from  Lexington  to 
Frankfort,  and  not  entering  any  of  the  way  offices.  I  found 
that  all  military  messages  were  sent  over  that  line.  As  it  did 
not  enter  Midway  office  I  ordered  it  to  be  cut,  thus  forcing  Lex 
ington  on  to  the  wire  that  did  run  through  the  office.  I  tested 
the  line  and  found,  by  applying  the  ground  wire,  it  made  no 
difference  with  the  circuit ;  and,  as  Lexington  was  Head-Quar 
ters,  I  cut  Frankfort  off.  Midway  was  called,  I  answered,  and 

received  the  following : 

'  LEXINGTON,  July  15,  1802. 

'  To  J.   W.  Woolums,  operator,  Midway : 

'Will  there  be  any  danger  in  coming  to  Midway?  Is  every 
thing  right?  'TAYLOR — Conductor? 

"  I  inquired  of  my  prisoner  (the  operator)  if  he  knew  a  man 
by  the  name  of  Taylor.  He  said  Taylor  was  the  conductor.  I 
immediately  gave  Taylor  the  following  reply : 

1  MIDWAY,  July  15,  1862. 
c  To  Tat/lor,  Lexington : 

4 All  right;  come  on.     No  sign  of  any  rebels  here. 

<  WOOLUMS/ 


ELLSWORTH    TELEGRAPHING.  193 

"The  operator  in  Cincinnati  then  called  Frankfort.  I  an 
swered  and  received  about  a  dozen  unimportant  dispatches.  He 
had  no  sooner  finished  than  Lexington  called  Frankfort.  Again 
I  answered,  and  received  the  following  message  : 

'LEXINGTON,  July  15,  1862. 
4  To  General  Finnell,  Frankfort : 

4 1  wish  you  to  move  the  forces  at  Frankfort,  on  the  line  of  the 
Lexington  railroad,  immediately,  and  have  the  cars  follow  and 
take  them  up  as  soon  as  possible.  Further  orders  will  await 
them  at  Midway.  1  will,  in  three  or  four  hours,  move  forward 
on  the  Georgetown  pike  ;  will  have  most  of  my  men  mounted. 
Morgan  left  Versailles  this  morning  with  eight  hundred  and 
fifty  men,  on  the  Midway  road,  moving  in  the  direction  of 
Georgetown.  'BRIGADIER- GENERAL  WARD.' 

"  This  being  our  position  and  intention  exactly,  it  was  thought 
proper  to  throw  General  Ward  on  some  other  track.  So,  in  the 
course  of  half  an  hour,  I  manufactured  and  sent  the  following 
dispatch,  which  was  approved  by  General  Morgan  : 

'MIDWAY,  July  15,  1862. 
'  To  Brigadier- General  Ward,  Lexington: 

'Morgan,  with  upward  of  one  thousand  men,  came  within  a 
mile  of  here,  and  took  the  old  Frankfort  road,  marching,  we 
suppose,  for  Frankfort.  This  is  reliable. 

'  WOOLUMS — Operator' 

"In  about  ten  minutes  Lexington  again  called  Frankfort, 
when  I  received  the  following : 

'  LEXINGTON,  July  15,  1862. 
•  To  General  Finnell,  Frankfort : 

'  Morgan,  with  more  than  one  thousand  men,  came  within  a 
mile  of  here,  and  took  the  old  Frankfort  road.  This  dispatch 
received  from  Midway,  and  is  reliable.  The  regiment  from 
Frankfort  had  better  be  recalled. 

'  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WARD/ 
13 


194  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

"  I  receipted  for  this  message,  and  again  manufactured  a 
message  to  confirm  the  information  General  Ward  received  from 
Midway,  and  not  knowing  the  tariff  from  Frankfort  to  Lexing 
ton,  I  could  not  send  a  formal  message ;  so,  appearing  greatly 
agitated,  I  waited  until  the  circuit  was  occupied,  and  broke  in, 
telling  them  to  wait  a  minute,  and  commenced  calling  Lexington. 
He  answered  with  as  much  gusto  as  I  called  him.  I  telegraphed 
as  follows : 

1  Frankfort  to  Lexington : 

6  Tell  General  Ward  our  pickets  are  just  driven  in.  Great 
excitement.  Pickets  say  the  force  of  enemy  must  be  two  thou 
sand.  '  OPERATOR.' 

It  was  now  two  P.  M.,  and  General  Morgan  wished  to  be  off 
for  Georgetown.  I  ran  a  secret  ground  connection,  and  opened 
the  circuit  on  the  Lexington  end.  This  was  to  leave  the  impres 
sion  that  the  Frankfort  operator  was  skedaddling,  or  that  Mor 
gan's  men  had  destroyed  the  telegraph." 

While  at  Midway,  dispositions  were  made  for  the  capture  of 
the  trains  coming  from  both  ends  of  the  road ;  but  they  wrere 
not  sent.  The  command  reached  Georgetown  just  at  sundown. 
A  small  force  of  Home-guards  had  mustered  there  to  oppose  us. 
Morgan  sent  them  word  to  surrender,  and  they  should  not  be 
hurt.  The  leader  of  this  band  is  said  to  have  made  his  men  a 
speech  of  singular  eloquence  and  stirring  effect.  If  he  was  re 
ported  correctly,  he  told  them  that  "Morgan,  the  marauder  and 
murderer — the  accursed  of  the  Union  men  of  Kentucky,"  was 
coming  upon  them.  That,  in  "  his  track  every  where  prevailed 
terror  and  desolation.  In  his  rear,  the  smoke  of  burning  towns 
was  ascending,  the  blood  of  martyred  patriots  was  streaming, 
the  wails  of  widowed  women  and  orphan  children  were  resound 
ing.  In  his  front,  Home-guards  and  soldiers  were  flying."  That 
"Tom  Long  reported  him  just  outside  of  town,  with  ten  or 
twelve  thousand  men,  armed  with  long  beards  and  butcher- 
knives  ;"  and  the  orator  thought  that  they  "  had  better  scatter 


REST   AT    GEORGETOWN.  195 

and  take  care  of  themselves."  They  accordingly  "scattered"  at 
full  speed.  Several  prisoners  (Southern  sympathizers)  were  con 
fined  in  the  court-house;  among  them,  a  man  whom  many  Ken- 
tuckians  have  a  lively  recollection  of — poor  Will  Webb.  He, 
upon  seeing  the  Home-guards  flee,  thrust  his  body  half  out  of  a 
window,  and  pointing  to  the  stars  and  stripes  still  flying,  apos 
trophized  the  fugitives  in  terms  that  ought  to  have  made  a  sutler 
fight.  "Are  you  going  to  desert  your  flag?"  he  said.  "Remain, 
and  perform  the  pleasing  duty  of  dying  under  its  glorious  folds, 
and  afford  us  the  agreeable  spectacle  that  you  will  thus  pre- 
"sent."  This  touching  appeal  was  of  no  avail. 

The  geographical  situation  of  Georgetown  with  relation  to  the 
towns  of  that  portion  of  Kentucky — especially  those  occupied 
by  Federal  troops — made  it  an  excellent  point  for  Colonel  Mor 
gan's  purposes.  lie  was  in  a  central  position  here,  nearly  equi 
distant  from  all  points  of  importance,  and  could  observe  and 
checkmate  movements  made  from  any  of  them.  Georgetown  is 
twelve  miles  from  Lexington,  and  eighteen  from  Frankfort,  the 
two  points  from  which  he  had  chiefly  to  anticipate  attacks.  Al 
though*  not  directly  between  these  two  places,  Georgetown  is  so 
nearly  on  a  line  with  them,  that  its  possession  enabled  him  to 
prevent  communication  of  any  kind  between  the  troops  occupy 
ing  them. 

As  the  command  greatly  needed  rest,  Colonel  Morgan  re 
mained  here  (where  he  felt  more  secure,  for  the  reasons  I  have 
mentioned)  during  two  days.  He  was  not  entirely  idle,  however, 
during  that  time.  He  sent  Captain  Hamilton,  with  one  com 
pany,  to  disperse  a  Home-guard  organization  at  the  Stamping 
Ground,  thirteen  miles  from  Georgetown.  Hamilton  accom 
plished  his  mission,  and  burned  the  tents,  and  destroyed  the 
guns.  Detachments  were  kept  constantly  at  or  near  Midway, 
to  prevent  any  communication  by  the  railroad  between  Lexing 
ton  and  Frankfort.  Captain  Castleman  was  sent  to  destroy  the 
bridges  on  the  Kentucky  Central  Railroad  between  Lexington 
and  Paris — which  he  did  ;  and  was  instructed  to  rejoin  the  com- 


196  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

mand  in  three  or  four  days  at  Winchester,  in  Clark  county. 
For  other  than  strategic  reasons,  Georgetown  was  an  admirable 
selection  as  a  resting  point.  The  large  majority  of  the  people 
throughout  this  region  were,  even  at  that  time,  strongly  South 
ern  in  sentiment  and  sympathy,  and  their  native  inclination  to 
hospitality  was  much  enhanced  by  the  knowledge  that  they 
were  feeding  their  friends,  when  we  would  suddenly  descend 
upon  them.  There  was  a  drawback  in  the  apprehension  of  a 
visit  from  some  provost-guards,  to  investigate  the  circumstances 
of  this  profuse  and  practical  sympathy  with  armed  rebels.  But 
they  hit  upon  an  expedient  which  they  thought  would  obviate 
all  the  unpleasant  after-claps.  They  would  give  nothing  of  their 
own  free  will  and  accord;  but  forced  us  to  "impress"  every 
thing  that  we  needed.  Many  a  time  have  I  seen  an  old  farmer 
unlock  all  the  closets  and  presses  in  his  house— press  the  keys 
of  his  meat-house  into  the  hands  of  the  Commissary,  point  out 
to  the  Quartermaster  where  forage  could  be  obtained,  muster  his 
negroes  to  cook  and  make  themselves  generally  useful,  protesting 
all  the  time  that  he  was  acting  under  the  cruelest  compulsion, 
and  then  stand  by,  rubbing  his  hands  and  chuckling  to  think 
how  well  he  had  reconciled  the  indulgence  of  his  private  sympa 
thies  with  his  public  repute  for  loyalty.  The  old  ladies,  how 
ever,  were  serious  obstacles  to  the  establishment  of  these  deco 
rous  records.  They  wished  not  only  to  give  but  to  talk  freely, 
and  the  more  the  husband  wisely  preached  "policy"  and  an 
astute  prudence,  the  more  certainly  were  his  cob-webs  of  cau 
tion  torn  into  shreds  by  the  trenchant  tongue  of  his  wife. 

Of  all  the  points  which  we  could  have  reached  just  at  that 
time,  Georgetown  was  the  one  where  this  sympathy  for  us  was 
strongest.  There  were  only  a  very  few  Union  men  living  in  the 
town,  and  these  had  run  away;  and  the  county  (Scott)  was  the 
very  hot-bed  of  Southern  feeling.  To  Owen  and  Boone  we  did 
not  contemplate  paying  a  visit.  We  had  not  yet  reached  Har 
rison ;  but  in  halting  in  Scott  county  and  at  Georgetown,  we 
felt  that  our  situation  would  not  need  to  be  improved.  A  good 


ORGANIZATION   OF   A   NEW   COMPANY.  197 

many  recruits  had  been  obtained  at  various  points  in  the  State, 
and  at  Georgetown  a  full  company  was  raised,  of  which  W.  C.  P. 
Breckinridge,  a  young  lawyer  of  Lexington,  was  elected  Cap 
tain.  He  had  just  run  the  blockade  established  around  the  lat 
ter  town. 

While  lying  at  Georgetown  the  command  was  encamped  in 
line  of  battle,  day  and  night- and  scouting  parties  were  sent 
three  or  four  times  a  day  toward  Lexington— which  were  in 
structed  to  clear  the  road  of  the  enemy's  pickets  and  reconnoi- 
tering  parties.  While  here,  Gano  and  Allen  rejoined  the  col 
umn,  having  accomplished  their  respective  missions. 

Gano  (in  making  a  detour  around  Lexington)  had  driven  in 
the  pickets  on  every  road— creating  a  fearful  amount  of  confusion 
in  the  place  among  its  gallant  defenders,  and  causing  the  order 
that  all  rebel  sympathizers,  seen  on  the  streets  should  be  shot, 
to  be  emphatically  reiterated.  As  Gano  had  approached  George 
town,  after  leaving  Lexington  and  on  his  way  to  burn  the  bridges 
below  Paris,  an  assemblage  of  a  strange  character  occurred.  He 
had  formerly  lived  near  Georgetown  and  knew  nearly  every  man 
in  the  county.  He  stopped  at  the  house  of  an  intimate  personal 
friend,  who  was  also  a  notorious  "  sympathizer,"  who  lived  four 
or  five  miles  from  Georgetown,  and  "  forced"  him  to  feed  his 
men  and  horses.  While  there,  two  or  three  of  the  Southern 
citizens  of  Scott,  among  them  Stoddard  Johnston  (afterward 
Lieutenant  Colonel  on  General  Brcckinridge's  staff)  came  to  the 
house,  and  were  immediately  and  with  great  solemnity,  placed 
under  arrest. 

Shortly  afterward  the  assistant  provost  marshal  of  George 
town  (who  was  a  very  clever  fellow),  came  out  to  protect  the 
house  and  grounds  from  any  disorder  that  the  troops  might  be 
inclined  to  indulge  in— thinking  (in  his  simplicity)  when  he  heard 
that  troops  were  quartered  there,  that  they  must  be  "  Union." 
The  owner  of  the  house  (of  course)  interceded  for  him,  and 
Gano  pleased  with  the  motive  which  had  actuated  him,  promised 
to  detain  him,  only  until  he  himself  moved  again.  In  a  short 


198 


HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 


time    another  arrival   was  announced.     The   most  determined, 
deeply-pitted,  high-colored  and  uncompromising  Union  man  in 
Georgetown,  came  galloping  up  the  road  to  the  house,  and  asked 
in  a  loud  and  authorative  tone  for  the  commander  of  the  detach 
ment.     Gano  walked  forth  and  greeted   him.     "  Why  how  are 
you,  Dick,"  said  the  new  comer.     UI  did'nt  know  that  you  were 
in  the  Union  army ;  I  Ve  got  something  for  you  to  do,  old  fellow." 
Gano  assured  him  that  he  was  delighted  to  hear  it.     "Where  is 
the   commander  of  these   men,"  continued  the  "  dauntless   pa 
triot,"      "I   am  their   commander,"   said   Gano.      "Well   then 
here's  an  order  for  you,"  said  the  bearer  of  dispatches  handing 
him   a  communication   from   the  Home-guard  headquarters,  in 
Georgetown.     Gano  read  it.     "  Oliver,"  he  then  said,  slowly  and 
very  impressively,  "  I  should  be  truly  sorry  to  see  you  injured, 
we  were  school   mates,  and   I   remember  our  early  friendship." 
Oliver's  jaw   fell,  and   his   intelligent  eye  grew  glassy  with  a 
"  wild  and  maddening  "  apprehension,  but  his  feelings  would  not 
permit   him  to  speak.     "  Oliver,"  continued  Gano  after  a  pause 
(and  keeping  his  countenance  remarkably)  "  is  n't  it  possible  that 
you  may  be  mistaken  in  these  troops.     To  which  army  do  you 
think   they   belong?"      "Why,"   gasped   Oliver;    "ain't   they 
Union  ?  "  "  Union ! "  echoed  Gano  with  a  groan  of  horror,  "  do  n't 
let  them  hear  you  say  so,  I  mightn't  be  able  to   control  them. 
They  are  Morgan's  Texas   Rangers."     He  then  led   the   half 
fainting  Oliver,  who  under  the  influence  of  this  last  speech  had 
become  "even   as  a  little   child,"  to  the  house,  and  placed  him 
with  the  other  prisoners. 

Saddest  and  most  inconsolable  of  these  were  the  sympathizers 
who  had  come  purposely  to  be  -captured.  When  the  hour  drew 
near  for  Gano's  departure,  he  held  .a  brief  conference  with  the 
"secesh,"  and  then  paroled  the  whole  batch,  including  his  host, 
binding  them  not  to  divulge  any  thing  which  they  had  seen  or 
heard.  All  were  impressed  with  the  solemn  nature  of  this  ob 
ligation,  but  the  melancholy  gravity  of  Johnston  (who  had  sug 
gested  it  )  was  even  awful. 


CAPTURE   OF   CYNTHIANA.  199 

Colonel  Morgan  finding  how  strongly  Lexington  was  garri 
soned,  gave  up  all  thought  of  attacking  it,  but  it  was  high  time 
that  he  made  his  arrangements  to  return  to  Dixie.  He  deter 
mined  to  make  a  dash  at  Cynthiana,  the  county  seat  of  Harrison 
county,  situated  on  the  Kentucky  Central  Railroad,  thirty-two 
miles  from  Lexington,  and  about  twenty-two  by  turnpike  from 
Georgetown.  By  moving  in  this  direction,  and  striking  a  blow 
at  this  point,  he  hoped  to  induce  the  impression  that  he  was 
aiming  at  Cincinnati,  and  at  the  same  time  thoroughly  bewilder 
the  oflicer  in  command  at  Lexington  regarding  his  real  intentions. 
When  he  reached  Cynthiana  he  would  be  master  of  three  or  four 
routes,  by  either  of  which  he  could  leave  Kentucky,  completely 
eluding  his  pursuers,  and  he  did  not  doubt  that  he  could  defeat 
whatever  force  might  be  collected  there. 

He  left  Georgetown  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  having  first 
dispatched  parts  of  two  companies  to  drive  all  scouts  and  de 
tachments  of  every  kind  into  Lexington.  While  moving  rapidly 
with  the  bulk  of  his  command  toward  Cynthiana,  these  detach 
ments  protected  his  march  and  prevented  it  from  being  discov 
ered  too  soon.  Cynthiana  was  occupied  by  three  or  four  hundred 
men  of  Metcalfe's  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  about  the  same 
number  of  Home-guards,  all  under  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Landrum,  of  Metcalfe's  regiment.  There  was  but  one 
piece  of  artillery  in  the  -tOAvn,  a  brass  twelve-pound  howitzer. 
This  was  under  charge  of  a  company  of  firemen  from  Cincinnati, 
under  command  of  "  Captain  Billy  Glass  of  the  Fourth  Ward," 
arid  they  went  to  work  when  the  fight  opened  as  if  they  were 
"  putting  out  a  fire."  We  struck  the  pickets  a  mile  or  two  from 
the  town,  and  the  advance  guard  chased  them  in,  capturing 
three  or  four.  General  Morgan  had  previously  determined  upon 
his  dispositions  for  the  attack,  well  knowing  the  country,  and 
they  were  made  immediately  after  the  alarm  to  the  pickets. 
Between  us  and  the  town  was  the  Licking  river,  crossed  at  the 
Georgetown  pike,  which  we  were  traveling,  by  a  narrow,  covered 
bridge.  Just  by  the  side. of  the  bridge,  there  was  a  ford  about 


200  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

waist-deep.  Nowhere  else,  in  the  then  stage  of  water,  was  the 
river  fordable  in  that  immediate  vicinity.  But  above  and  below 
about  a  mile,  respectively,  from  the  bridge,  were  fords,  and  to 
these  were  sent,  Gano  above,  and  the  Georgians  below,  with  in 
structions  to  cross  and  attack  the  town  upon  the  respective 
quarters  by  which  they  approached  it.  The  Second  Kentucky 
was  ordered  to  attack  upon  the  road  by  which  we  had  advanced. 

The  enemy  held  all  the  houses  upon  the  opposite  bank  of  the 
river,  which  runs  close  to  the  town,  and  opened  a  smart  fire  of 
musketry  upon  the  regiment  as  it  advanced.  Companies  A  and 
B  were  deployed  upon  the  right  of  the  road,  E  and  F  upon  the 
left,  and  C  was  held  in  reserve,  mounted ;  the  advance-guard 
had  been  sent  with  Gano.  The  recruits,  most  of  whom  were 
unarmed,  were  also,  of  course,  kept  in  the  rear.  The  howitzers 
were  planted  near  the  road,  about  three  hundred  and  fifty  yards 
from  the  bridge,  and  were  opened  at  once  upon  the  houses,  evi 
dently  filled  with  the  enemy. 

The  enemy's  single  piece  of  artillery  swept  the  bridge  and 
road,  and  commanded  the  position  where  the  howitzers  were 
stationed.  Companies  E  and  F  advanced  to  the  river's  edge 
and  poured  such  a  fire  across  the  narrow  stream  that  they  com 
pelled  the  troops  exposed  to  it  to  throw  down  their  guns  and 
surrender.  They  were  then  made  to  swim  the  river  in  order  to 
join  their  captors.  In  the  meantime,  Company  A,  after  having 
been  repulsed  two  or  three  times  in  attempting  to  rush  across 
the  bridge,  plunged  into  the  river  and,  holding  their  guns  and 
ammunition  above  their  heads,  crossed  at  the  ford  above-men 
tioned,  and  effected  a  lodgment  on  the  other  side.  For  awhile 
those  first  over  were  compelled  to  take  shelter  behind  a  long 
warehouse  near  the  bridge,  and  even  when  the  entire  company 
had  gotten  over,  and  assistance  had  been  sent  to  it,  it  seemed 
that  the  enemy,  who  concentrated  to  oppose  us  here,  and  re 
doubled  his  fire,  would  drive  all  back.  The  adjacent  houses  and 
yards  were  filled  with  sharpshooters,  who  poured  in  telling  vol 
leys  as  the  men  sought  to  close  with  them. 


CAPTURE    OF   CYNTIIIANA.  201 

The  lines  were  at  this  point  not  more  than  forty  yards  apart, 
and  most  of  our  loss  was  sustained  here,  and  by  Company  A. 

The  howitzers  were  brought  up,  and  posted  on  the  corner,  but 
the  close  fire  drove  the  gunners  away  from  them.  One  gunner 
named  TalboJ  loaded  and  fired  his  piece  two  or  three  times  by 
himself,  while  the  balls  were  actually  striking  it.  He  was  after 
ward  made  a  Lieutenant.  The  team  of  one  of  the  pieces,  smart 
ing  with  wounds,  ran  away  with  the  limber,  and  carried  it  into 
the  midst  of  the  enemy.  This  check  did  not  last  more  than 
three  or  four  minutes.  Company  C  charged  across  the  bridge 
and  up  the  principal  street,  on  horseback,  losing  three  or  four 
men  only,  and  distracting  the  enemy's  attention.  Company  B 
got  a  position  on  the  other  bank  where  they  could  shoot  right 
into  the  party  which  was  holding  Company  A  in  check.  The 
latter  made  a  determined  rush,  at  the  head  of  which  were  Ser 
geants  Drake  and  Quirk  and  private  James  Moore,  of  Louis 
iana,  a  little  fellow,  not  yet  sixteen  years  old,  who  fell  with  two 
severe  wounds,  but  recovered,  to  make  one  of  the  most  gallant 
officers  of  our  command.  In  this  dash,  Sergeant  Quirk,  out  of 
ammunition,  and  seeing  his  friend,  Drake,  in  imminent  peril, 
knocked  down  his  assailant  with  a  stone.  The  enemy  then  gave 
way ;  the  other  companies  were,  in  the  mean  time,  brought  up 
to  press  them. 

Gano  came  in  on  the  one  side,  and  the  Georgians  on  the 
other,  each  driving  all  opponents  before  them.  The  Texians, 
Georgians,  and  Kentuckians  arrived  simultaneously  at  the  piece 
of  artillery,  which  the  enemy  had  kept  busily  employed  all  the 
time.  It  was  immediately  taken,  each  claiming  its  capture. 

The  enemy  immediately  evacuated  the  town,  and  retreated 
eastwardly,  but  were  closely  pressed,  and  the  better  part  cap 
tured.  Greenfell  headed  a  charge  upon  the  depot,  in  which 
some  of  them  took  refuge.  He  received  eleven  bullets  through 
his  horse,  person,  and  clothes,  but  was  only  slightly  hurt.  A 
curious  little  scarlet  skull  cap,  which  he  used  to  wear,  was  per 
forated.  It  fitted  so  tight  upon  his  head  that  I  previously 


202  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

thought  a  ball  could  not  go  through  it  without  blowing  his  brains 
out. 

Colonel  Landrum  was  chased  eight  or  ten  miles.  Little  Billy 
Peyton,  a  mere  boy  (Colonel  Morgan's  Orderly),  but  perfectly 
fearless,  followed  him  closely,  and  exhausted  two  pistols  with 
out  hitting  him.  The  Colonel  was  riding  a  superb  horse,  which 
attracted  attention  to  him,  but  which  saved  him.  The  enemy's 
loss  was  about  ninety  in  killed  and  wounded;  ours  was  about 
forty.  Four  hundred  and  twenty  prisoners  were  taken. 

It  wrould  be  an  unfair  description  of  this  fight  if  mention  were 
omitted  of  the  gallant  conduct  of  the  recruits.  Although  the 
most  of  them,  as  has  been  stated,  were  unarmed,  they  all  "  went 
in"  like  game  cocks.  Plenty  of  fine  guns,  with  ammunition, 
were  captured ;  also  a  large  quantity  of  stores,  and  two  or  three 
hundred  horses. 

Cynthiana,  like  Georgetown  and  Versailles,  was  full  of  our 
devoted  friends,  and  we  felt  satisfied  that  the  wounded  we  were 
obliged  to  leave  behind  us  would  be  well  taken  care  of.  Two 
men  who  subsequently  died  of  their  wounds,  privates  George 
Arnold  and  Clarke,  behaved  with  such  conspicuous  gal 
lantry,  and  were  ahvays  so  noted  for  good  conduct,  that  their 
loss  caused  universal  regret.  Arnold  was  a  member  of  the  ad 
vance-guard,  and  volunteered  to  accompany  Company  C  in  the 
charge  through  the  town.  He  fell  with  an  arm  and  a  thigh 
broken.  Clarke  undertook  to  carry  an  order  through  the  ene 
my's  line  to  Gario,  who  was  in  their  rear,  and  fell  pierced 
through  the  body  with  five  balls.  The  best  men  were  among 
the  killed.  Private  Wm.  Craig,  of  Company  A,  first  to  cross 
the  river,  was  killed  as  he  mounted  the  bank.  All  of  the  other 
officers  having  been  wounded,  the  command  of  Company  A  de 
volved  upon  the  Third  Lieutenant,S.  D.  Morgan. 

Leaving  Cynthiana  at  one  or  two  p.  M.,  the  command  marched 
for  Paris.  About  five  miles  from  that  place,  we  encountered  a 
deputation  of  citizens,  coming  out  to  surrender  the  town.  We 
readied  Paris  about  sundown,  and  rested  there  during  the  night. 


RETREAT    FROM    KE^X/CKY.          \J  203 


I  have  omitted  to  mention  that  at  Georgetown,  Lieutenant  Niles 
was  appointed  by  Colonel  Morgan  upon  his  staff,  and  P.  II. 
Thorpe,  formerly  Captain  in  the  First  Kentucky  Infantry,  was 
made  Adjutant  in  his  stead.  I  mention  these  appointments  as 
if  they  were  regular  and  valid,  because  they  were  all  so  in  the 
end.  The  War  Department  made  some  trouble  about  them,  as 
was  expected,  and  perfectly  proper,  but  as  the  appointees  were 
borne  on  the  muster  and  pay  rolls  as  officers,  there  was  nothing 
to  be  done  but  recognize  them. 

R.  A.  Alston,  formerly  a  member  of  a  South  Carolina  .regi 
ment  of  cavalry,  but  a  member  and  private  at  the  time  of  Com 
pany  A,  Second  Kentucky,  had  been  selected  at  Kuoxville  by 
Colonel  Morgan  to  perform  the  duties  of  Adjutant-General,  on 
account  of  his  superior  fitness  for  that  position.  He  -was  per 
mitted  to  recruit  a  company  during  the  raid,  in  order  that  he 
might  obtain  the  rank  of  Captain.  He  got  his  commission,  and 
his  company  was  divided  between  some  others,  and  he  was  con 
tinued  upon  staif  duty,  although  Greenfell,  immediately  after  the 
conclusion  of  this  raid  became  Adjutant-General. 

The  next  morning  after  our  arrival  at  Paris,  a  large  force 
came  down  the  Lexington  road,  and  about  eight  A.  M.  gave  us 
strong  reasons  for  resuming  our  march.  This  force,  about 
twenty-five  hundred  or  three  thousand  men,  was  commanded  by 
General  G.  Clay  Smith.  Our  scouts  had  notified  us  of  its  ap 
proach  the  previous  night,  and  as  the  command  was  encamped 
on  the  Winchester  road,  the  one  which  we  wished  to  travel, 
there  was  no  danger  of  its  cutting  us  off.  It  came  on  very 
slowly,  and  there  was  at  no  time  any  determined  effort  made  to 
engage  us.  If  a  dash  had  been  made  at  us  when  we  prepared 
to  leave,  we  could  have  been  compelled  to  fight,  for  although  the 
prisoners  had  all  been  paroled,  we  were  very  much  incumbered 
containing  wounded  men,  brought  off  fromCyn- 

nm*Ti*LAr  pQJnfq  ^ 

Morgan  always  made  it  a  point  to  carry  off  every  wounded 
man  who  could  be  safely  moved  ;  in  this  way  he  prevented  much 


204  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

of  the  demoralization  attending  the  fear  the  men  felt  of 
falling,  when  wounded,  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  I  was 
once  seriously  told  that  a  belief  prevailed  with  some  people,  that 
Morgan  killed  his  own  wounded  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
making  them  prisoners. 

The  command  reached  Winchester  about  12  M.  and  remained 
there  until  4  P.  M.,  when  the  march  was  taken  up  again  and  we 
crossed  the  Kentucky  river  just  before  dark.  Marching  on,  we 
reached  Richmond  at  4  the  next  morning.  Here  we  met  with 
another  very  kind  reception,  and  were  joined  by  a  company  of 
recruits  under  Captain  Jennings.  It  was  admitted  into  the 
Second  Kentucky  as  Company  K.  Leaving  Richmond  at  4  P. 
M.  that  day  we  marched  toward  Crab  Orchard,  and  reached  that 
place  about  day  break  next  morning. 

It  had,  at  first,  been  Colonel  Morgan's  intention  to  make  a 
stand  at  Richmond,  as  the  whole  population  seemed  inclined  to 
join  him,  but  his  real  strength  was  now  known  to  the  enemy, 
and  they  were  collecting  to  attack  him  in  such  numbers,  that 
he  concluded  that  it  was  too  hazardous.  He  would  have  had 
to  have  fought  three  battles  at  least,  against  superior  forces,  and 
have  won  all  before  he  would  have  been  safe. 

Clay  Smith  was  following  him,  Woolford  was  collecting  forces 
to  the  southward  to  intercept  him,  and  troops  were  coming  from 
Louisville  and  other  points  to  push  after  him.  In  the  march 
from  Paris  to  Crab  Orchard,  a  good  many  wagons  and  a  large 
number  of  guns  were  captured,  and  all— wagons  and  guns— that 
were  not  needed  were  burned.  The  horses  captured  with  the 
twelve  pounder  at  Cynthiana  gave  out  and  died  before  we 
reached  the  Kentucky  river. 

Leaving  Crab  Orchard  at  11  A.  M.,  the  command  moved 
ward  Somerset  and  reached  that  place  about  sundown.     The  t 
ecrraph  was  again  taken  possession  of,  and  Colonel  Morgan  in 
structed  Ellsworth  to  countermand  all  of  General  Boyle's  orders 
for  pursuit.     At  Crab  Orchard  and  Somerset  one  hundred  ar 
thirty  Government  wagons  were  captured  and  burned.     At  Som- 


SAFE    ARRIVAL   AT   LIVINGSTON.  205 

erset  a  great  many  stores  of  all  kinds,  blankets,  shoes,  etc., 
were  found.  Several  wagons  were  loaded  with  as  much  as  could 
be  conveniently  carried  away,  and  the  rest  were  destroyed. 
Arms,  and  ammunition  for  small  arms  and  artillery,  were  also 
found  in  abundance,  and  were  destroyed. 

From  Somerset  the  column  marched  to  StagalPs  ferry  on  the 
Cumberland  river,  and  crossed  there.  We  reached  Monticello 
twenty-one  miles  from  the  river  that  night,  but  all  danger  was 
over  when  we  had  gotten  safely  across  the  river.  The  next  day  we 
proceeded  leisurely  toward  Livingston,  having  a  little  excitement 
with  the  bushwhackers,  but  suffering  no  loss. 

For  several  days  after  leaving  Somerset,  and  indeed  after 
reaching  Livingston,  we  suffered  greatly  for  want  of  rations,  as 
this  country  was  almost  bare  of  provisions.  Colonel  Morgan's 
objects  in  making  this  raid,  viz  :  to  obtain  recruits  and  horses, 
to  thoroughly  equip  and  arm  his  men,  to  reconnoiter  for  the  grand 
invasion  in  the  fall,  and  to  teach  the  enemy  that  we  could  recip 
rocate  the  compliment  of  invasion,  were  pretty  well  accom 
plished.  Enough  of  spare  horses  and  more  than  enough  of  extra 
guns,  saddles,  etc.,  were  brought  out,  to  supply  all  the  men  who 
had  been  left  behind.  A  great  many  prisoners  were  taken,  of 
whom  I  have  made  no  mention.  But  the  results  of  the  expedi 
tion  are  best  summed  up  in  the  words  of  Colonel  Morgan's  re 
port — 

"  I  left  Knoxville  on  the  4th  day  of  this  month,  with  about 
nine  hundred  men,  and  returned  to  Livingston  on  the  28th  inst. 
with  nearly  twelve  hundred,  having  been  absent  just  twenty-four 
days,  during  which  time  I  have  traveled  over  a  thousand  miles, 
captured  seventeen  towns,  destroyed  all  the  Government  supplies 
and  arms  in  them,  dispersed  about  fifteen  hundred  Home -guards 
and  paroled  nearly  twelve  hundred  regular  troops.  I  lost  in 
killed,  wounded  and  missing  of  the  number  that  I  carried  into 
Kentucky,  about  ninety." 

One  practice  was  habitually  pursued,  on  this  raid,  that  may 
be  remembered  by  some  of  our  friends  in  the  state  for  whose 


20< 


HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 


benefit  it  was  done.  Great  pains  were  always  taken  to  capture 
the  most  bitter  Union  man  in  each  town  and  neighborhood— the 
one  who  was  most  inclined  to  bear  down  on  Southern  men— es 
pecially  if  he  were  provost  marshal.  He  would  be  kept,  some 
times  a  day  or  two,  and  thoroughly  frightened.  Colonel  Mor 
gan,  who  derived  infinite  amusement  from  such  scenes,  would 
gravely  assure  each  one,  when  brought  into  his  presence,  that 
one  of  the  chief  objects  of  his  raid  was  to  catch  him.  It  was 
a  curious  sight  to  see  the  mixed  terror  and  vanity  this  declara 
tion  would  generally  excite— even  in  the  agonies  of  anticipated 
death,  the  prisoner  would  be  sensibly  touched  by  the  compliment. 
After  awhile,  however,  a  compromise  would  be  effected;  the 
prisoner  would  be  released  upon  the  implied  condition  that  he 
was,  in  the  future,  to  exert  himself  to  protect  Southern  people. 
It  was  thought  better  to  turn  all  the  captured  provost  marshals 
loose  and  let  them  resume  their  functions,  than  to  carry  them 
off,  and  let  new  men  be  appointed,  with  whom  no  understand 
ing  could  be  had. 

Ellsworth  wound  up  his  operations  at  Somerset,  with  compli 
mentary  dispatches  from  Colonel  Morgan  to  General  Jerry 
Boyle,  Prentice,  and  others,  and  concluded  with  the  following 
general  order  on  his  own  part  to  the  Kentucky  telegraphic 
operators : 

1  HEADQUARTERS,  TELEGRAPH  DEPT.  OF  KY., 

CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 
'  General  Order  No.\. 

"When  an  operator  is  positively  informed  that  the  enemy  is 
marching  on  his  station,  he  will  immediately  proceed  to  destroy 
the  telegraphic  instruments  and  all  material  in  his  charge.  Such 
instances  of  carelessness,  as  were  exhibited  on  the  part  of  the 
operators  at  Lebanon,  Midway,  and  Georgetown,  will  be  severely 
dealt  with.  By  order  of  G.  A.  ELLSWORTH, 

General  Military  Supi.  C.  S.  Telegraphic  Dept." 

At  Livingston  Colonel  Morgan  left  the  Second  Kentucky  and 
proceeded  to  Knoxville,  taking  with  him  the  Georgians,  Gano's 


MODE   OF   MUSTERING   OUT.  207 

squadron,  and  the  howitzers — which  needed  some  repairs.  After 
remaining  at  Livingston  three  days,  I  marched  the  regiment  to 
Spartn,  where  more  abundant  supplies  could  be  obtained,  and 
facilities  for  shoeing  horses  could  be  had.  While  at  Livingston, 
the  men  suffered  extremely  with  hunger,  and  one  man  declared 
his  wish  to  quit  a  service  in  which  he  was  subjected  to  such 
privations.  He  was  deprived  of  his  horse,  arms,  and  equipments, 
and  "blown  out"  of  the  regiment;  that  is,  upon  dress  parade, 
he  was  marched  down  the  front  of  the  regiment  (after  his  offense 
and  the  nature  of  the  punishment  had  been  read  by  the  Adjutant), 
with  the  bugler  blowing  the  "  Skedaddle"  behind  him  amid  the 
hisses  of  the  men,  who  were  thoroughly  disgusted  with  him ;  he 
was  then  driven  away  from  the  camp.  At  Sparta  we  found  a 
better  country  and  the  kindest  and  most  hospitably  people. 


208  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

As  soon  as  the  Second  Kentucky  was  placed  in  camp  at 
Sparta,  a  much  stricter  system  was  adopted  than  had  ever  pre 
vailed  before.  Camp-guards  were  regularly  posted  in  order  to 
keep  the  men  in  camp ;  and  as  staying  in  camp  closely  was 
something  they  particularly  disliked,  the  guard  had  to  be 
doubled,  until  finally  nearly  one  half  of  the  regiment  had  to  be 
put  on  to  watch  the  rest.  Guard-mounting,  dress-parades,  and 
drills  (company  and  regimental,  on  foot  and  on  horseback),  were 
had  daily,  much  to  the  edification  and  improvement  of  the  re 
cruits,  who  rapidly  acquired  instruction,  and  quite  as  much  to 
the  disgust  of  the  old  hands,  who  thought  that  they  "  knew  it  all." 
In  one  respect,  however,  they  were  all  equally  assiduous  and  dili 
gent  that  was  in  the  care  of  their  horses  and  attention  to  their 
arms  and  accouterments — no  man  had  ever  to  be.  reproved  or 
punished  for  neglect  of  these  duties.  The  regiment  now  num 
bered  about  seven  hundred  men,  nearly  all  of  the  recruits 
obtained  in  Kentucky  having  joined  it. 

It  was  then  in  the  flush  of  hope  and  confidence,  composed  of 
the  best  material  Kentucky  could  afford,  and  looked  forward  to 
a  career  of  certain  success  and  of  glory.  The  officers  were  (with 
scarcely  an  exception),  very  young  men ;  almost  every  one  of 
them  had  won  his  promotion  by  energy  and  gallantry,  and  all 
aspired  to  yet  further  preferment.  The  men  were  of  just  such 
stuff  as  the  officers,  and  all  relied  upon  (in  their  turn),  winning 
promotion. 

The  character  of  Kentucky  troops  was  never  better  illustrated 
than  in  this  regiment  and  at  that  time.  Give  them  officers  that 
they  love,  respect,  and  rely  on,  and  any  thing  can  be  accom 
plished  with  them.  While  almost  irrepressibly  fond  of  whisky, 


BUELL   CONCENTRATING   HIS   FORCES.  209 

and  incorrigible,  when  not  on  active  service,  about  straggling 
through  the  country  and  running  out  of  camp,  they,  nevertheless, 
stick  to  work  at  the  time  when  it  is  necessary,  and  answer  to  the 
roll-call  in  an  emergency  unfailingly,  no  matter  what  may  be  the 
prospect  before  them.  Aware  too  that  (in  quiet  times),  they 
are  always  behaving  badly,  they  will  cheerfully  submit  to  the 
severest  punishment — provided,  always,  that  it  is  not  of  a 
degrading  nature.  They  can  not  endure  harsh  and  insulting 
language,  or  any  thing  that  is  humiliating.  In  this  respect  they 
show  the  traits  which  characterize  all  of  their  Southern  brethren 
— the  Irish  are  of  a  similar  disposition.  I  have  frequently 
known  the  efficiency  of  fine  -companies  greatly  impaired  by 
officers  who  were  offensive  in  their  language  to  them,  and  yet 
rarely  punished,  while  other  officers,  who  never  indulged  in  such 
language,  but  were  accustomed  to  punish  severely,  were  not  only 
more  promptly  obeyed,  but  were  infinitely  more  liked.  While 
the  regiment  was  at  Sparta,  Colonel  Jno.  Scott  also  came  with 
his  own  fine  regiment  the  First  Louisiana,  and  a  portion  of  our 
old  friends,  the  Eighth  Texas. 

Colonel  Scott  was  one  of  the  most  active,  efficient,  and 
daring  cavalry  officers  in  the  Western  Confederate  army.  He 
had  performed  very  successful  and  brilliant  service,  during  the 
spring,  in  North  Alabama,  and  had  lately  served  with  Forrest  in 
the  hitter's  dashing  operations  in  Middle  Tennessee.  While  we 
were  all  at  Spnrta  together,  Buell's  army  began  to  commence  to 
concentrate,  and  a  large  part  of  it  under  Nelson  came  to 
McMinnville. 

McMinnville  is  twenty-eight  miles  from  Sparta,  and  a  force 
of  infantry,  preceded  by  two  or  three  hundred  cavalry,  came 
one  day  to  the  bridge  over  Calf  Killer  creek,  on  the  McMinn 
ville  road,  within  five  miles  of  Sparta.  Colonel  Scott  sent 
Major  Harrison  (afterward  Brigadier  General),  of  the  Eighth 
Texas,  with  two  or  three  companies  of  the  First  Louisiana,  and 
as  many  of  the  Eighth  Texas,  to  drivfc  them  back.  Harrison 
fell  on  them  in  his  usual  style,  and  they  went  back  immediately. 
14 


210  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

One  or  two  of  them  were  killed,  and  a  few  prisoners  were  taken. 
I  sent  Lieutenant  Manly,  of  my  regiment,  about  this  time,  to 
ascertain  the  disposition  of  Buell's  forces.  He  reported,  in  a 
few  days,  that  there  were  three  thousand  and  six  hundred  men 
at  Nashville,  a  great  many  of  them  convalescents,  four  thousand 
at  Columbia,  three  thousand  at  Pulaski,  and  three  thousand  at 
Shelbyville.  At  McMinnville  twelve  thousand.  At  points  on 
the  Tennessee  river,  in  Alabama,  about  two  thousand.  Generals 
Bragg  and  Smith  were  then  preparing  for  the  invasion  of  Ken 
tucky.  Bragg  lay  at  Chattanooga  with  about  thirty  thousand 
men.  We  confidently  expected  that  he  would  dash  across  the 
river,  while  Buell's  army  "was  thus  scattered,  break  through  it 
and  take  Nashville,  and  pick  up  the  fragments  at  his  leisure. 
He  gave  Buell  a  little  time,  and  the  latter  concentrated  with  a 
quickness  that  seemed  magical,  protected  Nashville,  and  was 
ready  for  the  race  into  Kentucky.  Buell's  own  friends  have 
damned  him  pretty  thoroughly,  but  that  one  exhibition  of  energy 
and  skill,  satisfied  his  enemies  (that  is,  the  Confederates)  of  his 
caliber,  and  we  welcomed  his  removal  with  gratification.  Manly 
also  reported,  that  rolling  stock  was  being  collected,  from  all 
the  roads,  at  Nashville,  and  that  wagon  trains  were  being  got 
ten  together  at  convenient  points.  This  indicated  pretty  clearly 
that  a  concentration  was  contemplated  for  some  purpose.  After 
remaining  a  few  days  at  Sparta,  Colonel  Scott  received  orders  to 
report  with  his  command  to  General  Kirby  Smith,  whose  Head 
quarters  were  at  Knoxville.  Shortly  afterward,  Colonel  Morgan 
reached  Sparta,  bringing  with  him  Gano's  squadron  and  Company 
G.  Gano's  two  companies,  numbered  now,  however,  only  one  hun 
dred  and  ten  effectives ;  he  had  left  a  good  many  sick  at  Knox 
ville,  who  did  not  rejoin  us  for  some  time.  The  howitzers,  to  our 
great  regret,  were  left  behind.  A  day  or  two  after  Colonel 
Morgan's  arrival,  we  set  out  to  surprise  the  Federal  garrison  at 
Gallatin,  distant  about  seventy  or  eighty  miles.  Morgan  had 
received  instructions  to  break  the  railroad  between  Louisville 
and  Nashville,  in  order  to  retard  Buell's  retreat  to  Louisville  as 


CAPTURE    OF   GALLATIN.  211 

greatly  as  possible,  also  to  occupy  the  Federal  cavalry,  and  pre 
vent  them  from  paying  attention  to  what  was  going  on  in  other 
quarters.  Gallatin  seemed  to  him  an  excellent  point  at  which 
to  commence  operations  with  all  these  views.  On  the  way,  he 
was  joined  by  Captain  Joseph  Desha  (formerly  of  the  First 
Kentucky  infantry),  with  twenty  or  thirty  men.  Captain 
Desha's  small  detachment  was  received  into  the  Second  Ken 
tucky,  and  he  was  promised  recruits  enough  to  make  him  a  full 
company.  He  soon  got  them,  and  his  company  was  duly  let 
tered  L  of  the  regiment.  Crossing  the  Cumberland  at  Sand 
Shoals  ford,  three  miles  from  Carthage,  on  the  day  after  we 
left  Sparta,  we  reached  Dixon  Springs,  about  eight  miles  from 
Gallatin,  about  2  or  3  p.  M.,  and,  as  our  coming  had  been  an 
nounced  by  couriers  sent  on  in  advance,  we  found  that  the 
friendly  and  hospitable  citizens  had  provided  abundant  supplies 
for  men  and  horses.  Crowds  of  them  met  to  welcome  us,  bring 
ing  every  delicacy.  It  was  a  convincing  proof  of  the  unanimity 
of  sentiment  in  that  region,  that  while  hundreds  knew  of  our 
march  and  destination,  not  one  was  found  to  carry  the  informa 
tion  to  the  enemy.  Just  before  dark  the  march  was  resumed, 
and  we  reached  Hartsville,  sixteen  miles  from  Gallatin,  about  11 
o'clock  at  night.  Pressing  on  through  Hartsville  without  halt 
ing,  the  column  turned  off  from  the  turnpike  a  few  miles  from 
Gallatin,  entirely  avoiding  the  pickets,  which  were  captured  by 
scouts  sent  after  we  had  gained  their  rear.  As  we  entered 
Gallatin,  Captain  Desha  was  sent  forward  with  a  small  party  to 
capture  Colonel  Boone,  the  Federal  commander,  who,  as  we  had 
learned,  was  in  the  habit  of  sleeping  in  town.  Desha  reached 
the  house  where  he  was  quartered,  and  found  him  dressed  and 
just  about  to  start  to  camp.  It  was  now  about  day-break. 
Colonel  Morgan  immediately  saw  Boone  and  represented  to  him 
that  he  had  better  write  to  the  officer  in  command  at  the  camp, 
advising  him  to  surrender,  in  order  to  spare  the  "  effusion  of 
blood,"  etc.  This  Boone  consented  to  do,  and  his  letter  was  at 
once  dispatched  to  the  camp  under  flag  of  truce.  It  had  the 


212  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

desired  effect,  and  the  garrison  fell  into  our  hands  without  firing 
a  shot.  Two  companies  had  been  sent  off  for  some  purpose, 
and  escaped  capture.  About  two  hundred  prisoners  were  taken, 
including  a  good  many  officers.  As  these  troops  were  infantry, 
no  horses  were  captured  with  them,  but  during  the  forenoon,  a 
train  arrived  with  some  eighty  very  fine  ones,  en  route  for 
Nashville.  Two  or  three  hundred  excellent  Springfield  rifles 
were  captured,  with  which  all  the  inferior  guns  were  replaced. 
Some  valuable  stores  were  also  captured,  <md  wagoned  off  to 
Hartsville. 

The  prisoners  were  paroled  and  sent  off  Northward,  during 
that  and  the  following  day.  The  Government  freight  train 
seized,  numbered  nineteen  cars,  laden  with  forage  for  the  cavalry 
at  Nashville.  Efforts  were  made  to  decoy  the  train  from  Nash 
ville  into  our  possession,  but  unsuccessfully.  Ellsworth  was  im 
mediately  put  in  possession  of  the  telegraph  office,  and  went  to 
work  with  even  more  than  his  ordinary  ingenuity.  It  was  the 
peculiarity  of  this  u  great  man  "  to  be  successful  only  in  his  own 
department;  if  he  attempted  any  thing  else  he  was  almost  sure 
to  fail.  At  Crab  Orchard,  for  instance,  on  the  late  raid,  he  had 
taken  it  into  his  head  to  go  after  a  notorious  and  desperate  bush 
whacker,  whom  our  best  scouts  had  tried  in  vain  to  capture. 

Telling  no  one  of  his  intention,  he  took  Colonel  Greenfell's 
horse,  upon  which  was  strapped  a  saddle  that  the  owner  valued 
very  highly,  and  behind  the  saddle  was  tied  a  buff  coat  equally 
as  much  prized,  and  in  the  coat  was  all  the  gold  the  Colonel  had 
brought  from  Richmond,  when  he  came  to  join  us — and  thus 
equipped  he  sallied  out  with  one  companion,  to  take  the  formid 
able  "  Captain  King." 

He  went  boldly  to  that  worthy's  house,  who,  seeing  only  two 
men  coming,  scorned  to  take  to  the  brush.  To  Ellsworth's  de 
mand  to  surrender,  he  answered  with  volleys  from  shot  gun  and 
revolver,  severely  wounding  the  friend  and  putting  Ellsworth 
himself  to  flight.  King  pressed  the  retreat,  and  Ellsworth,  al 
though  he  brought  off  his  wounded  companion,  lost  horse,  sad- 


OPERATIONS  AT  GALLATIN.  213 

die,  coat  and  gold.  St.  Lcgcr  was  like  an  excited  volcano,  and 
sought  Ellsworth  to  slay  him  instantly. 

Three  days  were  required  to  pacify  him,  during  which  time, 
the  great  "  operator  "  had  to  be  carefully  kept  out  of  his  sight. 
But  when  Ellsworth  was  seated  in  the  telegraph  office  he  was 
always  "  master  of  the  situation."  No  man  could  watch  him 
at  work,  see  him  catch,  without  a  boggle,  "  signals,"  "  tariff," 
and  all  the  rest,  fool  the  regular  operators,  baffle  with  calm  con 
fidence  their  efforts  to  detect  him,  and  turn  to  his  own  advantage 
their  very  suspicions,-  and  not  unhesitatingly  pronounce  him  a 
genius.  As  if  to  demonstrate  incontestably  his  own  superiority, 
he  has  (since  the  war  closed)  invented  a  plan  to  prevent  just 
such  tricks,  as  he  uoed  to  practice  at  way  stations,  from  being 
played. 

When  he  "  took  the  chair  "  at  Gallatin,  he  first,  in  accordance 
with  Colonel  Morgan's  instructions,  telegraphed  in  Colonel 
Boone's  name,  to -the  commandant  at  Bowlinggreen  to  send  him 
reinforcements,  as  he  expected  to  be  attacked.  But  this  gene 
rous  plan  to  capture  and  parole  soldiers,  who  wished  to  go  home 
and  see  their  friends,  miscarried.  Then  he  turned  his  attention 
to  Nashville.  The  operator  there  was  suspicious  and  put  a  good 
many  questions,  all  of  which  were  successfully  answered. 

At  length  the  train  he  wished  sent,  was  started,  but  when  it 
got  within  six  miles  of  Gallatin,  a  negro  signaled  it  and  gave 
the  alarm.  A  railroad  bridge  between  Gallatin  and  Nashville, 
was  then  at  once  destroyed,  and  the  fine  tunnel,  six  miles  above, 
was  rendered  impassable  for  months.  The  roof  of  the  tunnel 
was  of  a  peculiar  rock  which  was  liable  at  all  times  to  disinte 
grate  and  tumble  down  ;  to  remedy  this,  huge  beams,  supported 
by  strong  uprights,  had  been  stretched  horizontally  across  the 
tunnel,  and  a  sort  of  scaffolding  have  been  built  upon  these 
beams.  A  good  deal  of  wood  work  was  consequently  put  up. 
Some  of  the  freight  cars  were  also  run  into  the  tunnel  and  set 
on  fire  when  the  wood  work  was  kindled.  This  fire  smouldered 
on,  after  it  had  ceased  to  burn  fiercely,  for  a  long  time,  and  it 


214  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

was  weeks  before  any  repairs  could  be  attempted,  on  account 
of  the  intense  heat  and  the  huge  masses  of  rock  which  were 
constantly  falling.  This  tunnel  is  eight  hundred  feet  long. 

In  the  "  History  of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad 
during  the  war,"  the  Superintendent,  Mr.  Albert  Fink,  whose 
energy  to  repair,  was  equal  to  Morgan's  to  destroy,  says  of  the 
year  commencing  July  1,  1862,  and  ending  July,  1,  1863, 
"  the  road  has  been  operated  for  its  entire  length  only 
seven  months  and  twelve  days."  He  says,  moreover,  "  All  the 
bridges  and  trestle  work  on  the  main  stem  and  branches,  with 
the  exception  of  the  bridge  over  Barren  river  and  four  small 
bridges,  were  destroyed  and  rebuilt  during  the  year ;  some  of 
the  structures  were  destroyed  twice,  and  some  three  times.  In 
addition  to  this,  most  of  the  water  stations,  several  depots,  and 
a  large  number  of  cars  were  burnt,  a  number  of  engines  badly 
damaged,  and  a  tunnel  in  Tennessee  nearly  filled  up  for  a  dis 
tance  of  eight  hundred  feet."  This  shows  a  great  activity  to 
destroy,  but  wonderful  patience  and  industry  to  repair.  It  was 
by  this  road  that  the  Federal  army  in  Tennessee  got  its  supplies 
and  reinforcements,  almost  altogether,  during  the  greater  part 
of  the  year.  In  the  same  report  the  writer  goes  on  to  say : 
"  General  Morgan  took  possession  of  the  Louisville  and  Nash 
ville  road  at  Gallatin,  in  August,  1862,  and  this,  with  other 
causes,  forced  General  Buell's  retreat  to  Louisville." 

Before  giving  up  the  wires,  and  after  Colonel  Morgan  permitted 
him  to  reveal  himself,  Ellsworth  told  some  first-class  romances. 
He  made  Morgan's  force  out  about  four  thousand,  and  did  it  with 
a  skill  that  carried  conviction.  He  would  speak,  in  dispatches  to 
various  well-known  Federals,  of  certain  imaginary  commands, 
under  men  whom  they  well  knew.  He  telegraphed  Prentice  that 
Wash.  Morgan  was  at  Gallatin,  with  four  hundred  Indians, 
raised  especially  to  seek  for  his  (Prentice's)  scalp. 

Lieutenant  Manly,  and  a  few  men,  were  left  at  Gallatin  to 
burn  the  amphitheater  at  the  fair-grounds,  where  Boone's  regi 
ment  had  been  quartered.  The  command  left  Gallatin  about  12 


TREATED   WELL   BY   OUR   FRIENDS.  215 

o'clock  at  night,  and  returned  to  Hartsville.  Gallatin  was  taken 
on  the  12th  of  August.  We  remained  encamped  at  Hartsville 
until  the  19th.  During  that  time,  men  and  horses  were  entirely 
recruited.  The  citizens  supplied  all  the  rations  and  forage  that 
we  needed,  and  frequently  we  would  have  whole  stacks  of  hams, 
turkeys,  chickens,  etc.  (ail  cooked)  piled  up  in  our  camps. 

On  the  13th  of  August,  the  day  after  we  left  Gallatin,  a  Fed 
eral  force  of  about  twelve  hundred  men,  with  four  pieces  of  ar 
tillery,  came  there,  and  drove  Lieutenant  Manly  and  his  party 
away.  Manly  was  killed,  and,  we  learned,  after  he  had  surren 
dered.  Sergeant  Quirk,  of  Company  A,  was  sent,  with  fifteen 
men,  on  a  scout  to  Gallatin,  next  day.  He  found,  when  he  got 
there,  that  this  force  had  left,  on  the  way  to  Nashville  again. 
He  followed,  and  overtook  it,  about  three  miles  from  Gallatin, 
as  it  was  preparing  to  get  on  the  cars.  He  attacked  it  immedi 
ately,  and  killed  two  or  three,  and  captured  a  few  prisoners. 
The  artillery  was  opened  upon  him,  with  canister,  but  did  him 
no  damage.  He  brought  his  fifteen  men  upon  them  through  a 
corn  field,  and  got  close  before  he  fired.  John  Donnellan,  a  sol 
dier  who  was  always  in  the  extreme  front  in  every  fight,  exerted 
a  powerful  voice,  in  issuing  orders  to  the  "  Texians"  to  go  one 
way,  the  "Indians"  another,  and  "  Duke's  regiment"  to  fall  on 
their  rear,  until  he  had  ostensibly  and  vociferously  disposed  in 
line  enough  troops  to  have  frightened  the  "  heroes  of  Murengo." 

On  the  19th,  Colonel  Morgan  received  information  that  a  force 
of  some  three  hundred  infantry  had  come  to  Gallatin,  and  on 
that  evening  he  started  out  in  pursuit.  He  had  hoped  to  sur 
prise  them  in  the  town,  but  learned,  on  the  road,  that  they  had 
left  at  midnight,  and  were  on  their  way  back  to  Nashville.  Cap 
tain  Hutchinson,  of  Company  E,  of  the  Second  Kentucky,  was 
sent,  with  his  company,  to  intercept  them,  if  possible,  at  a  point 
seven  miles  below  Gallatin,  where  a  bridge  had  been  burned,  on 
the  railroad,  and  where  it  was  thought  that,  probably,  a  train 
would  be  waiting  to  take  them  back.  The  rest  of  the  command 
pushed  on  to  Gallatin,  and  reached  that  place  about  8  o'clock  <MI 


216  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

the  morning  of  the  20th.  We  found  that  the  enemy  had  taken 
off  nearly  every  male  inhabitant  of  the  place  above  the  age  of 
twelve,  and  the  women  were  all  in  terrible  distress  when  we  came 
in.  This  had  been  done  on  account  of  the  kind  reception  which 
had  been  given  us  in  the  place,  on  the  12th.  We  also  found  the 
corpse  of  one  of  our  men,  killed  the  night  before,  and  the  citi 
zens  told  us  that  he  had  been  kicked  and  cuffed  after  he  was 
shot.  As  we  passed  out  of  town,  on  the  Nashville  pike,  we  saw 
on  the  bridge  the  stain  of  Manly's  blood.  The  men  became 
very  much  excited,  and  could  scarcely  be  kept  in  the  ranks.  As 
we  pressed  on  down  the  road,  we  reached  the  point  where  Hutch- 
inson  had  been  directed  to  intercept  the  party  which  had  been 
to  Gallatin.  He  had  failed  to  do  this,  but  had  captured  a  stock 
ade,  garrisoned  by  forty  or  fifty  men.  He  came  upon  the  party 
after  which  he  started,  but  they  had  passed  the  point  at  which 
he  could  have  checked  them. 

Another  garrison  of  fifty  men  was  captured  at  a  stockade  still 
lower  down,  and  we  came  soon  after  upon  the  men  we  were 
looking  for.  We  could  not  prevent  the  escape  of  the  greater 
portion,  who  got  on  hand  cars  and  ran  down  the  road,  but  we 
killed  some  forty,  and  released  all  the  prisoners.  At  Edgefield 
junction,  First  Lieutenant  Jas.  Smith  who  reached  that  point  first, 
with  a  part  of  his  Company  (A  of  the  Second  Kentucky), 
attacked  the  stockade,  there,  supported  by  Captain  Breckinridge 
•who  shortly  afterward  arrived.  The  inmates  of  the  stockade 
made  fight,  and  Smith  lost  three  of  his  men,  and  was  himself  shot 
through  the  head,  of  which  wound  he  soon  died.  Lieutenant 
Nilcs,  of  Morgan's  staff,  was  also  killed  at  this  point,  shot 
through  the  body  with  five  or  six  balls.  I  came  up  at  the  time 
that  these  officers  were  shot  and  ordered  the  men  back.  I  saw 
no  chance  of  reducing  the  work,  even  with  great  loss,  in  the 
time  that  would  be  allowed  us. 

These  stockades  were  built  with  heavy  upright  timber,  ten  or 
twelve  feet  high.  They  were  sorrounded  by  ditches  and  pierced 
•for  musketry.  Assailants  when  right  at  this  bases,  were  as  far 


CAPTURE   OF    STOCKADES.  217 

from  taking  them  as  over.  There  was  a  plan,  which  I  am 
satisfied  would  have  been  successful  against  them,  but  I  never 
saw  it  tried,  viz.:  to  construct  bundles  of  bushwood  large  enough 
to  shelter  a  man  and  compact  enough  to  stop  a  musket  ball,  and 
place  a  sufficient  number  of  them  in  the  hands  of  the  men,  who 
holding  them  in  front,  should  advance  and  press  them  against 
the  loop-holes — of  course  riflemen  would  have  to  be  posted  in 
range,  to  prevent  a  sally  on  the  bundle-carriers.  The  fire  from 
the  stockade  having  been  thus  stopped,  the  walls  could  be 
chopped  down  with  axes,  or  brush,  in  large  quantities,  could  be 
set  on  fire  and  tossed  over  among  the  defenders,  until  they  con 
cluded  to  surrender.  This  plan,  however,  would  require  plenty 
of  time,  and  that  is  just  what  partisan  cavalry  have  least  of  on 
such  occasions. 

Colonel  Morgan  was  much  attached  to  both  Smith  and  Niles, 
and  it  was  with  great  difficulty  that  he  could  be  dissuaded  from 
continuing  to  attack  until  the  stockade  was  taken.  Lieutenant 
Smith  had  been  one  of  the  best  soldiers  in  the  squadron,  and  had 
given  universal  satisfaction  by  his  conduct  as  an  officer.  He 
was  more  than  ordinarily  brave,  intelligent  and  zealous,  and 
would  certainly  have  been  made  a  field  officer  if  he  had  lived  a 
few  months  longer.  His  men  were  devotedly  attached  to  him. 
The  repulse  at  this  stockade  made  us  more  than  ever  regret  the 
absence  of  the  howitzers.  With  them  we  could  have  battered  it 
down  directly.  It  was  lucky  that  Hutchinson  had  caught  the 
garrison  of  the  first  one  captured,  outside  of  its  walls,  and  as 
they  attempted  to  enter,  his  men  rushed  in  with  them.  The 
other  stockade  taken,  surrendered  without  firing  a  shot.  This 
was  a  very  exciting  day ;  the  chase  and  succession  of  skirmishes 
made  the  whole  affair  very  interesting. 

Returning  to  Gallatin,  we  met  the  people  of  the  adjacent 
country  coming  with  vehicles  of  every  description  to  convey 
their  re-captured  friends  back  home.  The  latter  weary  and  foot 
sore,  were  plodding  along  as  best  they  might,  except  when  our 
men  would  take  them  behind  them  or  dismount  and  let  them 


218  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

ride  their  horses.  There  was  a  scene  of  wild  congratulation  in 
town,  that  evening,  when  they  all  got  in.  That  night  the  entire 
command  encamped  in  the  fair  grounds.  About  12  o'clock, 
Colonel  Morgan  received  information  that  a  formidable  Federal 
force  had  passed  through  Ilartsville  on  the  previous  afternoon, 
and  was  encamped  at  Castilian  Springs,  ten  miles  from  Gallatin. 
He  ordered  the  pickets  to  be  strengthened  in  that  direction,  and 
shrewd  scouts  were  put  out  to  watch  their  movements  closely, 
but  he  did  not  disturb  the  command,  wishing  that  it  should  be 
rested  for  the  next  day's  work.  He  had  been  informed  that  in 
fantry  and  artillery  composed  this  force,  as  well  as  cavalry,  and 
he  knew  that  if  the  latter  waited  on  the  former,  he  was  in  no 
danger  of  being  forced  into  a  fight  that  it  might  be  imprudent 
to  make.  In  the  morning  the  scouts  came  in,  saying  tint  the 
enemy  were  rapidly  advancing.  The  column  was  immediately 
put  in  motion,  moving  toward  the  enemy,  but  it  was  Colonel 
Morgan's  intention  to  decline  battle  until  more  positively  in 
formed  of  the  enemy's  strength,  and  when  he  reached  the  junc 
tion  of  the  Ilartsville  and  Scottsville  turnpikes,  at  the  eastern 
edge  of  the  town,  he  turned  off  on  the  Scottsville  pike,  which 
runs  nearly  at  right  angles  to  the  other,  and  northeast. 

The  enemy,  in  the  meantime,  were  pressing  on  vigorously, 
driving  in  the  scouts  and  pickets.  Colonel  Morgan  and  my 
self  had  taken  position  at  the  junction  of  the  two  roads,  as  the 
column  filed  past,  and  fearing  that  we  would  be  taken  in  flank, 
or  that  our  rear  would  be  attacked  after  the  entire  command 
had  taken  the  Scottsville  road,  I  advised  him  to  form  and 
fight,  saying  that  I  believed  we  could  whip  them.  He  answered 
that  he  could  "get  fights  enough,  but  could  not  easily  get  such 
a  command  again,  if  he  lost  this  one."  Immediately  afterward, 
seeing  the  enemy  come  galloping  down  the  road,  he  added,  with 
a  half  smile,  "We  will  have  to  whip  these  fellows,  sure  enough. 
Form  your  men,  and,  as  soon  as  you  check  them,  attack." 
Gano,  who  was  in  the  extreme  rear,  was  ordered,  as  soon  as  his 
squadron  arrived  at  the  junction  of  the  roads,  to  charge  and 


BATTLE    OF    IIARTSVILLE.  219 

drive  back  the  enemy's  advance.  He  did  so  in  his  usual  dash 
ing,  impetuous  style.  The  enemy's  advance  guard  was  strong 
and  determined,  and  met  Gano's  charge  gallantly.  As  he  led 
on  his  men,  the  enemy  directed  their  fire  principally  at  him,  but 
with  the  good  fortune  which  attended  him  during  four  years  of 
dangerous  and  incessant  service,  he  escaped  unhurt,  losing,  by 
the  shots  aimed  at  him,  only  his  hat  and  a  few  locks  of  hair, 
which  latter  was  a  loss  he  could  well  stand,  although  the  other 
was  a  serious  matter.  After  a  brief  struggle,  Gano  drove  back 
the  advance,  killing  and  wounding  several.  Our  entire  force, 
deducting  one  hundred  men  used  as  a  guard  for  the  prisoners 
taken  the  day  before,  and  other  details,  was  about  seven  hundred 
strong.  That  of  the  enemy  was  about  the  same.  On  the  right 
of  the  Hartsville  road,  as  our  line  faced,  was  a  cornfield.  This 
was  immediately  occupied  by  Companies  I  and  K.  On  the  left 
of  the  Hartsville  pike,  and  just  east  of  the  Scottsville  road,  was 
a  woodland  of  some  twenty  acres.  Company  D  was  deployed  in 
this,  and  immediately  cleared  it  of  the  enemy,  who  had  entered 
it,  and  kept  it  until  the  line  advanced.  To  the  left  of  this  wood 
land  was  a  long  meadow,  five  or  six  hundred  yards  in  extent, 
and  some  three  hundred  broad ;  to  the  left  of  this,  again,  was 
another  cornfield.  The  column  had  gotten  some  distance  upon 
the  Scottsville  pike  before  the  command  to  halt  and  face  toward 
the  enemy  had  been  transmitted  to  its  head,  and  when  these 
companies  mentioned  had  been  formed,  there  was  a  gap  of  nearly 
two  hundred  yards  opened  between  them  and  tlie  others  that 
were  further  to  the  front.  Toward  this  gap  the  enemy  im 
mediately  darted.  Believing  that  we  were  seeking  to  escape 
upon  the  Scottsville  road,  he  had  thrown  the  bulk  of  his  force  in 
that  direction,  at  any  rate,  and  it  was  formed  and  advanced 
rapidly  and  gallantly.  Throwing  down  the  eastern  fence  of  the 
meadow,  some  three  hundred  poured  into  it,  formed  a  long  line, 
and  dashed  across  it,  with  sabers  drawn,  toward  the  line  of 
horses  which  they  saw  in  the  road  beyond.  Companies  B,  C,  E 
and  F  were  by  this  time  dismounted,  and  had  dropped  on  their 


220  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

knees  behind  the  low  fence  on  the  road- side,  as  the  enemy  carae 
rushing  on.  They  held  their  fire  until  the  enemy  were  within 
thirty  yards,  when  they  opened.  Then  was  seen  the  effect  of  a 
volley  from  that  long  thin  line,  which  looked  so  easy  to  break, 
and,  yet,  whose  fire  was  so  deadly.  Every  man  had  elbow-room 
and  took  dead  aim  at  an  individual  foe,  and,  as  the  blaze  left  the 
guns,  two  thirds  of  the  riders  and  horses  seemed  to  go  down. 
The  cavalry  was  at  once  broken,  and  recoiled.  Our  men  sprang 
over  the  fence  and  ran  close  up  to  them,  as  they  endeavored  to 
retreat  rapidly  through  the  gaps  in  the  fence,  by  which  they  had 
entered,  and  poured  in  such  another  volley  that  the  rout  was 
completed.  However,  they  reformed  and  came  back,  but  only 
to  be  repulsed  again.  By  this  time  the  companies  on  the  right 
had  driven  off  their  opponents  in  that  direction,  and  had  gotten 
a  position  where  they  could  enfilade  the  enemy's  line  as  it 
strove  to  advance,  and  in  a  little  while  it  was  forced  back  at  all 
points.  Gano  charged  again,  and  pressed  them  closely.  After 
retreating  about  half  a  mile,  the  enemy  halted  and  reformed 
upon  a  hill  which  ran  for  some  hundreds  of  yards  parallel  with 
their  former  line,  and  on  the  crest  of  which  were  high  fences 
and  timber. 

As  we  had  repulsed  them  the  last  time,  some  interesting  in 
cidents  occurred.  Captain  Leabo,  of  the  Second  Indiana,  dashed 
down  upon  our  line,  and,  coming  on  himself  after  his  men  turned 
back,  was  made  prisoner.  Another  individual  was  made  prisoner 
in  the  same  way,  although  he  did  not  come  with  the  same  intent 
which  inspired  the  gallant  Captain.  The  wildest  looking  fellow 
perhaps  in  the  Federal  army  came  rattling  down  the  pike  on  a 
big  sorrel  horse,  which  he  could  not  hold,  his  hair  standing  on 
end,  his  mouth  wide  open,  his  shirt  collar  flying  by  one  end  like 
a  flag  of  truce,  and  his  eyes  glazed,  lie  was  caught  by  the 
greatest  wag  in  the  command,  and  perhaps  in  the  Western 
Army — the  celebrated  Jeff.  Sterritt.  With  a  look  of  appalling 
ferocity,  the  captor  exclaimed:  "I  don't  know  whether  to  kill 
you  now,  or  to  wait  until  the  fight's  over."  "  For  God's  sake," 


ROUT    OF   FEDERAL   FORCES.  221 

said  the  captive,  "  do  n't  kill  me  at  all.     I'm  a  dissipated  char 
acter,  and  not  prepared  to  die." 

Company  A  and  the  advance-guard  had  been  held  until  this 
time  in  reserve  on  the  extreme  left.  When  our  whole  line  was 
pressed  forward  after  the  retreating  enemy,  I  carried  them 
rapidly  in  advance  of  the  rest  of  the  line,  and  through  a  woods 
which  concealed  the  movement  upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy's 
new  line  just  as  it  was  formed.  The  effect  of  their  fire,  then 
delivered  at  short  range,  was  decisive,  and  the  enemy  instantly 
broke  again,  and  this  time  made,  at  full  speed,  for  the  road,  and 
went  off  in  full  retreat.  The  bulk  of  the  command  was  too  far 
from  the  line  of  horses  to  mount  and  pursue  promptly,  but  Gano 
pressed  them  closely  again.  Adjutant  Wyncoop,  son  of  the 
Colonel  of  that  name,  was  killed  in  this  retreat,  as  he  was  trying 
to  rally  his  men.  His  body  was  removed  to  the  side  of  the  road, 
and  lay  there  as  we  passed,  with  a  coat  thrown  over  his  face  as 
if  he  were  unwilling  to  look  upon  the  rout  of  his  command. 

The  enemy  fell  back  about  three  miles,  and  halted  again. 
Their  loss  liad  been  very  heavy,  and  perhaps  two  hundred  horses 
had  been  killed  for  them.  Nearly  all  of  the  men  thus  dis 
mounted  were  made  prisoners.  Colonel  Morgan  now  learned 
that  the  officer  in  command  of  the  troops  he  had  been  fighting, 
was  Brigadier-General  Johnson,  and  became  satisfied  that  the 
infantry  and  artillery  with  which  the  force  had  been  at  first  pro 
vided  was  not  in  supporting  distance.  We  subsequently  learned 
that  it  had  been  sent  back  to  McMinnville  a  day  or  two  before. 

Just  as  the  horses  were  brought  up  and  the  men  were  mounted, 
a  flag  of  truce  came  from  General  Johnson  proposing  an  armis 
tice  in  order  that  he  might  bury  his  dead.  Colonel  Morgan 
answered  that  he  could  entertain  no  proposition  except  uncon 
ditional  surrender,  but  shortly  afterward  sent  offering  to  parole 
officers  and  men  if  a  surrender  were  made.  General  Johnson 
replied  that  "  catching  came  before  hanging."  Colonel  Morgan 
resolved  upon  immediate  and  vigorous  pursuit,  and  believing 
that  in  the  broken  and  demoralized  condition  of  the  enemy  he 


HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

could  safely  attempt  such  a  plan,  he  divided  his  force  into  three 
columns,  directing  each  in  a  special  direction,  in  order  to  more 
certainly  encounter  the  enemy,  who  had  now  more  than  three 
miles  the  start  of  us.  Five  companies  were  placed  upon  the 
left  of  the  road  under  Major  Morgan.  Colonel  Morgan  him 
self  kept  the  road  with  Gano's  squadron,  while  I  had  the  right, 
with  Companies  A,  B,  and  E,  and  the  advance-guard,  in  all 
about  two  hundred  and  twenty -five  men.  The  road  bends  to  the 
left  at  about  the  point  where  General  Johnson  had  last  halted, 
and  as  he  turned  off  just  there,  in  order  to  make  for  the  river, 
the  other  two  columns  missed  him  altogether,  and  mine,  pressing 
on  rapidly  in  the  direction  indicated,  was  so  fortunate  as  to  soon 
overtake  him. 

The  three  companies  were  formed  in  parallel  columns  of  fours, 
with  full  distance  between  them,  and  the  advance-guard  thrown 
out  as  skirmishers  in  front.  When  the  enemy  was  neared,  the 
whole  force  was  thrown  into  line,  and  advanced  at  a  gallop. 
We  were  not  more  than  fifty  yards  from  the  enemy  when  this 
was  done,  but  there  was  a  high  stone  wall  between  us,  which  our 
horses  could  not  leap.  This  prevented  us  from  closing  with 
them,  and  enabled  them  to  get  some  distance  ahead  of  us.  As 
we  passed  the  wall,  the  original  formation  was  resumed,  and  we 
followed  at  good  speed.  Soon  the  advance  guard,  sent  on  again 
in  front,  reported  that  the  enemy  had  halted  and  formed  for  a 

fight. 

A  short  reconnoisance  showed  that  they  were  dismounted  and 
drawn  up  under  a  long  hill,  and  about  forty  yards  from  its  crest, 
but  their  formation  was  defective,  in  that,  instead  of  present 
ing  a  straight,  uniform  line,  so  that  their  numbers  could  tell, 
they  Avere  formed  in  the  shape  of  a  V,  perhaps  to  meet  any 
movement  to  flank  them.  The  hill  was  one  of  those  gentle  un 
dulations  of  the  blue-grass  pastures,  which  present  perfectly 
smooth  surfaces  on  either  side,  and  yet  rise  enough  to  conceal 
from  those  on  the  one  side  what  is  being  done  on  the  other. 

The   three   companies    and   the    advance   were    immediately 


RESULT    OF    HARTSVILLE    FIGHT.  223 

brought  into  line  arid  dismounted  under  cover  of  the  brow  of 

O 

the  hill,  and  moved  to  a  position  which  would  bring  the  apex  of 
the  enemy's  formation  about  opposite  the  center  of  our  line. 
"When  we,  then,  charged  over  the  hill,  although  the  enemy  had 
some  advantage  in  firing  upward,  it  was  more  than  counterbal 
anced  by  the  fact  that  the  men  upon  their  flanks  could  not  fire 
at  us  at  all,  while  our  whole  line  could  fire  without  difficulty  upon 
any  portion  of  their  formation.  After  a  short  but  sharp  fight 
they  gave  way  again.  Our  loss  in  this  skirmish  was  two  killed. 
We  captured  General  Johnson,  his  Adjutant  General,  Major 
Winfrey  and  several  other  officers  and  twenty  or  thirty  privates. 
In  the  two  engagements  the  enemy  left  sixty-four  dead  on  the 
field,  and  a  number  of  wounded.  About  two  hundred  prisoners 
were  taken. 

This  force  had  been  selected  with  great  care  from  all  the  cav 
alry  of  Buell's  army,  and  placed  under  General  Johnson,  re 
garded  as  one  of  their  best  and  most  dashing  officers,  for  the 
express  purpose  of  hunting  Morgan.  It  was  completely  disor 
ganized  and  shattered  by  this  defeat.  A  great  deal  of  censure 
was  cast  at  the  time  upon  these  men,  and  they  were  accused  of 
arrant  cowardice  by  the  Northern  press.  Nothing  could  have 
been  more  unjust,  and  many  who  joined  in  denouncing  them 9 
afterward  behaved  much. more  badly.  They  attacked  with  spirit 
and  without  hesitation,  and  were  unable  to  close  with  us  on  ac 
count  of  their  heavy  loss  in  men  and  horses.  They  returned 
two  or  three  times  to  the  attack  until  they  found  their  efforts 
unavailing.  They  could  not  use  their  sabers,  and  they  found 
their  breech-loading  carbines  only  incumbrances.  They  may 
have  shown  trepidation  and  panic  toward  the  last,  but,  to  an 
enemy  (while  they  were  evidently  trying  to  get  away)  they  ap 
peared  resolute  although  dispirited.  I  have  seen  troops  much 
more  highly  boasted  than  these  were  before  their  defeat,  behave 
not  nearly  so  well.  Johnson  had  been  very  confident.  He  had 
boasted  as  he  passed  through  Hartsville,  that  he  would  "  catch 
Morgan  and  bring  him  back  in  a  band-box." 


224 

Hearing  the  day  before  the  fight  that  Forrest  was  in  his  rear, 
he  had,  very  properly,  pressed  on  to  fight  Morgan  before  the 
former  came  up.  His  attack  was  made  promptly  and  in  splen 
did  style,  his  dispositions  throughout  the  first  fight  were  good, 
and  he  exhibited  fine  personal  courage  and  energy.  I  could 
never  understand  his  reason  for  giving  battle  the  second  time, 
without  fresh  troops,  when  his  men  were  already  dispirited  by 
defeat,  and  pressed  by  an  enemy  flushed  with  recent  victory. 
He  could  have  gotten  oif  without  a  fight  by  a  prompt  retreat, 
immediately  after  his  last  message  to  Morgan,  and  protected,  by 
a  judicious  use  of  detachments  composed  of  his  best  men  as 
rear  guards.  He  was  evidently  a  fine  officer,  but  seemed  not  to 
comprehend  the  "  new  style  of  cavalry,"  at  all. 

Our  loss,  in  both  engagements,  was  seven  killed  and  eighteen 
wounded.  The  conduct  of  men  and  officers  was  unexceptiona 
ble.  Captains  Cassell  and  Hutchinson  and  Lieutenant  White, 
of  the  Second  Kentucky,  and  Lieutenant  Rogers  of  the  advance 
guard,  were  especially  mentioned.  Nothing  could  have  exceeded 
the  dash  and  gallantry  of  the  officers  and  men  of  Gano's  squad 
ron.  The  junior  Captain  Huffman  had  his  arm  shattered  early 
in  the  action,  but  went  through  it  all,  despite  the  suffering  he 
endured,  at  the  head  of  his  men. 

Colonel  Morgan  in  his  address  to  his  men,  thus  summed  up 
the  results  of  the  last  two  days  : 

"All  communications  cut  off  between  Gallatin  and  Nashville  ; 
a  bodv  of  infantry,  three  hundred  strong,  totally  cut  to  pieces  or 
taken  prisoners  the  liberation  of  those  kind  friends  arrested  by 
our  revengeful  foes,  for  no  other  reason  than  their  compassionate 
care  of  our  sick  and  wounded,  would  have  been  laurels  sufficient 
for  your  brows.  But  soldiers,  the  utter  annihilation  of  General 
Johnson's  brigade  composed  of  twenty-four  picked  companies, 
sent  on  purpose  to  take  us,  raises  your  reputation  as  soldiers, 
and  strikes  fear  into  the  craven  hearts  of  your  enemies.  Gene 
ral  Johnson  and  his  staff,  with  two  hundred  men  taken  prisoners, 


PAROLING    PRISONERS.  225 

sixty-four  killed,  and  one  hundred  wounded,  attests  the  resistance 
made,  and  bears  testimony  to  your  valor." 

Having  burned  all  the  bridges  the  day  before  that  were  under 
his  then  immediate  supervision,  and  preferring  Hartsville  as  a 
place  for  a  somewhat  lengthened  encampment,  he  returned  to 
that  place  on  the  evening  of  the  21st.  A  good  writer  and 
excellent  officer  of  Morgan's  old  command  very  truly  says,  in  re 
ference  to  the  choice  of  Hartsville  in  this  respect : 

"  The  selection  of  this  little  unknown  village  was  a  proof  of 
Morgan's  consummate  strategic  ability."  It  was  a  point  where 
it  was  literally  impossible  to  entrap  him.  While  here,  a  deserter 
taken  in  arms  and  fighting,  was  tried  by  court-martial,  sentenced 
and  shot  in  presence  of  the  command.  Forrest  reached  Harts 
ville  on  the  22nd  with  a  portion  of  his  command.  He  had  hur 
ried  on  to  reinforce  Morgan  before  the  latter  fought  Johnson,  fear 
ing  that  the  entire  original  force  of  infantry,  artillery  and  cavalry, 
which  had  left  McMinnville  with  Johnson,  would  be  too  much 
for  us.  Learning  that  he  was  no  longer  needed  in  Sumner 
county,  he  crossed  the  river  without  delay,  and  in  a  day  or  two 
we  heard  of  his  sweeping  every  thing  clean  around  Nashville. 
So  demoralizing  was  the  effect  of  the  system  of  immediately 
paroling  prisoners,  and  sending  them  off  by  routes  which  pre 
vented  them  from  meeting  troops  of  their  own  army,  which  had 
been  instituted  and  practiced,  for  some  time  previously  to  this 
date,  that  General  Buell  found  it  necessary  to  issue  an  order  on 
the  subject. 

Morgan  and  Forrest  inaugurated  the  system,  and  hundreds  of 
prisoners  were  induced  to  fall  into  their  hands,  by  the  facilities 
thus  offered  them  of  getting  home,  who,  otherwise,  would  never 
have  been  captured.  A  man,  thus  paroled,  was  lost  to  the  Fede 
ral  army  for  months  at  least,  for,  even  if  not  inclined  to  respect 
his  parole,  it  was  hard  for  the  authorities  to  find  him.  His  gun 
and  equipments,  also,  became  ours.  In  his  order,  General  Buell 
said  :  "  The  system  of  paroles  as  practiced  in  this  army  has  run 
into  an  intolerable  abuse.  Hereafter  no  officer  or  soldier  belong- 
15 


226 

ing  to  the  forces  in  this  district  will  give  his  parole  not  to  take 
up  arras,  for  the  purpose  of  leaving  the  enemy's  lines,  without 
the  sanction  of  the  General  commanding  this  army,  except  when 
by  reason  of  wounds  or  disease,  he  could  not  be  removed  without 
endangering  his  life.  Any  parole  given  in  violation  of  this 
order  will  not  be  recognized,  and  the  person  giving  it  will  be  re 
quired  to  perform  military  duty,  and  take  the  risks  prescribed  by 
the  laws  of  war,"  etc. 

This  order  was  issued  on  the  8th  of  August,  before  the  sur 
render  of  Boone.  While  we  were  at  Hartsville  a  case  of  types 
and  printing  press  had  been  found  in  the  deserted  room  once 
occupied  as  a  printing  office,  and  were  immediately  put  to  use. 
Poor  Niles,  who  had  once  been  an  editor,  went  to  work  and  or 
ganized  a  corps  of  assistants  from  among  the  practical  printers, 
of  whom  there  were  several  in  the  Second  Kentucky,  and  issued 
a  small  sheet  which  he  called  the  Vidette.  It  was  printed  on 
any  sort  of  paper  that  could  be  procured,  and  consequently,  al 
though  perfectly  consistent  in  its  politics,  it  appeared  at  different 
times  in  different  colors.  Sometimes  it  would  be  a  drab,  some 
times  a  pale  rose  color,  and,  my  recollection  is,  that  Boone's 
surrender  was  recorded  upon  a  page  of  delicate  pea-green. 
Colonel  Morgan  finding  the  pleasure  that  it  gave  the  men, 
took  great  pains  to  promote  the  enterprise.  The  Videlte  was 
expected  with  as  much  interest  by  the  soldiers  of  the  command 
and  country  people,  as  the  Tribune  or  Neivs,  by  the  reading 
people  of  New  York.  General  orders  were  published  in  it, 
promotions  announced,  and  complimentary  notices  made  by 
Colonel  Morgan  of  the  deserving.  Full  accounts  of  all  our 
operations  were  published,  and  the  reports  of  the  various 
scouting  parties  filled  up  the  column  devoted  to  "  local  news." 
The  editors  indulged  in  the  most  profound  and  brilliant  specula 
tions  on  the  political  future,  and  got  off  the  ablest  critiques  upon 
the  conduct  of  the  war.  As  every  thing  "good"  Avas  pub 
lished,  some  tremendous  and  overwhelmingly  decisive  Confederate 
victories,  of  which  the  official  records  make  no  mention,  even  by 


"THE  VIDETTE."  227 

name,  were  described  in  the  Vidette,  and  the  horrors  of  Federal 
invasion  were  depicted  in  terms  which  made  the  citizen  reader's 
blood  freeze  in  his  veins. 

Cotemporary  papers  were  encouraged,  or  rebuked,  as  the  case 
might  require,  with  becoming  zeal,  and  the  "pestilent  opposition 
sheets"  were  attacked  with  that  felicitous  but  inexorable  sar 
casm  which  distinguishes  editorial  contests.  The  rhetorical  ex 
pression  of  contempt  or  indignation,  and  the  large  share  which 
these  passions  had  in  the  leading  articles,  justly  entitled  the 
"  Vidette"  to  an  eminent  place  among  the  journals  of  the  period. 

About  this  time  there  had  recently  been  another  call  for  some 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  by  the  Federal  Government,  and 
Morgan  hoped  to  avail  himself  of  the  disinclination  of  the  Ken- 
tuckians  to  be  drafted,  to  increase  his  own  force.  He  had  dis 
patched  many  recruiting  agents  into  the  counties  of  Southern 
Kentucky,  and  had  instructed  them  to  inform  all  young  men 
who  wished  to  avoid  the  draft,  that  the  best  way  to  do  it  effec 
tually,  was  to  join  him.  As  a  great  many  preferred  (of  the  two 
armies)  the  Confederate,  they  carne,  when  forced  to  a  decision, 
to  the  -latter.  Many,  too,  had  long  hesitatingly  contemplated 
"joining  Morgan,"  and  the  imminent  danger  of  being  placed, 
forcibly,  in  the  other  army,  quickened  their  wits  and  resolution, 
and  they  came. 

Adam  R.  Johnson  and  Woodward,  who  were  at  this  time  ope 
rating  very  successfully  in  Southwestern  Kentucky,  got  a  large 
number  of  recruits  seeking  to  avoid  the  draft.  A  great  many 
came  to  Morgan — enough  to  fill  up  Desha's  company,  and,  be 
sides  increasing  all  the  old  companies,  to  add  another  company 
to  the  regiment.  This  one  was  lettered  M,  and  was  commanded 
by  Captain  W.  H.  Jones,  who  became  a  fine  officer,  altho-ugh  he 
had  then  seen  no  service.  To  remedy  all  trouble  from  the  in 
experience  of  the  Captain,  Colonel  Morgan,  in  accordance  with 
his  usual  policy,  appointed,  as  First  and  Second  Lieutenants, 
Sergeants  Thomas  Quirk  and  Ben  Drake  of  Company  A.  Both 
had  previously  distinguished  themselves,  and  both  made  their 


2-28  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

mark  as  officers.  Henry  Ilukill,  another  Sergeant  of  Company 
A,  and  an  excellent  soldier,  was  appointed  First  Lieutenant  of 
Company  L.  Gano,  also,  recruited  another  company  for  his 
squadron  at  this  time.  It  was  a  large  and  fine  one,  and  was 
commanded  by  Captain  Theophilus  Steele,  formerly  Surgeon  of 
the  Second  Kentucky  infantry,  but  he  was  one  of  that  kind  of 
Surgeons,  who,  in  war,  prefer  inflicting  wounds  to  curing  them. 

A  short  repose  at  Hartsville  was  interrupted  by  the  most 
welcome  and  stirring  summons  we  had  ever  received.  This  was 
an  order  from  General  Kirby  Smith  to  Colonel  Morgan,  to  meet 
him  at  Lexington,  Kentucky,  on  the  2d  of  the  coming  month 
(September). 

It  will  be  impossible  for  the  men,  whose  history  I  am  writing, 
to  ever  forget  this  period  of  their  lives.  The  beautiful  country 
in  which  it  was  passed,  the  blue-grass  pastures  and  the  noble 
trees,  the  encampments  in  the  shady  forests,  through  which  ran 
the  clear  cool  Tennessee  waters,  the  lazy  enjoyments  of  the 
green  bivouacks,  changing  abruptly  to  the  excitement  of  the 
chase  and  the  action,  the  midnight  moonlit  rides  amidst  the 
lovely  scenery,  cause  the  recollections  which  crowd  our  minds, 
when  we  think  of  Gallatin  and  Hartsville,  to  mingle  almost  in 
separably  with  the  descriptions  of  romance.  In  this  country 
live  a  people  worthy  of  it.  In  all  the  qualities  which  win  re 
spect  and  love,  in  generosity,  honesty,  devoted  friendship,  zealous 
adherence  to  what  they  deem  the  right,  unflinching  support  of 
those  who  labor  for  it,  in  hospitality  and  kindliness,  the  Creator 
never  made  a  people  to  excel  them.  May  God  bless  and  prosper 
them,  and  may  they  and  their  children,  only,  at  the  judgment 
day,  "arise  from  that  corner  of  the  earth,  to  answer  for  the 
sins  of  the  brave." 


OFF  TO  KENTUCKY- AGAIN.  229 


CHAPTER    X. 

BUDDING  our  friends  at  Hartsville  farewell,  we  set  out  for  the 
heart  of  Kentucky  on  the  morning  of  the  29th.  Never  were 
men  in  higher  and  more  exultant  spirits,  and  cheer  after  cheer 
ran"-  from  the  front  to  the  rear  of  the  column,  and  when  these 

O 

evidences  of  enthusiastic  joy  at  length  ceased,  the  way  was  en 
livened  with  laugh,  jest,  and  song.  Passing  by  the  Red  Sul 
phur  Springs,  we  reached  Scottsville,  in  Allen  county,  Kentucky, 
on  that  night  and  encamped  at  12  o'clock  a  few  miles  beyond. 
Stokes'  and  Haggard's  regiments  of  Federal  cavalry  were  re 
ported  to  be  in  that  section  of  the  country,  and  the  necessity 
for  somewhat  careful  scouting  could  not  be  ignored.  We  saw 
nothing  of  them,  however,  and  resuming  our  march  early  the 
next  morning,  reached  Glasgow  about  10  A.  M. 

At  Glasgow  we  found  rumors  prevailing,  as  yet  undefined  and 
crude,  of  Kirby  Smith's  advance  through  Southeastern  Kentucky. 
Our  friends  in  Glasgow  welcomed  us  with  their  usual  kindness 
and  after  enjoying  their  hospitality  for  some  hours,  we  marched 
off  on  the  Columbia  road.  Encamping  that  night  at  Green  river, 
we  reached  Columbia,  in  Adair  county,  on  the  next  day  about 
12  M.,  and  remained  there  until  the  next  morning. 

The  reason  for  the  slow  marching  of  the  last  two  days,  had 
been  Colonel  Morgan's  anxiety  to  obtain  some  information  of 
the  two  howitzers,  which  were  being  escorted  from  Knoxville, 
under  charge  of  his  brother  and  Aide-de-Campe  Captain  C.  H.  Mor 
gan,  with  an  escort  of  seventy-five  men.  This  escort  was  composed 
of  men  who  had  been  granted  furloughs,  and  of  convalescent 
sick  and  wounded  men,  returning  to  the  command.  These  men 
•were  all  well  armed,  and  were  under  the  immediate  command 
of  Captain  Allen,  who  was  assisted  by  several  excellent  officers. 


230  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

When  this  party  reached  Sparta,  it  marched,  in  accordance  with 
instructions  sent  there  for  its  guidance,  to  Carthage,  and  thence 
to  Red  Sulphur  Springs,  following,  then,  directly  in  the  track 
of  the  column.  Stokes'  cavalry  heard  of  them,  and  pursued. 
Once,  this  regiment  came  very  near  falling  foul  of  them.  The 
party  had  encamped  late  at  night,  and  as  a  measure  of  precau 
tion,  the  horses  were  taken  back  some  distance  into  the  woods, 
and  the  men  were  made  to  lie  down  in  line,  concealed  by  the 
brush — the  howitzers  were  planted  to  sweep  the  road.  No  fires 
were  lighted.  Shortly  afterward,  the  regiment  in  pursuit  of 
them  passed  by,  moving  not  more  than  twenty  yards  from  the 
line,  without  discovering  it;  whether  a  discovery  would  have 
benefited  the  said  regiment,  will  never  be  known,  although 
there  are  many  private  opinions  about  the  matter. 

When  the  party  reached  Glasgow — it  was  in  the  middle  of  the 
night — Captain  Morgan  could  get  no  information  about  the 
whereabouts  of  the  command  for  some  time.  He  was  supposed 
to  be  a  Federal  officer.  At  last  he  was  recognized  and,  at  once, 
got  the  necessary  information. 

On  the  same  occasion,  an  incident  occurred,  which  illustrated 
well  the  coolness  and  self-possession  which  characterized  the  men 
of  Morgan's  command,  in  the  peculiar  service  to  which  they 
were  inured.  A  party  of  some  twenty  men  had  been  sent,  be 
fore  Colonel  Morgan  left  Hartsville,  to  carry  dispatches  to  John 
son  and  Woodward,  inviting  them  to  co-operate  with  Morgan. 
In  returning,  this  party  learned  that  Colonel  Morgan  was  on  the 
march  for  Central  Kentucky,  and  immediately  changed  route  to 
join  him  the  more  speedily,  and  this  change  brought  them  to 
Glasgow  at  this  time.  Neither  of  these  parties  knew  of  the 
other's  presence,  or  anticipated  any  such  meeting,  until  they  sud 
denly  encountered  in  the  streets  of  Glasgow.  Fortunately,  the 
party  coming  from  the  West  was  under  the  command  of  a  young 
officer  of  more  than  ordinary  coolness  and  shrewdness,  as  well 
as  daring — Lieutenant  Houston  Hopkins.  Each  of  these  de 
tachments  had  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  other  was  an 


BUSHWHACKERS.  231 

enemy.  The  bulk  of  the  command  had  long  passed  this  point, 
so  long  that  the  rear-guard,  scouts,  every  thing  of  the  kind, 
ought  to  have  been  gone,  and  the  enemy  in  considerable  num 
bers  was  not  far  off.  Yet,  with  a  sort  of  instinct,  each  forbore  to 
fire,  until  more  positively  assured  of  what  the  other  was.  They 
came  within  twenty  yards  of  each  other — so  close  that  the  officers 
of  each,  could  hear  the  muttered  speculations  of  the  others  as 
to  their  probable  character. 

The  larger  detachment,  under  Captain  Allen,  immediately 
formed  across  the  road,  and  advanced  slowly,  with  guns  at  a 
"ready."  The  other  wheeled  rapidly,  and  fell  back  about  two 
hundred  yards,  halted,  and  also  formed.  Lieutenant  Hopkins 
then  rode  back  to  within  a  short  distance  of  Captain  Allen,  and 
entered  into  a  parley  with  him,  which,  of  course,  soon  ended  in 
recognition.  When  it  is  remembered  that  the  first  wish  and 
impulse  of  both  parties,  when  two  hostile  detachments  meet,  is, 
generally,  to  get  the  first  fire,  and  make  the  quickest  dash,  it 
will  be  conceded  that  on  this  occason  there  was  exhibited  rare 
coolness  and  discretion. 

Captain  Morgan  had  dispatched  a  courier  to  his  brother,  in 
forming  him  of  his  line  of  march,  which  courier  reached  Col 
umbia  soon  after  the  command  had  gone  into  camp  there.  Gano's 
squadron  was  immediately  sent  back  to  reinforce  the  escort,  and 
met  it  shortly  after  it  had  left  Glasgow.  The  necessary  delay 
for  the  arrival  of  the  guns  caused  us  to  remain  at  Columbia  for 
two  days.  Resuming  the  march  on  the  day  after  they  came,  at 
an  early  hour  the  command  moved  in  the  direction  of  Liberty, 
in  Casey  County.  In  the  vicinity  of  this  place,  we  saw,  in  the 
brief  time  that  we  remained,  more  active  and  business-like  bush- 
whacking  than  ever  before  in  our  entire  service.  The  hills  along 
the  road  seemed  alive  with  them,  and  from  behind  every  fourth 
or  fifth  tree  apparently,  they  were  blazing  away  at  us.  Every 
Southern  reader  will  understand  at  once  what  sort  of  individual 
is  meant  by  a  "  bushwhacker  " — that  he  is  a  gentleman  of  leisure, 
who  lives  in  a  wild  and,  generally,  a  mountainous  country,  does 


HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

not  join  the  army,  but  shoots,  from  the  tops  of  hills,  or  from  be 
hind  trees  and  rocks,  at  those  who  are  so  unfortunate  as  to  differ 
with  him  in  politics.  It  is  his  way  of  expressing  his  opinions. 
His  style  of  fighting  is  very  similar  to  that  of  the  outlying  scouts 
of  partisan  cavalry,  except  that  he  esteems  it  a  weakness  and 
an  unnecessary  inconvenience  to  take  prisoners,  and  generally 
kills  his  captives.  Sometimes,  and  especially  toward  the  latter 
part  of  the  war,  these  fellows  would  band  together  in  consider 
able  numbers,  make  certain  portions  of  the  country  impassable, 
except  to  strong  detachments,  and  even  undertake  expeditions 
into  neighboring  sections. 

There  were  "Union  bushwhackers"  and  "Southern  bush 
whackers  ;"  in  Kentucky,  the  former  were  more  numerous.  "It 
is  a  gratifying  reflection,"  to  use  the  language  of  one  of  Colonel 
Clarence  Prentice's  official  reports,  "that  many  of  them  will 
1  whack'  no  more."  In  the  Northern  rnind,  bushwhackers  and 
guerrillas  are  confounded  together,  an  eggrcgious  error  in  clas 
sification.  It  is  probable  that  the  bushwhacker  of  this  country 
would  answer  exactly  to  the  guerrilla  of  European  warfare }  but 
the  guerrilla  of  North  America  is,  or  rather  was  (for  happily 
he  is  almost,  if  not  quite  extinct)  ,  an  animal  entirely  distinct 
from  cither.  Formerly  the  Northern  press  styled  all  the  South 
ern  cavalry  guerrillas,  because  they  traveled  about  the  country 
freely,  and  gave  their  enemies  some  trouble.  This,  however, 
was  when  the  Federal  cavalry  used  to  still  ride  with  pillows  on 
their  saddles,  were  put  to  bed  carefully  every  night  by  the  General 
commanding,  and  encamped  on  the  march  in  the  midst  of  infantry 
regiments,  who  were  instructed  to  sec  that  their  horses  did  not 
hurt  them,  etc.  When  the  hardy,  dashing  regiments  of  the  lat 
ter  part  of  the  war — after,  indeed,  the  first  eighteen  months- 
began  to  do  real  service,  the  Northern  writers  found  that  they 
would  be -called  on  to  record  as  cavalry  operations  the  very  kind 
of  affairs  which  they  had  been  accustomed  to  chronicle  as  guer 
rilla  irregularities. 

A  guerrilla  was,  properly  speaking,  a  man  who  had  belonged 


w 


to 

ARRIVE    AT    ULXlNGrTOST.  j 


to  some  army,  and  had  deserted  and  gone  to  making  war  on  his 
private  account.  He  was  necessarily  a  marauder,  sometimes 
spared  his  former  friend,  and  was  much  admired  by  weak  young 
women  who  were  afflicted  with  a  tendency  toward  shoddy  ro 
mance. 

On  this  march  through  Casey  county,  the  bushwhackers  were 
unusually  officious.  The  advance-guard,  which  for  some  reason 
had  gone  on  some  distance  in  front,  reached  Liberty  about  two 
hours  before  the  column,  and  during  that  time  were  fairly  be 
sieged  in  the  place.  Colonel  Morgan  himself  made  a  narrow 
escape.  One  fellow,  more  daring  than  the  others,  had  come 
down  from  the  hills,  and  had  approached  within  seventy  yards 
of  the  road.  He  fired  at  Morgan,  missing  him,  but  wounded  a 
little  negro  boy,  his  servant,  who  was  riding  by  his  side,  re 
ceiving  some  order.  The  man,  who  fired,  at  once  ran  back  to  the 
hill,  followed  by  one  or  two  of  our  fellows  from  the  head  of  the 
column.  He  was  killed  by  private,  afterward  Captain  Thomas 
Franks,  who  made  an  excellent  shot,  hitting  the  bushwhacker 
in  the  head  while  he  was  running  at  top  speed,  and  Franks  him 
self  wa,s  going  at  a  rapid  gallop. 

That  night  we  reached  Houstonville,  about  fourteen  miles 
from  Danville,  and  learned  there  of  General  Smith's  complete 
victory  at  Richmond,  and  of  the  probability  that  he  was  already 
at  Lexington.  This  news  excited  the  men  very  much,  and  sleep 
was  banished  from  the  camp  that  night.  Early  on  the  next 
morning  we  started  for  a  good  day's  march,  and  reached  Dan 
ville  about  ten  A.  M.,  halted  there  some  three  hours,  and,  re 
suming  the  march,  reached  Nicholasville,  twenty-three  miles 
distant,  and  twelve  from  Lexington,  at  dusk. 

On  the  next  day,  the  4th  of  September,  the  command  entered 
Lexington  about  10  A.  M.,  amid  the  most  enthusiastic  shouts, 
plaudits,  and  congratulations.  Colonel  Morgan  (as  has  been 
said)  and  many  of  his  officers  and  men,  were  formerly  citizens 
of  Lexington,  and  many  others  came  from  the  vicinity  of  the 


234  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

place ;  relations  and  friends,  therefore,  by  the  score,  were  in 
the  crowd  which  thronged  the  streets  of  the  town. 

The  people  of  this  particular  section  of  Kentucky,  known  as 
the  Blue-grass  region,  had  always  been  strongly  Southern  in 
their  views  and  sympathies,  and  this  occasion,  except  that  of 
General  Smith's  entrance  a  day  or  two  before,  was  the  first 
chance  they  had  ever  had  to  manifest  their  political  proclivities. 
Some  of  them  shortly  afterward  were  very  sorry,  doubtless,  that 
they  had  been  so  candid.  The  command,  at  this  time,  numbered 
about  eleven  hundred  men.  The  Second  Kentucky  had  been 
greatly  increased,  and,  after  deducting  all  losses,  was  nearly,  if 
not  quite  nine  hundred  strong.  Gano's  squadron  numbered 
about  two  hundred  effectives.  The  rapidity  with  which  recruits 
came  to  Morgan  was  astonishing.  Captain  Breckinridge  was 
immediately  granted  authority,  by  General  Smith,  to  raise  a 
battalion  of  four  companies,  to  serve  in  Morgan's  brigade.  He 
was  permitted  to  take  his  own  company  (I)  out  of  the  Second 
Kentucky,  as  a  nucleus  for  his  battalion  organization,  and  in  a 
very  short  time  he  had  gotten  three  other  large  and  fine  com 
panies,  and  he  could  (if  he  had  been  permitted)  have  recruited  a 
regiment  with  as  little  trouble. 

Gano  was  granted  authority  to  raise  a  regiment,  and  in  a  very 
short  time  had  recruited  three  companies.  Active  service, 
which  necessitated  rapid  and  continuous  marching,  interfered 
for  a  time  with  the  organization  of  his  regiment,  but  it  was 
eventually  completed.  Second  Lieutenant  Alexander,  of  Com 
pany  E,  Second  Kentucky,  was  given  permission  to  raise  a 
company,  in  the  vicinity  of  Harrodsburg,  Mercer  county,  and 
in  four  or  five  days  returned  with  a  company  of  over  sixty  men, 
which  was  admitted  into  the  Second  Kentucky,  and  lettered  H, 
a  letter  which  had  been  in  disuse  in  the  regiment,  since  the  par 
tition  of  the  company  which  bore  Alston  into  a  Captaincy. 
Lieutenant  S.  D.  Morgan,  of  Company  A,  was  also  authorized 
to  recruit  a  company,  and  soon  did  it.  It  was  admitted  into 


COMMAND   INCREASING.  235 

the  Second  Kentucky  as  Company  I,  in  place  of  Breckinridge's. 
The  Second  Kentucky  now  numbered  twelve  companies,  and 
nearly  eleven  hundred  effective  men.  Almost  immediately, 
upon  arriving  at  Lexington,  Captain  Desha  resigned  the  Cap 
taincy  of  Company  L.  lie  was  a  very  fine  officer,  and  we  all 
regretted  to  part  with  him.  He  received  authority  to  recruit  a 
regiment  of  infantry,  and  had  partially  succeeded,  when  the  re 
treat  from  Kentucky  commenced.  He  then  entered  Colonel 
Thomas  Hunt's  regiment,  the  Fifth  Kentucky  infantry.  In  the 
last  year  of  the  war  he  was  offered  a  Brigadier's  commission, 
but  declined  it  upon  the  ground  that  ill-health  would  not  permit 
him  to  exercise  the  duties  required  of  him,  in  such  a  station, 
without  delay.  Private  John  Cooper,  of  Company  A,  was  ap 
pointed  Captain  in  his  stead — he  had  previously  been  elected 
color-bearer  of  the  regiment,  when  Colonel  Morgan  had  directed 
the  officers  to  choose  the  best  man  in  the  regiment  to  bear  a 
flag  presented  to  him  by  tho  ladies  of  the  State. 

Every  company  of  the  Second  Kentucky  was  increased  by 
recruits,  during  the  first  week  after  our  arrival.  Two  gentle 
men,  Colonels  Cluke  and  Chenaults,  were  authorized  to  recruit 
regiments  for  Morgan's  brigade,  and  immediately  went  to  work 
to  do  so. 

As  soon  as  the  first  greetings  had  been  passed  with  our 
friends,  every  man  was  curious  to  learn  the  particulars  of  Gen 
eral  Smith's  march  through  Southeastern  Kentucky,  and  of  the 
fight  at  Richmond.  General  Smith  had  collected  at  Knoxville, 
and  other  points  in  East  Tennessee,  some  twenty  thousand 
men,  and  leaving  eight  thousand,  under  General  Stephenson,  in 
front  of  Cumberland  Gap,  then  occupied  by  the  Federal  General 
G.  W.  Morgan,  with  eight  or  nine  thousand  men,  he,  with  twelve 
thousand  men,  and  thirty  or  forty  pieces  of  artillery,  pressed 
through  the  Big  Creek  and  Rogers  gaps  (of  the  Cumberland 
mountains),  and  marched  rapidly  for  the  Blue-grass  country. 
Master  of  Lexington,  he  would  have  the  terminus  of  the  two 
railroads,  and,  indeed,  one  half  of  the  State  of  Kentucky.  A 


236  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

complete  defeat  of  the  forces,  then  in  that  region,  would  clear 
his  path  to  Louisville,  in  the  one  direction,  and  to  Covington  in 
the  other.  He  would  be  in  no  danger,  until  forces  were  col 
lected  and  organized  in  sufficient  strength  at  Cincinnati,  to 
march  against  and  push  him  away.  As  for  Buell's  army,  it  was 
General  Bragg's  duty  to  take  care  of  that.  General  Smith  had 
with  his  army  about  one  thousand  cavalry.  This  force,  under 
Colonel  John  Scott,  advancing  some  distance  in  his  front,  fell 
upon  Metcalfe's  regiment,  eleven  or  twelve  hundred  strong,  on 
the  Bighill,  fifteen  miles  from  Richmond,  and  thoroughly  de 
feated  and  dispersed  it.  Even  after  this  affair,  the  Federal 
commander  remained  in  ignorance  of  any  force,  besides  the 
cavalry  under  Scott,  having  approached  in  that  direction,  until 
General  Smith,  having  pressed  on  with  wonderful  celerity  and 
secresy,  had  gotten  within  a  few  miles  of  Richmond. 

Then  every  available  man  was  concentrated  at  Richmond  and 
pushed  out  to  meet  the  invading  column.  The  collision  occurred 
on  the  29th  of  August.  General  Smith  had  marched  so  rapidly, 
his  men  had  fared  so  badly  (having  subsisted  for  ten  days  on 
green  corn),  'and  their  badly  shod  feet  were  so  cut  by  the  rough 
stony  way,  that  his  column  was  necessarily  somewhat  prolonged, 
although  there  was  little  of  what  might  be  called  struggling. 
Consequently,  he  could  put  into  the  fight  only  about  six  thousand 
men.  Heath  was  some  distance  in  the  rear.  He  attacked  as 
soon  as  he  came  upon  the  enemy,  drove  them,  and  although 
three  several  stands  were  made,  his  advance  was  never  seriously 
checked.  The  last  stand,  and  hardest  fight,  was  made  in  the 
outskirts  of  the  little  town  of  Richmond  itself,  and  when  the 
enemy  was  driven  from  the  town,  his  route  was  complete.  The 
Federal  commander  General  Nelson  was  wounded.  The  enemy's 
loss  was  over  one  thousand  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  six  thou 
sand  prisoners  were  taken  and  paroled.  General  Smith's  loss 
was  nine  hundred  in  killed  and  wounded. 

Scott  with  the  cavalry,  pressed  the  fugitives  for  many  miles. 
The  route  and  disintegration  of  the  Federal  army  was  such,  that 


HEATH   MOVES    TOWARD   COVINGTON.  237 

perhaps  not  a  single  command  maintained  its  organization,  and 
the  stream  of  fugitives  poured  through  Lexington  all  Saturday 
night  and  Sunday,  toward  Louisville  and  Cincinnati.  This  de 
cisive  victory  finished  General  Smith's  part  of  the  programme, 
and  closed  his  campaign,  for  the  time,  with  the  possession  of  all 
that  part  of  Kentucky.  On  the  1st  of  September,  General 
Smith  took  possession  of  Lexington,  and  on  the  2nd  or  3rd  he 
dispatched  General  Heath  with  five  or  six  thousand  men  toward 
Covington.  General  Smith  issued  the  strictest  orders  for  the 
maintainance  of  order  and  discipline,  and  the  prevention  of  ex 
cesses  or  mal-conduct  among  his  troops,  of  any  description. 
Such  was  the  state  of  discipline  that  he  had  brought  his  army  to 
before,  that  these  orders  were  little  needed.  He  also  went  ener 
getically  to  work  to  encourage  enlistments  in  his  ranks,  to  or 
ganize  every  department,  necessary  to  the  subsistence  and 
equipment  of  his  army,  and  to  collect  supplies. 

Notwithstanding  the  efforts  that  were  made  to  induce  the  Ken- 
tuckians  to  enlist  as  infantry,  very  few  would  do  so,  and  those 
who  did,  joined  regiments  which  came  in  with  General  Smith  ; 
not  a  single  infantry  regiment  was  raised  during  the  time  that 
the  Confederate  army  was  in  the  State.  All  of  the  Kentuckians 
who  joined  at  that  time,  wanted  to  ride.  As  a  people,  they  are 
fond  of  horses,  and  if  they  went  to  war  at  all,  they  thought  it  a 
too  great  tax,upon  them  to  make  them  walk. 

A  brigadier's  commission  was  given  to  Captain  AbramBuford 
(formerly  of  the  regular  army),  a  man  well  known  and  very  popular 
in  this  portion  of  Kentucky,  and  he  was  authorized  to  recruit  a 
mixed  brigade  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  He  got  three  fine  regi 
ments  of  cavalry,  under  Colonels  Butler,  Smith  and  Grigsby, 
without  any  trouble,  but  not  an  infantryman.  The  two  last  of 
the  above  named  regiments,  were  subsequently  assigned  to  Mor 
gan.  One  reason  why  so  many  enlisted  in  cavalry  (inde 
pendently  of  the  decided  preference  of  the  Kentuckians  for  that 
brancf  of  the  service),  was  the  fact,  that  companies  and  regiments 
had,  in  many  instances,  their  men  bespoken  and  ready  to  enlist  with 


238 

them  as  soon  as  a  favorable  opportunity  should  occur.  Many 
(also),  had  made  up  their  minds  to  join  Morgan  when  he  next 
came  through  the  country.  Men  who  expected  to  become  sol 
diers  (under  such  circumstances),  would  of  course  wish  to  join 
the  cavalry,  and  made  all  their  preparations  to  enlist  in  that 
arm  of  the  service. 

Had  a  decisive  battle  been  fought  and  won  by  General  Bra<ig, 
there  is  little  doubt  but  that  the  majority  of  that  class  of  men, 
who  were  waiting  for  that  event  before  they  enlisted,  would  then 
have  enlisted  as  infantry.  Two  or  three  days  after  we  reached 
Lexington,  four  companies  of  the  Second  Kentucky  were  sent 
with  the  two  howitzers,  to  capture  the  stockade  at  the  bridge 
over  Salt  river,  on  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad,  and 
burn  the  bridge.  The  expedition  was  under  command  of  Cap 
tain  Hutchinson.  This  officer  had  some  days  previously  been 
made,  at  my  request,  Acting  Lieutenant  Colonel  of  my  regiment 
(the  Second  Kentucky),  and  he  was  always  afterward  addressed 
by  that  title,  and  was  subsequently  given  the  position.  Hutch 
inson  was  a  singularly  active  and  energetic  officer,  and  possessed 
the  shrewdness  as  well  as  daring  which  eminently  qualified  him 
for  the  command  of  detachments.  He  made  a  tremendous  march, 
and  arrived  at  his  destination,  before  any  Federal  force,  which 
could  have  intercepted  him  or  have  marched  to  prevent  his  pur 
pose,  heard  of  his  coming.  % 

The  garrison  of  the  stockade  was  some  one  hundred  and  fifty 
strong.  He  placed  his  men  in  position  around  it,  and  planted 
his  howitzers  to  command  it.  He  then  sent  Captain  Bowles  to 
demand  the  surrender  of  the  garrison,  telling  him  that  he  would 
allow  but  twenty  minutes  for  the  negotiation. 

Captain  Bowles  approached  under  flag  of  truce'  and  entered 
into  a  parley  with  the  enemy.  They  were  quite  willing  to  sur 
render  in  less  than  twenty  minutes,  provided  that  one  strange 
stipulation  should  be  conceded,  viz :  that  the  bridge  would  not 
be  burned.  While  Bowles  was  endeavoring  to  prove  t<f  them 
the  folly  of  such  a  proposition,  the  twenty  minutes  expired- 


CAPTURE    OF   A    STOCKADE    ON    SALT   RIVER.  289 

Hutchinson,  who  was  very  literal  in  observing  all  that  he  said, 
immediately  caused  his  artillery  to  open  without  waiting  for  the 
return  of  his  envoy,  and  two  shells  were  bursted  just  above  the 
stockade,  wounding  one  of  the  inmates.  This  might  have  caused 
the  death  of  the  bearer  of  the  flag,  as  the  garrison  had,  then,  a 
perfect  right  to  shoot  him.  The  effect  of  it  on  Bowles,  however, 
who  was  one  of  the  very  few  men  I  have  known,  who,  I  believe, 
never  felt  fear,  was  to  render  him  indignant  that  his  embassy 
should  be  interrupted,  just  as  he  thought  that  it  was  about  to  be 
successful,  and  he  came  galloping  back  at  full  speed,  waving  his 
flag  at  his  own  friends,  and  shouting  at  the  top  of  his  voice, 
"  don't  shoot  any  more,  they'll  be  all  right  directly." 

The  inmates  of  the  stockade  at  the  same  time  poured  out, 
without  regard  to  rank,  waiving  pocket  handkerchiefs,  portions 
of  their  nether  garments  hastily  torn  off,  and  whatever  else,  they 
could  lay  hold  of,  that  would  serve  the  purpose.  As  soon,  how 
ever,  as  the  howitzers  opened,  the  skirmishers  advanced,  in  ac 
cordance  with  Hutchinson's  previous  instructions,  firing  also, 
and  their  fire  drove  the  enemy  back  into  the  stockade. 

Soon,  however,  all  mistakes  were  rectified  and  an  amicable 
adjustment  of  the  difficulty  arrived  at.  The  prisoners  were  im 
mediately  paroled,  the  bridge  thoroughly  destroyed,  and  the  de 
tachment  returned.  It  was  absent  only  a  few  days.  The  bridge 
destroyed  was  four  hundred  and  fifty  feet  long,  and  forty-six  feet 
high. 

Almost  immediately  after  Colonel  Hutchinson  returned  to 
Lexington,  he  was  sent 'with  Companies  B,  C,  D,  E,  L  and  H, 
to  report  to  General  Heath,  who  had  advanced  to  within  five 
miles  of  Covington,  and  withdrawing,,  needed  cavalry.  The  ut 
most  consternation  prevailed  in  Cincinnati  during  the  time  that 
Heath  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Covington ;  the  city  was  placed 
under  martial  law,  and  every  citizen  was  required  to  report  him 
self  for  military  duty.  So  persistent  were  the  detectives  in 
their  search  for  treason,  that  all  the  business  houses  in  the  town 
had  to  be  shut  up,  and  it  became  so  frequent  a  matter  to  con- 


240  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

strue  thoughtless  words  into  expressions  of  disloyal  sentiment, 
that  it  was  unsafe  to  speak  any  other  language  than  Dutch. 
Thousands  of  respectable  citizens,  nightly  left  their  comfortable 
homes,  to  cross  the  river,  and  shiver  and  ache  with  apprehension 
and  fatigue,  in  the  ditches  around  Covington.  Many  a  trades 
man  torn  from  his  shop,  got  the  manual  mixed  up  with  his  ac 
counts,  and  lost  the  run  of  both  ;  and  as  he  sat  in  a  rifle-pit, 
with  only  one  pontoon  bridge  (and  that  narrow)  connecting  him 
with  Cincinnati,  he  had  to  console  him — the  reflection  that  he 
was  performing  a  patriotic  duty,  and  letting  his  business  go  to 
the  devil. 

The  most  telling  maneuvre  against  such  an  army,  would  have 
been  to  send  emissaries  to  stir  up  the  street  boys  in  Cincinnati 
to  an  attacf  on  the  ungarrisoned  shops;  in  such  an  event  a  pre 
cipitate  retreat  would  most  probably  have  occurred  from  the 
Kentucky  side  of  the  river. 

For  several  days  after  Heath  was  close  enough  to  have  made 
a  dash  at  Covington,  at  any  hour,  there  were  no  other  defenders 
in  the  works  around  the  place  than  these  extempore  soldiers.  A 
very  few  only  of  their  guns  mounted  were  in  a  condition  to  be 
worked,  and  the  ammunition  first  provided  was  not  of  the  proper 
caliber.  On  the  first,  Gen.  Heath  came  within  sight  of  the  works, 
that  he  had  prepared  to  attack,  and  just  before  he  moved  upon 
them,  received  dispatches  from  Gen.  Smith,  instructing  him  not  to 
do  so,  but  to  be  prepared  to  return  at  short  notice.  General 
Smith  expected  to  be  soon  called,  to  re-inforce  General  Bragg, 
with  his  whole  force  to  fight  Buell's  army  before  it  reached. 
Louisville  ;  he  therefore  wished  every  thing  kept  well  in  hand, 
and  esteemed  the  maintenance  of  the  mobility  of  the  troops 
under  Heath  as  of  more  importance  than  the  capture  of  Cincin 
nati.  In  the  course  of  a  few  days,  however,  regular  troops 
began  to  arrive  at  Cincinnati,  and  they  came  in  rapidly.  When 
Heath  fell  back,  there  was  a  formidable  veteran  force,  there,  of 
perhaps  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand  men.  Hutchinson  reported 
to  him  at  Walton  twenty-five  miles  from  Covington,  and  was  at 


GENERAL   HEATH    FALLING    BACK.  244 

once  ordered  to  duty  on  the  front.  For  some  days  he  was  very 
actively  engaged  immediately  upon  the  ground  which  Heath  had 
just  left.  He  was  engaged  in  scouting  for  some  distance  above 
and  below  Covington,  to  ascertain  if  there  was  any  movement 
by  the  river,  as  well  as  having  to  carefully  watch  all  roads  lead- 
in  <r  out  of  the  place.  His  various  detachments  had  several 
skirmishes,  the  most  successful  of  which  was  made  by  a  party 
under  command  of  Lieutenant  Allensworth,  who  routed  a  much 
larger  body  of  the  enemy  and  captured  a  number  of  prisoners. 

Just  before  General  Heath  came  down  into  that  country,  fif 
teen  young  men  of  Boone  county  who  had  long  wished  to  join 
Morgan,  hearing  that  Confederate  troops  might  shortly  be  ex 
pected  in  their  neighborhood,  banded  together  and  attacked  a 
train  of  twenty-seven  wagons  guarded  by  fifty-one  Federal  sol 
diers,  dispersed  the  guard  and  burned  the  wagons.  This  party 
with  some  twenty-five  of  their  friends  then  equipped  themselves 
and  set  out  to  join  us. 

They  were  placed  in  the  new  Company  I.  In  the  service  done 
at  this  time,  Hutchinson's  loss  was  slight,  and  he  inflicted  a  good 
deal  upon  the  enemy.  He  took  a  number  of  'prisoners.  The 
railroad  was  destroyed — track  torn  up  and  bridges  burned — for 
a  good  many  miles.  General  Heath  continued  to  fall  back  to 
ward  Georgetown.  After  Hutchinson  had  been  in  command 
upon  the  Covington  front  six  or  seven  days,  I  sent  him  Company 
A,  and  the  next  day  followed  myself  with  Company  I.  Colonel 
Morgan  was  ordered  to  go  to  Eastern  Kentucky  and  intercept 
the  Federal  General  Geo.  W.  Morgan  on  his  march  from  Cum 
berland  Gap  to  the  Ohio  river.  General  Morgan  had  evacuated 
the  gap  and  gained  two  days  march  on  the  force  watching  it  on 
the  other  side.  It  was  General  Smith's  desire  that  Colonel  Mor 
gan  should  blockade  the  roads  in  his  front,  and  use  every  exer 
tion  to  retard  his  progress.  By  uniting  with  General  Marshall's 
forces,  it  was  hoped  that  Colonel  Morgan,  in  the  rugged,  almost 
impassable  country,  through  which  the  Federal  column  had  to 
march,  might  stop  it  altogether,  until  another  body  of  troops 
16 


HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

could  be  thrown  upon  its  rear,  and  thus  literally  starve  it  into 
surrender.  As  it  was,  Marshall  remained  inactive,  and  Morgan 
after  felling  trees  across  the  road,  climbing  up  and  down  moun 
tains,  and  sticking  close  to  the  front  of  the  column  for  six  days, 
was  compelled  to  suffer  the  mortification  of  seeing  it  get  away 
triumphantly. 

While  Colonel  Morgan  was  employed  in  the  mountains,  Gene 
ral  Smith  directed  me  to  annoy  the  enemy  as  much  as  possible 
in  the  direction  of  Covington.  On  the  evening  that  I  arrived  at 
Walton,  where  Ilutchinson  had  been  encamped,  I  found  him  in 
retreat,  pressed  by  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy.  We  soon 
found  that  we  could  not  efficiently  check  the  enemy's  ad 
vance,  and  accordingly  fell  back  to  Crittenden,  a  little  place 
seven  miles  from  Walton.  The  enemy  encamped  five  miles  from 
the  place.  On  the  next  morning  we  were  driven  out  of  Critten 
den,  and  as  the  enemy  continued  to  advance,  I  dispatched 
General  Heath  that  I  believed  it  was  an  advance  upon  Lexington. 
The  enemy's  force  consisted,  as  we  afterward  ascertained,  of 
about  seven  thousand  infantry,  one  thousand  cavalry,  or,  per 
haps  a  little  more,  and  eight  pieces  of  artillery.  Skirmishers 
were  thrown  out,  in  strong  lines,  for  a  mile  or  more  on  each  side 
of  fhe  road.  The  country  was  open  and  easily  traversed  by  troops, 
enabling  them  to  strengthen  any  part  of  the  line  that  might  need 
it.  We  could  therefore  hope  to  effect  littlej  and  after  carefully 
reconnoitering,  without  finding  a  convenient  opening,  we  recon- 
tented  to  move  slowly  in  their  front,  forcing  them  to  .keep  up 
their  troublesome  precautions. 

About  1  or  2  p.  M.,  leaving  scouts  to  observe  them,  I  marched 
rapidly  to  Williamstown.  This  place  is  just  upon  the  northern 
edge  of  the  rugged  Eagle  hills.  Thence  I  moved  eastwardly  to 
Falmouth,  a  small  town  on  the  Central  Kentucky  Railroad, 
about  forty  miles  from  Covington,  and  twenty  miles  from  Wil 
liamstown — indeed  nearly  equi-distant  from  the  Dry-ridge  road, 
or  Cincinnati  and  Lexington  pike  (upon  which  the  enemy  were 
moving),  and  the  Maysville  and  Lexington  pike,  which  also 


WATCHING   CINCINNATI.  243 

needed  some  watching.  I  was  then  in  a  position  to  observe 
every  movement  upon  the  entire  front,  and  was,  so  to  speak,  in 
the  center  of  the  web  commanding  all  the  avenues  which  should 
be  guarded.  If  the  enemy  continued  upon  the  road  upon  which 
he  was  then  advancing,  he  would  have  to  force  his  way  through. 
General  Heath's  forces,  advantageously  posted  amid  the  hills  of 
the  Easle  creek.  If  he  turned  to  the  left  to  seek  a  road  not  so 

o 

well  defended,  he  would  have  to  come  by  Falmouth,  and  there 
fore  Falmouth  was  the  point  where  the  cavalry  watching  him 
should  be. 

On  the  road,  however,  and  before  I  reached  Falmouth,  scouts 
brought  the  information  that  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  to  Wal 
ton,  and  also  informed  me  of  what  his  strength  apparently  was. 
It  was  plain  that  no  force  of  that  size  would  attempt  to  inarch 
on  Lexington.  Shortly  afterward,  other  scouts,  which  had  been 
sent  to  watch  the  Ohio  river,  came  from  Warsaw,  a  little  town 
on  its  banks,  and  reported  that  a  number  of  boats  laden  with 
troops  had  gone  down  the  river  toward  Louisville.  This  infor 
mation  explained  every  thing.  Finding  that  Heath  had  with 
drawn,  "and  Cincinnati  was  no  longer  threatened,  this  force, 
which  had  driven  us  away  from  Walton,  had  been  sent  to  .clear 
the  country  of  troublesome  detachments,  and  also  to  attract 
attention  in  that  direction,  and  conceal  the  concentration  of 
troops  at  Louisville.  Walton  is  twenty-five  miles  from  Falmouth. 
On  the  day  after  reaching  the  latter,  I  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to 
Walton,  with  dispatches,  which  General  Smith  had  instructed 
me  to  forward  to  Cincinnati.  The  flag  was  borne  by  Captain  S. 
D.  Morgan,  who  betted  with  the  Aide  of  the  commanding  Gene 
ral,  that  he  (Morgan),  would  drive  in  his  pickets  within  forty- 
eight  hours — he  won  the  wager.  The  entire  strength  of  the  six 
companies,  which  Colonel  Hutchinson  had  taken  to  this  country, 
was  not  quite  five  hundred  men — the  two  additional  companies 
A  and  I,  did  not  swell  the  total  effective  to  six  hundred  men. 
All  of  these  were  large  ones,  but  many  men  (from  four  or  five 
of  them)  were  on  furlough.  When  the  flag  of  truce  returned, 


244  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

Captain  Morgan  gave  me  such  an  account  of  the  enemy  that  a 
desire,  previously  conceived,  to  visit  him  was  greatly  increased. 
Morgan  could,  of  course,  see  but  little ;  he  was,  however,  vigi 
lant  and  shrewd,  and  drew  accurate  inferences  from  what  he  saw. 
He  was  satisfied  that,  while  careful  and  systematic  guard  was 
kept,  the  troops  were  all  green  and  could  be  easily  surprised. 
He  said  that  so  far  as  he  could  learn,  there  was  no  attempt  made 
ut  scouting,  and  that  a  total  ignorance  prevailed  among  them  of 
what  was  going  on,  a  few  hundred  yards  even,  beyond  the  outposts. 
This  latter  information  was  confirmed  by  the  reports  of  all  my 
scouts,  and  was  in  accordance  with  the  habits  of  raw  men  and 
officers.  He  thought,  moreover,  from  something  he  had  heard, 
that  cavalry  were  encamped  a  mile  or  two  from  the  infantry, 
and  the  country  people,  some  of  whom  from  that  neighborhood 
visited  us,  stated  that  the  cavalry  were  encamped  a  mile  and  a 
half  from  the  main  body,  and  nearer  Walton.  We  had  tried  in 
vain  to  get  hold  of  the  cavalry  on  the  day  we  were  driven  away 
from  Walton ;  it  kept  carefully  behind  the  infantry. 

Moving  from  Falmouth  late  in  the  afternoon,  with  nearly  the 
entire  command,  I  marched  until  about  twelve  o'clock  at  night. 

O        ' 

and  halted  at  a  point  on  the  Independence  road,  about  ten  miles 
from  the  enemy's  encampment.  Scouts  were  immediately  sent 
out  to  ascertain  as  nearly  as  possible  the  exact  location  of  the 
pickets,  and  the  condition  of  every  thing  about  the  encampments. 
They  were  instructed  not  to  fire  upon,  or  in  anywise  alarm  the 
pickets,  or  do  anything  which  might  make  them  suspect  our 
vicinity. 

The  scouts  observed  their  instructions  closely,  and  did  not 
see  the  pickets  at  all,  but  inquired  of  the  people  who  lived 
near  the  encampment,  and  were  told  that  no  change  had  oc 
curred  in  the  last  day  or  two,  in  any  respect,  in  the  posts  on  the 
different  roads.  After  this  information  I  was  satisfied  that  I 
would  be  able  to  get  upon  the  Georgetown  and  Covington  pjke, 
upon  which  the  enemy  was  encamped,  by  a  country  road  which 
runs  into  it  from  the  Independence  pike,  without  alarming 


CAPTURE    OF   PICKETS    NEAR   COVINGTON.  245 

the  main  body.  I  could  then  move  rapidly  to  the  point  where 
the  cavalry  was  encamped,  arid  defeat  it  before  the  infantry 
came  to  the  rescue.  The  infantry  encampment  was  about  two 
miles  north  of  Walton,  and  this  by-road  comes  into  the  pike 
about  one  thousand  yards  from  the  site  of  the  encampment,  and 
between  it  and  Walton. 

The  column  was  accordingly  put  in  motion  again  at  daybreak, 
and  marched  rapidly.  Just  at  sunrise  we  reached  the  George 
town  and  Covington  pike,  and  saw  standing,  in  sight  of  the 
point  where  we  would  enter,  ten  cavalry  pickets.  The  column 
was  at  once  halted,  and  arrangements  made  to  capture  them. 
They  had  not  yet  seen  us.  A  brief  reconnoisance  showed  an 
infantry  regiment  on  post,  some  three  hundred  yards  further 
down  the  road.  There  was  now  no  hope  of  passing  this  point 
without  discovery  by  the  main  body,  and  it  only  remained  to 
make  the  most  out  of  the  situation. 

Lieutenant  Messick,  of  Company  A,  was  sent  with  ten  men  to 
take  in  the  cavalry  videttes,  and  Lieutenant  Roberts,  command 
ing  the  advance-guard,  was  sent  with  a  portion  of  it  to  try  the 
same  game  with  the  infantry.  He  went  right  into  the  midst  of 
it.  The  column  was  moved  forward  at  a  gallop,  as  soon  as  the 
pickets  were  disturbed,  and  turned  in  the  direction  of  Walton ; 
the  rear  company,  however,  being  carried  at  full  speed  to  the 
assistance  of  Lieutenant  Roberts.  One  of  the  howitzers  which 
had  been  brought  along,  was  planted  at  the  point  where  we  en 
tered  the  pike,  to  cover  our  retreat,  if  it  were  pressed.  When 
I  reached  the  little  squad  of  Lieutenant  Roberts  with  the  com 
pany  which  I  took  to  assist  it,  I  found  it,  or  rather  a  fragment 
of  it,  in  a  situation  which  perhaps  was  never  paralleled  during 
the  war. 

Lieutenant  Roberts  was  still  further  down  the  road,  arid  to 
ward  the  encampment,  with  a  portion  of  the  detachment,  picking 
up  stragglers.  Sergeant  Will  Hays  stood  with  six  men  in  the 
midst  of  a  company  of  sixty-nine  Federal  infantry.  The  infan 
try  seemed  sullen  and  bewildered,  and  stood  with  their  riiles 


246  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

cocked  and  at  a  ready.  Hays  had  his  rifle  at  the  head  of  the 
Lieutenant  commanding,  demanding  that  he  should  order  his 
men  to  surrender,  and  threatening  to  blow  his  brains  out  if  he 
encouraged  them  to  resist.  Hays'  six  men  were  grouped  around 
him,  ready  to  shoot  down  any  man  who  should  raise  a  gun 
against  him.  I  thought  it  the  finest  sight  I  had  ever  seen.  The 
arrival  of  the  company  decided  the  infantry  to  surrender,  and 
the  caps  and  bayonets  having  been  taken  off  of  their  guns,  they 
were  sent  off,  guarded  by  the  men  which  had  been  brought  up 
to  complete  their  capture.  Lieutenant  Roberts  had  gone,  with 
his  mere  corporal's  guard,  into  the  infantry  regiment,  had  cap 
tured  one  company,  and  run  the  balance  back  into  camp. 

The  men  of  this  regiment  were  very  raw  and  green.  Hays 
had  persuaded  them  for  some  time,  that  he  was  an  officer  of  their 
own  cavalry,  and  it  was  only  when  he  peremptorily  ordered  them 
to  follow  him  to  Walton,  that  they  suspected  him.  After  sendino- 
off  the  prisoners,  four  or  five  of  us  rode  on  down  the  road  to 
join  Lieutenant  Roberts,  and  soon  found  him,  bringing  back 
more  prisoners.  We  were  now  farther  in  toward  the  encamp 
ment,  than  the  regiment  on  picket  had  stood,  and  had  a  fair  view 
of  it.  We  saw  the  whole  force  form,  and  it  was  a  very  pretty 
sight.  The  regiments  first  formed  on  their  respective  camp 
grounds,  and  then  took  their  positions  in  line  of  battle,  at  a 
double  quick.  They  were  finely  drilled,  although  very  raw. 
The  artillery  was  run  into  position,  and  behind  every  thing, 
peeping  over  the  shoulders  of  the  infantry,  were  our  friends  the 
cavalry,  that  we  had  taken  so  much  pains  to  see. 

While  we  were  looking  on,  a  staff  officer  came  galloping  to 
ward  us,  evidently  not  knowing  who  we  were,  and  taking  us  for 
some  of  his  pickets  not  yet  driven  in.  He  came  right  up  to  us  ; 
thinking  his  capture  certain,  Captain  Morgan,  who  thought  that 
he  recognized  in  him,  the  officer  with  whom  he  had  made  the  bet 
two  days  previously,  rode  forward,  saluted  him,  and  told  him 
he  was  a  prisoner.  He,  however,  did  not  seem  to  be  of  that 
opinion  for  he  wheeled  his  horse,  coming  so  close  to  us  in  doing 


MARCH   ON   AUGUSTA.  247 

so  as  to  almost  brush  the  foremost  man,  and  dashed  back  at  full 
speed,  despite  the  shots  that  were  fired  at  him. 

The  skirmishers,  who  were  not  more  than  two  hundred  yards 
off,  soon  induced  us  to  leave,  and  we  galloped  after  the  column. 
Eighty  or  ninety  prisoners  were  taken,  and  were  sent  on  to  Lex 
ington,  as  soon  as  we  got  back  to  Falmouth.  The  enemy  did 
not  know  for  some  hours,  that  we  were  entirely  gone,  and  indeed 
rather  expected  during  that  time  to  be  attacked  in  force.  I 
perhaps  ought  to  have  attacked,  but  the  disparity  of  forces,  and 
the  knowledge  that  the  enemy  could  detect  it  as  I  advanced,  de 
terred  me. 

On  tKe  next  day  I  sent  Captain  Castleman  with  Company  D, 
to  Foster's  landing  on  the  Ohio  river.  He  fired  upon  a  Govern 
ment  transport  loaded  with  troops,  but  could  not  bring  her  to 
with  his  rifles.  He  captured  the  regular  packet,  and  was  shelled 
by  one  of  the  river  gun  boats,  suffering  no  loss. 

At  this  period  the  Home-guard  organizations  were  disband 
ing,  or  being  incorporated  into  the  Federal  army.  At  Augusta, 
a  town  in  Bracken  county,  about  twenty-five  miles  from  Fal 
mouth,  and  situated  on  the  river,  forty  odd  miles  above  Cincin 
nati,  there  was  a  regiment  being  formed  out  of  some  Home- 
guard  companies.  This  organization  had  already  begun  to  give 
trouble,  and  one  or  two  of  its  scouting  parties  had  even1  ven 
tured  within  a  short  distance  of  Falmouth.  I  was  also  informed 
that  all  sorts  of  men,  whether  willing  or  not,  were  being  placed 
in  its  ranks.  I  determined  therefore  to  break  it  up,  before  it 
became  formidable.  There  was  a  ford,  moreover,  just  below 
Augusta,  by  which  the  river  could  be  crossed  at  that  season 
without  difficulty.  I  wished  to  take  the  town,  if  possible,  with 
little  loss,  and  cross  into  Ohio,  and  marching  toward  Cincin 
nati,  so  threaten  the  city  that  the  troops  at  Walton  would  bo 
hurried  back  to  protect  it. 

Leaving  Falmouth  in  the  morning  of  one  day,  I  could  (if  al 
lowed  to  cross  the  river  without  opposition)  have  been  in  the 
vicinity  of  Cincinnati  at  day-light  of  the  next  day.  Two  days. 


248  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

therefore,  after  the  expedition  to  Walton,  I  started  from  Fal- 
mouth  with  about  four  hundred  and  fifty  men — leaving  Company 
B  and  some  details  behind  to  observe  the  enemy  at  Walton  and 
for  other  purposes. 

On  the  way  to  Augusta,  I  came  upon  a  large  scouting  party 
from  that  place  but  it  dispersed  before  I  could  attack — it  was 
cut  off,  however,  from  Augusta  and  prevented  from  taking  part 
in  the  fight  there.  We  inarched  through  Brooksville  and  about 
7  A.  M.  reached  the  high  ground  in  the  rear  of  Augusta  and 
which  perfectly  commanded  the  town.  Two  small  stern  wheel 
boats  lay  at  the  wharf,  to  assist  in  the  defense  of  the  place.  A 
twelve  pounder  was  mounted  on  each  of  them;  their  sides  were 
protected  by  hay  bales  and  they  were  manned  by  sharp-shooters 
in  addition  to  the  gunners.  These  boats  commanded  the  turn 
pike  which  led  into  the  town  from  "Brookville  (by  which  road  we 
were  advancing)  but  about  a  mile  from  the  town  I  turned  the 
column  from  the  road  and  approached  the  hill  (upon  which  I 
took  position)  through  the  fields.  The  crest  of  this  hill  is  per 
haps  two  hundred  feet  above  the  level  of  the  river  (at  low  water) 
and  about  six  hundred  yards  from  its  bank.  The  town  runs 
back  to  the  foot  of  the  hill.  From  our  position  on  the  summit 
of  this  hill  we  could  distinctly  see  the  Home-guards  going  into 
the  houses  and  preparing  for  fight,  but  a  portion  of  them  were 
already  ensconced  in  the  houses  near  the  head  of  the  street  by 
which  we  entered  the  town  a  little  while  afterward.  These  lat 
ter  kept  themselves  concealed  while  we  remained  on  the  hill  and 
our  ignorance  of  their  location  cost  us  dearly.  Seeing  that  the 
boats  commanded  the  street  by  which  I  wished  to  enter  the  town, 
I  determined  to  drive  them  away  before  moving  the  bulk  of  the 
command  from  the  hill. 

Accordingly,  having  dismounted  and  formed  Companies  B,  C, 
E,  I  and  M,  and  planted  the  howitzers  on  the  highest  point  I 
could  find,  where  they  could  probably  chuck  every  shell  into  the 
boats,  I  ordered  Company  A,  and  the  advance-guard  to  cross 
the  Germantown  pike  and  take  position  near  the  bank  of  the 


ATTACK   ON   AUGUSTA. 


249 


river  in  the  eastern  end  of  the  town.  Here  they  would  be  en 
abled  to  annoy  the  troops  on  the  boats  very  greatly  with  their 
rifles  and  would  also  be  in  position  to  assist  in  reducing  the  gar 
risoned  houses,  when  the  fight  in  town  commenced.  In  that 
part  of  the  town  there  were  no  houses  occupied  by  the  enemy. 
Captain  Cassell  of  Company  A,  was  instructed  to  dispose  of  his 
own  company  and  the  advance-guard  in  accordance  with  these 
views  and  to  take  command  of  both.  I  especially  charged  him 
to  let  no  man  approach  that  part  of  the  town  where  I  expected 
to  have  to  fight  on  horseback,  but  to  bring  the  men  on  foot  when 
he  heard  firing. 

As  soon  as  Cassell  had  gotten  into  position,  the  howitzers 
were  opened  upon  the  boats.  Several  shells  burst  near  them 
and  one  penetrated  the  hull  of  the  "  Flag  Ship,"  as  I  suppose  I 
may  term  the  boat  upon  which  the  Captain  commanding  both 
of  them  had  his  quarters,  Cassell's  riflemen,  also  made  them 
selves  "very  disagreeable,  and  after  firing  only  three  shots,  the 
"  fleet "  withdrew.  As  long  as  the  boats  were  in  range  the  "  Bull 
pups  "  kept  after  them  and  they  steamed  up  the  river  and  out 
of  sight.  Having  driven  off  these  gun  boats,  upon  which  I 
knew°the  officer  commanding  in  the  town  chiefly  relied  for  the 
defense  of  the  place,  I  believed  that  I  would  have  no  more 
trouble  and  that  the  garrison  would  surrender  without  more 
fighting.  I  immediately  entered  by  the  principal  street  with 
Companies  B  and  C.  After  these  two  companies  had  gotten  well 
into  the  town  and  in  front  of  the  houses  into  which  the  defend 
ers  of  the  place  had  gone  unseen  by  us,  a  sharp  fire  was  sud 
denly  opened  upon  them,  killing  and  wounding  several.  I  at 
once  ordered  the  men  to  gather  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the 
street,  although  the  fire  came  from  both  sides,  and  to  take  shelter 
as  they  best  could. 

A  fierce  fight  at  once  began.  I  sent  for  Companies  E,  I,  and 
portions  of  L  and  M,  leaving  three  sections  of  each  to  guard  the 
road  in  our  rear.  I  made  the  men  force  their  way  into  the 
houses,  whence  they  were  fired  upon.  Captain  Cassell  came  to 


250 

join  me  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  firing,  but  unfortunately  Lieu 
tenant  Roberts  forgot,  in  his  ardor,  the  order  that  no  men  should 
enter  the  town  mounted,  and  he  dashed  up  to  the  scene  of  the 
fight  with  his  men  on  horseback,  greatly  increasing  the  confusion. 
The  Sergeant,  who  had  charge  of  the  howitzers,  opened  upon 
the  town,  when  he  heard  the  firing,  and  his  shots  did  us  as  much 
harm  as  they  did  the  enemy.  Lieutenant  Roberts  was  killed 
almost  instantly,  two  or  three  men  and  several  horses  of  his 
guard  were  also  shot,  and  the  crowding  of  horses  into  the  street 
added  to  the  disorder.  In  a  few  minutes,  however,  some  method 
was  restored.  Details  of  men  were  posted  in  the  middle  of  the 
street  in  front  of  every  house,  to  fire  at  the  inmates  when  they 
showed  themselves,  and  prevent  them  from  maintaining  an  ac 
curate  and  effective  fire.  Other  details  were  made  to  break  in 
the  doors  of  the  houses  and  enter  them.  The  artillery  was 
brought  into  the  town  and  turned  upon  the  houses  in  which  the 
most  stubborn  resistance  was  kept  up.  Planted  about  ten  paces 
from  a  house,  aimed  to  strike  about  a  yard  below  the  sills  of  the 
windows,  beneath  which  the  defenders  were  crouched  (except 
when  taking  aim),  and  double-shotted  with  grape  and  canister, 
the  howitzers  tore  great  gaps  in  the  walls.  Two  or  three  houses 
from  which  sharp  volleys  were  kept  up  were  set  on  fire.  Flags 
of  truce,  about  this  time,  were  hung  out  from  several  windows, 
and  believing  that  a  general  surrender  was  meant,  I  ordered  the 
fires  to  be  extinguished.  But  only  those  who  shook  the  white 
flags  meant  to  give  up,  and  the  others  continued  to  fight.  One 
or  two  men  putting  out  the  fires  were  shot.  I  immediately 
ordered  that  every  house  from  which  shots  came  should  be 
burned.  A  good  many  were  soon  in  flames,  arid  even  then  the 
fighting  continued  in  some  of  them.  My  men  were  infuriated 
by  what  they  esteemed  bad  faith,  in  a  continuance  of  the  fight 
after  the  flags  of  truce  were  displayed,  and  by  the  loss  of  their 
comrades  and  of  some  favorite  officers.  I  never  saw  them  fight 
with  such  ferocity.  Few  lives  were  spared  in  the  houses  into 
which  they  forced  their  way.  Several  savage  hand-to-hand 


IIAND-TO-HAND   CONTESTS.  251 

fights  occurred.     As  private  James  March,  of  Company  A,  was  * 
about  to  enter  a  house  after  battering  down  the  door  with  the 
butt  of  his  rifle,  a  Home-guard,  armed  with  musket  and  bayonet, 
sprang   out    and   lunged    at   him.     March    avoided   his   thrust, 
knocked  him   down  with  his   clubbed  gun,  and  then  seizing  the 
other's  musket,  pinned  him  to  the  ground  with  the  bayonet.     A 
somewhat,  similar  affair  happened  to  a  private  of  Company  B. 
whose  name  I  have  forgotten.     As  he,  also,  was  forcing  his  way 
into  a  house,  a  strong,  active  fellow  bounded  out  and  cut  at  him 
with  a  large  heavy  knife,  made  from  a  blacksmith's  file,  such  as 
were  formerly  often  seen  in  Kentucky.     He  closed  quickly  with 
his  assailant,  whose   blow  consequently  missed  him,  and  in  a 
moment  they  were  locked  in  each  other's  arms.     The  Home- 
guard  could  not  use  his  knife,  for  his  right  arm  was  stretched 
over  the  other's  shoulder  in  the  position  in  which  it  had  fallen 
with  the  blow.     The  other  wore  one  of  the  largest  sized,  heaviest, 
army  -pistols.     He  had  dropped  his  gun,  and  as  he  drew  his 
pistol,  his  enemy  clasped  the  lock  with  his  left  hand,  and  he 
could  not  cock  it.     Both  were  po\verful  men,  and  fighting  for 
life,  because  quarter  was  not  thought  of  by  either.     At  length 
the   Confederate  raised  the   pistol   to   a  level  with  the  other's 
head,  and  although  he  could  strike  only  by  the  inflection  of  the 
wrist,  inflicted  blows  with  the   heavy  barrel  upon  his  enemy's 
temple,  which  stunned  him.     Then  dashing  him  to  the  ground, 
the  Confederate  beat  in  his  skull  with   the  butt  of  his  pistol. 
The  fighting  lasted  about  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes,  when  Colonel 
Bradford,  the  commander  of  the  organization,  surrendered.     It 
was  with  great  difficulty  that  his  life,  or  the  lives  of  his  men, 
could  be  saved.     Fighting  in  narrow  streets,  close  to  their  op 
ponents,  the  loss  in  my  command  was,  of  course,  severe,  and  a 
great  many  wounds  proved  mortal,  on  account  of  the  balls  com 
ing  from  above,  ranging  downward. 

My  loss  was  twenty-one  killed,  and  eighteen  wounded.  I  had 
about  three  hundred  and  fifty  men  engaged.  Among  the  killed 
were  some  matchless  officers.  Captain  Samuel  D.  Morgan  (a 


252  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

cousin  of  Colonel  Morgan)  killed  several  men  with  his  own  hand 
before  he  fell.  He  had  been  a  good  soldier,  and  gave  promise 
of  unusual  merit  as  an  officer.  His  gallantry  and  devotion  were 
superb,  and  he  was  always  urgent  to  be  placed  on  perilous  ser 
vice.  He  was  a  mere  boy.  Lieutenant  Greenberry  Roberts  had 
been  made  First  Lieutenant  of  Company  A  after  Lieutenant 
Smith's  death.  He  much  resembled  his  predecessor.  He  had 
been  placed  in  command  of  the  advance-guard  when  Lieutenant 
Rogers  was  compelled  to  return  to  his  company  (E)  upon  the 
promotion  of  Captain  Hutchinson.  He  was  nineteen  years  old 
when  killed;  gay,  handsome,  and  a  universal  favorite.  His 
courage  was  untempered  by  any  discretion  or  calculation,  and 
unless  bound  by  positive  instructions,  he  would  go  at  any  thing. 
Lieutenant  Rogers  was  a  model  officer  and  gentleman.  He  was 
killed  while  exerting  himself  to  save  the  inmates  of  a  house1  from 
which  the  shot  which  killed  him  came. 

Lieutenant  King,  a  gallant  boy,  brevet  Second  Lieutenant  of 
Company  E,  fell  dead  the  moment  afterward  across  Rogers' 
body,  and,  a  rather  singular  circumstance,  an  old  man  of  that 
company,  devotedly  attached  to  both  these  officers,  private 
Puckett  (one  of  the  few  old  men  in  the  regiment)  rushed  to 
raise  them  and  was  instantaneously  killed,  falling  upon  them. 
Captain  Kennett,  of  Company  B,  just  made  Captain  in  the  place 
of  Captain  Allen,  who  was  elected  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  Butler's 
regiment,  and  Lieutenant  George  White,  of  the  same  company, 
were  mortally  wounded,  and  died  very  soon.  Both  were  veter 
ans  of  the  old  squadron,  and  very  brave  men. 

Most  of  the  casualties  occurred  in  the  first  few  minutes  of  the 
street  fight,  before  proper  dispositions  were  made  to  reduce  the 
garrisons  of  the  houses,  and  while  the  latter  were  taking  deadly 
aim. 

Captain  Cassell's  bold  attack  on  the  gunboats  saved  us  much 
greater  loss.  Some  of  the  women  came  (while  the  fight  was 
raging)  from  the  part  of  the  town  where  they  had  retired  for 
safety,  to  the  most  dangerous  positions,  and  waited  upon  the 


FALLING   BACK   FROM   AUGUSTA.  253 

wounded,  while  the  balls  were  striking  around  them.  The  ma 
jority  of  the  people  of  this  town,  or  a  large  proportion  at  least, 
were  Southern  sympathizers.  The  regular  members  of  the 
Home-guard  regiment  were  collected  from  the  country  for  miles 
around.  A  number  of  the  Southern  men  were  also  pressed  into 
the  service. 

The  last  house  set  on  fire  was  that  of  James  Armstrong. 
After  the  garrison  in  it  were  disposed  of,  eiforts  were  made  to 
save  it.  The  owner  bade  me  alet  it  burn,"  but  urged  me  to  col 
lect  and  destroy  all  the  arms  of  the  Home-guards,  that  they 
might  not  give  trouble  again.  During  the  fight  a  boat,  coming 
from  Cincinnati,  hove  in  sight  of  the  town,  but  did  not  come  on. 
It  was  reported,  but  incorrectly,  that  she  carried  troops. 

This  fight  prevented  the  excursion  into  Ohio.  All  of  the 
ammunition  for  the  howitzers  was  shot  away.  I  was  anxious  to 
remove  my  wounded  and  dead,  and  had  two  hundred  prisoners 
whom  I  wanted  to  carry  off.  About  four  P.  M.,  employing  all 
the  carriages  and  light  wagons  that  could  find  about  the  town 
and  neighborhood  to  carry  the  wounded,  who  could  stand  trans 
portation,  and  the  dead  bodies,  which  were  not  too  much  mutila 
ted,  I  went  back  toward  Falmouth.  That  night  we  reached 
Brookville  after  dark,  and  passed  the  night  there,  the  gloomiest 
and  saddest  that  any  man  among  us  had  ever  known. 

Brookville  is  a  little  hamlet,  nine  miles  from  Augusta,  and 
eighteen  from  Maysville.  This  latter  place  had  been  taken  by 
Gano,  a  week  or  two  before,  without  a  shot.  He  left  next  day, 
and  the  Union  men  there  became  belligerent,  sent  for  regular 
troops,  collected  Home-guards,  "resolved"  that  they  would 
fight,  bleed,  and  die,  if  they  got  another  chance,  and  distinguished 
themselves  very  much  in  that  way.  News  reached  Maysville  of 
the  fight  at  Augusta  on  the  same  evening  that  it  occurred,  and 
about  four  o'clock  next  morning  troops  left  there  to  march  to 
the  relief  of  Augusta.  At  seven  A.  M.  of  that  morning,  I  sent 
off  the  train  of  dead  and  wounded,  and  all  of  the  prisoners,  ex 
cept  about  eighty,  whom  I  intended  to  parole.  As  soon  as  they 


254  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

were  fairly  started,  I  ordered  Colonel  Hutchinson  to  follow  with 
the  command.  I  retained  Sergeant  Hays  and  ten  men  of  the 
advance-guard  with  me.  Most  of  the  prisoners  left  were  South 
ern  men,  who  had  been  forced  to  fight,  and  a  few  others  were 
men  paroled  at  Armstrong's  request. 

About  9  or  10  A.  M.,  while  engaged  in  writing  out  paroles,  I 
was  informed  by  my  orderly  that  a  force  of  Federals  was  coming 
into  town  on  the  Maysville  pike.  I  had  placed  no  pickets  after 
the  regular  detail  had  been  withdrawn  upon  the  march  of  the 
column,  and  nearly  all  of  the  ten  men  left  with  me  were  in  the 
court-house  at  the  time  by  my  side.  We  immediately  passed 
out  and  mounted  our  horses.  Sargeant  Hays  formed  seven  men 
and  we  dashed  through  the  enemy.  There  were  perhaps  fifty 
or  sixty  cavalry  in  the  town — they  were  scattered  about,  and 
had  no  chance  to  stop  us.  Several  shots  were  fired  upon  both 
sides.  None  of  my  party  were  hurt.  One  of  the  enemy  was 
killed  and  three  seized  by  the  bridle  reins,  as  we  went  through 
them,  and  carried  off  prisoners.  A  few  men  were  still  unparoled 
when  the  alarm  was  given.  Private  Conrade  remained  and  pa 
roled  them  all,  then  followed  us  through  the  enemy.  He  was 
subsequently  promoted  for  other  instances  of  the  coolest  daring. 
A  recruiting  officer  had  been  captured  that  morning  and  placed 
in  charge  of  Privates  Franks  and  McVae.  They  were  eating 
breakfast  when  the  enemy  entered  the  town  and  were  nearly 
captured.  They  placed  their  prisoner  on  a  bare-backed  horse 
and  carried  him  off  across  the  country,  taking  fences  and  every 
thing  else  at  a  gallop. 

We  lost  one  man  taken  prisoner,  he  could  not  get  to  his  horse. 
The  enemy's  force  was  composed  of  the  cavalry  which  first  en 
tered  and  about  four  hundred  infantry,  with  two  pieces  of 
artillery.  After  we  had  gotten  out  of  the  town,  we  turned  arid 
galloped  back  to  it  again,  to  create,  if  possible,  a  diversion  in 
favor  of  the  three  men  I  supposed  to  be  still  there.  The  infantry, 
however,  immediately  drove  us  off.  As  we  then  moved  rapidly 
after  the  command,  we  met  the  rear-guard,  which  always 


BURIAL    OF   LIEUTENANT   ROGERS.  255 

marched  a  good  distance  in  the  rear  of  the  column,  coming  ^back 
at  a  gallop  to  reinforce  us.  The  officer  in  charge  of  it,  one  of 
the  very  best  in  the  regiment — Lieutenant  Ash  Welsh,  had  re 
turned  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  firing.  His  men  and  himself 
were  dressed  in  dark  clothing,  and  I  thought  when  they  first 
came  in  sight,  that  they  were  a  part  of  the  enemy  which  had  cut, 
us  off.  They  also  mistook  us  for  the  enemy,  and  we  charged 
each  other  at  full  speed.  When  within  about  fifty  yards  of  each 
other  and  just  about  to  fire,  a  mutual  recognition  fortunately 
prevented  it. 

Soon  afterward,  I  met  Hutchinson  coming  with  the  command, 
but  I  turned  him  again.  The  enemy  shelled  the  road  after  we 
were  all  gone.  Learning  that  Captain  Castleman  had  fallen 
back  from  Falmouth  (in  anticipation  of  an  advance  from  Walton), 
to  Cyntbiana,  I  went  to  that  place  also.  It  turned  out  that  the 
rumor  of  the  intended  attack  upon  Falmouth  was  altogether  un 
founded.  I  placed  the  command  in  camp  at  Cynthiana,  and 
sent  the  prisoners  and  all  of  the  wounded  who  were  not  too 
much  exhausted  to  travel,  to  Lexington. 

On  the  next  day  the  funeral  of  Lieutenant  Rogers  was  cele 
brated.  He  was  a  native  of  Cynthiana,  and  the  citizens  of  that 
place  had  loved  him  and  were  proud  of  his  record.  They  came, 
the  true,  warm-hearted  yeomanry,  to  witness  his  soldier-burial, 
and  sympathize  in  the  sorrow  of  his  aged  and  heart-broken 
father.  The  men  remained  in  camp  at  Cynthiana  from  the  30th 
of  September  until  the  night  of  the  4th  of  October.  During  that 
time  I  made  several  promotions  which  were  confirmed  by  an  ex 
ercise  of  General  Morgan's  appointing  power. 

Thomas  Franks,  private  in  the  Mississippi  company  and 
"member  in  high  standing"  of  the  advance  guard,  was  made 
Captain  of  Company  I.  He  was  a  worthy  successor  of  Captain 
Morgan.  By  a  series  of  gallant  acts  and  uniform  good  conduct 
and  assiduous  and  thorough  discharge  of  his  duty,  he  had  well 
won  his  preferment.  Brevet  Second  Lieutenant  William  Mes- 
sick  (of  whom  a  great  deal  remains  to  be  said),  was  made  First 


256 

Lieutenant  of  Company  A.  Privates  Parks  and  Ashbrook  were 
made  respectively  First  and  Second  Lieutenants  of  Company  E. 
They  were  gallant,  and  had  fought  in  the  front  of  every  fight 
since  the  organization  of  the  regiment.  Sergeant  Wm.  Hays  was 
offered  his  choice  of  Captaincy  of  Company  B,  or  the  First  Lieu 
tenancy  of  the  same  company,  with  the  privilege  of  commanding 
the  advance-guard.  He  choose  the  latter — like  the  gallant  man 
that  he  was,  loving  danger  honestly  encountered  and  honor 
fairly  won. 

General  Morgan  unhesitatingly  approved  all  of  these  ap 
pointments — complimenting  the  appointees  and  declared  that  he 
had  contemplated  their  promotion  earlier.  In  pure,  unflinching 
courage,  soldierly  desire  for  personal  distinction,  devotion  to 
the  interests  of  the  service,  pride  in  the  reputation  of  their  own 
corps,  respect  for  and  zealous  obedience  to  their  own  commanders, 
energy  and  intelligence — these  officers  had  no  superiors. 

I  have  already  said  that  Colonel  Morgan  had  been  sent  to 
Eastern  Kentucky,  to  intercept  the  Federal  General  Morgan  on 
his  march  to  the  Ohio  river — I  can  not  do  better  than  copy  Ver 
batim  a  description,  given  of  his  operations  by  an  excellent 
writer.  "  Succeeded  in  collecting  about  a  thousand  cavalrymen, 
all  recruits  except  Gano's  Texians,  Company  F,  of  Duke's  reg 
iment,  and  such  of  our  battalion  (Breckinridge's)  as  had  seen 
service — many  insufficiently  armed  and  not  well  organized.  We 
reached  Richmond  on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  and  received  in 
formation  that  the  Federals  were  moving  from  Manchester,  via 
Booneville  to  Mt.  Sterling,  so  as  to  strike  the  Ohio  at  Maysville. 
Morgan  concentrated  at  Irvine  on  the  21st  and  moved  toward 
Proctor,  turned  to  the  right,  and,  the  head  of  his  column  was 
at  Campton,  Wolfe  county.  It  became  necessary  to  make  a 
detour,  and  by  rapid  marches  head  them  near  Hazel  Green. 
Colonel  Ashby  and  General  Stephenson  were  to  press  them  in 
rear ;  General  Humphrey  Marshall  was  to  move  to  Mt.  Ster 
ling,  and  either  stop  their  march  or  strike  them  in  flank.  Our 
part  was  merely  to  delay  them  until  Stephenson  or  Marshall 


MOUNTAIN   CAMPAIGN.  /  257 


could  strike.  The  enemy  beat  us  to  Hazel  Green ;  another  de 
tour  and  night  march  and  we  headed  them  near  West  Liberty. 

"  On  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  Morgan  sent  two  companies 
under  Captain  Will  Jones  to  strike  the  flank  of  the  marching 
column.  He  knew  that  the  column  must  be  stretched  out,  for 
some  miles;  that  a  vigorous  attack  would  cause  the  halt  of  the 
leading  command,  so  that  the  column  might  close ;  this  delay 
would  help  us.  Jones  attacked  on  foot,  striking  the  rear-guard 
of  the  second  advance  brigade,  and  utterly  surprising  them ; 
killed  several,  captured  some  dozen  prisoners,  scattered  a  drove 
of  cattle  through  the  woods,  and  gave  warning  of  our  presence. 
Morgan  and  his  staff  and  Major  Breckinridge  had  ridden  along 
to  see  Jones'  fight,  though  Jones  had  complete  command,  and  is 
entitled  to  the  credit. 

"  After  this  little  brush  was  over,  Morgan  rode  with  some 
others,  to  the  main  road  to  get  some  information.  Doctor  Tom 
Allen  had  the  wounded  (all  Federals)  moved  to  a  church  near 
by,  to  dress  their  wounds.  Morgan,  Breckinridge,  Alston,  and 
others  rode  a  few  hundred  yards  forward  to  where  a  beautiful 
creek  crossed  the  road,  and  beyond  the  creek  was  a  short,  steep, 
wooded  hill.  With  culpable  carelessness  the  whole  party  stop- 
ped  to  water  the  horses,  and  one  or  two  dismounted,  and  kneel 
ing  upon  rocks  were  drinking,  when  suddenly  a  regiment  in  line 
of  battle,  made  its  appearance  upon  the  crest  of  the  hill,  not  a 
hundred  yards  distant,  and  fired  a  full  volley  at  us.  Fortunately 
the  hill  was  so  steep  they  overshot  us.  Beliind  was  a  long 
lane  with  high  fences  and  clearec^  fields  on  each  side.  Death  or 
capture  seemed  inevitable.  But  with  perfect  coolness  Morgan 
shouted.  '  Tell  Colonel  Breckinridge  to  advance;  Major  Jones, 
open  your  guns.'  The  regiment  fell  back  over  the  hill,  and  we 
in  greater  hurry  evacuated  those  premises.  The  country  being 
Union,  it  was  very  difficult  to  get  reliable  information,  which 
General  Morgan  said  must  be  had. 

"While  we  were  talking  we  saw  some  mountaineers  with  guns 
approaching:  Morgan  said  instantly,  'I'll  pass  for  Colonel  De 
17 


/  \ 

258  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Courcey'  (a  Federal  Colonel  about  Morgan's  size).  When  the 
men  came  up  they  asked  who  we  were ;  Alston  said  '  That 's 
Colonel  De  Courcey.'  '  Why,  the  boys  told  us  De  Courcey's 
brigade  was  behind,  and  we  were  mighty  glad  to  see  you.'  It 
had  been  raining,  and  we  had  on  gum  cloths,  which  assisted  the 
•plan.  Morgan  asked,  '  Would  n't  you  like  to  join  us?'  'Oh 
no,'  answered  one  of  the  scoundrels,  '  We  can  do  you  more 
good  at  home,  killing  the  d d  secesh.'  With  a  sweet  ap 
proving  smile,  Morgan  said,  '  Oh,  have  you  killed  many  secesh?  ' 
i  I  reckon  we  have.  You  'd  have  laughed  if  you  had  seen  us 
make  Bill  (I  have  forgotten  the  last  name)  kill  his  brother.' 
'What  did  you  do  it  for?'  '  Why  you  see  Bill  went  South, 
and  we  burned  his  house,  and  he  deserted ;  we  arrested  him,  and 
said  we  were  going  to  hang  him  as  a  spy :  he  said  he  'd  do  any 
thing  if  we  let  him  off,  that  his  family  would  starve  if  we  hung 
him.  Last  Wednesday  we  took  him,  and  made  him  kill  nig 
brother  Jack.  He  didn't  want  to  do  it,  but  we  told  him  we'd 
kill  them  both  if  he  didn't,  and  we  made  him  do  it.' 

"  Morgan  kept  his  face  unchanged,  and  drew  from  these  mur 
derers  full  accounts  of  other  crimes;  and  from  one  of  them, 
who  had  watched  our  column,  a  pretty  fair  account  of  our  own 
strength.  They  gave  us  all  they  knew  of  the  Federal  strength, 
of  the  politics  of  the  citizens  on  the  road,  and  of  the  roads  and 
country.  After  getting  from  them  all  he  wanted,  he  said,  '  I 
am  John  Morgan,  and  I  'm  going  to  have  you  hung.'  Unfor 
tunately,  however,  General  Morgan's  leniency,  which  always 
got  the  better  of  him  when  he%paused  to  think,  induced  him  to 
spare  them." 

The  writer  goes  on — "Upon  the  27th,  another  skirmish,  and 
captured  a  few  prisoners ;  the  enemy  evidently  waiting  for  the 
column  to  close  up.  On  the  28th,  through  the  treachery  of  a 
guide,  we  were  led  into  an  ambush,  out  of  which  we  extricated 
ourselves  with  small  loss.  Upon  the  29th,  Company  A,  Breck- 
inridge's  battalion,  and  Company  F,  Duke's  regiment,  under 
Major  Breckinridge,  ambushed  the  enemy  from  the  side  of  a 


MOUNTAIN    CAMPAIGN.  259 

semicircular  bluff,  around  which  the  road  runs.  The  column 
came  to  within  twenty  yards  of  the  line  of  ambush,  and  its  head 
was  nearly  beyond  the  extreme  flank  of  the  two  companies  ;  in 
advance  Avere  seventeen  cavalrymen,  some  sitting  with  their  legs 
thrown  over  the  pommels  of  the  saddle,  some  eating  pawpaws  ; 
the  insignia  of  rank  upon  their  shoulders  could  be  easily  dis 
tinguished.  Suddenly  over  a  hundred  rifles  belched  forth  death 
and  fire- — again  their  volley  echoed  through  the  mountains  ; 
when  the  smoke  cleared  a'way,  the  head  of  the  column  had  dis 
appeared  like  a  wave  broken  upon  a  rock,  and  before  a  line 
could  be  formed  or  a  gun  unlimbered,  we  were  gone,  and  laughed 
as  we  marched  to  the  music  of  their  guns  shelling  the  innocent 
woods  over  the  mountain  from  us. 

"After  thte  they  changed  their  tactics,  and  marched  with  a 
heavy  line  of  skirmishers  in  front  and  upon  both  flanks.  After 
shelling  the  woods  for  hours,  we  fought  vigorously  with  the  ax 
and  torcji,  felling  trees,  barricading  the  road,  destroying  bridges, 
and  making  every  barricade  cost  a  skirmish  and  time,  for  with 
us  time  was  every  thing.  The  country  was  not  fit  for  cavalry 
operations.  The  30th  passed  away;  the  1st;  of  October  was 
half  gone.  From  the  morning  of  the  26th  to  noon  of  the  1st, 
over  five  days,  the  Federals  had  marched  not  over  thirty  miles, 
less  than  six  miles  a  day.  We  had  done  our  work,  but  where 
was  Marshall  or  Stephenson?  Since  the  morning  of  the  29th, 
we  had  been  anxious'y  looking  for  news  from  them.  Couriers 
had  been  constantly  sent  to  both,  and  to.  General  Smith.  We 
knew  that  the  enemy  were  living  on  meat  alone,  for  we,  in  their 
front,  went  without  bread  for  over  three  days,  living  on  fresh 
beef,  without  salt,  half-ripe  corn,  and  the  luscious  pawpaws.  If 
Marshall  or  Stephenson  had  attacked,  the  army  of  the  gap 
would  have  been  prisoners.  Whoever  was  to  blame,  let  him  be 
censured.  Morgan,  with  raw  recruits,  badly  armed,  accomplished 
his  part  of  the  task.  About  noon,  October  1st,  Morgan  received 
an  order  from  General  Smith  to  withdraw  from  George  Morgan's 
front,  not  to  attempt  further  to  impede  his  progress,  but  rather 


260  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

assist  him  to  leave  the  State,  and  rejoin  the  main  army  at  Lex 
ington,  or  wherever  it  might  be." 

This  writer  tells  well  the  story  of  the  campaign  in  the  moun 
tains,  and  the  reader  can  derive  from  it  a  vivid  idea  of  what  it 
was  like.  Toward  the  latter  part  of  the  expedition,  the  bush 
whackers  became  very  troublesome,  and  wounded  several  men. 
Little  Billy  Peyton,  the  Colonel's  orderly,  once  rode  down  on 
one  of  them  and  tried  to  scare  him  into  surrender  with  an  empty 
pistol.  The  fellow  had  two  guns — he  had  just  fired  one  at  Pey 
ton,  and  the  other  was  loaded.  He  answered  Peyton's  demand 
to  surrender  with  a  shot  from  the  latter.  Throwing  himself 
along  his  horse's  side,  Billy  escaped  being  killed,  but  was 
slightly  wounded.  His  chief  regret,  however,  was  that  his  as 
sailant  escaped.  u 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  Colonel  Morgan  reached  Lex 
ington.  Before  he  got  in,  he  became  satisfied  that  an  immediate 
evacuation  was  imminent,  and  he  was  induced  to  believe  that 
the  enemy  were  nearer  than  was  actually  the  case.  Anxious  to 
get  his  command  together  again,  and  learning  where  I  was,  he, 
with  characteristic  promptitude,  dispatched  me  a  courier,  bidding 
me  keep  a  careful  lookout,  and  if  "  cut  off,  come  by  way  of 
Richmond  and  Lancaster."  He  knew  that  I  would  be  mightily 
exercised  by  such  a  dispatch.  I  had  heard  nothing  of  the 
meditated  evacuation  of  Lexington,  and  without  waiting  for 
orders  from  General  Smith,  I  at  once  moved  with  my  command, 
and  marched  all  night.  When  I  reached  Lexington,  I  found 
that  preparations  were  being  made  for  its  evacuation.  I  hoped, 
as  did  thousands  of  others,  that  it  would  be  only  a  temporary 
one,  and  that  we  could  return  after  a  decisive  victory,  which 
should  give  us  fast  possession  of  Kentucky.  I  mentioned  this 
hope  to  Colonel  Morgan,  and  I  shall  never  forget  his  laugh,  and 
the  bitter  sarcasm  with  which  he  spoke  of  the  retreat,  which  he 
seemed  to  certainly  expect.  As  he  rapidly  mentioned  the  in 
dications  which  convinced  him  that  we  were  going  to  give  up 
the  stakes  without  an  effort  to  win  them,  my  faith,  too,  gave 


BRAGG   MYSTIFIED.  261 

way,  and  my  heart  sank.  He  generously  defended  General 
Bragg,  however,  saying,  that  his  course  was  perfectly  consistent, 
inasmuch  as  he  had  come  into  Kentucky  to  escape  a  fight,  and 
was  now  about  to  go  out  for  the  same  reason,  and  that,  more 
over,  a  commander-in-chief  always  did  well  to  avoid  battle,  no 
matter  what  was  the  spirit  of  his  troops,  when  he  felt  demoral 
ized  himself. 

On  the  6th  of  October,  Colonel  Morgan  left  Lexington  on  the 
track  of  General  Smith's  infantry  forces,  with  Cluke,  Gano  and 
the  Second  Kentucky.  It  was  thought  probable  that  the  enemy 
would  advance  from  the  direction  of  Frankfort,  and  an  engage 
ment  in  the  vicinity  of  Versailles,  where  a  portion  of  General 
Smith's  infantry  were  stationed,  was  anticipated.  Morgan, 
whose  entire  force  amounted  to  some  fifteen  hundred  effective 
men,  was  ordered  to  take  position  between  Versailles  and 
Frankfort,  and  attack  the  enemy  if  he  made  his  appearance. 
The  bulk  of  General  Smith's  command  was  eight  or  ten  miles 
farther  to  the  southwest,  in  the  vicinity  of  Lawrenceburg. 

Breckinridge's  battalion  had  been  detached  on  the  4th,  and 
was  ordered  to  report  first  to  Buford,  then  to  Wharton,  and 
finally  to  Ashby.  It  was  engaged  in  the  skirmishing  which  the 
two  latter  officers  successfully  conducted  with  the  enemy,  on  the 
road  between  Lawrenceburg  and  Harrodsburg,  and  Harrodsburg 
and  Perryville,  The  movements  of  Buell  had  completely  mysti 
fied  General  Bragg,  and  the  latter  was  not  only  .reduced  to  the 
defensive,  but  to  a  state  of  mind  pitiable  in  the  extreme.  He 
acted  like  a  man  whose  nerves  by  some  accident  or  disorder, 
had  been  crazed  ;  he  was  the  victim  of  every  rumor;  he  was  al 
ternately  exhilarated  and  dejected.  If  the  enemy  dallied,  or  the 
distance  between  them  happened  to  be  increased,  he  became  bold 
and  confident ;  when  a  collision  was  imminent,  he  could  contem 
plate  nothing  but  defeat  and  disaster.  Of  that  kind  of  fear 
which  induces  provision  against  dangers  which  are  far  in  the 
future,  he  knew  nothing,  and  he  was  equally  as  ignorant  of  the 
courage  which  kindles  highest  when  the  hour  of  final  issue  has 


262  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

arrived.  General  Bragg,  had,  as  a  subordinate,  no  superior  in 
bravery — lie  lutd,  as  a  commander,  no  bravery  at  all.  \Yliile  I 
shall  make  no  sort  of  comment  upon  General  Bragg's  character 
or  his  conduct,  which  I  do  riot  thoroughly  believe  to  be  correct, 
and  just  and  warranted  by  the  record  and  by  the  circumstances 
of  that  time  and  of  this — I  yet  deem  it  my  duty  to  candidly 
warn  my  readers  to  receive  with  due  allowance  every  line  writ 
ten  about  Bragg  by  a  Kentuckian. 

The  wrongs  he  did  Kentucky  and  Kentuckians,  the  malignity 
with  which  he  bore  down  on  his  Kentucky  troops,  his  hatred  and 
bitter  active  antagonism  to  all  prominent  Kentucky  officers, 
have  made  an  abhorrence  of  him  part  of  a  Kcntuckian's  creed. 
There  is  no  reason  why  any  expression  of  natural  feeling 
toward  him  should  be  now  suppressed — he  is  riot  dead,  nor  a 
prisoner,  nor  an  exile. 

General  Bragg  came  to  the  western  army  with  a  most  enviable 
reputation.  He  had  already  displayed  those  qualities  as  an 
organizer,  a  disciplinarian,  and  a  military  administrator,  in 
w/hich  he  was  unrivaled.  His  dashing  conduct  at  Shiloh,  and 
the  courage  and  ability  (there  exhibited  in  perfection),  in  which 
(as  a  corps  commander),  no  man  excelled  him,  had  made  him  a 
great  arid  universal  favorite.  The  admirable  method  which 
(when  second  in  command  at  Corinth,  and  really  at  the  head  of 
affairs),  he  introduced  into  all  departments;  the  marvelous  skill 
in  discipline,  with  which  he  made  of  the  "  mob"  at  Corinth  a 
splendidly  ordered,  formidable  army,  and  his  masterly  evacuation 
of  the  place  (totally  deceiving  Halleck  in  doing  so),  caused  him 
to  be  regarded,  almost  universally,  as  the  fit  successor  of  Albert 
Sydney  Johnston,  and  the  coming  man  of  the  West. 

The  plan  of  retiring  altogether  from  Mississippi,  and  of  sud 
denly  moving  the  army,  by  the  Southern  railroads,  away  around 
into  Tennessee  again — losing  the  slow,  dull-scented  Halleck — if 
conceived  by  a  subordinate,  was,  at  least,  attributed  to  him.  It 
was  brilliant  in  itself,  and  was  successfully  executed.  Men 
waited,  in  breathless  interest,  the  consummation  of  such  a  career. 


STRICTURES  ON  GENERAL  BRAGG.  263 

But  right  there  he  began  to  fail,  and  soon  he  gave  way  entirely. 
It  is  almost  impossible  now  to  realize  that  the  Bragg  of  the 
spring  and  the  Bragg  of  the  autumn  of  1862,  are  identical. 
When  he  reached  Chattanooga,  he  showed  for  the  first  time  va 
cillation  and  a  disposition  to  delay.  He  crossed  the  river  on  the 
28th  of  August  with  twenty -five  thousand  infantry,  beside  artil 
lery  and  cavalry.  He  moved  over  Waldron's  ridge,  up  the 
Sequatchy  valley,  through  Sparta,  into  Kentucky,  seeking  to 
beat  Buell  to  Munfordsville.  The  disposition  of  BuelFs  forces 
has  already  been  given  in  a  former  chapter.  His  army,  about 
forty  or  forty-five  thousand  strong,  was  scattered  over  a  wide 
extent  of  territory,  in  small  detachments  (with  the  exception  of 
the  forces  at  Battle  creek  and  at  McMinnville — each  about 
twelve  or  fourteen  thousand  strong. 

This  disposition  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  difficulty  of 
obtaining  supplies — it  was  also  requisite  to  a  thorough  garrison 
ing  of  the  country.  Had  General  Bragg,  as  soon  as  he  crossed 
the  river,  marched  straight  on  Nashville,  General  Buell  could 
iot  possibly  have  met  him  with  more  than  twenty  thousand  men. 
General  Buell  did  not  issue  orders  for  the  concentration  of  his 
troops  until  the  30th  of  August,  although  preparations  had  been 
made  for  it  before.  This  concentration  was  effected  at  Mur- 
freesboro'.  It  then  became  apparent  to  him  that  General  Bragg 
was  pushing  for  central  Kentucky,  and  it  became  necessary  that 
Buell,  to  save  his  communication,  should  march  into  Kentucky 
also.  General  Bragg  had  the  start  and  the  short  route,  and 
reached  Glasgow  on  the  13th  of  September;  then  taking  position 
on  the  main  roads  at  Cave  City,  while  Buell,  with  till  the  expi- 
dition  he  could  use,  had  gotten  only  so  far  as  Bowlinggreen,  he 
cut  the  latter  off  from  Louisville  and  the  reinforcements  await 
ing  him  there. 

General  Buell's  army  had  been  decreased  by  the  detachment 
of  a  garrison  for  Nashville.  After  an  unsuccessful  attack  (with 
the  loss  of  two  or  three  hundred  men),  by  a  small  Confederate 
force  upon  Munfordsville — the  garrison  of  that  place,  over  four 


264  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

thousand  strong,  subsequently  surrendered  on  the  17th.  What 
now  was  to  hinder  General  Bragg,  holding  the  strong  position  of 
Munfordsville,  from  stopping  Buell,  calling  Kirby  Smith,  with 
his  whole  force,  to  his  assistance,  and  outnumbering,  crush  his 
adversary?  This  question  has  been  asked  very  often.  How 
long  would  the  raw  troops  at  Louisville  have  withstood  the  attack 
of  Bragg's  veterans  when  their  turn  came?  General  Bragg 
discovered  that  the  country  was  barren  of  supplies — that  one 
of  the  richest,  most  fertile  regions  of  Kentucky,  could  not 
support  his  army  for  a  week,  and  he  withdrew  to  Bardstown. 
Buell  finding  the  road  clear,  marched  on  to  Louisville.  His  im 
mense  wagon  train,  more  than  twenty  miles  long  and  the  flank 
of  his  army  were  exposed,  and  with  impunity  by  this  movement. 

It  was  certainly  not  expecting  too  much  of  General  Bragg,  as 
commander-in-chief  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  Kentucky,  to 
expect  that  he  would  (after  this  was  done)  make  up  his  mind 
whether  he  was  going  to  fight  or  not,  without  farther  delay.  If 
he  did  not  intend  to  fight,  would  it  not  have  been  wiser  to  have 
marched  back  on  Nashville,  while  Buell  was  marching  on  Louis* 
ville,  to  have  taken  that  place  and  to  have  established  himself 
on  the  banks  of  the  Cumberland  with  less  of  loss,  fatigue,  and 
discontent  among  his  troops,  than  existed  when  after  his  long, 
harassing,  wearying  marches  through  the  mountains,  he  halted 
at  Murfreesboro'  much  later?  Kirby  Smith  could  have  re 
mained  in  Kentucky  long  enough  to  collect  and  secure  all  the 
supplies — he  had  demonstrated  that  he  could  take  care  of  him 
self,  and  if  he  had  been  hard-pressed,  he  could  have  retreated 
more  rapidly  than  any  pursuer  could  follow.  If  General  Bragg 
did  intend  to  fight,  why  did  he  not  concentrate  his  army  and 
fight  hard? 

After  Buell  marched  to  Louisville  (which  he  reached  on  the 
29th  of  September),  Bragg  took  position  at  and  about  Bards- 
town.  Our  line,  including  General  Smith's  forces,  may  be  de 
scribed  as  running  from  Bardstown,  on  the  extreme  left,  through 
Frankfort  and  Lexington,  to  Mount  Sterling  on  the  right  flank. 


STRENGTH    OF   BRAGG'S   ARMY.  265 

It  was  an  admirable  one.  However  threatened  on  front  or 
flanks,  the  troops  could  be  marched  to  the  threatened  points,  by 
excellent  roads.  The  base  at  Bryantsville  was  perfectly  secure 
— roads  ran  from  it  in  every  direction — and  it  was  a  place  of 
immense  natural  strength.  The  force  available,  for  the  defense 
of  this  line,  was  quite  forty-nine  thousand  infantry.  General 
Bragg's  staff  officers  represent  the  force  of  infantry  (which 
entered  the  State  with  General  Bragg)  to  have  been  twenty-five 
thousand.  General  Smith's  infantry  forces  (including  Marshall) 
numbered  twenty-four  thousand  [so  estimated  by  General  Smith 
himself].  There  were  perhaps  one  hundred  and  thirty  pieces 
of  artillery  in  all.  The  cavalry,  all  told,  was  about  six  thousand 
strong  (including  Morgan  and  Buford),  making  a  grand  total 
of  about  fifty-six  thousand  men. 

Buell  moved  out  from  Louisville  on  the  1st  of  October.  His 
advance  was  made  just  as  might  have  been  anticipated,  and  as 
many  had  predicted.  Not  caring  to  involve  his  whole  army  in 
the  rough  Chaplin  and  Benson  hills,  he  sent  detachments  toward 
Frankfort  and  Lawrenceburg,  to  guard  against  any  movement 
on  Louisville,  and  to  distract  Bragg's  attention  from  his  (Buell's) 
main  design,  and  make  him  divide  his  army.  In  this  latter  in 
tention  he  perfectly  succeeded.  The  bulk  of  his  army  marched 
through  Bardstown  and  Springfield  to  Perryville,  to  get  in 
Bragg's  rear  and  upon  his  line  of  retreat.  The  force  sent  to 
Frankfort,  five  or  six  thousand  strong,  under  Dumont,  broke  up 
the  inaugural  ceremonies  of  the  Provisional  Government,  which 
General  Bragg,  as  if  in  mockery  of  the  promises  he  had  so 
lavishly  and  so  confidently  made  to  his  own  Government,  and  to 
the  people  of  Kentucky,  and  of  the  hopes  he  had  excited,  had 
instituted.  He  made  one  of  the  first  and  best  men  of  the  State, 
a  man  of  venerable  years  and  character,  held  in  universal  re 
spect  for  a  long  life  of  unblemished  integrity,  beloved  for  his 
kind,  open,  manly  nature,  and  especially  honored  by  the  Southern 
people  of  Kentucky  for  his  devotion  to  the  cause — General 
Bragg  made  this  old  man,  who  had  been  unanimously  indicated 


266 

as  the  proper  man  for  Provisional  Governor  of  Kentucky,  tell 
the  people,  who  crowded  to  listen  to  his  inaugural  address,  that 
the  State  would  be  held  by  the  Confederate  army,  cost  what  it 
might.  At  the  very  time  that  General  Bragg  so  deceived  Gov 
ernor  Hawes,  and  made  him  unwillingly  deceive  his  people,  the 
Confederate  army  had  already  commenced  to  retreat. 

This  force,  which  came  to  Frankfort,  was  the  same  which 
General  Smith  was  prepared  to  fight  at  Versailles,  its  real 
strength  not  being  at  first  known.  A  day  or  two  afterward  it 
came  out  upon  the  Versailles  road,  and  was  ambushed  by  Colo 
nel  John  Scott,  and  driven  back  with  smart  loss.  General 
Smith,  hearing  that  the  enemy  were  advancing  in  force  to  Law- 
renceburg,  and  that  they  had  occupied  that  place  with  an  ad 
vance  guard,  ordered  Buford  to  drive  them  out  with  his  cavalry, 
and  followed  with  his  whole  force.  The  establishment  of  the 
enemy  at  Lawrenceburg,  and  upon  the  road  thence  to  Harrods- 
burg,  would  have  completely  cut  off  General  Smith  from  General 
Bragg.  The  force  advancing  toward  Lawrenceburg,  was  Sill's 
division,  perhaps  six  or  seven  thousand  strong  in  effectives. 
This  division  had  diverged  from  the  main  army  at  the  same 
time  with  Dumont's. 

General  Smith's  forces  were  arranged  at  Lawrenceburg  (which 
was  not  occupied  by  the  enemy)  and  on  the  road  thence  to  Har- 
rodsburo1  on  the  6th.  Sill's  division  fell  back  across  Salt  river 

o 

and  into  the  rugged  Chaplin  hills,  pressed  by  a  portion  of  Gen 
eral  Smith's  infantry,  Colonel  Thomas  Taylor's  brigade  in  ad 
vance.  Several  hundred  prisoners  were  taken.  The  position 
of  General  Smith's  forces  was  not  materially  changed  during 
that  day  and  the  next,  although  they  continued  to  draw  nearer 
to  Harrodsburg.  The  main  body  of  the  enemy  had  in  the  mean 
time  concentrated  its  marching  columns  and  moved  to  the  vicinity 
of  Perryville,  58,000  strong,  on  the  evening  of  the  7th. 

The  detachments  which  advanced  to  Frankfort  and  toward 
Lawrenceburg,  were  not  more  than  12,000  strong  in  all.  So 
rugged  and  difficult  of  passage  is  the  country  through  which 


VACILLATION    OF   BRAGG.  2G7 

these  detachments  had  to  pass,  that  a  comparatively  small  force 
could  have  prevented  their  junction  at  Lawrenceburg  and  held 
both  at  bay,  leaving  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate  army  free  to  con 
centrate  at  Perry ville.  Even  had  their  junction  been  permitted, 
three  thousand  such  cavalry  as  Bragg  had  at  his  disposal  could 
have  retarded  their  march  to  Harrodsburg  for  several  days. 
They  could  not  have  forced  their  way  along  the  road  in  less  than 
two  or  three  days,  and  as  many  would  have  been  required  to 
make  a  detour  and  join  Buell.  In  that  time  the  battle  of  Per- 
ryville  could  have  been  decided.  But  so  completely  was  General 
Bragg  in  the  dark  about  Buell's  movements  that,  when  he  first 
heard  of  the  advance  from  Louisville,  he  supposed  it  was  a  move 
ment  of  the  whole  Federal  army  upon  Frankfort,  and  he  ordered 
General  Polk  "to  move  from  Bardstown,  by  way  of  Bloomfield, 
toward  Frankfort,  to  strike  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear,"  while 
General  Smith  should  take  him  in  front.  This  order  was  evi 
dently  issued  under  an  unaccountable  and  entire  misapprehen 
sion  of  the  true  state  of  affairs,  but  showed  a  nerve  and  purpose 
which  promised  well.  General  Bragg  must  certainly,  when  he 
issued  it,  have  supposed  that  General  Buell's  whole  army  was 
coming  from  that  direction.  How  strange  is  it  that  a  com 
mander  who  could  thus  resolve  to  fight  his  foes,  when  he  believed 
them  to  be  united,  should  fear  to  encounter  them  separately. 
Whatever  may  be  the  verdict  upon  General  Folk's  disobedience 
of  orders,  whether  it  was  one  of  those  cases  in  which  a  subordi 
nate  can  rightfully  exercise  this  discretion  or  not,  the  fact  of 
General  Bragg' s  incompetency  looms  up  in  unmistakable  pro 
portions. 

The  most  remarkable  feature  of  General  Bragg's  conduct  was 
this  strange,  unexampled  vacillation.  There  was  perhaps  never 
afforded  such  an  instance  of  perfect  infirmity  and  flickleness  of 
purpose.  He  had,  there  can  be  little  doubt,  resolved  to  retreat 
without  delivering  battle  before  the  1st  of  October.  He  never 
theless  sought  to  fight  at  Frankfort  (as  has  been  seen)  a  few 
days  afterward.  Again,  immediately  afterward,  he  did  his  best 


268 

to  avoid  battle  when  it  could  have  been  delivered  (as  all  but 
himself  thought)  under  far  more  favorable  circumstances.  No 
one  now  doubts,  I  presume,  that  General  Bragg  fought  at  Per- 
ryville  with  a  fragment  of  his  army,  not  to  win  a  victory,  but  to 
check  the  enemy  and  cover  his  retreat. 

After  General  Polk  moved  to  Perryville,  General  Bragg,  of 
course,  learned  of  the  advance  of  the  enemy  in  that  direction, 
and  must  have  known  that  it  was  in  strong  column,  or  he  would 
not  have  permitted  sixteen  thousand  troops  to  collect  there  to. 
oppose  it.  He  was  still  in  error  regarding  the  other  movements, 
and  left  the  larger  part  of  his  army  to  confront  the  forces  man 
euvering  about  Lawrenceburg  and  Frankfort.  One  glance  at 
the  map  will  show  the  reader  that,  if  the  enemy  was  really  ad 
vancing  in  heavy  columns  by  these  different  routes,  it  was  clearly 
General  Bragg's  best  policy  to  have  struck  and  crushed  (if  he 
could)  that  body  threatening  him  from  the  south.  If  he  crushed 
that  his  line  of  retreat  would  be  safe,  and  he  could  have  fought 
the  other  at  his  leisure,  or  not  at  all,  as  he  chose.  He  could 
have  fought  (if  it  had  continued  to  advance)  at  Bryantsville,  or 
gone  after  and  attacked  it.  If,  on  the  contrary,  he  had  concen 
trated  to  fight  at  Frankfort  or  Lawrenceburg,  defeat,  with  this 
other  force  on  his  line  of  retreat,  would  have  been  ruinous. 
Even  complete  and  decisive  victory  would  have  left  him  still  in 
danger,  having  still  another  army  to  defeat  or  drive  away.  He 
would  have  been,  in  either  case,  between  his  foes,  preventing 
their  junction,  and  in  a  situation  to  strike  them  in  succession ; 
but  in  the  one  case  his  rear  was  safe,  and  in  the  other  it  was 
threatened. 

With  the  true  trimming  instinct,  he  elected  to  take  a  middle 
course  ;  he  divided  his  army,  and  sought  to  meet  both  dangers 
at  the  same  time.  Is  it  saying  too  much  that  he  was  saved 
from  utter  destruction  by  the  heroic  courage,  against  vast  odds, 
of  that  fragment  of  his  army  which  fought  at  Perryville?  It  is 
the  popular  idea  that  a  commander  is  out-generaled  when  he  is 
deceived.  Military  phraseology  can  mystify  the  popular  rnind, 


BRAGG   OUT-GENERALED.  269 

but  it  can  not  eradicate  from  it  this  idea.  Buell  certainly  de 
ceived  Bragg,  and  by  sending  detachments,  numbering  in  all 
not  more  than  twelve  thousand,  through  a  country  from  which  a 
mere  handful  of  men  could  have  prevented  them  from  debouch 
ing,  he  kept  thirty  thousand  men,  the  bulk  of  General  Bragg's 
army,  idle,  and  rendered  them  useless  until  the  game  was  de 
cided.  ? 

After  the  battle  of  Perryville  (where  he  certainly  got  the  bet 
ter  of  the  forces  opposed  to  him — an  earnest  of  what  might 
have  been  done  if  the  whole  army  had  been  concentrated — and 
after  an  accurate  knowledge  had  been  obtained,  of  howr  Sill's 
and  Dumont's  detachments  had  deceived  him  into  the  belief 
that  they  were  the  whole  Federal  army — General  Bragg  had  his 
entire  army  concentrated  at  Harrodsburg,  The  two  armies  then 
fairly  confronted  each  other,  neither  had  any  strategic  experi 
ments  to  fear,  on  flank  or  rear,  for  Sill's  division  was  making  a 
wide  and  prudent  circuit  to  get  to  Buell,  and  Dumont  .was. sta 
tionary  at  Frankfort.  It  would  have  been  a  fair,  square,  stand 
up  fight.  It  is,  now,  well  known  that  there  was  not  the  dispar 
ity  in  numbers  which  General  Bragg  and  his  friends  claimed  to 
have  existed.  There  was  less  numerical  inequality,  between  the 
armies,  than  there  has  been  on  many  battle-fields — where  the 
Confederate  arms  have  been  indisputably  victorious.  BuelPs 
Btrength  was  less  than  at  any  other  period  of  the  eight  or  ten 
days  that  a  battle  was  imminent.  Sill  had  not  gotten  up — the 
Federal  army  was  fifty-eight  thousand  strong- — minus  the  four 
thousand  killed  and  wounded  at  Perryville,  and  the  stragglers. 
Buell  had  in  his  army,  regiments  and  brigades,  of  raw  troops, 
thirty-three  thousand  in  all.  Bragg  had  not  more  than  five 
thousand;  most  of  them  distributed  among  veteran  regiments. 
There  were  no  full  regiments,  nor  even  full  companies  of  re 
cruits  in  Bragg's  army,  except  in  the  Kentucky  cavalry  com 
mands.  The  two  armies  faced  each  other,  not  more  than  three 
miles  apart.  The  belief  was  almost  universal,  in  each  army, 
that  next  morning  we  would  fight.  The  troops  thought  so,  and, 


270  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

despite  the  pouring  rain,  and  their  uncomfortable  bivouacs,  were 
in  high  and  exultant  spirits.  I  know,  for  I  saw  them  late  in 
the  night,  that  some  officers  of  high  rank  confidently  looked  for 
battle,  and  were  cheerful,  and  sanguine  of  victory. 

What  General  Bragg  really  intended  to  do  that  night — perhaps 
he  himself  only  knows — and  it  is  quite  as  probable  that  even  he 
does  not  know.  He  retreated  on  the  next  morning  to  Bryants- 
ville.  There  was  no  undignified  haste  about  this  movement — 
the  troops  moved  off  deliberately,  and  in  such  order,  that  they 
could  have  been  thrown  quickly,  if  it  had  become  necessary, 
into  line  of  battle.  General  Bragg  manifested  no  great  anxiety 
to  get  away  from  the  vicinity  of  his  enemy,  and  Buell  certainly 
manifested  no  strong  desire  to  detain  him. 

On  the  next  day  (the  12th),  the  army  remained  at  Bryants- 
ville,  and  took  up  its  march  for  Lancaster  about  ten  o'clock  of 
that  night.  It  reached  Lancaster  on  the  morning  of  the  13th, 
and  divided.  General  Smith  going  to  Richmond,  and  over  the 
Big  hill,  to  Cumberland  Gap,  General  Bragg  with  the  troops 
which  had  come  into  Kentucky,  under  his  immediate  command, 
passing  through  Crab  Orchard. 

It  was  hoped,  and  thought  probable,  that  Buell  would  over 
take  and  force  Bragg  to  fight  at  Crab  Orchard.  He  did,  indeed, 
come  very  near  doing  so.  Sending  one  division  to  Lancaster, 
he  moved  with  the  bulk  of  his  army  toward  Crab  Orchard.  He 
failed,  however,  to  intercept  Bragg,  and  the  latter  moved  on  out 
of  Kentucky. 

Thus  ended  a  campaign  from  which  so  much  was  expected, 
and  which,  had  it  been  successfnl,  would  have  incalculably  ben 
efited  the  Confederate  cause.  Able  writers  have  exerted  all 
their  skill  in  apologies  for  this  campaign,  but  time  has  developed 
into  a  certainty,  that  opinion  then  instinctively  held  by  so  many, 
that  with  the  failure  to  hold  Kentucky,  our  best  and  last  chance 
to  win  the  war  was  thrown  away. 

Let  the  historian  recall  the  situation,  and  reflect  upon  the  in 
fluences  which  in  the,  then,  condition  of  affairs  were  likely  to 


CRISIS     OF    THE    WAR.  271 

control  the  destinies  at  stake,  and  he  will  declare,  that  with  this 
retreat  the  pall  fell  upon  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy. 

All  the  subsequent  tremendous  struggle,  was  but  the  dying 
agony  of  a  great  cause,  and  a  gallant  people.  At  that  period 
the  veteran  Federal  arrny  of  the  West  was  numerically  much 
inferior  to  what  it  ever  was  again  ;  and  even  after  the  accession 
of  the  recruits  hastily  collected  at  Louisville,  it  was  much  less 
formidable  than  it  subsequently  became. 

The  Confederate  army  was  composed  of  the  veterans  of 
Shiloh,  and  the  soldiers  formed  in  the  ordeal  of  Corinth.  It 
was  as  nearly  equal  to  the  Federal  army,  in  numerical  strength, 
as  there  was  any  chance  of  it  ever  being,  and  the  character  of 
its  material  more  than  made  up  for  any  inequality  in  this  re 
spect.  No  man,  who  saw  it  in  Kentucky,  will  doubt  that  it 
would  have  fought  up  to  its  full  capacity.  Never  was  there  a 
more  fiery  ardor,  a  more  intense  resolution  pervading  an 
army,  than  that  one  felt,  when  expecting  a  battle  which  should 
decide  whether  they  were  to  hold  Kentucky,  or  march  back 
again,  carrying  the  war  once  more  with  them  to  their  homes  and 
firesides.  Not  even  on  the  first  day  of  Shiloh,  when  it  seemed 
that  they  could  have  charged  the  rooted  hills  from  their  bases, 
were  those  troops  in  a  temper  to  make  so  desperate  a  fight. 
But  a  doting  ^Eolus  held  the  keys  which  confined  the  storm.  It 
will  be  difficult  for  any  one  who  will  carefully  study  the  history 
of  this  period,  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  it  was  the  crisis  of 
the  war.  First  let  the  military  situation  be  considered.  While 
at  almost  every  point  of  subordinate  importance  the  Confede 
rates  were  holding  their  own,  they  were  at  those  points,  where 
the  war  assumed  its  grand  proportions,  and  the  issue  was  vital, 
carrying  every  thing  before  them. 

The  Confederate  Government  had  at  length  adopted  the  policy 
of  massing  its  troops,  and  the  effect  was  instantly  seen.  In 
Virginia,  General  Lee's  onset  was  irresistible.  His  army  burst 
from  the  entrenchments  around  Richmond,  like  the  lava  from 
the  volcano,  and  the  host  of  McClellan,  shrank  withered,  from 


272  HISTORY  or  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

its  path.  Driving  McClcllan  to  his  new  base,  and  leaving  him 
to  make  explanations  to  his  soldiery,  "  Uncle  Robert "  fell 
headlong  upon  Pope,  and  Pope  boasted  no  more.  Forcing  the 
immense  Federal  masses  disintegrated  and  demoralized  back  to 
Washington,  General  Lee  crossed  the  Potomac  and  pushed  into 
Maryland.  Jackson  took  Harper's  Ferry,  while  General  Lee 
fought  the  battle  of  Antietam  with  forty  thousand  men,  and 
again  crippled  McClellan. 

Although  the  Confederate  army  recrossed  the  Potomac  on  the 
18th  of  September,  McClellan  did  not  follow,  but  remained  in 
active  and  by  no  means  certain  (as  his  dispatches  show)  that  his 
great  adversary  would  not  return  to  attack  him.  It  was  not 
until  late  in  October,  that  the  Federal  army  again  advanced,  and 
its  march  was  then  slow  and  irresolute.  It  will  be  seen  then, 
that  on  the  17th,  the  day  on  which  Bragg  took  Munfordsville, 
General  Lee  was  fighting  in  Maryland.  Ought  not  General 
Bragg  to  have  risked  a  battle  (with  his  superior  force)  in  Ken 
tucky,  which  (if  successful),  would  have  ruined  the  army  op 
posed  to  him  and  have  laid  the  whole  Northwest  open  to  him, 
unless  McClellan  had  furnished  the  troops  to  oppose  him,  and 
have  placed  himself  at  the  mercy  of  Lee  ? 

General  Bragg  did  not  (of  course)  know,  on  the  17th  of  Sep 
tember,  1862,  that  the  battle  of  Antietam  was  being  fought,  but 
he  knew  that  General  Lee  had  achieved  great  successes,  and 
that  he  was  marching  into  Maryland.  Again,  what  effect  are 
we  at  liberty  to  suppose  that  a  decisive  victory  won  by  General 
Bragg,  at  Pcrryville,  on  the  6th  of  October,  would  have  had 
upon  the  general  result.  General  Buell,  pressed  by  Bragg's 
entire  army,  would  have  had  some  trouble  to  cross  the  Ohio 
river,  after  reaching  Louisville ;  and  the  defense  of  the  Western 
States  would  have  been  then  intrusted  with  many  misgivings  to 
Ms  shattered  army.  Arid  yet  the  West  would  have  been  left 
with  no  other  defense,  unless  the  army  of  the  Potomac  had  (in 
the  event  of  such  a  necessity)  been  weakened  and  endangered, 
that  reinforcements  might  go  to  Buell.  It  may  be  said  that  all 


EFFECT   OF   RETIRING   FROM    KENTUCKY.  273 

this  is  hypothetical.  Of  course  it  is.  But  what  General  ever 
yet  inaugurated  and  conducted  a  campaign,  or  planned  and 
fought  a  battle,  and  banished  such  hypotheses  altogether  from 
his  calculations  ?  Why  then  should  they  be  forbidden  in  the 
criticism  of  campaigns  and  battles  ?  It  is  not  infallibly  certain 
that  General  Bragg  could  have  defeated  Buell.  Nothing  is 
positively  certain  in  a  military  sense,  not  even  the  impregna 
bility  of  a  work  built  by  a  West  Pointer,  and  pronounced  so  by 
a  committee  of  his  classmates.  War  is  a  game  of  various  and 
varying  chances.  What  I  mean  to  urge,  is,  that  General  Bragg 
should,  under  all  the  circumstances,  have,  by  all  the  rules  of  the 
game,  risked  the  chances  of  a  battle.  But  if  there  were  strong 
military  reasons  why  an  effort  should  have  been  made  to  accom 
plish  decisive  results  in  this  campaign,  there  were  other  and 
even  stronger  reasons  for  it,  to  be  found  in  the  political  condi 
tion,  North  and  South.  The  Confederacy,  alarmed  by  the  re 
verses  of  the  winter  and  spring,  had  just  put  forth  tremendous 
and  almost  incredible  efforts,  The  South  had  done  all  that  she 
could  be  made  to  do  by  the  stimulus  of  fear.  Increased,  aye, 
even  sustained  exertion  could  have  been  elicited  from  her  peo 
ple,  only  by  the  intoxication  of  unwonted  and  dazzling  success. 
No  additional  inducement  could  have  been  offered  to  the  sol 
diers,  whom  pride  and  patriotism  had  sent  into  the  field,  to  re 
main  with  their  colors,  but  the  attraction  of  brilliant  victories 
and  popular  campaigns.  No  incentive  could  have  lured  into  the 
ranks  the  young  men  who  had  evaded  the  conscription  and  held 
out  against  the  sentiment  of  their  people,  but  the  prospect  of  a 
speedy  and  successful  termination  of  the  war.  But  there  are 
few  among  those  who  were  acquainted  with  the  people  of  Ten 
nessee,  Alabama,  and  Mississippi,  and  their  temper  at  that  time, 
who  will  not  agree  with  me,  that  a  great  victory  in  Kentucky, 
and  the  prospect  of  holding  the  State,  perhaps  of  crossing  the 
Ohio,  would  have  brought  to  Bragg's  army  more  Tennesseans, 
Alabamians  and  Mississippians,  than  were  ever  gotten  into  the 
Confederate  service,  during  the  remaining  two  years  and  a 
18 


274  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

half  of  the  war.  Such  a  victory  would  have  undoubtedly  added 
more  than  twenty  thousand  Kentuckians  to  the  army,  for  accu 
rate  computation  has  been  made  of  that  many  who  were  ready 
to  enlist,  as  soon  as  Bragg  had  won  his  fight.  Five  thousand 
did  enlist  while  it  was  still  uncertain  whether  the  Confederate 
army  would  remain  in  the  State.  It  is  not  perfectly  certain 
that  more  than  five  thousand  volunteers  were  ever  obtained,  in 
the  same  length  of  time,  in  any  seceded  State.  All  of  these 
men,  too,  followed  the  army  away  from  Kentucky.  Some  of 
General  Bragg's  friends  have  assigned,  as  one  reason,  why  he 
left  Kentucky  without  an  eifort  to  hold  her,  that  he  was  disap 
pointed  in  not  receiving  more  recruits  from  the  State.  It  is 
highly  probable  that  such  was  the  case.  If  an  able  General 
had  marched  into  his  enemy's  territory,  depending  upon  fight 
ing  an  early  and  hardly  contested  battle  against  a  veteran 
army,  with  the  assistance  of  recruits  just  obtained,  and  whom 
he  could  not  have  yet  armed,  his  friends  would  have  concealed 
(if  possible)  his  design,  or  if  unable  to  do  so,  would  have  con 
fessed  it  a  weakness  unworthy  of  their  chief,  for  which  they 
blushed.  But  it  is  not  difficult  to  believe  that  General  Bragg 
entertained  just  such  a  plan..  The  Kentuckians  had  not  the 
confidence  in  the  ultimate  success  of  the  Confederate  cause,  to 
induce  them  to  enlist  in  the  Confederate  service,  risking  every 
thing,  immediately-  sacrificing  much,  as  they  did  so,  when  they 
saw  a  magnificent  Confederate  army  decline  battle  with  a  Federal 
force,  certainly  not  its  superior.  General  Bragg  was  not  only  a 
very  shrewd  judge  of  human  nature,  but  even  he  might  have 
known  that  the  irresolution  and  timidity  he  showed  from  the 
first  day  he  put  foot  in  Kentucky,  was  not  the  way  to  inspire 
confidence  in  any  people — it  certainly  was  the  worst  method  he 
could  have  adopted  to  win  the  people  of  Kentucky. 

And  now,  to  consider  the  effect  which  such  a  Confederate 
success  would  have  in  the  North :  I  do  not  allude  to  the  effect 
it  would  have  had  upon  the  wishes  and  plans  of  President  and 
Cabinet,  upon  the  views  of  the  Congress,  nor  upon  the  arrange- 


SPECULATIONS    ON   THE   SITUATION.  275 

ments  of  politicians  and  the  patch  work  of  their  conventions, 
but  to  the  direction  it  might  have  given  the  popular  mind  and 
the  popular  feeling.  Men  who  were  then  serving  in  the  Con 
federate  army,  know  little,  of  course,  of  the  temper  of  the 
Northern  people,  at  that  time,  but  many  were  impressed  with 
the  idea,  then,  strengthened  by  conversation  with  Northern  men 
since,  that,  if  ever  the  Northern  people  doubted  of  subjugating 
the  South,  it  was  at  that  period. 

Immense  efforts  had  been  made,  immense  sums  had  been  ex 
pended,  immense  armies  had  been  sent  against  them,  and  still 
the  Southern  people  were  unconquered,  defiant,  and  apparently 
stronger  thnn  ever.  Would  it  have  been  possible  to  strengthen 
this  doubt  into  a  conviction  that  the  attempt  to  subdue  the 
Southern  people  was  hopeless,  and  the  war  had  better  be  stopped? 
Volunteering  was  no  longer  filling  the  Federal  armies.  Now, 
if  the  Confederate  arms  had  been  incontestably  triumphant  from 
the  Potomac  to  the  Ohio,  if  Northern  territory  had  been  in  turn 
threatened  with  general  invasion,  and  if  the  option  of  continuing 
a  war,  thus  going  against  them,  or  making  peace,  had  been  sub 
mitted  at  the  critical  moment  to  the  Northern  people,  how  would 
they  have  decided?  Would  they  have  encouraged  their  Gov 
ernment  to  draft  them — or  would  they  have  forced  the  Govern 
ment  to  make  peace  ?  The  matter  was,  at  any  rate,  sufficiently 
doubtful  to  make  it  worth  while  to  try  the  experiment.  When 
that  scare  passed  off,  it  is  the  firm  conviction  of  more  than  one 
man  who  "  saw  the  war  out "  that  the  last  chance  of  Confederate 
independence  passed  away. 

The  Northern  people  then  learned,  for  the  first  time,  their 
real  strength ;  they  found  that  bounties,  and  the  draft,  and  the 
freedmen,  and  importations  from  the  recruiting  markets  of  the 
whole  world,  would  keep  their  armies  full,  and  nothing  could 
have  made  them  despond  again.  The  war  then  became  merely 
--a  comparison  of  national  resources.  Something  was  undoubtedly 
gained  by  the  march  into  Kentucky,  but  how  little  in  compari 
son  with  the  golden  opportunity  which  was  thrown  away.  Had 


276  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

the  combatants  been  equally  matched,  the  result  of  this  cam 
paign  might  have  been  a  matter  for  congratuation ;  but  when 
the  Confederacy  was  compelled,  in  order  to  cope  with  its  for 
midable  antagonist,  to  deal  mortal  blows  in  every  encounter,  or 
come  out  of  each  one  the  loser,  the  prisoners,  artillery,  and 
small  arms  taken,  the  recovery  of  Cumberland  Gap  and  a  por 
tion  of  Tennessee,  and  the  supplies  secured  for  the  army, 
scarcely  repaid  for  the  loss  of  prestige  to  Confederate  general 
ship,  and  the  renewal  of  confidence  in  the  war  party  of  the 
North. 

When  Bragg  moved  out  of  Kentucky,  he  left  behind  him,  un 
crippled,  a  Federal  army  which  soon  (having  become  more  for 
midable  than  ever  before)  bore  down  upon  him  in  Tennessee. 
The  inquest  of  history  will  cause  a  verdict  to  be  rendered,  that 
the  Confederacy  "  came  to  its  death  "  from  too  much  technical 
science.  It  is  singular,  too,  that  the  maxims  which  were  al 
ways  on  the  lips  of  the  military  savants,  were  often  neglected 
by  themselves  and  applied  by  the  unlettered  "  irregulars."  The 
academic  magnates  declared  in  sonorous  phrase  that  struck  ad 
miration  into  the  very  popular  marrow,  the  propriety  of  a  Gen 
eral  "marching  by  interior  lines,  and  striking  the  fragments  of 
his  enemy's  forces  with  the  masses  of  his  own ;"  while  Forrest, 
perhaps,  after  doing  that  very  thing,  would  make  it  appear  a 
very  ordinary  performance,  by  describing  it  as  "  taking  the  short 
cut,  and  getting  there  first  with  the  most  men." 

It  was  a  great  misfortune  to  the  Confederacy,  too,  that  Fabius 
ever  lived,  or,  at  least,  that  his  strategy  ever  became  famous. 
Every  Confederate  General  who  retreated,  when  he  might  have 
fought  successfully,  and  who  failed  to  improve  an  opportunity 
to  punish  the  enemy,  had  only  to  compare  his  policy  to  that  of 
Fabius,  and  criticism  was  silenced.  Perhaps,  if  history  had 
preserved  the  reports  of  Hannibal,  the  "  Fabian  policy  "  would 
not  have  become  so  reputable.  At  any  rate,  it  is  safe  to  as 
sume  that,  had  Rome  been  situated  on  the  same  side  of  the 
Mediterranean  as  Carthage,  and  had  she  been  a  seceded  state, 


FABIAN   POLICY.  277 

inferior  in  wealth,  numbers,  and  resources,  which  the  latter  was 
trying  to  "  coerce,"  Fabius  would  have  been  a  most  injudicious 
selection  as  commander-in-chief.  Historians  are  agreed,  I  be 
lieve,  that  if  the  advice  of  this  classic  "  Micawber,"  to  the  con 
suls  Livius  and  Nero,  had  been  followed  by  them,  the  battle  of 
"  The  Metaurus"  would  not  have  been  fought,  the  two  sons  of  the 
"  Thunder-bolt "  would  have  effected  their  junction,  and  would, 
in  all  probability,  have  forced  the  legions  to  another  and  final 
"  change  of  base." 

This  campaign  demonstrated  conclusively  the  immense  im 
portance  to  the  Confederacy  of  the  possession  of  East  Ten 
nessee,  and  the  strategic  advantage  (especially  for  offenso-de- 
fensive  operations)  which  that  vast  natural  fortress  afforded  us. 
While  that  region  was  firmly  in  the  Confederate  grasp,  one  half 
of  the  South  was  safe,  and  the  conquests  of  the  Federal  armies 
of  the  rest  were  insecure.  It  is  apparent  at  a  glance  that  so 
long  as  we  held  it,  communication  between  the  armies  of  North 
ern  Virginia  and  of  Tennessee  would  be  rapid  and  direct ;  co 
operation,  therefore,  between  them  would  be  secure  whenever 
necessary.  While  these  two  armies  could  thus  practically  be 
handled  almost  as  if  they  were  one  and  the  same,  communication 
between  the  Federal  army  of  the  Potomac  and  that  of  the  Ohio 
was  circuitous,  dilatory,  and  public.  No  advance  of  the  enemy 
through  Tennessee  into  Georgia  or  Alabama  could  permanently 
endanger  the  integrity  of  the  Confederate  territory,  while  the 
flank  and  rear  of  his  army  was  constantly  exposed  to  sudden 
attack  by  formidable  forces  poured  upon  it  from  this  citadel  of 
the  Confederacy. 

Not  only  would  the  safety  of  invading  armies  be  compromised, 
and  their  communications  (even  if  confined  to  the  Tennessee 
rivers),  be  liable  at  any  time  to  be  destroyed,  but  a  sudden  irrup 
tion  from  East  Tennessee  might  (unless  an  army  was  always 
ready  to  meet  it),  place  the  most  fertile  portions  of  Kentucky, 
perhaps,  even  a  portion  of  the  territory  of  Ohio,  in  the  hands  of 
the  Confederates.  The  success  clearlv  attending  the  Con- 


278  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

federate  strategy  in  the  first  part  of  this  campaign,  would  seem, 
too,  to  establish  the  fact,  that,  until  the  concentration  for  decisive 
battle  becomes  necessary,  an  army  may  (under  certain  circum 
stances),  be  moved  in  two  or  more  columns,  upon  lines  entirely 
independent  of  each  other,  and  even  widely  apart,  but  which  lead 
to  a  common  goal — and  its  operations  will  be  more  efficient — 
than  if  it  be  marched  en  masse,  by  one  route. 

The  advantages  to  be  derived  from  such  a  disposition  (as  re 
gards  freedom,  and  rapidity  of  movement,  and  facility  of  obtain 
ing  supplies),  are  at  once  apparent,  but  certain  strategic 
advantages  besides,  may,  in  some  cases,  be  thus  secured.  To 
attempt  it,  in  moving  against  a  strong  enemy,  already  posted  at 
the  objective  point,  would  be  to  give  him  the  opportunity  of  at 
tacking  and  crushing  the  columns  separately.  But  when,  as 
was  the  case  in  this  campaign  of  General  Bragg,  two  armies 
make  a  race  for  the  occupation  of  a  certain  territory  which  is 
to  be  fought  for,  the  army  which  is  divided,  while  on  the  march, 
if  the  columns  are  all  kept  on  the  same  flank  of  the  enemy,  can 
be  worked  most  actively  and  as  safely.  More  can  be  accom 
plished  by  such  a  disposition  of  forces,  in  the  partial  engage 
ments  and  lighter  work  of  the  campaign,  and  the  morale  of  the 
troops  will  be  all  the  better  when  the  detachments  are  again 
combined.  Such  campaigns  might  be  made  more  frequently 
than  they  are,  and  with  success. 

When  the  army  was  concentrated  at  Harrodsburg,  on  the 
night  of  the  10th  of  October,  Colonel  Morgan  was  ordered  to 
take  position  about  six  miles  from  the  town,  on  the  Danville 
pike,  and  picket  the  extreme  left  flank.  Desirous  of  ascertain 
ing  what  was  before  him — as  he  could  see  the  camp-fires  of  the 
enemy  stretching  in  a  great  semi-circle,  in  front  of  Harrodsburg 
— Colonel  Morgan  during  the  night,  sent  Captain  Cassell  to  recon- 
noiter  the  ground  in  his  front.  The  night  was  rainy  arid  very 
dark.  The  position  of  both  armies,  of  the  main  body  of  each, 
at  least,  was  distinctly  marked  by  the  long  lines  of  fires  which 
glared  through  the  gloom,  but  we  had  not  lighted  fires,  and 


CAVALRY   SKIRMISHING.  279 

Morgan  thought  that  any  body  of  the  enemy  which  might  be 
confronting  him,  and  detailed  upon  similar  duty,  would  exercise 
the  same  prudence.  Cassell  returned  about  daylight,  and  reported 
that  he  had  discovered,  exactly  in  front  of  our  position,  and 
about  a  mile  and  a  quarter  from  it,  a  small  body  of  cavalry  on 
picket,  and  a  few  hundred  yards  to  their  rear,  a  forco  of 
infantry,  perhaps  of  one  regiment.  He  stated  positively,  also, 
that  one  piece  of  artillery  had  passed  along  a  narrow  lane,  which 
connected  the  point  where  the  cavalry  was  stationed  with  the 
position  of  the  infantry.  The  intense  darkness  prevented  his 
seeing  the  tracks  made  by  the  wheels,  but  he  had  satisfied  him 
self,  by  feeling,  that,  from  the  width  of  the  tire,  and  the  depth 
to  which  the  wheels  had  sunk  into  the  soft  earth,  they  could 
only  have  been  made  by  artillery.  This  report  was  verified  on 
the  next  day,  in  every  particular. 

Colonel  Morgan,  at  an  early  hour,  attacked  the  cavalry,  with 
a  portion  of  his  command,  drove  them  back  to  the  point  indi 
cated  by  Captain  Cassell,  as  that  one  where  he  had  seen  the 
infantry,  and  sure  enough,  as  he  rode  down  upon  it,  he  received 
a  volley  from  a  regiment  of  infantry  posted  behind  a  stone  fence, 
and  was  opened  upon  by  a  single  piece  of  artillery.  The  perfect 
accuracy  with  which  Captain  Cassell,  under  circumstances  pecu 
liarly  unfavorable,  noted  every  detail  of  the  enemy's  strength, 
position,  etc.,  elicited  the  admiration  of  all  of  his  comrades, 
and  among  them,  were  perhaps,  as  shrewd,  practiced,  and  daring 
scouts  as  ever  lived. 

About  1  or  2  P.  M.,  learning  that  General  Bragg  was  falling 
back  to  Bryantsville,  Colonel  Morgan  sent  pickets  to  Harrods- 
burg  ;  these  soon  sent  word  that  the  enemy  had  entered  that 
place.  About  the  same  time  our  scouts  brought  us  informatiou 
that  the  enemy  were  in  Danville  also — about  four  miles  from 
our  position.  Having  an  enemy,  now,  upon  three  sides  of  him, 
and  finding  that  General  Bragg's  rear  was  unmolested,  Colonel 
Morgan  concluded,  in  the  absence  of  instructions  to  fall  back 
also.  He  accordingly  struck  across  the  country  to  Shakcrto>vn. 


280  HISTORY  OF  .MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

reaching  that  place,  about  4  p.  M.  Colonel  Morgan  had  always 
respected  the  peaceful  and  hospitable  "  Shakers,"  and  had  af 
forded  them,  whenever  it  became  necessary,  protection,  strictly 
forbidding  all  members  of  his  command  to  trespass  upon  them 
in  any  way.  We  were  consequently  great  favorites  in  Shaker- 
town,  and  on  this  occasion  derived  great  benefit  from  the  per 
fect  rectitude  of  conduct  which  we  had  always  observed — "  in 
that  part  of  the  country."  The  entire  community  resolved  it 
self  into  a  culinary  committee,  and  cooked  the  most  magnifi 
cent  meal  for  the  command..  It  was  with  deep  regret  that  we 
tore  ourselves  away  on  the  next  morning. 

Colonel  Morgan  received  orders,  on  the  12th,  to  proceed  to 
Nicholasville  and  remain  there  until  the  next  day.  On  the  13th 
we  follow  the  army  and  reached  Lancaster  about  mid-day.  In 
the  afternoon  the  enemy,  with  whom  General  Wheeler  had  been 
skirmishing  all  day,  advanced  upon  Lancaster,  arid  opened  upon 
the  troops,  collected  about  the  place,  with  artillery.  A  little 
sharpshooting  was  also  done  upon  both  sides.  Two  guns  be 
longing  to  Rain's  brigade  of  infantry,  which  was  General  Smith's 
rear-guard,  were  brought  back  and  replied  to  the  enemy's  fire. 
One  man  of  this  section  killed,  was  the  only  loss  sustained  upon 
our  side.  The  cannonading  was  kept  up  until  dark.  We  held 
the  town  during  the  night.  Only  one  division  of  Buell's  army 
(as  has  already  been  stated),  was  sent  to  Lancaster. 

On  the  morning  of  the  14th,  we  moved  slowly  away  from 
Lancaster,  our  command  forming  (with  Colonel  Ashby's)  the  ex 
treme  rear-guard  of  General  Smith's  corps.  We  were  not  at 
all  pressed  by  the  enemy,  and  on  the  15th  halted  at  Gum  Springs 
twenty-five  miles  from  Richmond.  Colonel  Morgan  obtained 
permission  from  General  Smith  to  select  his  own  •'  line  of  re 
treat  from  Kentucky,  with  the  understanding,  however,  that  he 
should  protect  the  rear  of  the  infantry  uutil  all  danger  was 
manifestly  over.  He  represented  to  General  Smith  that  he  could 
feed  his  men  and  horses,  and  have  them  in  good  condition  at  the 
end  of  the  retreat,  by  taking  a  different  route  from  that  pursued 


ANOTHER  RAID  CONTEMPLATED.  281 

by  the  army,  which  would  consume  every  thing.  He  explained, 
moreover,  how  in  the  route  he  proposed  to  take,  he  would  cross 
Buell's  rear,  taking  prisoners,  capturing  trains,  and  seriously 
annoying  the  enemy,  and  that  establishing  himself  in  the  vicin 
ity  of  Gallatin  again,  he  could,  before  he  was  driven  away,  so 
tear  up  the  railroad,  once  more,  as  to  greatly  retard  the  concen 
tration  of  the  Federal  army  at  Nashville.  It  was  perfectly  ap 
parent  to  General  Smith,  that  all  this  could  be  done,  and  that, 
when  Morgen  reached  the  portion  of  Tennessee  which  he  indi 
cated,  he  would  be  in  exactly  the  proper  position  to  guard  one 
flank  of  the  line,  which  Bragg's  army  would  probably  establish. 
He  accorded  him,  therefore,  the  desired  permission,  and  on  the 
17th,  when  the  infantry  had  gotten  beyond  Big  Hill  and  were 
more  than  thirty  miles  from  an  enemy,  Colonel  Morgan  turned 
over  to  Colonel  Ashby  the  care  of  "the  rear"  and  prepared  to 
leave  Kentucky  in  his  own  way.  Colonel  Ashby  had  proven 
himself  -competent  to  the  successful  discharge  of  even  more 
important  duty. 

Colonel  Morgan's  force  consisted  at  this  time,  counting  troops 
actually  with  him,  of  the  Second  Kentucky  (with  the  exception 
of  one  company),  Gano's  regiment  (the  Third  Kentucky),  and 
Breckinridge's  battalion  which  had  rejoined  us  at  Lancaster — 
in  all  about  eighteen  hundred  men.  Cluke's  arid  Chenault's 
regiments  had  gone  with  General  Smith.  The  time  and  situa 
tion  were  both  propitious  to  such  an  expedition  as  he  contem 
plated.  No  such  dash  was  looked  for  by  the  enemy  who  be 
lieved  that  every  Confederate  was  anxious  to  get  away  as  rap 
idly  as  possible  by  the  shortest  route.  The  interior  of  Ken 
tucky  and  the  route  Morgan  proposed  to  take  were  clear  of 
Federal  troops,  excepting  detachments  not  strong  enough  or 
sufficiently  enterprising  to  give  him  much  cause  for  apprehen 
sion. 


HISTORY    OF   MORGAN  S    CAVALRY, 


CHAPTER    XI. 


ON  the  17th  of  October,  Colonel  Morgan  marched  from  Gum 
Springs  in  the  direction  of  Lexington.  The  command  was  put 
in  motion  about  1  P.  M.  Gano  and  Breckinridge  were  sent  to 
the  Richmond  pike,  by  which  it  was  intended  that  they  should 
approach  the  town,  and  full  instructions  regarding  the  time  and 
manner  of  attack,  were  given  them.  Information  had  been  re 
ceived  that  a  body  of  Federal  cavalry  had  occupied  Lexington 
a  day  or  two  previously,  and  Lieutenant  Tom  Quirk  had  been 
sent  to  ascertain  some  thing  about  them ;  he  returned  on  the 
evening  of  the  17th,  bringing  accurate  information  of  the 
strength  and  position  of  the  enemy.  Colonel  Morgan  accompa 
nied  my  regiment  (the  Second  Kentucky),  which  crossed  the 
river  below  Clay's  ferry,  and  moved  by  country  roads  toward 
Lexington. 

The  immediate  region  was  not  familiar  to  any  man  in  the 
regiment,  nor  to  Morgan  himself,  and,  as  it  was  strongly 
Union,  some  difficulty  was  at  first  anticipated  about  getting 
guides  or  information  regarding  the  routes.  This  was  obviated 
by  Colonel  Morgan's  address.  It  was  quite  dark  by  the  time 
the  column  was  fairly  across  the  river,  and  he  rode  to  the  nearest 
house,  where,  representing  himself  as  Colonel  Frank  Woolford, 
of  the  Federal  service,  a  great  favorite  in  that  neigborhood,  he 
expressed  his  wish  to  procure  a  guide  to  Lexington.  The  man 
of  the  house  declared  his  joy  at  seeing  Colonel  Woolford,  and 
expressed  his  perfect  willingness  to  act  as  guide  himself.  His 
loyal  spirit  was  warmly  applauded,  and  his  offer  cordially 
accepted.  Under  his  guidance  we  threaded  the  country  safely? 
and  reached  the  Tates-creek  pike,  at  a  point  about  ten  miles 
from  Lexington,  a  little  after  mid-night.  About  two  o'clock  we  had 


FOUKT1I   OHIO   CAVALRY   AGAIN.  283 

gotten  within  three  miles  of  the  town,  and  were  not  much  more 
than  a  mile  from  the  enemy's  encampment.  We  halted  here,  for, 
in  accordance  with  the  plan  previously  arranged,  a  simultaneous 
attack  was  to  be  made  just  at  day-light,  and  Ga.no  and  Breckin- 
riclge  had  been  instructed  to  that  e fleet. 

The  guide,  now,  for  the  first  time,  learned  the  mistake 
under  which  he  had  been  laboring,  and  his  amazement  was  only 
equaled  by  his  horror.  All  during  the  night  he  had  been  say 
ing  many  hard  things  (to  "Woolford  as  he  thought),  about  Mor 
gan,  at  which  the  so-called  Woolford  had  seemed  greatly 
amused,  and  had  encouraged  him  to  indulge  himself  in  that  way. 
All  at  once,  the  merry,  good-humored  "  Woolford "  turned  out 
to  be  Morgan,  and  Morgan,  seemed  for  a  few  moments,  to  be  in 
a  temper  which  made  the  guide's  flesh  creep.  He  expected  to 
be  shot,  and  scalped  perhaps,  without  delay.  Soon  finding, 
however,  that  he  was  not  going  to  be  hurt,  he  grew  bolder,  and 
actually  Assumed  the  offensive.  "General  Morgan,"  he  said,  "I 
hope  you  wont  take  my  horse  under  the  circumstances,  although 
I  did  make  this  here  little  mistake  ?"  He  was  turned  loose, 
horse  and  all,  after  having  been  strongly  advised  to  be  careful 
in  future  how  he  confided  in  soldiers. 

The  force  encamped  near  Lexington,  which  we  were  about  to 
attack,  was  the  Fourth  Ohio  cavalry — our  old  friends.  The  main 
body  was  at  Ashland,  about  two  miles  from  the  town,  encamped 
in  the  eastern  extremity  of  the  woods,  in  which  the  Clay  mansion 
stands,  on  the  southern  side  of  the  Richmond  pike.  One  or  two 
companies  were  in  town,  quartered  at  the  court-house.  As  day 
light  approached,  I  put  my  regiment  in  motion  again,  detaching 
two  companies  to  enter  the  town,  under  command  of  Captain 
Cassell,  and  capture  the  provost-guard,  and  to  also  picket  the 
road  toward  Paris.  Two  other  companies,  under  Captain  Bowles, 
were  sent  to  take  position  on  the  Richmond  pike,  at  a  point  be 
tween  the  town  and  the  camp,  and  about  equidistant  from  them. 
This  detachment  was  intended  to  intercept  the  enemy  if  they 
attempted  to  retreat  from  Ashland  to  the  town  before  we  could 


284  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

surround  the  encampment,  also  to  maintain  communication  be 
tween  the  detachment  sent  into  town  and  the  bulk  of  the  regi 
ment,  in  the  event  of  our  having  to  engage  other  forces  than 
those  we  had  bargained  for. 

Quirk  had  furnished  very  full  and  positive  information,  as  has 
already  been  mentioned,  but  he  had  also  stated  that  the  Federal 
General  Granger  was  at  Paris  (eighteen  miles  from  Lexington) 
and  it  was  not  impossible  that  he  might  have  been  marching  to 
Lexington  within  the  past  fifteen  hours.  Colonel  Morgan 
instructed  me  to  move  with  the  remainder  of  my  regiment,  upon 
the  enemy's  encampment.  Just  as  we  entered  the  woods,  and 
were  within  some  five  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy,  a  smart 
firing  was  heard  upon  the  Richmond  pike.  It  turned  out  to  be  a 
volley  let  off  at  a  picket,  whom  Gano  had  failed  to  capture,  and 
who  ran  into  the  camp.  We  thought,  however,  that  the  fight 
had  begun,  and  instantly  advanced  at  a  gallop.  In  accordance 
with  the  plan  previously  arranged,  Breckinridge  was  to  attack 
on  foot,  and  Gano  was  to  support  him,  mounted,  keeping  his 
column  on  the  pike.  Breckinridge  was  in  line  and  advancing 
(when  this  firing  occurred),  directly  upon  the  enemy's  front,  and 
he  opened  fire  just  as  my  men  formed  in  column  of  platoons? 
carne  charging  upon  the  rear.  I  was  upon  elavated  ground, 
about  one  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy's  position  on  one  side ; 
Breckinridge  was  about  the  same  distance  off  on  the  other  side, 
and  the  enemy  were  in  a  slight  depression  between  us.  Conse 
quently.  I  got  the  benefit  of  Breckinridge's  fire — in  great  part 
at  least.  I  saw  a  great  cloud  of  white  smoke  suddenly  puff  out 
and  rise  like  a  wall  pierced  by  flashes  of  flame,  and  the  next 
instant  the  balls  came  whizzing  through  my  column,  fortunately 
killing  no  one.  This  volley  settled  the  enemy  and  repulsed  me! 

Not  caring  to  fight  both  Yankees  and  Rebels,  I  wheeled  and 
took  position  further  back,  contenting  myself  with  catching  the 
stragglers  who  sought  to  escape.  Breckinridge,  however,  did 
not  enjoy  his  double  triumph  long.  The  howitzers  had  been 
sent  to  take  position  on  the  right  of  the  enemy — to  be  used 


A   CHAPTER   OF    ACCIDENTS. 


285 


only  in  case  of  a  stubborn  resistance ;  they  happened,  on  that 
occasion,  to  be  under  command  of  Sergeant,  afterward  First 
Lieutenant  Corbett,  a  capital  officer,  but  one  constitutionally 
unable  to  avoid  taking  part  in  every  fight  that  he  was  in  hearing 
.of.  About  the  time  that  Breckinridge's  men  were  taking  victo 
rious  possession  of  the  encampment,  Corbett  opened  upon  it, 
and  shelled  them  away.  The  chapter  of  accidents  was  not  yet 
concluded.  While  my  regiment  was  watching  a  lot  of  prisoners, 
and  was  drawn  up  in  line  parallel  to  the  pike,  the  men  sitting 
carelessly  on  their  horses,  it  was  suddenly  and  unaccountably 
fired  into  by  Gano's,  which  moved  down  and  confronted  it. 
Again,  and  this  time  almost  miraculously,  we  escaped  without  loss. 
Unfortunately,  however,  one  prisoner  was  shot.  Colonel  Mor 
gan  rushed  in  front  of  the  prisoners,  and  narrowly  escaped  being 
killed  in  trying  to  stop  the  firing.  His  coat  was  pierced  by  sev 
eral  balls. 

The  Second  Kentucky  began  to  think  that  their  friends  were 
tired   of  them,  and  were  plotting  to  put  them  cut  of  the  way. 
Gano's  men  stated,  however,  that  shots  were  first  fired  at  them 
from  some  quarter.     My  Adjutant,  Captain  Pat  Thorpe,  as  gal 
lant  a  man  as  ever  breathed,  came  to  me  after  this  affair  was 
over,  with  a  serious  complaint  against  Gano.     Thorpe  always 
dressed  with  some  taste,  and  great  brilliancy,  and  on  this  occa 
sion  he  was  wearing  a  beautiful  Zouave  jacket,  thickly  studded, 
upon  the  sleeves,  with  red  coral  buttons.     He  justly  believed 
that  every  man  in  the  brigade  was  well  acquainted  with  that 
jacket.     He  stated  with  considerable   heat   that,  while  he  was 
standing  in  front   of  the  regiment   calling,  gesticulating,  and 
trying  in  every  way  to  stop  the  firing,  Colonel   Gano,  "  an  of 
ficer  for  whom  he  entertained  the  most  profound  respect   and 
the  warmest  friendship,"  had  deliberately  shot  twice  at  him.     I 
bade  him  not  to  think  hard  of  it — that  it  was  barely  light  at  the 
time,  and  that,  of  course,  Gano  did  not  know  him.     "  Ah,  Col 
onel,"  he  answered,  "I  held  up  my  arms  full  in  his  sight,  and 
although  he  might  not  have  recognized  my  face,  he  couldn't 


28 G  HISTORY  OP  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

have  failed  to  know  these  buttons."  Just  before  this  occurred, 
Major  Wash  Morgan  was  mortally  wounded  by  the  last  shot  fired 
by  the  enemy.  The  man  who  hit  him,  was  galloping  toward 
town,  and  fired  when  within  a  few  paces  of  him.  This  man  was 
killed  by  one  of  the  Second  Kentucky,  immediately  afterward. 
All  of  the  enemy  who  made  their  escape  from  the  camp  were 
intercepted  by  Bowles.  The  provost-guard  made  some  show  of 
fight,  but  were  soon  induced  to  surrender.  Our  force  was  too 
superior,  and  our  attack,  on  all  sides,  too  sudden,  for  much  re 
sistance  to  be  offered,  either  at  the  camp  or  in  the  town.  Be 
tween  five  and  six  hundred  prisoners  were  taken,  very  few  were 
killed  or  wounded.  The  most  valuable  capture  was  of  army 
Colt's  pistols,  of  which  a  large  supply  was  obtained.  Our  horses 
were  so  much  better  than  those  which  were  captured,  that  few 
of  the  latter  were  carried  off.  Such  of  the  men  who  had  not 
good  saddles,  and  blankets,  provided  themselves  with  both,  in 
the  camp. 

Lexington  was  thrown  by  this  aifair  into  a  state  of  extreme 
excitement  and  equal  bewilderment;  no  one  could  exactly  un 
derstand  what  it  meant.  The  Union  people  feared,  and  our 
people  hoped  that  it  portended  the  return  of  the  Confederate 
arm}-.  There  lived  (and  still  lives)  in  Lexington,  an  old  gen 
tleman,  who  was  Union  and  loyal  in  his  politics,  but  who,  to 
use  his  own  expression,  "never  saw  any  use  in  quarreling  with 
either  side  which  held  the  town."  His  kindness  and  benevo 
lence  made  him  very  popular  with  people  of  both  sides.  As 
Colonel  Morgan  rode  into  town,  this  old  gentleman  stopped 
him,  arid  said,  with  the  strong  lisp  which  those  who  know  him 
can  supply,  "  Well,  John,  you  are  a  curious  fellow  !  How  'are 
Kirby  Smith  and  Gracie?  Well,  John,  when  we  don't  look 
for  you,  it's  the  very  time  you  come." 

The  previous  evening,  the  loyal  people  had  decorated  their 
houses  with  flags  and  many  pretty  ornaments,  in  honor  of  the 
arrival  of  the  Federal  troops;  and  had  met  them  as  gayly  ;is 
the  mythological  young  women  used  to  dance  before  Bacchus. 


IN   A   TIGHT   PLACE.  287 

On  the  morning  of  the  18th,  all  of  these  symbols  of  joy  were 
taken  in.  The  Southern  people,  in  their  turn,  were  jubilant — 
"  which  they  afterward  wished  they  had  n't." 

Resuming  our  march  at  1  p.  M.,  on  that  day,  the  brigade 
passed  through  Versailles,  and  went  into  camp  at  Shryock's 
ferry.  Gano  and  Breckinridge  crossed  the  river  and  encamped 
on  the  southern  side ;  my  regiment  remained  on  the  other  side. 
About  1  o'clock  at  night  we  were  awakened  by  the  bursting  of 
two  or  three  shells  in  my  camp.  Dumont  had  learned  that  we 
had  passed  through  Versailles,  and  had  started  out  in  pursuit. 
He  sent  his  cavalry  on  the  road  which  we  had  taken,  and 
pressed  his  infantry  out  from  Frankfort  to  Lawrenceburg. 
Shryock's  ferry  is  four  miles  from  Lawrenceburg;  the  country 
between  the  two  points  is  very  broken  and  difficult  of  passage. 

Had  every  thing  been  kept  quiet  until  the  infantry  had  occu 
pied  Lawrenceburg,  our  situation  would  have  been  critical  in 
deed.  .With  this  disposition  in  our  front,  and  the  road  closed 
behind  us,  we  would  have  been  forced  to  take  across  the  coun 
try,  and  that  would  have  been  something  like  climbing  over  the 
houses  to  get  out  of  a  street.  Colonel  Morgan  had  hesitated  to 
halt  there  in  the  first  instance,  and  was  induced  to  do  so  only  by 
the  fatigue  of  men  and  horses  after  a  march  of  over  si&ty  miles,  and 
the  knowledge  that  no  fit  ground  for  camping  was  within  some 
miles.  It  was  a  generous  act  of  the  officer,  who  came  in  our 
rear,  to  shell  us,  and  it  saved  us  a  vast  deal  of  trouble,  if  nothing 
worse.  He  had  not  even  disturbed  our  pickets,  but  turning  off 
of  the  road,  planted  his  guns  on  the  high  cliff  which  overlooks 
the  ferry  on  that  side,  and  sent  us  an  intimation  that  we  had 
better  leave.  Colonel  Morgan  comprehended  his  danger  at 
once,  and  as  he  sprang  to  his  feet,  instructed  one  of  the  little 
orderlies,  who  always  slept  near  him,  to  gallop  to  Colonel  Gano 
and  Major  Breckinridge,  and  direct  them  to  move  at  once  to 
Lawrenceburg ;  the  one,  who  formed  first,  taking  the  front,  and 
picketing  and  holding  the  road  to  Frankfort,  as  soon  as  the 
town  was  reached.  The  boys,  who  were  his  orderlies,  were  in- 


288  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

telligent  little  fellows,  well  known,  and  it  was  our  habit  to  obey 
orders  brought  by  them,  as  promptly  as  if  delivered  by  a  staff 
officer.  The  officers  to  whom  the  orders  were  sent,  were  the 
promptest  of  men,  and  although  my  regiment  formed  rapidly, 
the  others  were  marching  by  the  time  that  it  was  ready  to 
move.  The  howitzers  were  sent  across  the  river  first  (fortu 
nately  it  was  shallow  fording  at  that  season),  and  the  regiment 
immediately  followed.  The  pickets  on  the  road  to  Versailles 
were  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  regiment  was  fairly  across,  and 
the  officer  in  charge  of  them  was  instructed  to  make  a  rear-guard 
of  his  detail.  The  entire  brigade  was  hurrying  to  Lawrenceburg, 
in  less  than  twenty  minutes  after  the  first  shell  awakened  us. 
We  reached  Lawrenceburg  a  little  after  2  o'clock,  and  passed 
through  without  halting,  taking  the  Bloomfield  road.  I  have 
heard  since,  but  do  not  know  if  it  be  true,  that  General  Dumont 
reached  Lawrenceburg  about  half  an  hour  after  our  rear-guard 
quitted  it.  Marching  on  steadily  until  12  or  1  o'clock  of  the 
next  day,  we  reached  Bloomfield,  a  little  place  whose  every 
citizen  was  a  warm  friend  of  "  Morgan's  men."  They  met  us 
with  the  utmost  kindness,  and  at  once  provided  supplies  of  forage 
and  provisions.  We  halted  only  about  an  hour  to  enjoy  their 
hospitality,  and  then  moved  on  toward  Bardstown. 

Colonel  Morgan,  at  this  time,  received  information  that  there 
was  at  Bardstown  a  force  of  infantry  strong  enough  to  give  a 
good  deal  of  trouble,  if  they  chose  to  ensconce  themselves  in  the 
houses.  They  were  stationed  there  to  protect  sick  and  wounded 
men,  and  hospital  stores.  As  there  was  nothing  in  prospect  of 
their  capture  to  repay  for  the  delay,  and  probable  loss  it  would 
cost,  he  determined  to  make  a  circuit  around  the  town.  This 
was  done,  the  column  moving  within  about  a  mile  of  the  town 
(the  pickets  having  been  previously  driven  in),  and  crossing  the 
Louisville  road,  two  miles  from  the  town. 

We  encamped  that  night  not  far  from  the  Elizabethtown  road, 
and  some  five  or  six  miles  from  Bardstown.  During  the  night 
Lieutenant  Sales,  with  Company  E,  of  the  2d  Kentucky,  was 


STORES   CAPTURED.  .  289 

sent  some  miles  down  the  Louisville  road,  and  captured  one 
hundred  and  fifty  wagons,  the  escort  and  many  stragglers.  The 
wagons  were  laden  with  supplies  for  Buell's  army.  They  were 
burned,  with  the  exception  of  two  sutlers'  wagons,  which  Sales 
brought  in  next  morning.  These  wagons  contained  every  thing 
to  gladden  a  rebel's  heart,  from  cavalry  boots  to  ginger-bread. 
The  brigade  moved  again  at  10  A.  M.,  the  next  day,  the  20th. 
and  reached  Elizabethtown  that  evening.  Here  the  prisoners 
picked  up  around  Bardstown,  and  upon  the  march,  who  had  not 
been  paroled  during  the  day,  were  given  their  free  papers.  The 
command  went  into  camp  on  the  Litchfield  road,  two  miles  from 
Elizabethtown.  About  8  o'clock  of  the  next  morning  a  train 
of  cars  came  down  the  railroad,  and  troops  were  disembarked 
from  them.  A  culvert,  three  miles  from  town,  had  been  burned 
the  ni^ht  before,  in  anticipation  of  such  a  visit,  and  the  train 
necessarily  stopped  at  that  spot.  Our  pickets  were  stationed 
there,  antl  the  troops  were  furnished  a  lively  greeting  as  they 
got  off  of  the  cars.  After  a  good  deal  of  fussing  with  the 
pickets,  these  troops  entered  the  town  about  5  A.  M.,  and  at  6 
A.  M.,  we  moved  off  on  the  Litchfield  road. 

The  brigade  encamped  at  Litchfield  on  the  night  of  the  21st,. 
and  on  the  next  day  "crossed  Green  river  at  Morganton  and 
Woodbury,  almost  in  the  face  of  the  garrison  of  Bowlinggreen, 
"  who  pretended  to  try  to  catch  us,  and  who  would  have  been 
very  much  grieved  if  they  had,"  as  has  been  truthfully  written. 
My  regiment  was  in  the  rear  on  the  morning  of  the  23d,  when 
we  marched  away  from  Morganton,  and  I  placed  it  in  ambush 
on  the  western  side  of  the  road,  upon  which  the  enemy  were 
"figuring,"  for  they  could  not  be  said  to  be  advancing. 

The  road  which  the  rest  of  the  brigade  had  taken  ran  at  right 
angles  to  this  one,  and  my  left  flank  rested  upon  it.  To  my 
astonishment,  about  half  an  hour  afterward,  the  enemy,  also, 
went  into  ambush  on  the  same  side  of  the  road,  and  a  few  hun- 
died  yards  from  the  right  of  my  line.  After  they  had  gotten 
snug  and  warm,  I  moved  off  quietly  after  the  column,  leaving 
19 


290 

them  "  still  vigilant."  We  crossed  Mud  river  that  night  at  Ro 
chester,  on  a  bridge  constructed  of  three  flat  boats,  laid  endwise, 
tightly  bound  together,  and  propped,  where  the  water  was  deep, 
by  beams  passing  under  the  bottoms  of  each  one  and  resting 
on  the  end  of  the  next ;  each  receiving  this  sort  of  support  they 
mutually  braced  each  other.  A  planking,  some  five  feet  wide,  was 
then  laid,  and  the  horses,  wagons,  and  artillery  were  crossed 
without  trouble.  The  bridge  was  built  in  about  two  hours. 

On  the  24th  we  reached  Greenville  ;  that  night  a  tremendous 
snow  fell — tremendous,  at  least,  for  the  latitude  and  season. 
After  crossing  Mud  river,  there  was  no  longer  cause  for  appre 
hension,  and  we  marched  leisurely.  Colonel  Morgan  had  found 
the  country  through  which  he  had  just  passed  filled,  as  he  had 
expected,  with  detachments  which  he  could  master  or  evade, 
and  with  trains  which  it  was  pleasant  and  profitable  to  catch. 
He  and  his  followers  felt  that  they  had  acquitted  themselves 
well,  and  had  wittingly  left  nothing  undone.  If  there*  was  any 
thing  which  they  could  have  "  gone  for  "  and  had  not  "  gone  for," 
they  did  not  know  it.  A  very  strong  disposition  was  felt,  there 
fore,  to  halt  for  a  few  days  at  Hopkinsville,  situated  in  a  rich 
and  beautiful  country,  the  people  of  which  were  nearly  all  friendly 
to  us.  We  knew  that  we  would  receive  a  hospitality  which  our 
mouths  watered  to  think  of.  Colonel  Morgan  felt  the  more  in 
clined  to  humor  his  command  in  this  wish,  because  he  himself 
:fully  appreciated  how  agreeable  as  well  as  beneficial  this  rest 
would  be. 

Before  commencing  the  long  and  rapid  march  from  Gum 
Spring  to  Hopkinsville,  we  had  all  been  engaged  in  very  ardu 
ous  and  constant  service.  This  last  mentioned  march  was  by 
no  means  an  easy  one,  and  both  men  and  horses  began  to  show 
that  fatigue  was  telling  upon  them.  Many  of  the  men  were 
then  comparatively  young  soldiers,  and  were  not  able  to  endure 
fatigue,  want  of  sleep,  and  exposure,  as  they  could  do  subse 
quently,  when  they  had  become  as  hardy  and  untiring  as  wild 
beasts.  On  this  march  I  saw  more  ingenious  culinary  expedi- 


CULINARY   EXPEDIENTS.  291 

cnts  devised  than  I  had  ever  witnessed  before.  Soldiers,  it  is 
well  known,  never  have  any  trouble  about  cooking  meat ;  they  can 
broil  it  on  the  coals,  or,  fixing  it  on  a  forked  stick,  roast  it  be 
fore  a  camp  fire  with  perfect  ease.  So,  no  matter  whether  the 
meat  issued  them  be  bacon,  or  beef,  or  pork  freshly  slaughtered, 
they  can  speedily  prepare  it.  An  old  campaigner  will  always 
contend  that  meat  cooked  in  this  way  is  the  most  palatable. 
Indeed  it  is  hard  to  conceive  of  how  to  impart  a  more  delicious 
flavor  to  fresh  beef  than,  after  a  hard  day's  ride,  by  broiling  it 
on  a  long  stick  before  the  right  kind  of  a  fire,  taking  care  to  pin 
pieces  of  fat  upon  it  to  make  gravy  ;  then  with  pepper  and  salt, 
which  can  be  easily  carried,  a  magnificent  meal  can  be  made,  if 
enough  is  issued  to  keep  a  man  cooking  and  eating  half  the 
night.  Four  or  five  pounds  of  fresh  beef,  thus  prepared,  will 
be  mightily  relished  by  a  hungry  man,  but  as  it  is  easily  digested 
he  will  soon  become  hungry  again.  It  is  the  bread  about  which 
there  is  the  trouble.  Cavalry,  doing  such  service  as  Morgan's 
did,  can  not  carry  hard  tack  about  with  them  very  well,  nor  was 
bread  ready  cooked  generally  found  in  any  neighborhood  (south 
of  the  Ohio)  in  sufficient  quantities  to  supply  a  brigade  of  sol 
diers.  Houses  were  not  always  conveniently  near  to  the  camps 
where  they  could  have  bread  cooked,  and  as  they  would  have  it, 
or  would  not  do  without  it  many  days  in  succession,  they  were 
thrown  upon  their  own  resources,  and  compelled  to  make  it 
themselves,  notwithstanding  their  lack  of  proper  utensils.  I  had 
often  seen  bread  baked  upon  a  flat  rock,  or  a  board,  or  by 
twisting  it  around  a  ramrod  or  stick,  and  holding  it  to  the  fire, 
but  one  method  of  baking  corn  bread  was  practiced  successfully 
upon  this  march  which  I  had  never  witnessed  before.  It  was 
invented,  I  believe,  in  Breckinridge's  battalion.  The  men  would 
take  meal  dough  and  fit  it  into  a  corn-shuck,  tying  the  shucks 
tightly.  It  would  then  be  placed  among  the  hot  embers,  and  in 
a  short  time  would  come  out  beautifully  browned.  This  method 
was  something  like  the  Old  Virginia  way  of  making  "  ash  cake/' 
but  was  far  preferable,  and  the  bread  so  made  was  much  sweeter. 


292  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

The  trouble  of  making  up  bread  (without  a  tray)  was  very  readily 
gotten  over.  Every  man  carried  an  oil-cloth  (as  they  were 
issued  to  all  of  the  Federal  cavalry),  and  wheaten  bread  was 
made  up  on  one  of  these.  Corn  meal  was  worked  up  into  dough 
in  the  half  of  a  pumpkin,  thoroughly  scooped  out.  When  we 
were  in  a  country  where  meat,  meal,  and  flour  were  readily  ob 
tained,  and  we  were  not  compelled  to  march  at  night,  but  could 
go  regularly  into  camp,  we  never  had  trouble  in  feeding  the 
men,  although  on  our  long  marches  and  raids  we  never  carried 
cooking  utensils. 

At  Hopkinsville,  Colonel  Woodward  came  to  see  Morgan;  his 
command  was  encamped  not  far  off.  He  had  been  doing  excel 
lent  service  in  this  section  of  the  State  for  several  months,  and 
Colonel  Morgan  was  very  anxious  to  have  him  attached  to  his 
brigade.  We  remained  at  Hopkinsville  three  days,  and  then  re 
sumed  our  march. 

At  "  Camp  Coleman  "  we  were  the  guests  of  Woodward's  reg 
iment,  and  their  friends,  in  that  neighborhood,  brought  in  whole 
wagon  loads  of  provisions,  ready  cooked — hams,  turkeys,  saddles- 
of-mutton  were  too  common  to  excite  remark — we  realized  that 
we  were  returning  to  u  Dixie,"  and  were  not  far  off  from  Sumner 
county,  Tennessee.  We  reached  Springfield,  Robertson  county, 
Tennessee,  on  the  1st  or  2nd  of  November. 

We  remained  here  two  days.  During  this  stay,  a  printing 
press,  type,  etc.,  having  been  found  in  the  town,  the  "  Vidette" 
made  its  appearance  again.  A  full  account  of  the  Kentucky 
campaign  was  published,  telling  what  everybody  did,  and  hint 
ing  what  was  going  to  be  done  next  time.  Prentice  and  Horace 
Greely  were  properly  reprimanded,  and  the  "London  Times" 
was  commended  and  encouraged.  A  heavy  mail  had  been  cap 
tured,  on  the  march  through  Kentucky,  containing  many  letters 
denunciatory  of  Buell — all  these  were  published.  We  were 
glad  to  do  any  thing  which  might  push  out  of  the  way,  the  man 
we  thought  the  ablest  General  in  the  Federal  service. 

While  at  Springfield,  Gano's  regiment  was  increased  by  the 


BREACH    OF   DISCIPLINE.  293 

accessions  of  two  full  companies  under  Captains  Dorch  arid 
Page.  Captain  Walter  McLean,  of  Logan  county,  Kentucky, 
also  joined  us  with  some  thirty  or  forty  men.  This  fragment 
was  consolidated  with  Company  B,  of  the  Second  Kentucky,  and 
McLean  was  made  Captain.  He  was  junior  Captain  of  the  reg 
iment  until  Lieutenant  Ralph  Sheldon  was  promoted  to  the  Cap 
taincy  of  Company  C,  vice  Captain  Bowles  promoted  to  the 
Majority,  after  Major  Morgan's  death. 

On  the  4th  of  November,  we  arrived  at  Gallatin,  and  were  re 
ceived  by  our  friends  there  with  the  warmest  welcome.  We 
had  been  absent  two  months  and  a  half,  and  we  were  now  to 
perform  the  same  work  to  retard  the  return  of  the  Federal  army 
into  Tennessee,  as  we  had  previously  done  to  embarrass  its 
march  into  Kentucky.  While  at  Hopkinsville,  Colonel  Gano 
had  been  sent  with  his  regiment  to  destroy  the  railroad  between 
Louisville  and  Nashville,  and  also  on  the  Russellville  branch. 
The  bridges  over  Whippoorwill  and  Elk  Fork,  and  the  bridge 
between  Russellville  and  Bowlinggreen,  three  miles  and  a  half 
from  Russellville,  were  burned.  Captain  Garth  of  Woodward's 
command  joined  Gano  and  was  of  great  assistance  to  him. 
Some  portion  of  the  road  between  Bowlinggreen  and  Gallatin 
was  destroyed.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hutchinson  burned  the 
trestle  near  Springfield,  and  the  two  long  trestles  between 
Springfield  and  Clarksville  which  finished  the  work  on  that  end 
of  the  road.  On  the  31st  the  trestle  at  the  ridge,  and  the 
three  small  bridges  between  the  ridge  and  Goodletsville  were  de 
stroyed.  So  it  will  be  seen  that  the  road  was  scarcely  in  run 
ning  condition  when  Morgan  got  through  with  it.  I  have  thus 
far  neglected  to  mention  a  circumstance,  which  should  by  no 
means  be  omitted  from  the  narration  of  this  period  of  Morgan's 
history. 

A  courier  came  from  General  Smith,  while  we  were  at  Lex 
ington,  on  the  18th  of  October,  countermanding  his  permission 
previously  given  Colonel  Morgan  to  go  out  of  Kentucky  by  the 
Western  route,  on  account  of  an  order  received  from  General 


294 

Bragg  instructing  him  to  send  Morgan  to  guard  the  salt  works 
in  Virginia.  General  Smith  regretted  it,  but  he  ordered  Col 
onel  Morgan  to  proceed  at  once  to  that  point.  A  staff  officer 
who  saw  the  order  before  the  courier  could  deliver  it  to  Colonel 
Morgan,  pocketed  it  and  dismissed  the  courier.  The  officer  rea 
soned  that  the  salt  works  were  in  no  danger,  that  if  they  were, 
it  was  Marshall's  peculiar  province  to  guard  them.  That  it  was 
more  important  to  operate  upon  the  railroads,  in  front  of  Nash 
ville,  than  to  look  after  salt  works,  and  that  therefore  it  was  bet 
ter  not  to  mention  the  matter. 

Whether  it  was  General  Bragg's  intention  or  not,  it  is  certain 
that  if  we  had  gotten  into  Western  Virginia,  at  that  time,  there 
would  have  been  an  end  to  all  enterprise  upon  our  part  and  no 
more  reputation  would  have  been  won  by  us.  We  got  there  soon 
enough  as  it  was.  No  evil  consequences  followed  this  breach 
of  discipline.  The  salt  works  were  undisturbed  until  a  much 
later  period. 

Colonel  Morgan  captured  nearly  five  hundred  prisoners  after 
he  left  Lexington.  The  railroads  were  destroyed,  as  I  have  re 
lated,  and  when  he  reached  Gallatin,  he  was  in  a  position  to 
picket  the  right  flank  of  Bragg's  army,  then  slowly  creeping 
around  to  Murfreesboro'. 

When  we  left  Hartsville  the  previous  summer,  a  regiment  was 
organizing  there  for  Morgan's  brigade,  composed  principally  of 
men  from  Sumner  county.  This  regiment,  the  Ninth  Tennessee 
cavalry,  became  subsequently  one  of  the  very  best  in  Morgan's 
command,  and  won  a  high  reputation,  but  it  met  with  many  mis 
haps  in  the  process  of  organization.  It  had  few  arms,  and  the 
enemy  would  come  sometimes  and  "practice"  on  it.  It  was 
several  times  chased  all  over  that  country.  When  we  reached 
Gallatin,  this  regiment  joined  the  brigade;  it  was  still  in  an  in 
choate  state,  but  it  was  anxious  to  revenge  the  trouble  it  had  been 
occasioned.  It  was  organized  with  James  Bennett  as  Colonel, 
W.  W.  Ward,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  and  R.  A.  Alston,  formerly 
Morgan's  Adjutant  General,  as  Major.  The  senior  captain — 


ANECDOTE   OF   DICK  MCCANN.  295 

the  famous  Dick  McCann — was  scouting  around  Nashville,  hold 
ing  high  carnival,  and  behaving  himself  much  as  Morgan  had 
formerly  done  on  the  same  ground. 

Captain  McCann  had  served  for  some  time  in  infantry,  but 
found  it  too  slow  for  him.  He  accompanied  our  command  in  our 
first  raid  into  Kentucky,  and  served  with  distinction  as  a  volun 
teer  in  our  advance-guard,  in  the  operations  around  Gallatin,  of 
the  summer  of  1862.  It  would  be  impossible  to  recount  all  of  his 
numerous  adventures.  He  kept  himself  so  busy  prowling  around 
night  and  day,  and  so  rarely  permitted  an  enemy  to  venture  be 
yond  the  fortifications  of  Nashville,  without  some  token  of  his 
thoughtful  attention,  that,  in  all  probability  he  could  not  remem 
ber  his  own  history.  Just  before  we  arrived  at  Gallatin,  how 
ever,  his  useful  (if  not  innocent),  existence  had  come  very  near 
being  terminated.  He  had  gone  on  a  scout  one  night  with  two 
men,  and  Dr.  Robert  Williams  (who  frequently  accompanied  him 
upon  those  "  visits,"  as  he  used  to  term  his  raids  around  Nash 
ville,  "to  the  scenes  of  his  happy  childhood),"  also  went  with 
him.  Not  far  from  the  city,  they  came  upon  a  picket  stand,  and 
McCann  sent  his  two  men  around  to  get  between  the  two  out 
post  videttes  and  the  base,  intending  then  to  charge  down  on 
them,  with  the  Doctor,  and  capture  them,  as  he  had  taken  many 
such  before.  The  moon  was  shining  brightly,  and,  as  he  stole 
closer  than  was  prudent  upon  the  videttes,  they  discovered  him 
and  fired.  One  ball  struck  him  upon  the  brass  buckle  of  his  sa 
ber  belt,  which  happened  to  be  stout  enough  to  save  his  life  by 
glancing  the  ball,  but  the  blow  brought  him  from  his  horse  and 
convinced  him  that  a  mortal  wound  was  inflicted. 

"Dick."  said  the  Doctor,  "  are  you  hurt?"  "  Yes,"  groaned 
Dick,  "  killed — deader  than  a  corpse — shot  right  through  the 
bowels — Quick,  Bob — pass  me  the  bottle  before  I  die." 

Although  the  men  had  been  accustomed  to  look  forward  to 
the  time  of  their  arrival  at  Gallatin,  as  a  period  when  they  would 
enjoy  profound  rest,  they  were  not  long  left  quiet  after  quitting 
there.  General  John  C.  Breckinridge  had  just  gotten  to  Mur- 


296  HISTORY 

freesboro'  with  a  small  force.  He  was  desirous  of  impressing 
the  enemy  at  Nashville  with  an  exaggerated  idea  of  his  strength, 
so  that  the  army  of  Buell  (or  of  Rosecrans  it  was  then),  might 
not  be  in  any  too  great  haste  to  drive  him  away  from  Murfrees- 
boro',  when  it  reached  Nashville.  General  Bragg  was  limping 
on  so  slowly,  that  it  was  by  no  means  certain  that  a  swinging 
march  would  not  put  the  enemy  in  possession  of  the  whole  of 
Middle  Tennessee  (with  scarcely  a  skirmish),  and  shut  Bragg 
up  in  East  Tennessee.  With  the  instinct,  too,  which  he  felt  in 
common  with  all  men  who  are  born  generals,  Breckinridge 
wished  to  press  upon  the  enemy  and  strike  him  if  he  discovered 
a  vulnerable  point. 

He  learned  that  a  large  lot  of  rolling-stock  (of  the  Louisville 
and  Nashville  Railroad),  had  been  collected  in  Edgefield.  There 
were,  perhaps,  three  hundred  cars  in  all.  If  these  were  burned, 
the  damage  done  the  enemy,  and  the  delay  occasioned  him, 
would  be  very  great.  The  cars  were  collected  at  a  locality  com 
manded  by  the  batteries  on  the  Capitol  hill,  and  so  near  the 
river,  that  all  the  forces  in  the  city  could  be  readily  used  to  pro-, 
tect  them.  Breckinridge  depended  upon  Morgan  to  burn  them, 
but  planned  a  diversion  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  which  he 
hoped  would  attract  the  enemy's  attention  strongly,  and  long 
enough,  to  enable  Morgan  to  do  his  work. 

The  day  after  we  arrived  at  Gallatin,  a  dispatch  was  received 
from  General  Breckinridge,  communicating  his  plan.  Forrest 
was  to  move  on  the  south-eastern  side  of  Nashville,  supported 
by  the  Kentucky  infantry  brigade,  and  Morgan  was  instructed 
to  dash  into  Edgefield  and  burn  the  cars,  while  Forrest  was 
making  all  the  racket  he  could.  There  was  one  flaw  in  this 
plan,  which  no  one  perceived  until  all  was  over.  Morgan  could 
not  hope  to  succeed,  unless,  by  moving  all  night,  he  got  close 
enough  to  Edgefield,  to  dash  in  early  in  the  morning,  before  his 
presence  was  even  suspected.  If  he  marched  in  the  day  time, 
or  remained  after  daylight  in  the  vicinity  of  the  place,  his 
presence  would  certainly  be  discovered,  and  preparations  would 


ATTACK  ON  TRAIN  AT  EDGEFIELD.  297 

be  made  to  receive  him.  But  if  he  attacked  at  daylight,  he 
scarcely  allowed  time  for  the  troops  on  the  other  side  to  com 
mence  their  work,  or  at  any  rate,  was  likely  to  attack  simulta 
neously  with  them;  when  their  attack,  rousing  every  thing, 
would,  perhaps,  do  more  harm  than  good.  It  so  turned  out. 

Our  brigade  moved  all  night  (of  the  5th),  and  striking 
through  the  woods  came  upon  the  northern  side  of  Edgefield. 
Just  as  we  struck  the  pickets,  we  heard  Forrest's  guns  on  the 
other  side  of  the  river.  The  Second  Kentucky  was  in  advance, 
and  as  the  head  of  the  column  was  struggling  over  a  very 
rough  place  in  the  railroad,  it  was  opened  upon  by  a  company 
of  infantry  pickets,  who  came  out  from  behind  a  small  house, 
about  sixty  yards  off.  I  never  saw  men  fight  better  than  these 
fellows  did.  They  were  forty  or  fifty  strong,  and  had  to  re 
treat  about  half  a  mile,  to  reach  their  lines.  The  timber  of  the 
ground  over  which  they  had  to  retreat  had  been  cut  down  to 
leave  the  way  clear  for  the  play  of  artillery  and  we  could  not 
charge  them.  Few  men  beside  those  in  the  advance  guard  got 
a  chance  at  them.  They  turned  and  fought  at  every  step.  At 
least  eight  or  ten  were  killed,  and  only  three  captured. 

I  lost  three  of  my  advance  guard.  Conrad  of  the  guard  was 
riding  a  large  gray  horse,  which  saved  his  life.  He  rode  close  up 
on  the  enemy,  and  one  of  them,  presenting  his  gun  within  a  few  feet 
of  his  breast,  fired ;  Conrad  reined  his  horse  tightly,  making 
him  rear  and  receive  the  ball  in  his  chest.  The  horse  fell  dead, 
pinning  his  rider  to  the  ground.  We  pressed  on  to  within  a 
hundred  yards  of  the  railroad  embankment,  in  the  bottom  near 
the  river,  and  quite  through  Edgefield.  Some  little  time  was 
required  to  get  all  the  regiment  up,  and  Hutcliinson  and  I  had 
just  formed  it,  and  the  line  was  advancing,  when  Colonel  Mor 
gan  ordered  us  back.  He  had  reconnoitered,  and  had  seen  a 
strong  force  of  infantry  behind  the  embankment ;  and  the  fire 
slackening  on  the  other  side,  induced  him  to  suppose  that  more 
infantry,  which  we  could  see  double  quicking  across  the  pontoon 
bridge,  was  the  entire  garrison  of  that  side  coming  to  oppose 


298  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

him.  It  turned  out  that  this  force  coming  over  the  bridge,  was 
small ;  but  the  Sixteenth  Illinois  and  part  of  another  regiment, 
were  stationed  behind  the  embankment,  and  among  the  cars  we 
wished  to  burn.  We  succeeded  in  burning  a  few — Lieutenants 
Drake  and  Quirk  (who  generally  hunted  together)  superintended 
the  work.  A  good  deal  of  firing  was  kept  up  by  the  enemy 
upon  the  detail  engaged  in  the  work  of  destruction,  but  without 
effect.  So  little  attention  was  paid  to  what  Forrest  was  doing, 
that  when  we  drew  off  altogether,  the  enemy  followed  us  a  mile 
or  two.  As  the  column  filed  off  from  the  by-road  (by  which  it 
had  approached  Edgefield)  on  the  Gallatin  pike,  the  enemy  drove 
back  the  pickets  which  had  been  sent  down  the  pike. 

The  point  at  which  we  entered  the  pike  is  about  a  mile  and 
a  quarter  from  Nashville.  For  awhile  there  seemed  to  be  great 
danger  that  the  enemy  would  take  us  in  flank,  but  the  column 
got  fairly  out  upon  the  pike  before  the  blue-coats  hove  in  sight. 
A  few  of  us  remained  behind  after  the  rear  guard  passed  to  as 
certain  the  truth  of  a  report  the  pickets  brought,  that  the  ene 
my  were  moving  up  artillery.  The  head  of  an  infantry  column 
had  made  its  appearance  on  the  pike,  but  halted  about  three  hun 
dred  yards  from  where  we  were,  and  no  firing  had  as  yet  oc 
curred  on  either  side.  They  seemed  disposed  to  rcconnoiter, 
and  we  were  not  anxious  to  draw  their  fire. 

Hutchinson  soon  determined  to  see  them  closer,  and  called  to 
one  of  the  advance  guard,  whom  he  had  kept  with  him,  to  ac 
company  him.  This  man  was  celebrated,  not  only  for  his  cool, 
unflinching  courage,  but  also  as  the  best  shot  in  the  Second  Ken 
tucky.  Every  old  "  Morgan  man "  will  remember,  if  he  has 
not  already  recognized,  Billy  Cooper.  Breckinridge  and  I  re 
monstrated  with  Hutchinson,  and  urged  that  his  action  would 
only  precipitate  the  enemy's  attack  and  our  retreat — that  we 
would  be  driven  away  before  we  had  witnessed  all  that  we 
wished  to  see.  There  were  only  seven  or  eight  men  in  our 
party  ;  Gano  encouraged  him  to  go — and  he  declared  that  he 
would  go — unless  I  positively  ordered  him  to  remain.  He  ac- 


ANECDOTE    OF   COLONEL    GANO.  299 

COrdinglj  started — Cooper  with  him.  There  was  a  considerable 
depression  in  the  pike  between  our  position  and  that  of  the  en 
emy.  Just  as  our  enterprising  friends  got  down  into  this  hol 
low,  and  about  half  of  the  distance  they  were  going,  the  enemy, 
having  completed  the  necessary  dispositions,  commenced  mov 
ing  forward.  I  shouted  to  Hutchinson,  informing  him  of  it, 
but  the  noise  of  his  horse's  hoofs  drowned  my  voice ;  before 
he  discovered  the  enemy,  he  was  in  thirty  paces  of  their  col 
umn.  He  fired  his  pistol,  and  Cooper,  rising  in  his  stirrups, 
discharged  his  gun  killing  a  man ;  both  then  wheeled  and 
spurred  away  at  full  speed.  They  got  back  into  the  hollow  in 
time  to  save  themselves,  but  while  we  were  admiring  their  rapid 
retreat  and  particularly  noticing  Hutchinson,  who  came  back 
in  great  glee,  whipping  his  horse  with  his  hat  as  was  his  custom 
when  in  a  tight  place,  a  volley,  intended  for  them,  came  rattling 
into  us.  Two  or  three  citizens  who  had  collected  to  see  the  fun 
fled  like  deer,  although  one  of  them  was  a  cripple — and,  to  tell 
the  truth,  we  left  as  rapidly. 

I  shall  never  forget  this  occasion,  because  it  was  the  first  and 
only  time  that  I  ever  saw  Colonel  Richard  M.  Gano  frightened. 
He  was  sitting  on  his  horse,  complacently  eyeing  Hutchinson's 
brisk  retreat,  and,  apparently,  not  even  remotely  supposing 
that  the  enemy  were  likely  to  fire.  One  ball  pierced  a  Mexican 
blanket  which  was  wrapped  around  him,  sending  the  red  stuff 
with  which  it  was  lined  flying  about  his  head.  I  thought,  and 
so  did  he,  that  it  was  his  blood.  If  I  had  been  mortally 
wounded,  I  could  not  have  helped  laughing  at  the  injured  look 
he  at  once  drew  on ;  it  was  the  look  of  a  man  who  had  confided, 
and  had  been  deceived.  "Why,  Duke,"  he  said,  "they're 
shooting  at  us."  Some  one  told  Major  Alston  that  something 
was  going  on  in  the  rear,  "  that  would  do  to  go  in  the  papers," 
and  he  joined  us,  as  the  enemy  fired  a  second  volley,  just  in 
time  to  get  his  best  horse  shot.  Although  we  burned  a  few 
cars,  the  expedition  was  a  failure — we  went  to  burn  all.  Re 
turning  to  Gallfitin  that  night  (the  6th),  we  found  that  we  were 


300  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

not  yet  to  be  permitted  rest.  Our  scouts  soon  began  to  bring 
in  news  of  the  approach  of  Rosecrans'  army,  which  was 
marching  by  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  pike,  and  the  Scotts- 
ville  and  Gallatin  pike,  to  Nashville.  Crittenden's  corps  was  in 
advance,  a  portion  on  each  road.  Colonel  Morgan  determined 
to  ambuscade  the  division  marching  on  the  Louisville  and  Nash 
ville  road,  at  a  point  near  Tyree  Springs.  He  selected  two 
hundred  men  for  the  expedition.  So  much  excitement  was  an 
ticipated  upon  it,  that  all  of  his  field  officers  begged  to  'go. 
After  a  good  deal  of  solicitation,  he  permitted  Gano  and  myself 
to  accompany  him,  leaving  Hutchinson  in  command  of  the  re 
mainder  of  the  brigade  at  Gallatin.  The  party  detailed  for  this 
expedition,  reached  the  neighborhood  of  the  proposed  scene  of 
ambush  late  at  night,  and  on  the  next  morning  (the  8th),  at 
daybreak,  took  position. 

The  Federal  troops  had  encamped  at  Tyree  Springs  the  night 
before.  First  one  or  two  sutlers'  wagons  passed,  which  were 
not  molested,  although  when  we  saw  one  fellow  stop,  and  de 
liberately  kill  and  skin  a  sheep  and  throw  it  into  his  wagon,  a 
general  desire  was  felt  to  rob  him  in  his  turn.  After  a  little 
while,  an  advance  guard  of  cavalry  came,  and  then  the  infantry 
rolled  along  in  steady  column,  laughing  and  singing  in  the  fresh 
morning  air.  As  soon  as  the  head  of  the  column  approached 
our  position,  our  line  arose  and  fired.  We  were  within  seventy- 
five  yards  of  the  road,  on  a  hill,  which  told  against  our  chances 
of  doing  execution,  but  the  men  had  been  cautioned  to  aim  low. 
The  column,  unprepared  for  such  an  entertainment,  recoiled, 
but  soon  rallied  and  charged  the  hill.  Artillery  was  brought 
up  and  opened  upon  us.  We  did  not  stay  long.  Our  loss  was 
one  man  killed.  I  have  never  been  able  to  learn  satisfactorily 
what  was  the  enemy's  loss.  Many  reports  were  received  about 
it,  some  of  which  must  have  been  greatly  exaggerated.  Colonel 
Morgan  immediately  moved  rapidly  to  get  in  the  rear  of  this 
column.  He  accordingly  struck  the  road  again,  some  three 
miles  north  of  Tyree  Springs.  Posting  the  bulk  of  his  force  in 


301 

a  woods  on  the  side  of  the  road,  he,  himself,  with  Lieutenant 
Quirk  and  two  or  three  others,  went  some  distance  up  the  pike, 
and  occupied  themselves  in  picking  up  stragglers,  which  he 
would  send  back  to  the  main  body,  where  they  would  be  placed 
under  guard.  In  this  way  some  forty  or  fifty  prisoners  were 
taken.  Suddenly  Stoke's  regiment  came  up  the  road  from 
toward  Tyree  Springs,  and  drove  the  detachment  immediately 
upon  the  road,  consisting  of  about  fifty  men,  back  to  the  main 
body,  thus  cutting  off  Colonel  Morgan  and  his  party.  Couriers 
were  immediately  sent  to  Colonel  Morgan  to  warn  him  of  his 
danger,  but  they  did  not  reach  him.  He  was  returning,  how 
ever,  about  that'  time,  and  quickened  his  pace  when  he  heard  a 
few  shots  fired.  He  was  bringing  back  some  ten  or  twelve 
prisoners.  He,  Lieutenant  Quirk,  and  one  or  two  men,  forming 
the  head  of  a  column,  of  which  the  prisoners  composed  the 
body.  Suddenly  he  rode  right  into  this  Federal  regiment.  He 
was,  of  course,  halted  and  questioned.  He  stated  that  he  was  a 
Federal  Colonel,  that  his  regiment  was  only  a  short  distance  off, 
and  that  the  prisoners  with  him  were  men  he  had  arrested  for 
straggling.  His  questioners  strongly  doubted  his  story,  and 
said  that  his  dress  was  a  very  strange  one  for  a  Federal  Colonel, 
that  rebels  often  wore  blue  clothes,  but  they  had  never  heard 
of  their  officers  wearing  gray.  The  prisoners,  who  knew  him, 
and  never  doubted  that  he  would  be  now  captured  in  his  turn, 
listened,  grinning,  to  the  conversation,  but  said  nothing.  He 
suddenly  pretended  to  grow  angry,  said  that  he  would  bring  his 
regiment  to  convince  them  who  he  was,  and  galloped  away. 
Quirk  followed  him.  Before  an  effort  could  be  made  to  stop 
them,  they  leaped  their  horses  over  the  fence,  and  struck,,  at 
full  speed,  across  the  country.  In  the  course  of  an  hour  they 
rejoined  the  rest  of  us,  and  relieved  our  minds  of  very  grave 
apprehensions. 

It  is  probable  that  no  other  man  than  Colonel  Morgan  would 
have  escaped  (in  such  a  situation)  death  or  capture.  But  his 
presence  of  mind  and  address,  in  the  midst  of  a  great  and  im- 


302  HISTORY   OF   MORGAN  S    CAVALRY. 


minent  danger,  were  literally  perfect.     I  have   known   many 
similar  escapes,  where  the  chances  were  not  so  desperate ;  but 
in  each  case  but  this,  there  was  some  circumstance  to  intimidate, 
or  to  contribute  to  mystify  the  enemy.     On  this  occasion  every 
circumstance  was  adverse  to  him.     He  could  expect  no  rescue 
from  his  friends,  for  we  had  managed  so  badly,  that  the  enemy 
had  gotten  between  him  and  us.     He  was  dressed  in  full  Con 
federate  uniform.     The  enemy  knew  that  the  Confederate  forces 
were  near  by,  and  it  was  reasonable  to  suppose  that  he  was  at 
tached  to  them.     The  prisoners  were  there  to  tell  on  him.     He 
had  nothing  to  depend  upon  but  the  audacity  and  address  which 
never  failed  him,  and  a  quality  even  higher  than  courage — I  can 
describe   it  only  as   the  faculty  of  subjecting  every  one  to  his 
will,  whom  he  tried  to  influence;  it  was  almost  mesmeric.     The 
prisoners  fifty  or  sixty  in  number,  were   paroled  in  the  course 
of  the  day  and  started  back  to  Kentucky  by  a  route  which  would 
enable  them  to  avoid  meeting  detachments  of  their  own  army. 
Our  party  encamped  that  night  about  seven  miles  from  Gallatin. 
Colonel   Morgan  when  he  started  upon  this   expedition,  knew 
that  Wood's  and  Van  Cleve's  divisions  were  marching  toward 
Gallatin,  and  he  cautioned  Hutchinson  not  to*  make  a  fight,  if 
during  his  absence  the   enemy  approached  the   town,  simulta 
neously,  upon  more  than  two  roads.     He  knew  that  Hutchinson 
would  be  vigilant,  but  he  feared  that  his  indisposition  to  avoid 
fighting  would  induce  him  to  engage  a  larger  force  of  the  enemy 
than  he  could  repulse.     Early  in  the  morning  of  the  day  succeed 
ing  that  on  which  the  events  I  have  just  described  occurred,  the 
enemy  inarched  into  Gallatin.     They  had  threatened  the  place  on 
three  sides  during  the  night,  but  Hutchinson  hoping  to  repulse 
them,  would  not  retire. 

In  the  morning,  however,  they  demonstrated  in  such  strength, 
as  to  convince  him  that  he  had  better  not  fight — and  so,  sending 
the  brigade  on  the  Lebanon  road  to  cross  the  Cumberland,  he 
retained  only  the  advance-guard  of  the  Second  Kentucky,  and 
the  howitzers,  to  salute  the  enemy  as  they  entered.  His  guns 


NARROW   ESCAPES.  303 

were  planted  upon  the  eminence  on  the  Lebanon  road,  just 
outside  of  town,  and,  as  the  head  of  a  column  of  infantry  turned 
into  that  road,  they  were  opened,  causing  it  to  recoil.  Several 
good  shots  were  made,  but  as  the  little  pieces  were  limbered  up 
to  move  off,  a  line  of  infantry  was  discovered  drawn  up  across 
the  road  in  the  rear  of  the  party — it  had  taken  position  very 
quietly,  while  they  were  amusing  themselves  cannonading  the 
troops  in  town. 

Hutchinson,  Breckinridge,  Alston,  and  nearly  every  field  and 
staff  officer  of  the  brigade,  were  in  the  trap.  They  tried  to  es 
cape  upon  another  road,  and  found  that  also  blockaded.  Finally, 
sending  the  howitzers  and  the  advance-guard  across  a  pasture 
into  the  Springfield  road,  Hutchinson,  with  the  numerous 
"officials"  in  his  train,  made  the  best  of  his  way  across  the 
country,  and  rejoined  the  brigade.  The  advance-guard  and  the 
howitzers  dashed  gallantly  past  a  large  body  of  the  enemy,  but 
were  neither  checked  nor  injured.  The  retreat  of  the  others, 
diverted  (as  was  intended)  attention  from  them  to  some  extent, 
and  they  rattled  on  down  the  pike  at  a  brisk  canter,  confident, 
now  (that  they  were  not  surrounded),  that  they  could  whip  a 
moderate  sized  brigade. 

About  three  miles  from  town,  they  met  our  detachment  of 
two  hundred  men ;  at  first  (thinking  us  a  party  of  the  enemy 
sent  to  enter  the  town  by  that  road),  they  prepared  to  attack 
and  route  us,  but  finding  out  who  we  were,  let  us  off  with  the 
scare.  We  had  already  learned  that  the  enemy  had  entered 
Gallatin,  and  I  was  especially  rejoiced  to  find  the  "bull  pups," 
and  my  advance-guard — the  flower  of  my  regiment — all  safe. 
Colonel  Morgan  learned  directly  from  the  officer  in  command  of 
this  party,  the  particulars  of  the  affair,  and  was  satisfied  that  all 
had  gotten  away.  We  at  once  turned  toward  the  river,  and 
marching,  until  we  reached  it,  through  the  woods  arid  fields, 
crossed  at  a  ford,  some  miles  lower  down  than  that  which  the 
brigade  had  crossed.  We  reached  Lebanon  on  the  same  after 
noon,  and  found  our  fugitive  friends  there.  Colonel  Morgan 


304  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

formally  congratulated  Hutchinson  upon  his  "  improved  method 
of  holding  a  town." 

This  was  the  9th,  and  the  bulk  of  the  brigade  went  into  camp, 
four  miles  from  Lebanon,  on  the  Murfreesboro'  pike.  As  Rose- 
crans'  army  came  pouring  into  Nashville,  the  commandant  there 
manifested  a  strong  disposition  to  learn  how  matters  stood  out 
side.  On  the  night  of  the  9th,  a  force  of  the  enemy  came  down 
the  Nashville  and  Lebanon  pike  to  Silver  Springs,  seven  miles 
from  Lebanon.  Scouts  were  sent  to  examine  this  force,  and 
returned,  reporting  that  it  manifested  no  disposition  to  move. 
Almost  immediately  after  the  scouts  came  back  to  Lebanon,  the 
enemy  came,  too,  having  moved  just  behind  the  scouts.  There 
was  no  force  in  Lebanon  to  meet  them,  and  they  held  the  place 
until  Hine's  company,  of  Breckinridge's  battalion,  was  sent  to 
drive  them  out.  That  night  Breckinridge's  entire  battalion  was 
sent  to  the  town,  supported  by  Bennett's  regiment.  On  the 
evening  of  the  llth,  they  were  both  driven  away,  by  a  heavy 
force  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  but,  reinforced  by  Gano,  checked 
the  enemy  a  short  distance  from  the  town.  When  the  enemy 
retreated,  Gano  pressed  them,  taking  one  hundred  and  fifty- 
eight  prisoners,  and  a  number  of  guns.  On  the  13th  or  14th, 
the  enemy  returned,  and  Breckinridge  drove  them  away,  follow 
ing  them  eleven  miles  on  the  Hartsville  pike.  On  this  occasion 
a  very  handsome  feat  was  performed  by  a  scouting  party  under 
command  of  Sergeant  McCormick,  of  Breckinridge's  battalion. 
Billy  Peyton,  who  had  killed  an  officer  and  brought  off'  his  horse 
and  pistol,  a  day  or  two  before,  went  with  him  as  "military  ad 
viser."  Major  Breckinridge  sent  this  scouting  party  to  find 
where  the  enemy  halted.  It  went  through  the  woods  and  found 
the  enemy  encamped  on  the  river  bank,  fifteen  miles  from 
Lebanon.  Returning  by  the  road,  the  party  stumbled  upon  a 
videlte,  stationed  about  a  half  mile  from  the  camp,  and  between 
it  and  a  picket  base,  which  he  said  was  a  short  distance  off. 
He  also  informed  them  that  all  the  pickets  had  been  notified 
that  a  scouting  party  would  shortly  leave  camp,  and  pass 


HEAVY    SKIRMISHING.  305 

through  them  on  that  road.  The  idea  at  once  occurred  to 
McCorraick  to  represent  that  scouting  party  with  his  ;  so,  car 
rying  the  prisoner  with  him,  he  rode  through  the  pickets  at  the 
head  of  his  men,  receiving  and  returning  their  salutes.  John 
Haps,  of  Company  F,  Second  Kentucky,  tightly  gripping  the 
prisoner's  throat,  meanwhile,  to  prevent  inopportune  disclosures. 
Just  as  the  party  got  clear  of  the  base,  they  were  discovered, 
and  one  man's  horse  falling,  he  was  made  prisoner.  On-  the 
15th,  Breckinridge  and  Bennett  were  sent  to  Baird's  mill,  eight 
miles  from  Lebanon,  and  eleven  from  Murfreesboro',  where  the 
Second  Kentucky  had  been  encamped  since  the  10th.  During 
that  time  it  had  been  operating  in  the  direction  of  Nashville, 
the  most  successful  expedition  having  been  made  by  Major 
Bowles,  who  defeated  a  body  of  the  enemy  superior  in  numbers 
to  his  own  detachment,  killing  several  and  taking  some  pri 
soners.  About  this  time  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  took  posi 
tion  at  Jefferson,  seven  miles  from  Baird's  mill.  This  force 
required  constant  watching,  and  scouts  were  kept  in  sight  of 
the  encampment  at  all  hours  of  the  twenty-four,  with  instructions 
to  fire  upon  the  pickets  as  often  as  each  detail  was  relieved. 
Spence's  battery  was  sent  from  Murfreesboro'  to  Baird's  mill, 
to  reinforce  us.  On  the  16th,  Gano,  who  had  remained  at 
Lebanon,  was  driven  away  by  a  large  force  of  cavalry  and  two 
brigades  of  infantry.  One  of  the  latter  got  in  his  rear,  and 
gave  him  a  good  deal  of  trouble.  After  making  a  gallant  fight, 
he  fell  back  to  Baird's  mill;  and  then  carried  Breckinridge, 
Bennett,  and  the  Second  Kentucky,  back  to  Lebanon  to  attack 
the  enemy  there.  Colonel  Morgan  had  been  at  Black's  shop, 
four  miles  nearer  to  Murfreesboro',  for  several  days,  and  I  had 
gone  to  Murfreesboro'  on  that  day,  the  16th.  When  I  returned 
to  Baird's  mill,  I  found  every  thing  gone,  but  a  few  pickets,  and 
the  scouts  reported  indications  of  an  advance  from  Jefferson. 
When  I  reached  Gano,  I  found  him  just  taking  position  to  fight 
(he  thought),  and  planting  his  battery  (Spence's)  to  shell  the 
camp,  the  fires  of  which  we  could  plainly  see.  I  dissuaded  him 
20 


306  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

from  opening  with  artillery,  for  I  did  not  wish  to  fight  at  Leb 
anon,  when  there  seemed  such  an  imminent  prospect  of  an  at 
tack  upon  Baird's  mill.     Gano  was  not  satisfied  to  return  until 
an   examination   showed  the    camp   deserted.     The  enemy  had 
moved  off,  leaving  their  fires  burning.     Gano  had  hurried  from 
Baird's  mill,  with   his  reinforcements,  so  rapidly,  that  he  had 
not  given  his  scouts  time  to  reconnoiter.     I  immediately  carried 
the  brigade  back  to  Baird's  mill.     The  saddles  were   kept  upon 
the  horses  all  night,  and  the  men  lay  down  in  line  of  battle,  but 
the    enemy    did    not    attack.     Two    or  three    days    after   this, 
Hutchinson  was  sent,  with  a  portion  of  the  Second  Kentucky, 
to  watch  the  Nashville  and  Lebanon  pike,  between  Stone  river 
and  Silver  Springs,  at  which  latter  place  a  strong  force  of  the 
enemy  was   encamped.     Information    had   been    received   that 
foraging  parties  of  the  enemy  had  been  habitually  resorting  to 
that  particular  neighborhood,  and  it  was  thought  that  some  of 
them  could  be   caught.     Hutchinson  missed  the   foragers,  but 
•captured  a  picket  detail  thirty  or  forty  strong,  at  Stone  river, 
•and  brought  his  prisoners  and  their  horses  into  camp.     A  little 
later  Major  Steele,  with  a  detachment  from  his  regiment,  went 
on  an  expedition  to  Hartsville.     Just  as  his  column  had  crossed 
the  river,  and  ascended  the  bank,  it  was  attacked  by  a  portion 
of  Woolford's  regiment.     Major  Steele  was  forced  to  recross 
the  river  and  return,  but  before  doing  so,  beat  off  his  first  as 
sailants.     On  the  23d,  Hutchinson,  with  Company  A,  of  Breck- 
inridge's  battalion,  and  a  detail  from  the  Second  Kentucky,  in 
all,  two  hundred  men,  and  the  howitzers,  attacked  the  enemy 
encamped  at   Gallatin,  landing  on  the  southern  side^  and  drove 
them  out  of  their  encampment  and  across  the  river.     A  good 
many  other  scouts    and   expeditions  were   made,  replete  with 
personal  adventures,  the   details    of  which   have    escaped  my 
memory. 

It  was  a  Very  busy  season,  and  a  good  many  prisoners  were 
taken ;  they  were  brought  in  from  some  quarter  every  day. 
Our  own  loss  was  slight.  Colonel  Morgan  believed  that,  with 


RETURN   OF   OUR   CAPTURED   COMRADES.  307 

enemies  so  near  him,  in  so  many  quarters,  he  could  defend  him 
self  only  by  assuming  the  offensive. 

General  Bragg's  army  did  not  get  to  Murfreesboro'  until  the 
20th  or  21st.  During  that  time,  General  Breckinridge  had  some 
four  thousand  infantry.  Rosecrans'  army  must  have  been  con 
centrated  in  Nashville  by  the  12th.  Two  days'  marching  would 
have  brought  them  to  Murfreesboro'.  General  Breckinridge 
could  not  have  repulsed  it ;  of  course  it  could  have  been  sub 
sisted  for  a  week  off  of  the  country,  or  its  foragers  had  lost 
their  cunning.  In  that  time  General  Bragg  would  have  been 
forced,  in  all  probability,  to  return  to  East  Tennessee,  with 
out  a  chance  to  deliver  battle  with  a  rational  hope  of  success. 
His  army  was  footsore,  wreary,  and  could  not  have  been  readily 
concentrated.  Buell  was  removed  because  he  was  thought  to 
be  "  slow,"  and  dull  to  perceive  and  seize  favorable  opportuni 
ties.  There  will  always  be  a  difference  of  opinion  about  which 
opportunities  were  the  safest  to  seize.  A  very  prevalent  opin 
ion  obtained  in  "  Morgan's  cavalry  "  (who  thought  that  they  ap 
preciated  Buell),  that  had  he  been  in  command  at  Nashville,  on 
the  12th  of  November,  1862,  he  would  have  marched  without  de 
lay  on  Murfreesboro>.  It  is  not  too  much  to  claim  that  Mor 
gan's  destruction  of  the  railroads  delayed,  not  only  the  concen 
tration  at  .Nashville,  but  the  movement  thence  to  Murfreesboro'. 
The  activity  of  Morgan,  Forrest  and  the  other  Confederate 
cavalry  commanders,  in  November,  and  the  firm  attitude  of 
Breckinridge,  also  contributed  to  prevent  it. 

In  the  latter  part  of  November,  Colonels  Cluke  and  Chenault 
rejoined  the  brigade.  Their  regiments  were  not  improved  by  the 
trip  through  the  mountains,  and  the  list  of  absentees  from  each 
was  large.  Major  Stoner  also  brought  a  battalion  to  Morgan, 
transferred  from  Marshall's  brigade.  About  the  same  time,  the 
men  of  the  "  Old  Squadron/'  who  had  been  captured  at  Leba 
non,  came  to  us.  They  had  been  exchanged  a  month  or  two 
previously,  but  htrd  been  unable  to  get  to  the  brigade  sooner. 
We  were  glad  to  welcome  them  back.  They  had  been  only 


308  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

seven  months  away,  and  they  returned  to  find  the  command 
they  had  last  seen  as  less  than  half  a  regiment,  now  grown  to 
a  brigade  of  five  regiments  and  two  battalions. 

These  men  were  organized  by  Colonel  Morgan,  into  a  com 
pany  of  scouts,  to  be  attached  to  no  regiment.  Lieutenant 
Thomas  Quirk  was  appointed  to  command  them,  and  Lieutenant 
Owens,  who  had  been  captured  and  exchanged  with  them,  was 
made  their  First  Lieutenant.  Lieutenant  Sellers,  who  had  been 
also  captured  at  Lebanon,  was  assigned  to  one  of  Bennett's 
companies;  the  scouts  were  at  once  armed,  equipped  arid 
mounted — the  company  numbered  about  sixty,  total  effective, 
and  was  a  very  fine  one.  On  the  24th,  the  Second  Kentucky, 
under  command  of  Hutchinson,  and  Breckinridge's  battalion, 
were  sent  to  Fayetteville,  Lincoln  county,  Tennessee,  to  rest 
men  and  horses  ;  and  the  other  regiments  of  the  brigade  were 
less  severely  worked  than  during  the  past  two  or  three  weeks. 

Rosecrans  seemed  extremely  anxious  to  shut  us  out  from  the 
country  around  Gallatin  and  Hartsville — perhaps  on  account  of 
the  supplies  of  meat  which  could  be  obtained  there,  and  which 
the  sympathy  of  the  people  enabled  us  to  obtain,  if  we  could 
readily  communicate  with  them.  Strong  garrisons  were  estab 
lished  at  Gallatin  and  Castalian  Springs,  about  six  or  eight 
miles  from  Hartsville,  and  at  the  latter  place.  The. fact  that 
any  force  of  Confederates  marching  to  attack  these  garrisons, 
unless  they  made  a  wide  detour  eastward,  would  expose  its 
flank  and  rear  to  attack  from  Nashville — not  to  consider  the  re 
sistance  of  the  garrisons  themselves — seemed  to  insure  that 
country  from  Confederate  intrusion. 

But  it  was  right  hard  to  keep  Morgan  out  of  Sumner  county 
— he  had  a  great  affection  for  it.  He  persistently  applied  for 
permission  to  attack  the  force  stationed  at  Hartsville,  and  it 
was  at  length  granted  him.  He  was  allowed  to  select  two 
regiments  from  the  Kentucky  infantry  brigade,  and  to  take 
also  Cobb's  battery,  a  very  fine  one,  attached  to  that  brigade. 
The  "  Kentucky  brigade  "  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Roger 


MARCH    ON    IIARTSVILLE.  309 

W.  Hanson,  who  had  been  only  a  short  time  before  exchanged, 
with  his  gallant  regiment,  the  Second  Kentucky  infantry,  which 
had  been  captured  at  Donelson.  One  of  the  colonels  of  the 
brigade,  was  Thomas  H.  Hunt,  a  very  superior  officer,  who,  with 
his  regiment,  the  Ninth  Kentucky,  one  of  the  best  in  the  Confed 
erate  service,  had  seen  arduous  and  hazardous  service  at  Shiloh, 
Corinth  and  Baton  Rouge.  Colonel  Morgan  asked  that  this  of 
ficer  (his  uncle)  should  command  the  infantry  regiments,  which 
were  to  form  part  of  his  force  for  the  expedition  ;  and  Colonel 
Hunt  selected  his  own  regiment  and  the  Second  Kentucky  (in 
fantry). 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  December,  Colonel  Morgan  set 
out  on  this  expedition.  The  cavalry  force  was  placed  under 
my  command,  and  consisted  of  Gano's,  Bennett's,  Cluke's  and 
Chenault's  regiments,  and  Stoner's  battalion — in  all  numbering 
about  fifteen  hundred  men.  Hanson's  brigade  was  encamped 
at  Baird's*  mill.  Here  the  infantry  detachment  joined  us,  seven 
hundred  strong ;  the  full  strength  of  neither  regiment  was  taken. 
Quirk's  "  scouts  "  and  other  scouting  parties  were  sent  to  re- 
connoiter  in  the  direction  of  Hartsville,  to  watch  the  enemy  at 
Castalian  Springs,  and  the  fords  of  the  river,  and  to  picket  the 
Nashville  and  Lebanon  pike.  The  "  combined  forces "  left 
Baird's  mill  about  11  A.  M.,  and  passed  through  Lebanon  about 
2  p.  M.,  taking  the  Lebanon  and  Hartsville  pike.  The  snow  lay 
upon  the  ground  and  the  cold  was  intense. 

The  infantry  had  been  promised  that  they  should  ride  part  of 
the  way,  and,  accordingly,  a  few  miles  beyond  Lebanon  a  por 
tion  of  the  cavalry  gave  up  the  horses  to  them.  This,  however, 
was  an  injudicious  measure.  The  infantry  had  gotten  their  feet 
wet  in  trudging  through  the  snow,  and,  after  riding  a  short 
time,  were  nearly  frozen  and  clamored  to  dismount.  The  cav 
alrymen  had  now  gotten  their  feet  saturated  with  moisture,  and 
when  they  remounted,  suffered  greatly  in  their  turn.  There 
was  some  trouble,  too,  in  returning  the  horses  to  the  proper 
parties  (as  this  last  exchange  was  effected  after  dark),  and  the 


310  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

infantry-men  damned  the  cavalry  service  with  all  the  resources 
of  a  soldier's  vocabulary. 

The  infantry  and  Cobb's  battery  reached  the  ferry  where  it 
was  intended  that  they  should  cross,  about  ten  o'clock  at  night, 
and  were  put  across  in  two  small  leaky  boats,  a  difficult  and 
tedious  job.  When  the  cavalry  reached  the  ford,  where  Colonel 
Morgan  had  directed  me  to  cross,  I  found  that  the  river  had 
risen  so  much  since  the  last  reconnoisance  that  it  was  past 
fording  at  that  point,  and  I  had  to  seek  a  crossing  further 
down.  The  ford  (where  I  decided  to  cross)  was  so  difficult  to 
come  at,  that  the  operation  of  crossing  was  made  very  slow. 
The  men  could  reach  the  river  bank  only  by  a  narrow  bridle 
path  which  admitted  only  one  man  at  a  time.  They  were  then 
compelled  to  gather  their  horses  and  leap  into  the  river,  over 
the  bluff  about  four  feet  high.  Horse  and  man  would  generally 
be  submerged  by  the  plunge — a  cold  bath  very  unpleasant  in 
such  weather.  The  ascent  on  the  other  side  was  nearly  as  diffi 
cult.  In  a  little  while  the  passage  of  the  horses  rendered  the 
approach  to  the  river  even  more  difficult.  The  ford  was  not 
often  used,  and  the  unbeaten  path  became  cut  up  and  muddy. 
It  grew  worse  and  worse.  The  cold  (after  the  ducking  in  the 
river)  affected  the  men  horribly ;  those  who  got  across  first  built 
fires,  at  which  they  partially  warmed  themselves  while  the  others 
were  crossing.  Only  fifteen,  however,  were  frozen  so  .stiff  that 
they  had  to  be  left. 

Finding,  as  the  night  wore  on,  that  day  would  appear  before 
all  got  across,  and  fearing  that  I  would  detain  Colonel  Morgan, 
I  moved  (with  those  already  on  the  northern  bank)  about  three 
o'clock,  leaving  a  great  part  of  my  column  still  on  the  southern 
side  of  the  river.  I  posted  pickets  to  watch  the  roads  by  which 
they  could  be  attacked,  and  instructed  the  officers  to  hurry  on 
to  Hartsville  as  soon  as  practicable.  I  had  about  five  miles  to 
march  to  rejoin  Colonel  Morgan,  and  found  him  at  the  point  he 
had  designated,  some  three  miles  from  Ilartsville.  He  decided 
not  to  wait  for  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry,  fearing  that  infor- 


DISPOSITION   FOR   THE   FIGHT.  311 

mation  would  be  taken  to  Castalian  Springs  (where  six  thousand 
Federal  troops  were  encamped),  and  he  would  be  himself  at 
tacked.  He,  therefore,  moved  forward  at  once.  Just  at  day 
light  the  cavalry,  who  were  marching  in  front,  came  upon  a 
strong  picket  force,  about  half  a  mile  from  the  encampment, 
who  fired  and  retreated.  We  were  thus  prevented  from  sur 
prising  the  enemy  before  they  formed.  Colonel  Morgan  did 
not,  however,  expect  to  do  so,  for  he  had  no  certain  plan  of 
capturing  the  pickets  without  giving  the  alarm. 

Bennett's  regiment  was  immediately  sent  around  the  encamp 
ment,  and  into  the  town  of  Hartsville.  Colonel  Morgan  ordered 
me  to  form  Cluke's  and  Chenault's  regiments  opposite  the  right 
flank  of  the  line  the  enemy  were  establishing,  and  partially  out 
flanking  it.  The  enemy  was  encamped  in  wooded  ground, 
slightly  elevated  above  the  surrounding  fields.  The  left  flank 
of  the  line  they  formed  rested  upon  open  ground  near  the 
river.  Opposite  their  right  flank  and  center  was  a  large  meadow, 
between  which  and  the  woods  was  a  slight  depression,  which 
gradually  deepened  toward  the  southward,  until  from  a  valley  it 
became  a  ravine,  and  when  it  approached  the  river  was  perhaps 
ten  feet  deep,  and  its  banks  were  almost  precipitous.  Colonel 
Morgan  had  intended  to  let  the  infantry  of  his  command  form 
in  this  ravine  and  attack  from  it,  but  the  enemy's  line  was  es 
tablished  so  near  to  it  that  this  was  not  attempted. 

When  we  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy  and  saw  them  forming, 
it  was  at  once  plain  that  the  force  there  was  much  stronger  than 
it  had  been  represented  to  be.  Instead  of  fifteen  hundred  men, 
as  Colonel  Morgan  had  estimated  it  to  be  from  the  reports  of 
his  spies,  it  was  more  than  twenty-five  hundred  strong.  I  said 
to  him,  "  You  have  more  work  cut  out  for  you,  than  you  bar 
gained  for."  "  Yes,"  he  answered,  "you  gentlemen  must  whip 
and  catch  these  fellows,  and  cross  the  river  in  two  hours  and  a 
half,  or  we  '11  have  six  thousand  more  on  our  backs."  Cluke's  and 
Chenault's  regiments  after  deducting  horse-holders,  numbered 
four  hundred  and  fifty  men,  between  them.  I  formed  Cluke 


312  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

opposite  the  One  Hundred  and  Fourth  Ohio  Infantry,  eight 
hundred  strong,  and  formed  Chenault  obtusely  to  Cluke  (on  the 
latter's  left),  with  his  (Chenault's)  left  flank  inclining  toward  the 
enemy,  and  outflanking  him.  The  infantry  were  shortly  after 
ward  formed  opposite  the  center  of  the  enemy — Cobb's  battery 
confronted  the  enemy's  left  flank.  Our  entire  force  in  the  fight 
(Bennett  having  been  sent  to  Hartsville  to  prevent  the  escape 
of  the  enemy  in  that  direction)  was  twelve  hundred  and  fifty 
men.  I  have  neglected  to  state  that  Stoner's  battalion  had 
been  sent,  with  the  "  Bull  pups,"  down  the  Hartsville  and  Leb 
anon  pike  to  take  position  opposite  the  enemy's  encampment. 
Stoner  was  instructed  to  maneuver  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  and 
shell  away  at  them  briskly.  Colonel  Morgan  knew  that  the 
little  pieces  could  not  reach  the  encampment,  but  he  wished  tho 
enemy's  attention  attracted  to  that  quarter. 

Stoner  succeeded  so  well  that  the  two  Parrot  guns  which  the 
enemy  had  were  engaged  with  him,  when  we  took  position,  and 
we  were  spared  the  annoyance  they  could  have  inflicted  while 
we  were  forming.  As  I  have  said  we  failed  to  surprise  the 
Federal  force  in  its  camp — and  the  only  advantage  which  our 
sudden  appearance  gave  us,  was  the  partial  demoralization  which 
is  apt  to  assail  all  troops,  when  unexpectedly  and  promptly  at 
tacked.  The  enemy  naturally  thought  that  we  were  in  over- 
whelmning  force,  or  that  we  would  not  have  incurred  such  risks. 

One  good  sign  was,  that,  as  we  formed  in  sight  of  each  other, 
our  ringing  shouts  were  answered  by  the  feeblest  of  cheers. 
Cluke  and  Chenault  having  formed  at  a  gallop,  immediately  dis 
mounted  their  men  and  advanced.  The  enemy's  line  was  about 
four  hundred  yards  distant.  A  line  of  skirmishers  occupied  the 
hollow,  posted  behind  a  fence,  whose  fire  did  us  some  little  dam 
age.  These  two  regiments  had  never  been  under  fire  before 
(with  the  exception  of  a  slight  skirmish  which  Cluke's  had  wit 
nessed  in  Kentucky)  and  I  was  not  at  first  certain  that  they 
would  drive  their  part  of  the  line.  But  they  moved  on  with 
perfect  steadiness,  halting  (after  having  advanced  about  a  hun- 


BATTLE    OF    IIAKTSVILLE.  313 

dred  yards)  to  discharge  a  volley  which  dislodged  the  skirmish 
ers,  and  then,  after  reloading,  pressed  on  at  a  swift  run.  The 
enemy  fired  by  rank,  each  volley  passing  over  our  heads,  for  the 
men  had  reached  the  hollow.  No  time  was  given  them  to  re 
load.  When  within  sixty  yards  our  fellows  opened,  Cluke 
pressing  right  upon  the  front,  and  Chenault  having  swept  so  far 
round,  and  then  closed  in,  that  the  two  regiments  were  firing 
almost  into  each  other's  faces. 

The  open  cavalry  formation  not  only  enabled  us  with  a  smaller 
force,  to  cover  the  entire  front  of  the  enemy  opposed  to  us,  but 
while  exposing  us  to  less  loss,  made  our  fire  more  deadly.  The 
One  Hundred  and  Fourth  Ohio  backed  about  twenty  steps,  the 
men  striving  to  reload  their  guns,  and  it  then  broke  and  ran  in 
perfect  disorder.  Cluke  and  Chenault  moved  on,  swinging 
around  to  the  right,  until  they  were  formed  at  right  angles  to 
the  original  direction  of  their  line,  and  the  force  confronting 
them  was  lapped  back  upon  the  rest  of  the  enemy's  line.  This 
lasted  about  twenty  minutes.  By  that  time  Colonel  Hunt  had 
formed  his  infantry,  and  he  sent  them  in,  in  echelon,  the  Second 
Kentucky  in  advance.  Cobb's  battery  had  not  been  idle,  and 
had  gotten  one  caisson  blown  up  by  a  shell  from,  one  of  the  en 
emy's  Parrots. 

The  infantry  had  marched  quite  thirty  miles,  over  slippery 
roads,  and  through  the  chilling  cold,  and  I  saw  some  of  them 
stumble  (as  they  charged),  with  fatigue  and  numbness,  but  the 
brave  boys  rushed  in  as  if  they  were  going  to  a  frolic.  The  Se 
cond  Kentucky  dashed  over  the  ravine,  and  as  they  emerged  in 
some  disorder,  an  unfortunate  order  was  given  them,  to  halt  and 
"dress."  There  was  no  necessity  for  it — the  regiment  was 
within  fifty  yards  of  the  enemy,  who  were  recoiling  and  drop 
ping  before  their  fire.  Several  officers  sprang  to  the  front  and 
countermanded  the  order — it  was  a  matter  of  doubt  who  gave  it 
— and  Captain  Joyes,  seizing  the  colors,  shouted  to  the  men  to 
follow  him. 

The  regiment  rushed  on  again,  but  in  that  brief  halt,  sus- 


314 

tained  nearly  all  of  its  loss.  Just  then,  the  Ninth  Kentucky 
came  to  its  support — the  men  yelling  and  gliding  over  the 
ground  like  panthers.  The  enemy  gave  way  in  confusion,  and 
were  pressed  again  on  their  right  and  rear  by  Cluke  and  Chen- 
ault,  who  were  at  this  juncture  reinforced  by  seventy-five  men 
of  Gano's  regiment,  who  came  up  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Huff 
man,  commanding  the  regiment  in  Gano's  absence,  and  Major 
Steele,  and  at  once  went  into  the  fight.  A  few  minutes  then  suf 
ficed  to  finish  the  affair.  The  enemy  were  crowded  together  in 
a  narrow  space,  and  were  dropping  like  sheep.  The  white  flag 
was  hoisted  in  an  hour  after  the  first  shot  was  fired.  Our  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  was  one  hundred  and  twenty-five,  of 
which  the  Second  Kentucky  lost  sixty-five,  the  Ninth,  eighteen ; 
the  cavalry  thirty-two,  and  Cobb's  battery,  ten.  Lieutenant  Colo 
nel  Coleman,  a  gallant  and  accomplished  officer,  was  seriously 
wounded.  His  regiment,  the  Eighth  Kentucky  (Cluke's),  was 
devotedly  attached  to  him,  and  could  ill  afford  to  lose  his  valuable 
services.  Some  fine  officers  were  lost  by  the  infantry  regiments. 
A  loss  which  was  deeply  regretted  by  Morgan's  entire  command, 
was  that  of  little  Craven  Peyton.  Colonel  Morgan  invariably  se 
lected  as  his  orderlies  bright,  intelligent,  gentlemanly  little 
fellows  from  among  the  boys  of  his  command.  They  were  not 
required  to  perform  the  ordinary  services  of  an  orderly,  but 
were  treated  more  like  staff  officers,  and  were  assigned  such  du 
ties,  as  are  usually  required  of  an  aide. 

This  was  an  excellent  method  of  spoiling  young  soldiers — but 
Colonel  Morgan  permitted  himself  such  luxuries.  Of  all  these, 
Craven  Peyton  was  the  most  celebrated  and  popular.  His  integ 
rity  and  sense  were  such,  that  officers  of  the  command  would  not 
hesitate  to  act  upon  an  order  which  he  bore,  although  unwritten^ 
and  he  possessed  the  most  remarkable  daring  and  determination. 
Exposing  himself  in  this  fight  with  his  usual  recklessness,  he  re 
ceived  a  wound,  which  disabled  him  so  much  that  he  could  not 
be  removed.  He  was  made  prisoner,  and  in  a  few  days  fretted 
himself  to  death.  The  enemy's  loss,  in  killed  and  wounded,  was 


BRILLIANT    ACHIEVEMENTS.  315 

over  four  hundred,  and  two  thousand  and  four  prisoners  were 
carried  off  to  Murfreesboro'.  If  there  ever  was  a  fight  to  which 
the  time  honored  phrase,  so  frequent  in  official  reports,  was  ap 
plicable,  viz.:  "That  where  all  behaved  so  well,"  etc., — it  was 
this  one.  It  would  indeed  be  difficult  to  assign  the  palm. 
Every  officer  and  man  seemed  inspired  with  the  most  perfect 
confidence  and  the  most  dauntless  resolution.  Every  regiment 
and  company  rushed  recklessly  and  irresistibly  upon  every 
thing  confronting  it,  and  the  sudden  discovery,  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  fight,  that  the  enemy  were  so  much  stronger  than  we 
had  supposed  them  to  be,  seemed  only  to  increase  their  courage. 
They  had  literally  made  up  their  minds  not  to  be  beaten,  and  I 
firmly  believe,  that  five  thousand  more  could  not  have  beaten 
them.  The  tents,  and  every  thing  which  could  not  be  carried 
off,  were  burned;  a  number  of  captured  wagons  were  loaded 
with  arms  and  portable  stores,  and  hurried  over  the  river — four 
or  five  wagons  which  did  not  cross  the  river,  were  driven  into 
the  woods  and  their  contents  secreted.  Some  of  the  most 
valuable  captures,  were  in  boots  and  shoes — for  many  of  the 
men  (especially  of  Ciuke's  and  Chenault's  regiments)  had  no 
other  covering  for  their  feet  than  old  rags. 

The  prisoners  were  gotten  across  the  river  as  rapidly  as  pos 
sible — and  the  infantry  were  taken  over  behind  the  cavalrymen. 
Some  of  the  prisoners  were  made  to  wade  the  river,  as  the  en 
emy  from  Castalian  Springs  began  to  press  upon  us  so  closely 
that  we  could  not  "  stand  upon  the  order  of  transportation." 
Ciuke's  regiment  was  posted  upon  the  Gallatin  road  to  hold 
the  enemy  in  check — Quirk's  scouts  having  already  retarded 
their  advance.  Gano's  regiment  was  sent  as  soon  as  it  got  up 
to  support  Cluke.  Nothing  but  the  rapid  style  in  which  the 
fight  had  been  conducted  and  finished  saved  us.  We  had  no 
sooner  evacuated  the  ground  than  the  enemy  occupied  it,  and 
our  guns  which  opened  upon  them  from  the  southern  shore, 
were  answered  by  their  batteries. 

No  pursuit  was  attempted,  and  we   marched  leisurely  back 


STORY  OF  MORGAN'S 


through  Lebanon,  regaining  our  camps  late  in  the  night.  Two 
splendid  pieces  of  artillery  were  among  the  trophies — which  did 
good  service  in  our  hands,  until  they  were  recaptured  upon  the 
"  Qliio.jcaid."  This  expedition  was  justly  esteemed  the  most 
brilliant  thing  that  Morgan  had  ever  done,  and  was  referred  to 
with  pride  by  every  man  who  was  in  it. 

General  Bragg  in  his  congratulatory  order  issued  to  the  army 
oil  account  of  it,  spoke  in  the  highest  terms  of  the  conduct  of 
the  troops — especially  of  the  remarkable  march  of  the  infantry, 
and  he  says :  "  To  Brigadier  General  Morgan  and  to  Colonel 
Hunt  the  General  tenders  his  thanks,  and  assures  them  of  the 
admiration  of  his  army.  The  intelligence,  zeal  and  gallantry 
displayed  by  them  will  serve  as  an  example  and  an  incentive  to 
still  more  honorable  deeds.  To  the  other  brave  officers  and  men 
composing  the  expedition  the  General  tenders  his  cordial  thanks 
and  congratulations.  He  is  proud  of  them  and  hails  the  suc 
cess  achieved  by  their  valor  as  but  the  precursor  of  still  greater 
victories.  Each  corps  engaged  in  the  action  will  in  future  bear 
upon  its  colors  the  name  of  the  memorable  field." 


PROMOTION   OF  MORGAN.  317 


CHAPTER    XII . 


THE  victory  of  Harts ville  brought  Colonel  Morgan  his  long- 
expected  and  long-delayed  commission  of  Brigadier-General. 
He  had  long  been  styled  General  by  his  men,  and  had  been  of 
late  habitually  so  addressed  in  official  communications  from  army 
headquarters.  Many  and  urgent  applications  had  been  made 
by  influential  parties  and  officers  of  high  rank  for  his  promotion. 
General  Smith  had  strongly  urged  it,  General  Bragg  concurring, 
but  while  Brigadiers  were  being  uttered  as  rapidly  almost  as 
Confederate  money,  he  remained  a  simple  Colonel.  President 
Davis  happened  to  visit  Murfreesboro'  a  few  days  after  the  Harts- 
ville  affa-ir,  and  gave  him  his  commission,  making  Hanson,  also, 
a  Brigadier  of  even  date.  This  promotion  of  my  chief  made 
me  a  Colonel,  and  Hutchinson  a  Lieutenant-Colonel,  thus  illus 
trating  that  many  felicitous  consequences  will  sometimes  flow 
from  one  good  act.  The  latter  had  occupied  a  very  anamolous 
position  ;  while  really  a  Captain,  he  had  acted  as,  and  been  styled 
Lieutenant-Colonel.  Being  a  most  excellent  officer,  who  had 
seen  a  great  deal  of  service,  and  acting  as  second  in  command 
of  an  unusually  large  regiment,  he  was  placed  frequently  upon 
detached  service,  and  in  very  responsible  situations,  and  fre 
quently  commanded  Lieutenant-Colonels  of  legitimate  manufac 
ture,  just  as  Morgan,  while  only  a  General  "  by  courtesy,"  com 
manded  floating  Brigadiers  who  came  within  his  vortex.  It 
proved  more  agreeable  to  men,  who  were  really  modest,  to  take 
rank  by  the  virtue  of  commissions  rather  than  by  the  force  of 
impudence,  and  the  example  was  better.  General  Hardee  urged 
that  the  commission  should  be  made  out  as  Major-General,  but 
Mr.  Davis  said,  "  I  do  not  wish  to  give  my  boys  all  of  their  sugar 
plums  at  once." 


\ 

318  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

At  Bryantsville,  in  Kentucky,  Colonel  Joseph  Wheeler  had  been 
appointed  Chief  of  Cavalry,  and  Morgan,  Scott,  Ashby — all  of 
the  cavalry  commanders  had  been  ordered  to  report  to  him. 
Colonel  Wheeler  was  a  very  dashing  officer,  and  had  done  ex 
cellent  service,  but  he  had  neither  the  experience  nor  the  record 
of  Morgan,  and  the  latter  did  not  fancy  having  to  serve  under 
him.  He  was  with  Wheeler  so  little,  however,  in  Kentucky, 
that  he  found  not  much  inconvenience  from  having  a  "  Chief  of 
cavalry  "  to  superintend  him.  Morgan  was,  of  course,  perfectly 
independent  upon  his  retreat  out  of  Kentucky,  and  in  his  opera 
tions  afterward  in  North  Middle  Tennessee — indeed,  with  the 
exception  of  having  to  report  to  General  Breckinridge,  while 
the  latter  was  in  command  at  Murfreesboro',  and  afterward  to 
the  Commander-in-chief,  he  was  perfectly  independent  until  a 
period  even  later  than  that  of  his  promotion.  But  this  is  a  sub 
ject  for  a  later  chapter.  A  great  many  injudicious  friends  of 
Morgan  were  inclined  to  attribute  the  delay  of  his  promotion  to 
prejudice  upon  the  part  of  Mr.  Davis,  against  him  in  particular, 
and  Kentuckians  in  general. 

There  is  no  doubt  but  that  General  Morgan's  free  and  easy 
way  of  appointing  his  own  officers  and  of  conducting  all  of  his 
military  affairs,  as  well  as  his  intense  aversion  to  subordinate 
positions,  had  excited  much  official  disapprobation  and  some  in 
dignation  against  him  at  Richmond.  He  had  been  careless  and 
dilatory,  too,  in  making  out  and  forwarding  the  muster-rolls  of 
his  regiment,  an  omission  which  was  undoubtedly  censurable, 
and  unpardonable  in  the  eyes  of  the  Pundits  of  the  War  Depart 
ment,  with  whom  such  papers  were  the  gospels  of  military  gov 
ernment.  General  Morgan  paid  too  little  attention  to  matters 
of  this  kind,  essential  to  the  transaction  of  military  business, 
and  the  proper  conduct  of  the  affairs  of  the  army,  and  the  au 
thorities  resented  a  neglect  that  looked  a  good  deal  like  contu 
macious  disrespect.  He  was,  however,  unlucky  in  this  respect, 
to  some  extent,  for  when  he  appreciated,  which  was  not  until 
after  he  had  raised  the  greater  portion  of  his  brigade,  the  no- 


DIFFICULTIES   WITH   WAR   DEPARTMENT.  319 

cessity  and  the  propriety  of  making  full,  formal,  and  prompt 
returns,  he  met  with  delays  and  accidents  in  transmitting  them 
to  llichmond,  which  were  frequent  and  extraordinary.  The 
officers,  who  acted  as  his  Adjutant  Generals  at  different  periods 
previously  to  his  promotion,  will  remember  and  can  affirm,  that 
returns  and  rolls  of  his  regiments  and  battalions  composing  his 
brigade,  were  sent  into  them,  and  forwarded  by  them  to  Rich 
mond.  Officers  were  especially  detailed  to  go  to  Richmond 
and  look  after  these  papers.  And,  yet,  to  every  application 
made  for  the  appointment  of  bonded  officers  (or  rather  for  their 
commissions,  for  Morgan  could  manage  appointments),  by  com 
manders  of  the  oldest  regiments  in  his  brigade,  the  Secretary 
of  War  would  politely  inform  the  Colonel  that  his  regiment  was 
unknown  "in  the  records  of  this  office."  Judging  from  the 
frequency  of  this  reply,  and  the  nature  of  some  promotions  that 
were  made  for  that  quarter,  it  would  appear  that  the  War  De 
partment  at  Richmond,  and  the  cavalry  on  the  western  front, 
had  no  acquaintance  in  common.  That  all  the  evil  might  be 
cured,  papers  of  formidable  size  and  appearance,  nearly  square 
(I  should  say  an  acre  by  an  arpent),  were  carefully  made  out,  and 
forwarded  to  Richmond,  showing  the  date  of  the  organization 
of  each  regiment,  the  officers  originally  upon  its  rolls,  all 
changes,  and  how  they  occurred,  up  to  the  date  of  the  making 
out  of  the  compendious  document,  the  names  of  the  officers 
serving  in  it  at  the  time,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  obtained 
their  rank,  whether  by  appointment,  election,  or  promotion,  and 
by  whom  appointed,  when  such  was  their  status. 

Notwithstanding  the  work  expended  upon  the  accursed  things, 
and  the  perspiration,  and,  I  regret  to  say,  blasphemy,  which 
they  elicited  from  some  of  our  officers,  they  did  no  good  in  the 
world ;  and  after  more  labor  and  tribulation,  ten  to  one,  than 
an  advance  of  the  whole  Federal  army  would  have  cost  us,  we 
found  ourselves  as  much  outsiders  as  ever.  It  must  be 
distinctly  understood,  that  nothing  here  written  is  intended 
as  an  insinuation  against  Mr.  Davis  ;  I  will  not  do  that 


KsU  HISTORY  OF   MORGAN  S  CAVALRY. 

which  I  would  join  in  condemning  in  another  man,  whose 
antecedents  are  like  my  own.  The  profound  respect  I  feel  for 
him,  prevents  any  attempt,  upon  my  part,  at  even  such  criticism 
of  his  action  as  may  seem  legitimate ;  and  unkind  and  carping 
reflections  upon  him  are  more  becoming  in  the  mouths  of  non- 
combatant  rebels,  than  from  ex-confederate  soldiers,  whom  self- 
respect  should  restrain  from  any  thing  of  the  kind.  But  there 
were  certain  officers  at  Richmond,  who,  if  their  souls  had  been 
tied  up  with  red  tape,  indorsed  in  accordance  with  the  latest 
orders,  and  stuffed  into  pigeon  holes,  would  have  preferred  it  to 
a  guarantee  of  salvation.  I  honestly  believe  that  these  gentle 
men  thought,  that  when  an  officer  made  out  a  muster-roll,  and 
forwarded  it  to  them,  he  had  done  his  full  duty  to  his  country, 
had  gotten  through  with  his  part  of  the  war,  and  might  go  to 
sleep  without  putting  out  pickets.  It  was  said  of  a  certain 
Confederate  General,  of  high  rank,  that  he  would  rather  have 
from  his  subordinates  "a  neat  and  formal  report  of  a  defeat, 
than  a  slovenly  account  of  a  victory."  It  might  have  been  said 
of  the  war  office  gentry,  with  equal  propriety,  that  they  would 
have  preferred  an  army  composed  of  Fallstaffian  regiments,  all 
duly  recorded,  to  a  magnificent  soldiery  unticketed  at  Rich 
mond. 

With  this  class  Morgan  was  always  unpopular ;  not  that  a 
stronger  personal  dislike  was  felt  for  him,  in  the  official  bosom, 
than  for  other  men  of  the  same  stamp  and  style,  but  all  such 
men  were  gravely  disliked  by  this  class.  Such  men  were  de 
veloping  new  ideas,  not  to  be  found  in  the  books  which  the 
others  had  studied,  and  were  in  the  habit  of  consulting.  They 
were  managing  cavalry  and  winning  fights  in  a  thoroughly  ir 
regular  and  revolutionary  manner ;  there  was  grave  cause  for 
apprehension  that,  if  they  were  given  high  rank  and  correspond 
ing  command,  they  would  innovate  upon  established  infantry 
tactique,  in  the  same  unprecedented  and  demoralizing  style. 
Mr.  Davis  did  not  dislike  Morgan,  but  simply  entertained  no 
particular  fancy  for  him,  and  did  not  believe  that  he  was  really 


MORGAN'S  MARRIAGE.  321 

a  superior,  although  a  successful  officer ;  in  fact,  he  knew  very 
little  about  him. 

To  say  Mr.  Davis  disliked  Kentuckians,  is  absurd.  The 
Kentucky  vanity  is  as  irritable,  although  not  as  r&dieal,  as  the 
Virginian,  and  sees  a  slight  in  every  thing  short  of  a  caress. 
He  appointed  some  fifteen  general  officers  from  Kentucky,  and 
he  permitted  the  Kentucky  loafers  to  secure  their  full  share  of 
"soft  places."  General  Bragg,  doubtless,  was  entirely  free 
from  any  blinding  affection  for  Kerituckians,  and  few  of  them 
felt  a  tenderness  for  him.  Despite  the  terrors  of  his  stern  rule, 
they  let  few  occasions  escape  of  evincing  their  feeling  toward 
him.  It  was  said,  I  know  not  how  truly,  that  at  a  later  date 
General  Bragg  told  Mr.  Davis  that  "  General  Morgan  was  an 
officer  who  had  few  superiors,  none,  perhaps,  in  his  own  line, 
but  that  he  was  a  dangerous  man,  on  account  of  his  intense  de 
sire  to  act  independently." 

When  Morgan  received  this  rank,  his  brigade  was  quite 
strong,  and  composed  of  seven  regiments.  Breckinridge's  and 
Stoner's  battalions  were  consolidated,  and  formed  a  regiment 
above  the  minimum  strength.  Breckinridge  became  Colonel, 
and  Stoner  Lieutenant  Colonel.  Shortly  after  the  Hartsville 
fight,  Colonel  Adam  R.  Johnson  reached  Murfreesboro'  with  his 
regiment.  It  had  been  raised  in  Western  Kentucky,  and  was 
very  strong  upon  the  rolls,  but  from  losses  by  capture,  and 
other  causes,  had  been  reduced  to  less  than  four  hundred  effective 
men.  It  was  a  fine  body  of  men,  and  splendidly  officered. 
Martin,  the  Lieutenant  Colonel,  was  a  man  of  extraordinary 
dash  and  resolution,  and  very  shrewd  in  partisan  warfare. 
Owens,  the  Major,  was  a  very  gallant  man,  and  the  disciplinarian, 
of  the  regiment. 

On  the  14th  of  December,  an  event  occurred  which  was 
thought  by  many  to  have  materially  affected  General  Morgan's 
temper,  and  subsequent  fortunes.  He  was  married  to  Miss 
Heady,  of  Murfreesboro',  a  lady  to  whom  he  was  devotedly  at 
tached,  and  who  certainly  deserved  to  exercise  over  him  the 
21 


322 

great  influence  which  she  was  thought  to  have  possessed.  The 
marriage  ceremony  was  performed  by  General  Polk,  by  virtue  of 
his  commission  as  Bishop,  but  in  full  Lieutenant  General's 
uniform.  The  residence  of  the  Honorable  Charles  Heady,  father 
of  the  bride,  held  a  happy  assembly  that  night — it  was  one  of  a 
very  few  scenes  of  happiness  which  that  house  was  destined  to 
witness,  before  its  olden  memories  of  joy  and  gayety  were  to 
give  place  to  heavy  sorrow  and  the  harsh  insolence  of  the  invader. 
The  bridegroom's  friends  and  brothers-in-arms,  and  the  Com- 
mander-m-Cliief,  and  Generals  Ilardee,  Cheatham  and  Breckin- 
ridgc  felt  called  upon  to  stand  by  him  on  this  occasion. 

Greenfell  was  in  a  high  state  of  delight ;  although  he  had 
regretted  General  Morgan's  marriage — thinking  that  it  would 
render  him  less  enterprising — he  declared,  that  a  wedding,  at 
which  an  Episcopal  bishop-militant,  clad  in  general's  uniform, 
officiated,  and  the  chief  of  an  army  and  his  corps  commanders 
were  guests,  certainly  ought  not  to  soften  a  soldier's  temper. 
On  his  way  home  that  night  he  sang  Moorish  songs,  with  a 
French  accent,  to  English  airs,  and  was  as  mild  and  agreeable  as 
if  some  one  was  going  to  be  killed. 

The  seven  regiments  which  composed  the  brigade,  represented 
an  aggregate  force  of  over  four  thousand  in  camp — when  they 
were  gotten  together,  which  was  about  the  18th,  the  Second 
Kentucky  returning  then  from  Fayetteville.  Several  hundred 
men,  however,  were  dismounted,  and  totally  unarmed  and  un 
equipped.  This  force  was  so  unwieldy,  as  one  brigade,  that 
General  Morgan  determined  to  divide  it  into  two  parts,  which 
should  be  organized  in  all  respects  as  two  brigades,  and  should 
Jack  but  the  sanction  of  the  General  commanding  (which  he 
.hoped  to  obtain),  to  be  such  in  reality.  He  accordingly  in- 
,  dicated  as  the  commanders  of  the  two  brigades  (as  I  shall  call 
.them  for  the  sake  of  convenience),  Colonel  Breckinridge  and  my 
self.  There  was  no  doubt  of  Colonel  A.  R.  Johnson's  seniority 
to.  all  the  other  colonels,  but,  for  some  reason,  he  positively  de- 


MILITARY    IRREGULARITIES. 


323 


clined  to  accept  the   command  of  either  brigade,  and  signified 
his  willingness  to  serve  in  a  subordinate  capacity. 

Instances  of  senior  officers  waiving  rank,  and  consenting  to 
serve  under  their  juniors,  were  not  unfrequent  at  that  period,  and 
continued  to  occur  in  Morgan's  command.  Such  conduct  was 
lompted  by  the  manliest  and  most  patriotic  mo- 
not  help  thinking  that  it  is  an  unsafe  practice, 
r  lead  to  very  great  injuries  to  the  service  in 
ly  obtains.  The  spirit  which  prompted  many 
nee,  who  outranked  General  Morgan),  to  serve 
Iliim,  because  of  the  influence  upon  the  troops 
lition,  and  because  of  his  recognized  skill,  was 
r  as  well  as  a  chivalric  one.  But,  except  where 
ter  and  influence  of  the  junior,  are  as  rare  as 
d  as  commanding  as  in  the  case  of  Morgan  or 
'tter  for  the  senior  to  assume  his  legal  position. 
T  resulted  from  this  practice  in  our  command, 
was  one  which  had  a  "  genius  and  constitu- 
but,  chiefly  because  (I  do  not  think  I  am 
ily  of  my  old  comrades),  it  was  officered  by  a 
•markable  intelligence,  and  singular  directness 
;th  of  character.  But,  supposing  this  custom 
r,  how  apparent  are  the  results  prejudicial  to 
iciency,  which  may  be  naturally,  expected  to 


324  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

of  incompetency  in  the  conduct  of  the  other — and  a  correspond 
ing  jealousy  may  be  thus  awakened  in  the  mind  of  the  junior  com 
manding — and  that  harmony  which  is  so  necessary  to  efficiency 
may  become  impaired.  Independently  of  these  considerations, 
there  is  the  fact  that  this  condition  is  abnormal  and  highly  irre 
gular.  The  men  and  subaltern  officers  will  recognize  it  to  be  so, 
and  it  may  become  more  difficult  to  maintain  the  requisite  subor 
dination  and  respect  for  rank.  It  is  a  great  deal  better  than  to 
follow  this  practice — to  adopt  and  run  almost  to  extremes,  the 
system  of  rapid  promotion  for  merit  and  distinguished  conduct. 
The  probable  evils  of  the  one  practice,  which  have  been  indicated, 
can  prevail  under  no  system  where  every  man  fills  his  legitimate 
place.  There  was  some  discussion  as  to  whether  Cluke  or  Breck- 
inridge  should  command  one  of  the  brigades,  after  Johnson  de 
clined.  It  was  a  mooted  question,  whether  Cluke's  rank  as 
Colonel  dated  from  the  period  at  which  he  received  his  commis 
sion  to  raise  a  regiment,  or  from  the  period  at  which  his  regi 
ment  became  filled.  In  the  former  case,  he  would  rank 
Breckinridge ;  in  the  latter,  he  would  not.  None  of  us,  then, 
(with  the  exception  of  Johnson),  had  received  our  commissions, 
although  our  rank  was  recognized. 

There  was  no  wrangle  for  the  position,  however,  between 
these  officers,  as  might  be  inferred  from  my  language.  On  the 
contrary,  each  at  first  declined,  and  urged  the  appointment  of 
the  other.  General  Morgan  settled  the  matter  by  appointing 
Breckinridge. 

The  first  brigade  (mine)  was  composed  of  the  Second  Ken 
tucky,  Lieut.-Colonel  Hutchinson,  commanding;  Gano's  regi 
ment,  the  Third  Kentucky,  Lieut.-Colonel  Huffman  commanding 
(Gano  was  absent  on  furlough) ;  Cluke's  regiment,  the  Eighth 
Kentucky,  Colonel  Leroy  S.  Cluke  commanding ;  Palmer's  battery 
of  four  pieces  (two  twelve-pounder  howitzers,  and  two  six-pounder 
guns,)  was  attached  to  this  brigade.  The  second  brigade  (Breck- 
inridge's)  was  composed  of  his  own  regiment,  the  Ninth  Kentucky, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Stoner  commanding;  Johnson's  regiment, 


STRENGTH    OF   MORGAN'S   DIVISION.  325 

the  Tenth  Kentucky,  Colonel  Johnson  commanding  ;  Chenault's 
regiment,  the  Eleventh  Kentucky,  Colonel  Chenault  command- 
.  ing ;  and  Bennett's  regiment,  the  Fourteenth  Tennessee,  Colonel 
Bennett  commanding.  To  this  brigade  was  attached  one  three- 
inch  Parrot,  commanded  by  Captain  White,  and  the  two  moun 
tain  howitzers  under  Lieutenant  Corbett. 

On  the  21st  of  December,  the  division  was  in  camp  at  and 
around  Alexandria.  The  first  brigade  was  reviewed  on  that 
day,  and  numbered,  of  cavalry,  eighteen  hundred  effective  men. 
There  were  in  its  ranks  more  men  than  that  number.  The 
Second  Kentucky  mustered  seven  hundred  and  forty,  and  the 
other  two  regiments  about  six  hundred  each.  There  were  in  this 
brigade,  however,  nearly  two  hundred  men  unarmed  but  mounted. 
The  entire  strength  of  the  brigade,,  of  armed  and  unarmed  men, 
including  Palmer's  battery,  was  very  little  short  of  two  thousand 
and  one  hundred  men.  The  second  brigade  was,  including  ar 
tillerists,  about  eighteen  hundred  strong,  but  it,  too,  had  some 
unarmed  men  in  its  ranks.  These  fello\vs  without  guns  were 
not  so  useless  as  might  be  imagined,  for  (when  it  was  satisfac 
torily  ascertained  that  it  was  not  their  own  fault  that  they  were 
unarmed,  and  that  they  could  be  trusted)  they  were  employed 
as  horse-holders.  The  division,  therefore,  including  Quirk's 
"scouts,"  reporting  to  division  headquarters,  numbered  quite 
three  thousand  and  nine  hundred.  In  General  Morgan's  report 
of  the  expedition  undertaken  into  Kentucky  immediately  after  this 
organization,  the  strength  of  the  division  is  estimated  at  thirty- 
one  hundred  armed  men.  This  was  a  mistake  upon  the  part  of 
his  Adjutant-General,  which  I  sought  to  correct  at  the  time. 
The  proportion  of  men  without  guns  was  nothing  like  so  large. 
Just  before  the  march  was  taken  up  for  Kentucky  from  Alex 
andria,  Colonel  Greenfell,  still  acting  as  General  Morgan's  Ad 
jutant-General  up  to  that  date,  resigned  his  position  and  declined 
to  accompany  him  upon  the  expedition.  The  cause  of  his  dis 
satisfaction  was  the  appointment  of  Breckinridge  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  second  brigade.  A  great  many  believed  and  said  that 


326  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

he  was  disappointed  at  not  obtaining  command  of  the  brigade  him 
self,  but  I  am  satisfied  that  such  was  not  the  case.  It  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  a  practical  man  can  behave  as  he  did  on  that 
occasion,  unless  his  own  interests,  or  those  of  a  friend,  are  in 
volved,  and  there  is,  consequently,  a  general  disposition  to  at 
tribute  such  conduct  to  interested  motives.  I  talked  to  Greenfell, 
and  believe  that  he  had,  from  some  cause,  conceived  a  violent 
dislike  for  Breckinridge,  and,  moreover,  he  had  come  to  regard 
an  interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  command  as  his  right.  At 
any  rate  when  General  Morgan  declined  to  accept  his  suggestions 
upon  the  subject,  and  requested  him  to  desist  from  agitating  it, 
he  became  so  thoroughly  disgusted  that  he  declined  to  act  longer 
with  the  command.  As  he  was  not  regularly  in  the  Confederate 
service,  there  was  nothing  to  be  done  but  let  him  go  when  and 
where  he  pleased. 

Captain  W.  M.  Maginis,  Acting  Assistant  Adjutant- General 
of  the  second  brigade,  was  immediately  appointed  in  his  stead. 
This  officer  was  very  young,  but  had  seen  a  great  deal  of  arduous 
service.  He  had  served  in  the  infantry  for  more  than  a  year ; 
he  had  seen  Belmont,  Shiloh,  Farmington,  and  Perryville,  had 
behaved  with  the  greatest  gallantry,  and  had  won  the  enco 
miums  of  his  chiefs.  He  had  been  assigned  to  staff  duty  just 
before  he  came  to  us,  and  had  acted  in  the  capacity  of  ordnance 
officer,  I  believe,  for  General  Walthall,  an  officer  who,  of  the  first 
class  himself,  would  have  only  the  same  sort  about  him.  He 
had  been  assigned  upon  General  Morgan's  application  (at  my 
urgent  request)  to  his  command,  and,  as  has  been  stated,  was 
on  duty  with  the  first  brigade,  when  General  Morgan  suddenly 
stood  in  need  of  an  Assistant  Adjutant- General,  and  took  him, 
intending  to  keep  him  temporarily.  He  was  so  much  pleased 
with  him  that,  upon  his  return  from  this  expedition,  he  procured 
his  commission  in  the  Adjutant  and  Inspector  General's  Depart 
ment,  and  his  assignment  to  him.  He  remained  with  General 
Morgan  until  his  death. 

On  the  morning  of  December  22d,  the  division  took  up  its 


ANOTHER  VISIT   HOME.  327 

march  for  Kentucky.  General  Bragg  desired  that  the  roads 
which  Rosecrans  had  repaired  in  rear  should  again  be  broken, 
and  the  latter' s  communications  with  Louisville  destroyed.  The 
service  was  an  important  one ;  it  was  meet  that,  for  many  rea 
sons,  the  expedition,  the  first  Confederate  movement  into  Ken 
tucky  since  Bragg's  retreat,  should  be  a  brilliant  one.  General 
Morgan  had  under  his  command  at  that  time  the  largest  force 
he  ever  handled,  previously  or  afterward,  and  he  would  not  have 
permitted  them  to  have  stopped  him.  A  writer  from  whom  I  have 
frequenly  had  occasion  to  quote,  gives  a  description  of  the  com 
mencement  of  the  march,  so  spirited  and  so  graphic,  that  it  will 
serve  my  purpose  better  than  any  that  I  can  write  myself.  He 
says : 

"  The  regiments  had  been  carefully  inspected  by  the  Surgeons 
and  Inspectors,  and  every  sick  soldier  and  disabled  horse  had 
been  taken  from  their  regiments,  and  the  stout  men  and  servicea 
ble  horses  only  were  permitted  to  accompany  the  expedition. 
The  men  were  never  in  higher  spirits  or  more  joyous  humor; 
well  armed,  well  mounted,  in  good  discipline,  with  perfect  confi 
dence  in  their  commander,  and  with  hearts  longing  for  the  hills 
—and  valleys,  the  blue-grass  and  woods  of  dear  old  Kentucky  ; 
they  made  the  air  vocal  with  their  cheers  and  laughter  and  songs 
and  sallies  of  wit.  The  division  had  never  operated  together 
before  the  brigades  had  first  been  organized,  therefore  every 
regiment  was  filled  with  the  spirit  of  emulation,  and  every  man 
was  determined  to  make  his  the  crack  regiment  of  Morgan's 
cavalry.  It  was  a  magnificent  body  of  men — the  pick  of  the 
youth  of  Kentucky.  No  commander  ever  led  a  nobler  corps — 
no  corps  was  ever  more  nobly  led.  It  was  splendidly  officered 
by  gallant,  dashing,  skillful  men  in  the  flush  of  early  manhood; 
for  of  the  seven  Colonels  who  commanded  those  seven  regiments, 
five  became  brigade  commanders — the  other  two  gave  their  lives 
to  the  cause — Colonel  Bennett  dying  early  in  January,  1863, 
of  a  disease  contracted  while  in  the  army,  and  Colonel  Chenault 
being  killed  on  July  4,  1863,  gallantly  leading  his  men  in  a 


328  HISTORY 

fruitless  charge  upon  breastworks  at  Green  river  bridge.  This 
December  morning  was  a  mild,  beautiful  fall  day;  clear,  cloud 
less  sky  ;  bright  sun ;  the  camps  in  cedar  evergreens,  where  the 
birds  chirped  and  twittered;  it  felt  and  looked  like  spring.  The 
reveille  sounded  before  day-break;  the  horses  were  fed,  break 
fast  gotten.  Very  early  came  the  orders  from  General  Morgan 
announcing  the  organization  of  the  brigades,  intimating  the  ob 
jects  of  the  expedition,  and  ordering  the  -column  to  move  at 
nine  o'clock.  Duke  in  advance.  As  the  order  was  read  to  a 
regiment  the  utmost  deathless  silence  of  disciplined  soldiers 
standing  at  attention  was  broken  only  by  the  clear  voice  of  the 
Adjutant  reading  the  precise  but  stirring  words  of  the  beloved 
hero-chieftain ;  then  came  the  sharp  word  of  command  dismiss 
ing  the  parade ;  and  the  woods  trembled  with  the  wild  hurrahs 
of  the  half  crazy  men,  and  regiment  answered  regiment,  cheer 
re-echoed  cheer,  over  the  wide  encampment.  Soon  came  Duke, 
and  his  staff,  and  his  column — his  own  old  gallant  regiment  at 
the  head — and  slowly  regiment  after  regiment  filed  out  of  the 
woods  into  the  road,  lengthening  the  long  column. 

"  After  some  two  hours  march,  a  cheer  began  in  the  extreme 
rear  and  rapidly  came  forward,  increasing  in  volume  and  enthu 
siasm,  and  soon  General  Morgan  dashed  by,  with  his  hat  in  his 
hand,  bowing  and  smiling  his  thanks  for  these  flattering  cheers, 
followed  by  a  large  and  well  mounted  staff.  Did  you  ever  see 
Morgan  on  horseback  ?  If  not,  you  missed  one  of  the  most  im 
pressive  figures  of  the  war.  Perhaps  no  General  in  either  army 
surpassed  him  in  the  striking  proportion  and  grace  of  his  per 
son,  and  the  ease  and  grace  of  his  horsemanship.  Over  six  feet/ 
in  hight,  straight  as  an  Indian,  exquisitely  proportioned,  with 
the  air  and  manner  of  a  cultivated  and  polished  gentleman,  and 
the  bearing  of  a  soldier,  always  handsomely  and  tastefully 
dressed,  and  elegantly  mounted,  he  was  the  picture  of  the  su 
perb  cavalry  officer.  Just  now  he  was  in  the  hight  of  his  fame 
and  happiness ;  married  only  ten  days  before  to  an  accomplished 
lady,  made  Brigadier  justly  but  very  tardily ;  in  command  of 


FIGHT   AT   GLASGOW.  329 

the  finest  cavalry  division  in  the  Southern  army ;  beloved  almost 
to  idolatry  by  his  men,  and  returning  their  devotion  by  an  ex 
travagant  confidence  in  their  valor  and  prowess ;  conscious  of 
his  own  great  powers,  yet  wearing  his  honors  with  the  most  ad 
mirable  modesty,  and  just  starting  upon  a  carefully  conceived 
but  daring  expedition,  he  was  perhaps  in  the  zenith  of  his  fame,. 
and  though  he  added  many  a  green  leaf  to  his  chaplct,  many  a 
bright  page  to  his  history,  yet  his  future  was  embittered  by  the 
envy,  jealously,  and  hatred  that  then  were  not  heard." 

Marching  all  day  the  column  reached  Sand  Shoals  ford  on  the 
Cumberland  just  before  dark.  The  first  brigade  crossed,  and 
encamped  for  the  night  on  the  northern  bank  of  the  river.  The 
second  brigade  encamped  between  the  Caney  fork  and  the  Cum 
berland. 

On  the  next  day,  moving  at  daylight,  a  march  of  some  thirty 
miles  was  accomplished;  it  was  impossible  to  march  faster  than 
this,  and  keep  the  guns  up.  On  the  24th,  the  division  went  into 
camp  within  five  miles  of  Glasgow.  Breckinridge  sent  Captain 
Jones  of  Company  A,  Ninth  Kentucky  to  discover  if  all  was 
clear  in  Glasgow,  and  I  received  instructions  to  support  him 
with  two  companies  under  Major  Steele  of  the  Third  Kentucky 
who  was  given  one  of  the  little  howitzers.  Jones  reached  the 
town  after  dark,  and  just  as  he  entered  it  a  Michigan  battalion 
came  into  it  also  from  the  other  side.  Captain  Jones  encoun 
tered  this  battalion  in  the  center  of  the  town,  and  in  the  skir 
mish  which  ensued  he  was  mortally  wounded.  He  was  an  ex 
cellent  officer  and  as  brave  as  steel.  Poor  Will  Webb  was 
also  mortally  wounded — only  a  private  soldier,  but  a  cultivated 
and  a  thorough  gentleman ;  brave,  and  kindly,  and  genial.  A 
truer  heart  never  beat  in  a  soldier's  bosom,  and  a  nobler  soul 
was  never  released  by  a  soldier's  death.  First  Lieutenant  Sam 
uel  0.  Peyton  was  severely  wounded — shot  in  the  arm  and  in 
the  thigh.  He  was  surrounded  by  foes  who  pressed  him  hard, 
after  he  was  wounded,  to  capture  him.  He  shot  one  assailant, 
and  grappling  with  another,  brought  him  to  the  ground  and  cut 


330  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

his  throat  with  a  pocket  knife.  Lieutenant  Peyton  was  by  birth, 
education,  arid  character  a  thorough  gentleman.  Perfectly 
good  natured  and  inoffensive — except  when  provoked  or  at 
tacked — and  then — he  dispatched  his  affair  and  his  man  in  a 
quiet,  expeditious  and  thorough  manner.  The  Federal  cavalry 
retreated  from  the  town  by  the  Louisville  pike. 

On  the  next  morning — Christmas — the,division  moved  by  the 
Louisville  pike.  Captain  Quirk,  supported  by  Lieutenant  Hays 
with  the  advance-guard  of  the  first  brigade,  fifty  strong,  cleared  the 
road  of  some  Federal  cavalry,  which  tried  to  contest  our  advance, 
driving  it  so  rapidly,  that  the  column  had  neither  to  delay  its 
march,  nor  make  any  formation  for  fight.  In  the  course  of  the 
day,  Quirk  charged  a  battalion,  dismounted,  and  formed  across 
the  road.  He  went  through  them,  and  as  he  dashed  back  again, 
with  his  head  bent  low,  he  caught  two  balls  on  the  top  of  it, 
which,  singularly  (coming  from  different  directions),  traced  a  neat 
and  accurate  angle  upon  his  scalp. 

Although  the  wounds  were  not  serious  at  all,  they  would  have 
stunned  most  men ;  but  a  head  built  in  County  Kerry,  with  es 
pecial  reference  to  shillelagh  practice,  scorned  to  be  affected  by 
such  trifles.  Breckinridge  sent  Johnson's  regiment  during  the 
day  toward  Munfordsville,  to  induce  the  belief  that  we  were 
going  to  attack  that  place.  Colonel  Johnson  executed  his  mis 
sion  with  perfect  success.  That  night  we  crossed  Green  river. 
The  first  brigade  being  in  advance  had  little  trouble  compara 
tively,  although  Captain  Palmer  had  to  exert  energy  and  skill  to 
get  his  battery  promptly  across;  but  the  second  brigade  reaching 
the  bank  of  the  river  late  at  night  had  great  difficulty  in  get 


ting  across. 


The  division  encamped  in  the  latter  part  of  the  night  at  Ham- 
rnondsville.  A  day  before,  just  upon  the  bank  of  the  river,  the 
most  enormous  wagon,  perhaps,  ever  seen  in  the  State  of  Ken 
tucky,  was  captured.  It  was  loaded  with  an  almost  fabulous 
amount  and  variety  of  Christmas  nicknacks ;  some  enterpris 
ing  settler  had  prepared  it  for  the  Glasgow  market,  intending 


GALLANT   DEFENSE.  331 

to  make  his  fortune  with  it.  It  was  emptied  at  an  earlier  date, 
in  shorter  time,  and  by  customers  who  proposed  to  themselves  a 
much  longer  credit  than  he  anticipated.  There  was  enough  in 
it  to  furnish  every  mess  in  the  division  something  to  eke  out  a 
Christmas  supper  with. 

On  the  next  day  the  column  resumed  its  march  amid  the 
steadily  pouring  rain,  and  moved  through  mud  which  threatened 
to  ingulf  every  thing,  toward  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  rail 
road.  Hutchinson  was  sent,  with  several  companies  of  the 
Second  Kentucky,  and  the  Third  Kentucky,  to  destroy  the 
bridge  at  Bacon  creek.  There  was  not  more  than  one  hundred 
men,  at  the  most,  in  the  stockade  which  protected  the  bridges, 
and  hejwas  expected  to  reduce  the  stockade  with  the  two  pieces 
of  artillery,  which  he  carried  with  him,  but  there  was  a  large 
force  at  Munfordsville,  only  eight  miles  from  Bacon  creek, 
and  General  Morgan  gave  him  troops  enough  to  repulse  any 
movement  of  the  enemy  from  Munfordsville  to  save  the  bridge. 
A  battalion  of  cavalry  came  out  from  Munfordsville,  but  was 
easily  driven  back  by  Companies  B  and  D,  of  the  Second  Ken 
tucky,  under  Captain  Castleman.  Although  severely  shelled, 
the  garrison  held  out  stubbornly,  rejecting  every  demand  for 
their  surrender.  Hutchinson  became  impatient,  which  was  his 
only  fault  as  an  officer,  and  ordered  the  bridge  to  be  fired  at  all 
hazards — it  was  within  less  than  a  hundred  yards  of  the  stockade, 
and  commanded  by  the  rifles  of  the  garrison.  It  was  partially 
set  on  fire,  but  the  rain  would  extinguish  it  unless  constantly 
supplied  with  fuel.  Several  were  wounded  in  the  attempt,  and 
Captain  Wolfe,  of  the  Third  Kentucky,  who  boldly  mounted  the 
bridge,  was  shot  in  the  head,  and  lay  unconscious  for  two  hours, 
every  one  thinking  him  dead,  until  the  beating  rain  reviving 
him,  he  returned  to  duty,  suffering  no  further  inconvenience. 
Some  of  the  men  got  behind  the  abutment  of  the  bridge,  and 
thrust  lighted  pieces  of  wood  upon  it,  which  the  men  in  the 
stockade  frequently  shot  away.  At  length  General  Morgan  ar 
rived  upon  the  ground,  and  sent  a  message  to  the  garrison  in 


332  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALUY. 


his  own  name,  offering  them  liberal  terms  if  they  would  sur 
render.  As  soon  as  they  were  satisfied  that  it  was  indeed 
Morgan  who  confronted  them,  they  surrendered.  This  ^Yas  a 
very  obstinate  defense.  A  number  of  shells  burst  within  the 
stockade.  Some  shots  penetrated  the  walls  and  an  old  bam, 
which  had  been  foolishly  included  within  the  work,  was  knocked 
to  pieces,  the  falling  timbers  stunning  some  of  the  men. 

The   stockade   at  Nolin   surrendered  to   me  without  a  fin-lit. 

o 

The  commandant  agreed  to  surrender  if  I  would  show  him  a 
certain  number  of  pieces  of  artillery.  They  were  shown  him, 
but  when  I  pressed  him  to  comply  with  his  part  of  the  bargain, 
he  hesitated,  and  said  he  would  return  and  consult  his  officers. 
I  think  that  (as  two  of  the  pieces  shown  him  were  the  little 
howitzers,  which  I  happened  to  have  temporarily)  he  thought  he 
could  hold  out  for  a  while,  and  gild  his  surrender  with  a  fight. 
He  was  permitted  to  return,  but  not  until,  in  his  presence,  the 
artillery  was  planted  close  to  the  work,  and  the  riflemen  posted 
to  command,  as  well  as  possible,  the  loop-holes.  He  came  to 
us  again,  in  a  few  minutes,  with  a  surrender.  The  Nolin  bridge 
was  at  once  destroyed,  and  also  several  culverts  and  cow-gaps 
within  three  or  four  miles  of  that  point. 

The  division  encamped  that  night  within  six  miles  of  Eliza- 
bethtown.  On  the  morning  of  the  27th,  the  division  moved 
upon  Elizabethtown,  This  place  was  held  by  about  six  hundred 
men,  under  a  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smith.  As  we  neared  the 
town,  a  note  was  brought  to  General  Morgan,  from  Colonel 
Smith,  who  stated  that  he  accurately  knew  his  (Morgan's) 
strength,  had  him  surrounded,  and  could  compel  his  surrender, 
and  that  he  (Smith)  trusted  that  a  prompt  capitulation  would 
spare  him  the  disagreeable  necessity  of  using  force.  The  mis 
sive  containing  this  proposal — the  most  sublimely  audacious  I 
ever  knew  to  emanate  from  a  Federal  officer,  who,  as  a  class, 
rarely  trusted  to  audacity  and  bluff,  but  to  odds  and  the  con- 
cours  of  force — this  admirable  document  was  brought  by  a 
Dutch  Corporal,  who  spoke  very  uncertain  English,  but  was 


CAPTURE    OF   ELIZABETHTOW]ST.  333 


positive  on  the  point  of  surrender.  General  Morgan  admired 
the  spirit  which  dictated  this  bold  effort  at  bluffing,  but  returned 
for  answer  an  assurance  that  he  knew  exactly  the  strength  of 
the  Federal  force  in  the  town,  and  that  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Smith  was  in  error,  in  supposing  that  he  (Smith)  had  him 
(Morgan)  surrounded ;  that,  on  the  contrary,  he  had  the  honor 
to  state,  the  position  of  the  respective  forces  was  exactly  the 
reverse.  He  concluded  by  demanding  him  to  surrender.  Colo 
nel  Smith  replied  that  it  was  "  the  business  of  an  United  States 
officer  to  fight,  and  not  to  surrender."  During  the  parley,  the 
troops  had  been  placed  in  position.  Breckinridge  was  given 
the  left  of  the  road,  and  the  first  brigade  the  right.  I  dis 
mounted  Cluke's  regiment,  and  moved  it  upon  the  town,  with  its 
left  flank  keeping  close  to  the  road.  I  threw  several  companies, 
mounted,  to  the  extreme  right  of  my  line,  and  the  rear  of  the 
town.  Breckinridge  deployed  his  own  regiment,  under  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  Stoner,  immediately  on  the  left  of  the  road, 
stretching  mounted  companies  also  to  his  left,  and  around  the 
town. 

The  bulk  of  both  brigades  was  held  in  reserve.  The  Parrot 
gun  was  placed  in  the  pike;  it  was  opened  as  soon  as  the  last 
message  from  Colonel  Smith  was  received ;  and,  as  suddenly  as 
if  its  flash  had  ignited  them,  Palmer's  four  guns  roared  out 
from  the  hill  on  the  left  of  the  road,  about  six  hundred  yards 
from  the  town,  where  General  Morgan  himself  was  superintend 
ing  their  fire.  Cluke  moved  warily,  as  two  or  three  stockades 
were  just  in  his  front,  which  were  thought  to  be  occupied.  When 
he  entered  the  town,  he  had  little  fighting  to  do,  and  that  on  the 
extreme  right.  Stoner  dashed  in  on  the  left  with  the  Ninth 
Kentucky,  at  a  swift  run.  He  burst  into  the  houses  occupied  by 
the  enemy  at  the  edge  of  the  town,  and  with  slight  loss,  com 
pelled  the  inmates  to  surrender.  The  enemy  had  no  artillery, 
and  ours  was  battering  the  bricks  about  their  heads  in  fine  style. 
Palmer,  who  was  a  capital  officer — cool  and  clearheaded — con 
centrated  his  fire  upon  the  building  where  the  flag  floated,  and 


HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

the  enemy  seemed  thickest,  and  moved  his  six  pounders  into  the 
very  edge  of  the  town.  I  sent  for  one  of  the  howitzers,  and 
when  it  came  under  Lieutenant  Corbett,  it  was  posted  upon  the 
railroad  embankment,  where  it  crossed  the  road.  Here  it  played 
like  a  fire  engine  upon  the  headquarters  building.  Breck  in  ridge 
posted  Company  A,  of  his  regiment,  to  protect  the  howitzer, 
making  the  men  lie  down  behind  the  embankment. 

The  enemy  could  not  well  fire  upon  the  gunners  from  the  win 
dows,  on  account  of  the  situation  of  the  piece,  but  after  each  dis 
charge  would  rush  out  into  the  street  and  open  upon  them. 
Then  the  company  lying  behind  the  embankment  would 
retaliate  on  the  enemy  in  a  style  which  took  away  their  appetite 
for  the  game.  It  happened,  however,  that  a  staff  officer  of  Gen 
eral  Morgan,  passed  that  way,  and  conceiving  that  this  company 
was  doing  no  good,  ordered  it,  with  more  zeal  than  discretion,  to 
charge.  The  men  instinctively  obeyed.  As  they  ran  forward, 
they  came  within  fair  view  of  the  windows,  and  a  heavy  volley 
was  opened  upon  them,  fortunately  doing  little  damage.  Their 
officers,  knowing  that  the  man  who  gave  the  order,  had  no  right 
to  give  it,  called  them  back,  and  they  returned  in  some  confu 
sion,  the  enemy  seized  the  moment,  and  flocking  out  of  the 
houses,  poured  a  sweeping  fire  down  the  street.  The  gunners 
were  driven  away  from  the  howitzers,  and  two  or  three  hit. 
Lieutenant  Corbett,  however,  maintained  his  place,  seated  on  the 
carriage,  while  the  bullets  were  actually  hopping  from  the  rein 
force  of  the  piece.  He  soon  called  his  men  back,  and  resumed 
his  fire. 

It  was  as  fine  an  exhibition  of  courage  as  I  ever  saw.  Shortly 
after  this,  there  seemed  to  be  a  commotion  among  the  garrison, 
and  the  white  flag  was  shown  from  ong  of  the  houses.  Major 
Llewellyn,  Division  Quartermaster,  immediately  galloped  into 
the  town,  reckless  of  the  firing,  waving  a  white  handkerchief. 
Colonel  Smith  was  not  ready  to  surrender,  but  his  men  did  not 
wait  on  him  and  poured  out  of  the  houses  and  threw  down  their 
arms.  Among  the  fruits  of  this  victory,  were,  six  hundred  fine 


WORKING    OX   THE   RAILROAD.  335 

rifles,  more  than  enough  to  arm  all  of  our  men  who  were  with 
out  guns.  The  entire  garrison  was  captured.  Some  valuable 
stores  were  also  taken.  On  the  next  day,  the  28th,  the  command 
moved  leisurely  along  the  railroad,  destroying  it  thoroughly.  The 
principal  objects  of  the  expedition,  were  the  great  trestle  works 
at  Muldraugh's  hill,  only  a  short  distance  apart.  The  second  bri 
gade  captured  the  garrison  defending  the  lower  trestle  six  hundred 
strong;  the  first  brigade  captured  the  garrison  of  the  upper  tres 
tle  two  hundred  strong.  Both  of  the  immense  structures  were 
destroyed  and  hours  were  required  to  thoroughly  burn  them. 
These  trestles  were,  respectively,  eighty  or  ninety  feet  high 
— and  each,  five  hundred  feet  long. 

Cane  Run  bridge,  within  twenty-eight  miles  of  Louisville,  was 
destroyed  by  a  scouting  party.  Two  bridges  on  the  Lebanon 
branch,  recently  reconstructed,  were  also  burned.  Altogether, 
General  Morgan  destroyed  on  this  expedition,  two  thousand  two 
hundred- and  fifty  feet  of  bridging,  three  depots,  three  water  sta 
tions,  and  a  number  of  culverts  and  cattle-guards.  The  impres 
sion  which  prevails  in  some  quarters,  that  General  Morgan  left 
the  road  on  account  of  the  pursuit  of  Colonel  Harlan,  is  entirely 
erroneous.  "With  the  destruction  of  the  great  trestles  at  Mul 
draugh's  hill,  his  contract  with  the  road  expired  and  he  prepared 
to  return.  He  would  have  liked  to  have  paid  the  region  about 
Lexington  another  visit,  but  General  Bragg  had  urged  him  not 
to  delay  his  return.  Harlan  was  moving  slowly  after  us ;  but  for 
the  delay  consequent  upon  the  destruction  o't  the  road,  he  would 
never  have  gotten  near  us  and,  but  for  an  accident,  he  would 
never  have  caught  up  with  any  portion  of  the  column,  after  we 
had  quitted  work  on  the  railroad. 

,  On  the  night  of  the  28th,  the  division  had  encamped  on  the 
southern  bank  of  the  Rolling  fork.  On  the  morning  of  the 
29th,  it  commenced  crossing  that  stream,  which  was  much 
swollen.  The  bulk  of  the  troops  and  the  artillery  were  crossed 
at  a  ford  a  mile  or  two  above  the  point  at  which  the  road  from 
Elizabethtown  to  Bardstown  along  which  we  had  been  encamped. 


336  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

crosses  the  Rolling  fork.  The  pickets,  rear-guard,  and  some  de 
tachments,  left  in  the  rear  for  various  purposes,  in  all  about 
three  hundred  men,  were  collected  to  cross  at  two  fords — deep 
and  difficult  to  approach  and  to  emerge  from.  Cluke's  regiment, 
with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  had  been  sent  under  Major  Bullock 
to  burn  the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Rolling  fork,  five  miles  be 
low  the  point  where  we  were.  A  court-martial  had  been  in 
session  for  several  days,  trying  Lieutenant  Colonel  Huffman,  for 
alleged  violations  of  the  terms  granted  by  General  Morgan  to 
the  prisoners  at  the  surrender  of  the  Bacon  creek  stockade. 

Both  brigade  commanders,  and  three  regimental  commanders, 
Cluke,  Hutchinson,  and  Stoner,  were  officers  or  members  of  this 
court.  Just  after  the  court  had  finally  adjourned,  acquitting 
Colonel  Huffman,  and  we  were  leaving  a  brick  house,  on  the 
southern  side  of  the  river  and  about  six  hundred  yards  from 
its  bank,  where  our  last  session  had  been  held,  the  bursting 
of  a  shell  a  mile  or  two  in  the  rear  caught  our  ears.  A  few 
videttes  had  been  left  there  until  every  thing  should  have 
gotten  fairly  across.  Some  of  them  were  captured ;  others 
brought  the  information  that  the  enemy  was  approaching. 
This  was  about  eleven  A.  M.  We  knew  that  a  force  of  infantry 
and  cavalry  was  cautiously  following  us,  but  did  not  know  that 
it  was  so  near.  It  was  at  once  decided  to  throw  into  line  the 
men  who  had  not  yet  crossed,  and  hold  the  fords,  if  possible, 
until  Cluke's  regiment  could  be  brought  back.  If  we  crossed 
the  river  leaving  that  regiment  on  the  southern  side,  and  it  did 
not  succeed  in  crossing,  or  if  it  crossed  immediately  and  yet 
the  enemy  pressed  on  vigorously  after  us?  beating  it  to  Bards- 
town — in  either  event  it  would  be  cut  off  from  us,  and  its  cap 
ture  even  would  be  probable.  No  one  knew  whether  there  was 
a  ford  lower  down  at  which  it  could  cross,  and  all  feared  that  if 
we  retreated  promptly  the  enemy  would  closely  follow  us.  I, 
therefore,  sent  a  message  to  General  Morgan,  informing  him  of 
what  was  decided  upon,  and  also  sent  a  courier  to  Major  Bullock, 
directing  him  to  return  with  the  regiment  as  soon  as  possible. 


BATTLE  OF  ROLLING  FORK.  337 

The  ground  on  which  we  were  posted  was  favorable  to  the  kind 
of  game  we  were  going  to  play.  Upon  each  flank  were  thick 
woods  extending  for  more  than  a  mile  back  from  the  river.  Be 
tween  these  woods  was  a  large  meadow,  some  three  hundred 
yards  wide,  and  stretching  from  the  river  bank  for  six  or  eight 
hundred  yards  to  a  woods  again  in  the  back  ground,  and  which 
almost  united  the  other  two.  In  this  meadow  and  some  two 
hundred  yards  from  tfie  river  was  a  singular  and  sudden  depres 
sion  like  a  terrace,  running  straight  across  it.  Behind  this  the 
men  who  were  posted  in  the  meadow  were  as  well  protected  as 
if  they  had  been  behind  an  earthwork.  On  the  left  the  ground 
was  so  rugged  as  well  as  so  wooded  that  the  position  there  was 
almost  impregnable.  There  was,  however,  no  adequate  protec 
tion  for  the  horses  afforded  at  any  point  of  the  line  except  the 
extreme  left. 

The  Federal  force  advancing  upon  us  consisted  of  nearly  five 
thousand  infantry,  two  thousand  cavalry,  and  several  pieces  of 
artillery.  This  force,  which,  if  handled  vigorously  and  skillfully, 
if  its  march  had  even  been  steadily  kept  up,  would  have,  in  spite 
of  every  effort  we  could  have  made,  swept  us  into  the  turbid 
river  at  our  backs,  approached  cautiously  and  very  slowly. 
Fortunate  as  this  was  for  us — indeed,  it  was  all  that  saved  us — 
the  suspense  yet  became  so  sickening,  as  their  long  line  tediously 
crept  upon  us  and  all  around  us,  that  I  would  almost  have  pre 
ferred,  after  an  hour  of  it  had  elapsed,  that  Harlan  had  made  a 
fierce  attack. 

We  were  not  idle  during  this  advance,  but  the  skirmishers 
were  keeping  busy  in  the  edges  of  the  woods  on  our  flunks,  and 
the  men  in  the  meadow  were  showing  themselves  with  the  most 
careful  regard  to  an  exaggerated  idea  being  formed  of  their 
numbers.  When  the  enemy  reached  the  edge  of  the  woods  which 
fringed  the  southern  extremity  of  the  meadow,  and  had  pressed 
our  skirmishers  out  of  it  and  away  from  the  brick-house  and  its 
out-buildings,  the  artillery  was  brought  up  and  four  or  five  guns 

were  opened  upon  us.     Just  after  this  fire  commenced,  the  six- 
oo 


338  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

pounders  sent  with  Bullock  galloped  upon  the  ground,  and  a 
defiant  yell  a  short  distance  to  the  right  told  that  Cluke's  regi 
ment,  "  The  war-dogs,"  were  near  at  hand.  I  was  disinclined  to 
use  the  six-pounders  after  they  came,  because  I  knew  that  they 
could  not  effectively  answer  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  Parrots, 
ane  I  wished  to  avoid  every  thing  which  might  warm  the  affair 
up  into  a  hot  fight,  feeling  pretty  certain  that  when  that  oc 
curred,  we  would  all,  guns  and  men,  ugo  itp  "  together.  Major 
Austin,  Captain  Logan,  and  Captain  Pendleton,  commanding 
respectively  detachments  from  the  Ninth,  Third,  and  Eighth 
Kentucky,  had  conducted  the  operations  of  our  line  up  to  this 
time  with  admirable  coolness  and  method. 

The  guns  were  sent  across  the  meadow  rapidly,  purposely 
attracting  the  attention  of  the  enemy  as  much  as  possible,  to 
the  upper  ford.  A  road  was  cut  through  the  rough  ground  for 
them,  and  they  were  crossed  with  all  possible  expedition.  Cluke 
threw  five  companies  of  his  regiment  into  line ;  the  rest  were 
sent  over  the  river.  We  now  wished  to  cross  with  the  entire 
force  that  was  on  the  southern  side,  but  this  was  likely  to  prove 
a  hazardous  undertaking  with  an  enemy  so  greatly  out-number 
ing  us  lying  just  in  our  front.  A  courier  arrived  just  about  this 
time  from  General  Morgan  with  an  order  to  me  to  withdraw.  In 
common  with  quite  a  number  of  others,  I  devoutly  wished  I  could. 
The  enemy's  guns — the  best  served  of  any,  I  think,  that  I  ever 
saw  in  action — were  playing  havoc  with  the  horses  (four  were 
killed  by  one  shell),  and  actually  bursting  shells  in  the  lower 
ford  with  such  frequency  as  to  render  the  crossing  at  it  by  a 
column  out  of  the  question. 

Our  line  was  strengthened  by  Cluke's  five  companies  to  nearly 
eight  hundred  men,  but  when  the  enemy  moved  upon  us  again, 
his  infantry  deployed  in  a  long  line,  strongly  supported,  with  a 
skirmish  line  in  front,  all  coming  on  with  bayonets  glistening,  the 
guns  redoubling  their  fire,  and  the  cavalry  column  on  the  right 
flank  (of  their  line)  apparently  ready  to  pounce  on  us  too,  and 
then  the  river  surging  at  our  backs,  my  blood,  I  confess,  ran  cold. 


ESCAPE   OF   THE   COMMAND.  339 

The  final  moment  seemed  at  hand  when  that  gallant  rear 
guard  must  give  way  and  be  driven  into  the  stream,  or  be 
bayoneted  on  its  banks.  But  not  one  fear  or  doubt  seemed  to 
trouble  for  a  moment  our  splendid  fellows.  They  welcomed  the 
coming  attack  with  a  glad  and  defiant  cheer  and  could  scarcely 
be  restrained  from  rushing  to  meet  it.  But  we  were  saved  by 
the  action  of  the  enemy. 

The  advancing  line  was  withdrawn  (unaccountably  to  us)  as 
soon  as  it  had  come  under  our  fire.  It  did  not  recoil — it  per 
haps  had  not  lost  a  man.  It  was  at  once  decided  that  a  show 
of  attack,  upon  our  part,  should  be  made  on  the  center,  and  I 
ordered  Captain  Pendleton  to  charge  upon  our  left,  with  three 
companies,  and  silence  a  battery  which  was  annoying  us  very 
greatly ;  under  cover  of  these  demonstrations  we  had  determ 
ined  to  withdraw.  Just  after  this  arrangement  was  made,  I 
was  wounded  in  the  head  by  the  explosion  of  a  shell,  which 
burst  in  a  group  of  us  true  to  its  aim.  The  horse  of  my  acting 
Aide-de-camp,  Lieutenant  Moreland,  was  killed  by  a  fragment 
of  it.  Colonel  Breckinridge  at  once  assumed  command,  and 
energetically  and  skillfully  effected  the  safe  withdrawal  of  the 
entire  force.  Pendleton  accomplished  by  his  charge  all  that 
was  expected.  He  killed  several  cannoneers  and  drove  all  from 
the  guns,  silencing  them  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour.  He,  himself, 
was  badly  wounded  by  the  fragment  of  a  shell  which  burst 
short. 

Aided  by  this  diversion  and  the  one  made  upon  the  front, 
every  thing  was  suddenly  thrown  into  columns  and  dashed 
across  the  river,  leaving  the  army  on  the  other  side  cheated  of 
its  prey  which  it  ought  to  have  secured.  The  troops  were 
gotten  across  the  more  readily  because  of  the  discovery  of  a 
third  ford  in  the  rear  of  Cluke's  position.  It  was  accidentally 
found  at  the  last  moment.  Our  loss  was  very  slight,  except  in 
horses.  The  enemy  did  not  attempt  pursuit.  No  eulogium 
could  do  justice  to  the  conduct  of  the  men  engaged  in  this  affair 
— nothing  but  their  perfect  steadiness  would  have  enabled  any 


340  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

skill  to  have  rescued  them  from  the  danger.  Captains  Pendleton, 
Logan,  Page,  and  nines,  and  Major  Austin,  deserved  the  warm 
est  praise.  Cluke  acted,  as  he  did  always  where  courage  and 
soldierly  conduct  were  required,  in  a  manner  that  added  to  his 
reputation.  Breckinridge's  skill  and  vigor,  however,  were  the 
chief  themes  of  conversation  and  praise. 

On  that  night  the  division  encamped  at  Bardstown.  Colonel 
Chenault,  on  the  same  day,  destroyed  the  stockade  at  Boston, 
and  marched  on  after  the  division  at  Bardstown. 

Leaving  that  place  on  the  30th,  the  column  reached  Spring 
field  at  3  P.  M.  "Adam  Johnson  had  been  ordered  to  move 
rapidly  in  advance,  and  attack  the  pickets  in  front  of  Lebanon  ; 
which  he  had  executed  with  such  vigor  as  to  make  Colonel 
Hoskins  believe  he  intended  to  attack  him,  and  he  called  in  a 
regiment  of  cavalry  stationed  near  New  Market,  thereby  open 
ing  the  way  for  us  to  get  out  without  a  fight." 

At  Springfield  General  Morgan  learned  that  his  situation  was 
hazardous,  and  one  that  would  elicit  all  of  his  great  powers  of 
strategy  and  audacity.  The  enemy  had  withdrawn  the  bulk  of 
his  troops  from  the  Southern  part  of  the  State,  and  had  concen 
trated  them  at  Lebanon,  only  eight  miles  distant  from  his  then 
position,  and  right  in  his  path.  This  force  was  nearly  eight 
thousand  strong  and  well  supplied  with  artillery.  He  had  also 
received  intelligence  that  a  large  force  was  marching  from  Glas 
gow  to  intercept  him  at  Columbia,  should  he  succeed  in  evading 
the  force  at  Lebanon.  Harlan  was  not  so  far  in  his  rear  that 
he  could  afford  to  dally.  "In  this  emergency,"  he  said,  "I  de 
termined  to  make  a  detour  to  the  right  of  Lebanon,  and  by  a 
night  march  to  conceal  my  movements  from  the  enemy,  outstrip 
the  column  moving  from  Glasgow  to  Columbia,  and  cross  tho 
Cumberland  before  it  came  within  striking  distance."  Shortly 
before  midnight,  therefore,  on  the  night  of  the  30th,  the  column 
moved  from  Springfield,  turning  off  from  the  pike  on  to  a  little, 
rarely  traveled,  bye-road,  which  passes  between  Lebanon  and 
St.  Mary's.  Numerous  fires  were  built  in  front  of  Lebanon, 


HAND-TO-HAND   ENCOUNTER.  341 

and  kept  up  all  night  to  induce  the  belief  that  the  division  was 
encamped  there  and  would  attack  in  the  morning.  The  night 
was  intensely  dark  and  bitterly  cold,  the  guides  were  inefficient, 
and  the  column  floundered  along  blindly ;  the  men  worn  out  and 
half  frozen,  the  horses  stumbling  at  every  step — nothing  pre 
served  organization  and  carried  the  column  along  but  the  will 
of  the  great  Captain  in  the  front  and  the  unerring  sagacity 
which  guided  him.  It  is  common  to  hear  men  who  served  ia 
Morgan's  cavalry  through  all  of  its  career  of  trial  and  hardship, 
refer  to  the  night  march  around  Lebanon  as  the  most  trying 
scene  of  their  entire  experience. 

Morning  found  the  column  only  eight  miles  from  Springfield, 
and  two  and  a  half  from  Lebanon.  At  that  place,  however,  the 
garrison  were  drawn  up,  confidently  expecting  attack  from 
another  direction.  By  1  P.  M.,  of  the  31st,  the  column  reached 
the  top  of  Muldraugh's  hill,  on  the  Lebanon  and  Columbia  road, 
and  soon"  after  nightfall  was  in  Campbellsville. 

Just  after  the  column  had  crossed  the  hill,  a  hand-to-hand 
fight  occurred  between  Captain  Alexander  Treble  and  Lieutenant 
George  Eastin,  on  the  one  side,  and  Colonel  Halisey,  of  the 
Federal  cavalry,  and  one  of  the  latter's  Lieutenants,  on  the 
other.  Treble  and  Eastin  had,  for  some  purpose,  fallen  behind 
the  rear-guard  and  were  chased  by  Halisey's  regiment,  which 
was  following  us  to  pick  up  stragglers.  Being  both  well 
mounted,  they  easily  kept  ahead  of  their  pursuers,  until,  looking 
back  as  they  cantered  down  a  long  straight  stretch  in  the  road, 
they  saw  within  three  hundred  yards,  perhaps,  of  them,  four 
men  who  were  far  in  advance  of  the  rest  of  the  pursuers. 

Treble  and  Eastin  were  both  high-strung  men  and  they  did 
not  like  to  continue  to  run  from  that  number  of  enemies.  So 
as  soon  as  they  reached  a  point  in  the  road  where  it  suddenly 
turned,  they  halted  a  few  yards  from  the  turn.  They  expected 
to  shoot  two  of  the  enemy  as  soon  as  they  came  in  si^ht  and 
thought  that  they  would  then  have  little  trouble  with  the  others. 
But  it  so  happened  that  only  two,  Halisey  and  his  Lieutenant, 


342  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

made  their  appearance;  the  other  two,  for  some  reason,  halted; 
and  what  was  stranger,  Treble  and  Eastin,  although  both 
practiced  shots,  missed  their  men.  Their  antagonists  dashed 
at  them  and  several  shots  were  fired  without  effect.  The 
combatants  soon  grappled,  man  to  man,  and  fell  from  their 
horses.  Treble  forced  the  head  of  his  man  into  a  pool  of 
water  just  by  the  side  of  the  road  and,  having  half  drowned 
him,  accepted  his  surrender.  Eastin  mastered  Halisey  and, 
putting  his  pistol  to  his  head,  bade  him  surrender.  Halisey  did 
so,  but,  still  retaining  his  pistol,  as  Eastin  let  him  arise,  he  fired, 
grazing  the  hitter's  cheek,  who  immediately  killed  him.  Eastin 
brought  off  his  saber,  which  he  kept  as  a  trophy. 

In  Campbellsville,  luckily,  there  was  a  large  supply  of  com 
missary  stores,  which  were  immediately  issued  to  the  division. 
Leaving  early  on  the  next  morning,  the  1st  of  January,  1863, 
the  column  reached  Columbia  at  three  P.  M.  All  that  day  the 
roaring  of  artillery  was  distinctly  heard  by  many  men  in  the 
column.  There  was  no  cannonading  going  on — at  least,  in  the 
volume  which  they  declared  that  they  heard — except  at  Murfrees- 
boro,  far  distant,  where  the  battle  between  the  armies  of  Bragg 
and  Rosecrans  was  raging  ;  but  it  seems  incredible  that  even 
heavy  guns  could  have  been  heard  at  that  distance. 

Just  before  night  fall,  the  column  moved  from  Columbia  and 
marched  all  night — a  dark,  bitter  night  and  a  terrible  march — 
to  Burkesville.  The  Cumberland  was  crossed  on  the  2nd  and 
the  danger  was  over.  The  division  then  moved  leisurely  along, 
through  Livingston,  crossing  Caney  Fork  at  Sligo  Ferry,  and 
reached  Smithville  on  the  5th.  Here  it  halted  for  several  days 
to  rest  and  recruit  men  and  horses,  both  terribly  used  up  by  the 
raid. 

The  results  of  this  expedition  were  the  destruction  of  the 
railroads  which  has  been  described,  the  capture  of  eighteen  hun 
dred  and  seventy-seven  prisoners,  of  a  large  number  of  stores, 
arms,  and  government  property  of  every  description.  Our  loss 


COMPLIMENT  OF  CONFEDERATE  CONGRESS.        343 

was  only  twenty -six  in  killed  and  wounded  (only  two  killed), 
and  sixty-four  missing. 

During  our  absence,  the  sanguinary  battle  of  Murfreesboro' 
was  fought,  ending  in  the  withdrawal  of  Bragg  to  Tullahoma, 
much,  it  is  claimed,  to  the  surprise  of  his  adversary.  General 
Bragg  had  sent  officers  to  Morgan  (who  never  reached  him  until 
it  was  too  late)  with  instructions  to  him  to  hasten  back,  and  at 
tack  the  enemy  in  the  rear.  It  was  unfortunate  that  these  orders 
were  not  received.  To  do  General  Bragg  justice,  he  managed 
better  than  almost  any  commander  of  the  Confederate  armies  to 
usefully  employ  his  cavalry,  both  in  campaigns  and  battles.  In 
the  battle  of  Murfreesboro',  he  made  excellent  use  of  the  cavalry 
on  the  field.  Wharton  and  Buford,  under  command  of  Wheeler, 
three  times  made  the  circuit  of  the  Federal  army  and  were 
splendidly  efficient ;  at  one  time  Wheeler  was  master  of  all  be 
tween  the  immediate  rear  of  Rosecrans  and  Nashville. 

Perhaps  Morgan's  raid  was  delayed  a  little  too  long,  as  well 
as  that  of  Forrest  into  Western  Tennessee  (undertaken  about  the 
same  time,  and  in  prisoners,  captures  of  all  sorts,  and  interrup 
tion  of  the  enemy's  communications,  as  successful  as  Morgan's)  ; 
but  these  expeditions  drew  off  and  kept  employed  a  large  num 
ber  of  troops  whose  presence  in  the  great  battle  would  have 
vastly  aided  Rosecrans. 

The  Confederate  Congress  thought  this  expedition  worthy  of 
recognition  and  compliment,  and  passed  a  joint  resolution  of 
thanks,  as  follows  : 

"Resolved  by  the  Congress  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America : 
That  the  thanks  of  Congress  are  due,  and  are  hereby  tendered  to 
Gen.  John  II.  Morgan,  and  the  officers  and  men  of  his  command, 
for  their  varied,  heroic,  and  invaluable  services  in  Tennessee 
and  Kentucky,  immediately  preceding  the  battle  before  Mur 
freesboro' — services  which  have  conferred  upon  their  authors 
fame  as  enduring  as  the  records  of  the  struggle  which  they  have 
so -brilliantly  illustrated.  Approved  May  17,  1863." 


344  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

AFTER  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro  ,  and  the  retreat  of  the 
army  to  Tullahoma,  at  which  place  General  Bragg' s  headquar 
ters  were  established,  the  infantry  went  into  winter  quarters, 
and  General  Bragg  protected  the  front  and  flanks  of  his  army 
with  the  fine  cavalry  corps  of  Van  Dorn  and  Wheeler.  The 
former  was  assigned  to  the  left,  making  headquarters  at  Col 
umbia,  and  guarding  the  lines  far  to  the  west,  while  Wheeler 
had  the  right.  This  latter  corps  was  composed  of  the  divisions 
of  Morgan,  Wharton,  and  Martin. 

Although  the  armies  were  idle  for  months  after  this  disposi 
tion  was  made,  the  cavalry  was  never  so.  General  Wheeler 
had  been  placed  in  command  of  his  corps  by  General  Bragg, 
probably  more  on  account  of  the  dislike  entertained  by  the  lat 
ter  to  certain  other  officers,  than  because  of  the  partiality  he  felt 
for  him.  The  reputation  of  this  officer,  although  deservedly 
high,  hardly  entitled  him  to  command  some  of  the  men  who 
were  ordered  to  report  to  him.  He  became  subsequently  a 
much  abler  commander  than  he  was  at  the  time  of  his  prefer 
ment,  but  he  always  exhibited  some  very  high  qualities.  He 
was  vigilant  and  energetic,  thoroughly  instructed  in  the  duties 
of  his  profession,  and  perfectly  conversant  with  the  elaborate 
details  of  organization  and  military  business.  While  he  did  not 
display  the  originality  and  the  instinctive  strategical  sagacity 
which  characterized  Morgan  and  Forrest,  he  was  perhaps  bet 
ter  fitted  than  either  for  the  duties  which  devolve  upon  the  com 
mander  of  large  bodies  of  cavalry,  permanently  attached  to  the 
army  and  required  to  conform,  in  all  respects,  to  its  move 
ments  and  necessities. 

Thus,  it  was  often  said  of  him,  that  "he  is  not  a  good  raider, 


SCENE  OF 

GEN.  MORGAN'S 


(345) 


846  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

but  there  is  no  better  man  to  watch  the  front  of  the  army." 
General  Wheeler  possessed  in  an  eminent  degree,  all  of  the  at 
tributes  of  the  gentleman.  He  was  brave  as  a  Paladin,  just,  high- 
toned,  and  exceedingly  courteous.  He  was  full  of  fire  and 
enterprise,  but,  while  thoroughly  impressed  with  the  necessity 
of  order  and  discipline,  was  singularly  unfortunate  in  maintain 
ing  them — perhaps,  because  he  did  not  keep  strict  enough  rule 
with  his  officers  immediately  next  him  in  rank.  He  labored 
under  great  disadvantages,  on  account  of  the  violent  and  unjust 
prejudices  excited  against  him  by  General  Bragg's  preference 
for  him  and  his  rapid  promotion.  General  Morgan  said  to  him, 
when  first  ordered  to  report  to  him,  that  he  (Morgan),  had 
wished  to  be  left  free,  acting  independently  of  all  orders  except 
from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  but  that  since  he  was  to  be  subor 
dinate  to  a  corps  commander,  he  would  prefer  him  to  any  other. 
General  Morgan  always  entertained  this  opinion,  and  I  have 
reason  to  believe  that  General  Wheeler  reluctantly  assumed 
command  of  his  division. 

The  history  of  the  command,  for  the  winter  of  1863,  properly 
commences  at  the  date  of  the  return  from  the  raid  into  Ken 
tucky,  described  in  the  last  chapter.  The  entire  division  reached 
Smith ville  upon  the  4th  of  January,  and  remained  in  the  vicinity 
of  that  little  town  and  at  Sligo  ferry  until  the  14th.  Upon  the 
14th,  the  division  was  marched  to  McMinnville,  and  encamped 
around  that  place — where  General  Morgan's  headquarters  were 
then  established.  The  first  brigade  lay  between  McMinnville 
and  Woodbury,  at  which  latter  point  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hutchin- 
son  was  stationed  with  the  Second  Kentucky.  The  weather  was 
intensely  cold,  and  all  of  the  men  who  were  unprovided  with  the 
means  of  adequately  sheltering  themselves,  suffered  severely. 
Their  ingenuity  was  taxed  to  the  utmost  to  supply  the  lack  of 
cooking  utensils,  and  it  frequently  happened  that  they  had  very 
little  to  cook. 

Fortunately,  a  great  many  blankets  had  been  obtained  upon 
the  last  raid,  and  almost  every  man  had  gotten  a  gum  cloth. 


WINTER   QUARTERS.  347 

These  latter  were  stretched  over  the  rail  shanties  which  each 
mess  would  put  up;  and  thus  covered  the  sloping,  shed-like 
structures  (built  of  the  fence  rails),  made  very  tolerable  substi 
tutes  for  tents,  and  with  the  help  of  the  rousing  fires,  which  were 
built  at  the  front  of  them,  were  by  no  means  uncomfortable. 
Very  little  system  was  observed  in  the  "  laying  out"  of  the  en 
campment — men  and  horses  were  all  huddled  together,  for  the 
men  did  not  fancy  any  arrangement  which  separated  them  by  the 
slightest  distance  from  their  horses,  and  the  latter  were  always 
tied  close  to  the  lairs  of  their  masters. 

Notwithstanding  the  lack  of  method  and  the  apparently  inex 
tricable  confusion  of  these  camps,  their  inmates  could  be  gotten 
under  arms  and  formed  in  line  of  battle,  with  a  celerity  that 
would  have  appeared  marvelous  to  the  uninitiated. 

Colonel  Chenault  was  ordered,  in  the  latter  part  of  January, 
to  Clinton  county,  Kentucky,  to  picket  against  a  dash  of  the 
enemy  from  that  direction.  On  tke  23rd  of  January,  Colonel 
Breckinridge  was  ordered  to  move  to  Liberty,  eleven  miles  from 
Smithville  and  about  thirty  from  McMinnville,  with  three  regi 
ments — the  Third  Kentucky,  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Huffman, 
the  Ninth  Kentucky,  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Stoner,  and  the 
Ninth  Tennessee,  under  Colonel  Ward,  who  had  come  to  the 
command  of  it  after  Colonel  Bennett's  death.  Colonel  Adam 
R.  Johnson  was  already  in  the  vicinity  'of  that  place  with  his  re 
giment,  the  Tenth  Kentucky.  Captain  Quirk  preceded  these 
regiments  with  his  company,  and  shortly  after  his  arrival  at 
Liberty  and  before  he  could  be  supported,  he  was  driven  away 
by  the  enemy.  He  returned  next  morning,  the  enemy  having 
retreated.  The  three  regiments,  under  Colonel  Breckinridge, 
occupied  the  country  immediately  in  front  of  Liberty,  picketing 
all  of  the  roads  thoroughly.  The  enemy  were  in  the.  habit  of 
sending  out  strong  foraging  parties  from  Readyville  toward 
Woodbury,  and  frequent  skirmishes  occurred  between  them  and 
Ilutchinson's  scouts. 

Upon  one  occasion,  Hutchinson,  with  less   than  one  hundred 


348  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

men,  attacked  one  of  these  parties,  defeating  it  with  smart  loss, 
and  taking  nearly  two  hundred  prisoners  and  forty  or  fifty 
wagons.  For  this  he  was  complimented  in  general  orders  from 
army  headquarters.  It  led,  however,  in  all  probability,  to  dis 
astrous  consequences,  by  inducing  the  enemy  to  employ  many 
more  troops  in  that  quarter  than  he  would  otherwise  have  sent 
there.  This  affair  occurred  a  short  time  previously  to  the  occu 
pation  of  Liberty  by  the  force  under  Colonel  Breckinridge,  and 
a  much  brisker  condition  of  affairs  began  to  prevail  all  along  the 
line.  Rosecrans  was  determined  to  make  his  superior  number! 
tell,  at  least,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  his  army.  He  inaugu 
rated  a  system,  about  this  time,  which  resulted  in  the  decided 
improvement  of  his  cavalry.  He  would  send  out  a.  body  of 
cavalry,  stronger. than  any  thing  it  was  likely  to  encounter,  and 
that  it  might  never  be  demoralized  by  a  complete  whipping,  he 
would  back  it  by  an  infantry  force,  never  far  in  the  rear,  and 
always  ready  to  finish  the  fight  which  the  cavalry  began.  This 
method  benefited  the  latter  greatly.  On  the  24th,  the  Second 
Kentucky  was  attacked  at  Woodbury  by  a  heavy  force  of  the 
enemy,  arid  a  gallant  fight  ensued,  ending  by  an  unhappy  loss  for 
us,  in  the  death  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hutchinson. 

From  various  causes  the  regiment  had  become  much  depleted, 
and  on  this  day  it  was  reduced  (by  the  sending  off  of  detach 
ments  for  necessary  duties),  to  less  than  four  hundred  men. 
The  enemy  advanced,  over  three  thousand  strong,  principally 
infantry,  but  Hutchinson  determined  not  to  give  up  his  position 
without  a  hard  fight.  He  posted  his  men  advantageously  upon 
the  brow  of  a  hill  in  front  of  the  village,  sheltering  a  portion  of 
his  line  behind  a  stone  wall.  The  enemy  preceded  his  attack 
with  a  smart  fire  of  artillery,  to  which  Hutchinson  could  make 
no  reply,  but  was  forced  to  take  it  patiently.  But  when  the 
infantry  moved  up  and  came  within  range  of  our  riflemen,  the 
tables  were  (for  a  little  while)  completely  turned,  and  they  fell 
fast  under  a  fire  that  rarely  failed  to  do  deadly  execution.  The 
unequal  contest  lasted  more  than  an  hour ;  during  that  time  the 


LOSS    OF    COLONEL   HUTCHINSON.  349 

stone  wall  was  carried  by  the  enemy,  but  was  retaken  by  Cap 
tain  Treble  and  Lieutenant  Lea,  charging  at  the  head  of  their 
gallant  companies.  Much  as  he  needed  men,  Hutchinson  kept 
one  of  his  companies  idle  and  out  of  the  fight,  but,  nevertheless, 
producing  an  effect  upon  the  enemy.  He  caused  Captain  Cooper 
to  show  the  head  of  his  company,  just  upon  the  brow  of  the  hill, 
so  that  the  enemy  could  see  it  but  could  not  judge  correctly  of 
its  strength,  and  might  possibly  think  it  a  strong  reserve. 

Constantly  exposed  to  the  fire  of  artillery  and  small  arms 
throughout  the  fight,  this  company  never  flinched,  nor  moved 
from  its  position  until  it  was  ordered  to  cover  the  retreat.  Then 
it  filed  to  the  left,  as  if  moving  to  take  the  enemy  in  flank,  and 
when  the  column  had  passed,  wheeled  into  the  rear,  under  cover 
of  the  hill.  Colonel  Hutchinson,  at  length,  yielded  to  the  con 
viction  that  he  could  not  hold  his  ground  against  such  odds. 
The  arrival  of  a  fresh  company  enabled  him  to  retreat  with 
greater  security,  and  he  ordered  the  line  to  retire.  A  portion 
of  it  was  pressed  hard  as  it  did  so,  and  he  rode  to  the  point  of 
danger  to  encourage  the  men  by  his  presence.  He  had  exposed 
himself  during  the  action  with  even  more  than  his  usual  reckless 
ness,  but  with  impunity.  Just  as  all  seemed  over,  however,  and 
he  was  laughing  gleefully  at  his  successful  withdrawal,  a  ball 
struck  him  upon  the  temple,  and  he  fell  dead  from  his  horse. 
Lieutenant  Charles  Allen,  the  gallant  acting  Adjutant  of  the  re 
giment,  and  Charles  Haddox  (his  orderly),  threw  his  body  upon 
his  horse  and  carried  it  off 'under  the  hot  fire. 

Captain  Castleman  at  once  assumed  command,  and  successfully 
conducted  the  retreat.  The  supply  of  ammunition  entirely  gave 
out  just  after  the  retreat  was  commenced. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Hutchinson  was,  beyond  all  comparison, 
the  best  field  officer  in  Morgan's  division,  and  indeed  that  I  ever 
saw.  Had  he  lived  and  been  placed  in  situations  favorable  to 
the  development  of  his  talent,  he  would,  I  firmly  believe,  have 
become  competent  to  any  command.  He  had  more  natural  mil 
itary  aptitude,  was  more  instinctively  the  soldier,  than  any  man 


350 

I  have  ever  known.  He  did  not  exhibit  a  marked  partiality  and 
gift  for  a  particular  class  of  military  duties,  so  much  as  a  ca 
pacity  and  fitness  for  all.  He  could  make  himself  thorough  in 
every  thing  which  the  service  required.  All  that  a  soldier  ought 
to  know,  he  seemed  to  learn  easily — all  the  proper  feelings  of  a 
soldier  seemed  his  natural  impulses.  General  Morgan  felt  a 
warm  and  manly  admiration  for  him,  and  reposed  an  implicit 
confidence  in  his  character  and  ability.  His  brother  officers 
loved  to  enhance  his  reputation,  his  men  idolized  him.  Hutch- 
inson  had  the  frank  generous  temper,  and  straight  forward,  al 
though  shrewd,  disposition  which  wins  popularity  with  soldiers. 
While  watchful  and  strict  in  his  discipline,  he  was  kind  to  his 
men,  careful  of  their  wants,  and  invariably  shared  their  fare, 
whatever  it  might  be.  He  was  born  to  be  a  soldier  and  to 
rank  high  among  soldiers.  He  loved  the  excitement  of  the  game 
of  war.  He  loved  honor,  as  a  western  man  loves  the  free  air 
of  the  prairies — it  was  his  natural  element.  It  may  seem  to  the 
general  reader  that  I  have  extravagantly  eulogized  him,  but  his 
old  comrades  will,  perhaps,  think  that  I  have  said  too  little. 
When  killed  he  was  barely  twenty-four,  but  the  effects  of  ex 
posure  and  the  thoughtful  expression  of  his  eye  made  him  ap 
pear  several  years  older.  His  great  size  and  erect,  soldierly 
bearing  made  him  a  conspicuous  figure  at  all  times,  and  in  battle 
he  was  superb.  Taller  than  all  around  him,  his  form,  of  im 
mense  muscular  power,  dilated  with  stern  excitement — always 
in  the  van — he  looked,  as  he  sat  upon  his  colossal  gray  charger, 
like  some  champion  of  an  age  when  one  man  could  stay  the 
march  of  armies.  There  was  some  thing  in  his  look  which  told 
his  daring  nature.  His  aquiline  features,  dark  glittering  eye, 
close  cropped  black  hair,  and  head  like  a  hawk's,  erect  and  alert, 
indicated  intense  energy  and  invincible  courage.  Hutchinson's 
death  cast  a  deep  gloom  over  his  regiment  and  (as  Major  Bowles, 
who  then  became  Lieutenant  Colonel,  was  absent  when  it  oc 
curred)  an  unfortunate  quarrel  broke  out  between  two  of  the 
officers  respecting  seniority  and  the  right  to  command  it.  This 


HEAVY    PICKET    DUTY.  351 

quarrel  was  espoused  by  their  respective  friends,  and  a  state 
of  feeling  was  induced  which  greatly  impaired  the  efficiency  of 
the  regiment,  until  it  was  settled  by  the  appointment  of  Captain 
Webber  to  the  Majority.  Webber  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
dispute,  but  a  committee  appointed  by  General  Morgan  to  inves 
tigate  and  decide  the  claims  of  all  the  Captains  to  seniority,  pro 
nounced  him  senior  to  both  the  contestants. 

On  the  14th  of  February,  Colonel  Cluke  was  sent  into  Eastern 
and  Central  Kentucky,  for  purposes  which  will  be  explained  in 
the  account  which  will  be  given  of  his  operations.  He  took 
with  him  his  own  regiment,  two  companies  under  Major  Steele — 
Company  A,  of  the  Second,  and  Companies  C  and  I  of  the  Third 
Kentucky — and  about  seventy  men  of  the  Ninth  Kentucky 
under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Stoner. 

These  detachments  weakened  the  effective  strength  of  the 
command  at  a  time  when  it  was  engaged  in  service  which  tasked 
its  energies  to  the  utmost.  That  portion  of  "  the  front  "  which 
General  Morgan  was  expected  to  protect,  may  be  described  as 
extending  from  Woodbury,  in  Tennessee,  to  Wayne  county,  in 
Kentucky,  in  an  irregular  curved  line  more  than  one  hundred 
and  twenty  miles  in  length.  It  was  exceedingly  important  that 
this  entire  line  should  be  well  picketed  and  closely  watched,  but 
it  was  necessary  to  give  especial  attention  to  that  section  of  it 
in  Tennessee  (which  was  immediately  confronted  by  formidable 
numbers  of  the  enemy)  and  here,  consequently,  the  greater  part 
of  the  division  was  employed. 

While  it  was  necessary  to  keep  strict  ward  at  Woodbury,  upon 
the  left  flank  of  this  line,  and  a  force  adequate  to  the  thorough 
picketing  and  scouting  of  that  region  was  always  kept  there — 
the  chief  interest  centered  at  Liberty,  for  here  the  efforts  of  the 
enemy  to  break  the  line  and  drive  back  the  forces  guarding  it, 
were  most  frequently  and  energetically  directed.  This  little 
hamlet  is  situated  twenty-nine  miles  from  Murfreesboro',  by  the 
turnpike,  and  almost  due  Northeast  of  it.  A  line  drawn  from 
Carthage  to  Woodbury  would  pass  through  Liberty,  and  the 


HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

latter  is  distant  some  eighteen  miles  from  each.  Carthage  is  a 
little  east  of  north,  Woodbury  a  little  west  of  south,  from 
Liberty.  About  twenty-one  or  two  miles  from  Liberty,  and 
west  of  south,  is  Ready ville — where  was  stationed  at  the  time 
of  which  I  write,  a  strong  Federal  force.  Ready  ville  is  ten 
miles  from  Murfreesboro',  and  about  the  same  distance  north 
west  of  Woodbury.  Lebanon,  twenty-six  miles  from  Liberty 
by  the  turnpike  which  runs  through  Alexandria,  and  northwest 
of  it,  was  at  this  time,  permanently  occupied  by  neither  side, 
but  both  Federal  and  Confederate  troops  occasionally  held  it. 
Carthage,  far  upon  the  flank  and  virtually  in  the  rear  of  the 
forces  at  Liberty,  was  occupied  by  a  Federal  garrison,  which 
varied  in  strength,  as  the  plans  of  the  Federal  Generals  required. 
It  could  be  reinforced  and  supplied  from  Nashville  by  the  river, 
upon  which  it  is  situated,  and  it  was  well  fortified. 

A  direct  advance  upon  Liberty  from  Murfreesboro'  promised 
nothing  to  the  attacking  party  but  a  fight  in  which  superior 
numbers  might  enable  it  to  dislodge  the  Confederates,  and  force 
them  to  retreat  to  Smithville;  thence,  if  pressed,  to  McMinn- 
ville  or  Sparta.  If  such  a  movement  were  seconded  by  a  co 
operative  one  from  Carthage,  the  effect  would  be  only  to  hasten 
the  retreat,  for  the  country  between  Carthage  and  Smithville  is 
too  rugged  for  troops  to  traverse  it  with  ease  and  dispatch,  and 
they  would  necessarily  have  to  march  directly  to  Liberty,  or  to 
a  point  but  a  very  short  distance  to  the  east  of  it.  It  may  be 
stated  generally  that  the  result  would  be  the  same  were  an  ad 
vance  made  upon  Liberty  by  any  or  all  of  the  routes  coming  in 
upon  the  front,  and  the  enemy  at  Carthage  was  dangerous  only 
when  the  Confederates  exposed  their  rear  by  an  imprudent  ad 
vance.  A  rapid  inarch  through  Woodbury  upon  McMinnville 
might  bring  the  enemy  at  any  time  entirely  between  Liberty 
and  the  army  at  Tullahoma,  or  if  he  turned  and  marched  through 
Mechanicsville,  dash  and  celerity  might  enable  him  to  cut  off 
the  force  at  Liberty  entirely. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  about  the  only  point  of  import- 


ARDUOUS   DUTIES.  353 

ance  outside  of  Murfreesboro*  and  Nashville,  and  short  of  the 
line  I  have  described  (with  the  exception  of  Lebanon),  whether 
north  or  south  of  the  river,  was  occupied  by  a  Federal  garrison 
large  enough  to  undertake  the  offensive,  and  that  the  country 
was  traced  in  every  direction  by  innumerable  practicable  roads, 
it  will  be  clear  that  sleepless  vigilance  and  the  soundest  judg 
ment  were  necessary  to  the  protection  of  the  Confederate  forces 
stationed  in  it.  The  three  regiments  encamped  in  the  vicinity 
of  Liberty  numbered  about  one  thousand  effectives,  and  the  other 
regiments  under  Colonel  Gano,  including  all  which  were  not  de 
tached  in  Kentucky,  under  Colonels  Cluke  and  Chenault,  were 
posted  in  the  neighborhood  of  Woodbury  and  McMinnville,  and 
were  about  the  same  aggregate  strength. 

During  the  latter  part  of  January  smd  in  February  and  March, 
the  entire  command  was  kept  constantly  and  busily  employed. 
Scouts  and  expeditions  of  all  kinds — dashes  at  the  enemy  and 
fights  between  reconnoitering  parties  were  of  almost  daily  oc 
currence,  and  when  Colonels  Gano  and  Breckinridge  were  not 
harassing  the  enemy,  they  were  recipients  of  like  attention  from 
him.  Perhaps  no  period  in  the  history  of  Morgan's  cavalry  of 
equal  duration  can  be  cited,  in  which  more  exciting  and  ar 
duous  service  was  performed.  I  regret  that  my  absence  from 
it  at  that  time,  and  consequent  want  of  familiarity  with  these 
events,  renders  it  impossible  that  I  shall  describe  them  with  the 
minuteness  and  accuracy  which  belong  only  to  the  personal  ob 
server.  It  has  been  said,  in  allusion  to  this  period  and  the  ac 
tion  then  of  Morgan's  command,  "  If  all  the  events  of  that  winter 
could  be  told,  it  would  form  a  book  of  daring  personal  adven 
tures,  of  patient  endurance,  of  great  and  continued  hardship, 
and  heroic  resistance  against  fearful  odds."  The  narration  of 
these  scenes  in  the  simple  language  of  the  men  who  were  actors 
in  them,  the  description  by  the  private  soldiers  of  what  they 
dared  then,  and  endured,  the  recital  of  men  (unconsciously  tell 
ing  their  own  heroism)  would  be  the  proper  record  of  these  stir 
ring  and  memorable  months.  They  could  tell  how,  worn  out 
23 


354  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

with  days  and  nights  of  toil,  the  brief  repose  was  at  length  wel 
come  with  so  much  joy.  Frequently  the  rain  and  sleet  would 
beat  in  their  faces  as  they  slept,  and  the  ice  would  thicken  in 
their  very  beds.  Happy  were  the  men  who  had  blankets  in 
which  to  wrap  their  limbs,  other  than  those  which  protected 
their  horses'  backs  from  the  saddle.  Thrice  lucky  those  who 
could  find  something  to  eat  when  they  lay  down,  and  another 
meal  when  they  arose.  It  oftenest  happened  that  before  the 
chill,  bleak  winter's  day  had  broken,  the  bugle  aroused  them 
from  comfortless  bivouacs,  to  mount,  half  frozen  and  shivering, 
'upon  their  stiff  and  tired  horses  and,  faint  and  hungry,  ride 
miles  to  attack  a  foe,  or  contest  against  ten-fold  odds  every  foot 
of  his  advance. 

Some  of  the  personal  adventures,  so  frequent  at  that  time, 
will  perhaps  be  found  interesting.  An  expedition  undertaken 
by  General  Morgan  himself,  but,  unlike  most  of  those  in  which 
he  personally  commanded,  unsuccessful,  is  thus  related  :  "  Upon 
January  29th,  General  Morgan,  accompanied  by  Major  Steele; 
Captain  Cassell,  and  a  few  men,  came  to  Liberty  to  execute  a  dan 
gerous  plan.  It  was  to  take  fifty  picked  men,  dressed  in  blue 
coats,  into  Nashville,  burn  the  commissary  stores  there,  and  in  the 
confusion  of  the  fire,  make  their  escape.  He  had  an  order  written, 
purporting  to  be  from  General  Rosecrans,  to  Captain  Johnson, 
Fifth  Kentucky  cavalry,  to  proceed  from  Murfreesboro'  to  Leb 
anon,  thence  to  Nashville,  arrest  all  stragglers,  make  all  discov 
eries,  etc.  I  can  not  recollect  now  from  what  commands  the 
•fifty  men  were  selected,  but  know  that  Steele,  Cassell,  and  Quirk 
went  along.  The  plan  was  frustrated  by  an  accident.  As  Gen 
eral  Morgan  rode  up  to  Stewart's  ferry,  over  Stone  river,  a 
Captain  of  a  Michigan  regiment,  with  some  twenty  men,  rode 
up  to  the  other  side.  Morgan  immediately  advanced  a  few  feet 
in  front  of  his  command,  touched  his  hat,  and  said,  "  Captain, 
what  is  the  news  in  Nashville  ?" 

Federal  Captain — "Who  are  you?" 

"  Captain  Johnson,  Fifth  Kentucky  Cavalry,  just  from  Mur- 


A   MICHIGAN   OFFICER   CAUGHT.  355 

freesboro',  via  Lebanon,  going  to  Nashville  by  General  Rose- 

crans'  order — what  is  your  regiment?"  " Michigan." 

Morgan  then  asked :  "  Are  you  going  further  ?" — "  No." 
"Have  you  any  news  of  Morgan  ?"  With  perfect  self  posses 
sion  Morgan  answered :  "  His  cavalry  are  at  Liberty — none 
closer."  He  then  said  to  Quirk :  "  Sergeant,  carry  as  many 
men  over  at  a  load  as  possible,  and  we  will  swim  the  horses.  It 
is  too  late  to  attempt  to  ferry  them  over." 

"  The  Michigan  Captain  started  to  move  on  when  Morgan  asked 
him  to  wait  and  they  would  ride  to  Nashville  together.  When 
he  consented,  most  of  his  men  got  down  and  tried  to  warm 
themselves  by  walking,  jumping,  etc.  Quirk  pushed  across  with 
about  a  dozen  men,  reached  the  bank,  and  started  the  boat  back; 
unfortunately,  as  his  men  climbed  the  bank,  their  gray  pants 
showed,  the  Michiganders  became  alarmed,  and  Quirk  had  to 
attack  forthwith.  The  Captain  and  some  fifteen  men  surren- 
rendered  immediately ;  the  remainder  escaped  and  ran  to  Nash 
ville,  giving  the  alarm.  Morgan  declared  that  if  he  had  succeeded 
in  capturing  them  all,  he  would  have  gone  immediately  into 
Nashville.  Those  who  knew  him  best,  will  most  readily  believe 
it."  A  short  time  after  the  fight  at  Woodbury,  Lieutenant  Colo 
nel  Bowles,  with  the  greater  part  of  the  Second  Kentucky,  and 
supported  by  a  battalion  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Malone 
(Alabama),  engaged  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  at  Bradyville. 
Attacking  the  advance-guard  of  this  force  (before  he  became 
aware  of  the  strength  of  the  main  body),  Colonel  Bowles  drove 
it  in  confusion  and  rout,  into  the  town,  and  even  forced  back 
for  some  distance  (so  impetuous  was  his  charge),  the  regiments 
sent  to  its  support. 

In  reckless,  crushing  attack,  Colonel  Bowles  had  no  superior 
among  the  officers  of  the  division.  His  dauntless  and  rash 
bravery  gave  great  weight  to  a  charge,  but,  unluckily,  he  was 
perfectly  indifferent  about  the  strength  of  the  enemy  whom  he 
charged.  On  this  occasion  greatly  superior  forces  closed  in  on 
both  flanks  of  his  command,  and  a  part  of  the  enemy  driving 


356  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

away  Malone's  battalion,  gained  his  rear  before  he  could  disen 
tangle  himself.  Quick  fighting  and  fast  running  alone  saved  the 
regiment,  but  it  was  a  "  hard  party'7  to  capture,  and  it  got  away 
with  a  very  slight  loss  in  prisoners.  Several  men  in  the  extreme 
rear  were  sabered,  but,  of  course,  not  killed.  One  man  of  Com 
pany  K,  who  had  an  axe  strapped  on  his  back,  was  collared  by 
a  Federal  Captain,  who  struck  him  on  the  head  with  his  saber. 
The  "old  regular"  deliberately  unstrapped  his  axe,  and  with 
one  fierce  blgw  shivered  his  assailant's  skull. 

The  sloughs  and  mud  holes  were  frequent  and  deep.  Some 
of  the  men  declared  that  they  would  "  dive  out  of  sight  at  One 
end  of  them  and  come  up  at  the  other."  Lieutenant  Colonels 
Huffman  and  Martin  were  especially  enterprising  during  the 
early  part  of  F  ebruary,  in  the  favorite  feat  of  wagon  catching, 
and  each  attacked  with  success  and  profit  large  foraging  parties 
of  the  enemy.  They  some  times  ran  into  more  difficult  situa 
tions  than  they  had  bargained  for,  and  it  must  be  recorded  that 
each  had,  on  more  than  one  occasion,  to  beat  a  hasty  and  not  al 
together  orderly  retreat.  But  these  mishaps,  invariably  repaired 
by  increased  vigor  and  daring,  served  only  to  show  that  officers 
and  men  possessed  one  of  the  rarest  of  soldierly  qualities,  the 
capacity  to  receive  a  beating  and  suffer  no  demoralization  from 
it.  I  have  heard  an  incident  of  one  of  these  dashes  of  Martin, 
related  and  vouched  for  by  reliable  men  who  witnessed  it,  which 
ought  to  be  preserved.  Martin  had  penetrated  with  a  small 
force  into  the  neighborhood  of  Murfreesboro',  and  upon  his  re 
turn  was  forced  to  cut  his  way  through  a  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry.  He  charged  vigorously,  and  a  melee  ensued,  in  which 
the  combatants  were  mixed  all  together.  In  this  confused  hand- 
to-hand  fight,  Captain  Bennett  (a  dashing  young  officer,  whose 
coolness,  great  strength  and  quickness  had  made  him  very  suc 
cessful  and  celebrated  in  such  encounters),  was  confronted  by 
an  opponent  who  leveled  a  pistol  at  his  head,  and  at  the  same 
time  Bennett  saw  one  of  the  men  of  his  company  just  about  to 
be  shot  or  sabered  by  another  one  of  the  enemy.  Bending  low 


HINES*    REPORT.  357 

in  his  saddle  to  avoid  the  shot  aimed  at  himself,  Captain  Bennett 
first  shot  the  assailant  of  his  follower  and  then  killed  his  own 
foe.  Upon  one  occasion,  Captain  Quirk  in  one  of  his  many 
daring  scouts  got  into  a  "tight  place,"  which  is  thus  briefly  nar 
rated  by  one  familiar  with  the  affair : 

"  On  the  same  day,  Captains  Quirk  and  Davis  (the  latter  of 
South  Carolina),  Colonel  Breckinridge's  aide,  started  for  a  sort 
of  fancy  trip  toward  Black's  shop.  Below  Auburn  they  met 
Federal  cavalry  and  charged ;  the  enemy  had  prepared  an  am 
buscade,  which  Quirk's  men  saw  in  time  to  avoid — but  not  so 
Quirk,  Davis  and  Tom  Murphy,  who  being  splendidly  mounted, 
were  ahead.  Into  it,  through  it  they  went.  Quirk  unhurt — 
Davis  wounded  and  captured,  and  Tom  Murphy  escaping  with 
what  he  described  4a  hell  of  a  jolt,'  with  the  butt  of  a  musket  in 
the  stomach.  Davis  some  how  managed  to  escape,  and  reached 
our  lines  in  safety,  but  with  a  severe  flesh  wound  in  the  thigh." 
Captain  Davis  became  afterward  Assistant  Adjutant  General  of 
the  first  brigade. 

The  following  report  of  what  was  justly  entitled  "one  of  the 
most  dashing  and  brillant  scouts  of  the  war,"  will  give  an  idea 
of  how.  this  force,  so  small  and  so  constantly  pressed,  yet 
managed  to  assume  the  offensive,  and  of  how  far  it  would  strike : 

REPORT  OF  CAPTAIN  T.  H.  HINES. 

Liberty,  Tennessee,  March  3,  1S63. 

Colonel  William  C.  P.  Breckinridge,  commanding  2nd  Brig 
ade,  General  Morgan's  Division,  Sir  :  Having  been  detailed 
with  a  detachment  of  thirteen  men  and  one  Lieutenant,  J.  M. 
Porter,  of  my  company,  to  proceed  to  Kentucky,  south  of  Bar 
ren  river,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  Federal  transports 
from  plying  between  Bowlinggreen,  Kentucky,  and  Evansville, 
Indiana,  I  have  the  honor  of  submitting  my  report.  The  de 
tachment  left  this  point  at  twelve  o'clock,  February  7th  ;  on 
the  evening  of  the  8th,  crossed  the  Cumberland  river  at  Gran- 


358  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

ville,  Tennessee.  The  night  of  the  llth,  reached  the  vicinity 
of  Bowlinggreen,  but  unfortunately  our  presence,  force  and  de 
sign  becoming  known  to  the  Federal  authorities  by  the  capture 
of  Doctor  Samuel  Garvin,  who  had  volunteered  to  accompany 
us,  we  were  under  the  necessity  of  altering  materially  the  plan 
of  operations.  We  disbanded  to  meet  on  the  night  of  the  20th, 
twelve  miles  south  of  Bowlinggreen.  On  the  morning  of  the 
21st,  we  burned  the  depot  and  three  cars  at  South  Union,  on 
the  Louisville  and  Memphis  railroad,  all  stored  with  Federal 
property.  At  12  o'clock,  M.,  on  the  25th,  captured  the  steamer 
"  Hettie  Gilmore,"  in  the  employ  of  the  Federal  Government, 
and  heavily  laden  with  stores  for  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
all  of  which  we  destroyed,  paroling  the  boat.  Made  a  circuit 
of  forty  miles,  destroyed  a  train  of  twenty-one  cars  and  an  en 
gine  at  Woodburn,  on  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad,  at 
6  o'clock,  P.  M.,  February  26th.  The  whole  amount  of  Federal 
property  destroyed  on  the  21st,  25th  and  26th,  inclusive,  can 
not  fall  short  of  half  a  million  of  dollars.  In  conclusion,  Col 
onel,  we  have  been  twenty-one  days,  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
within  the  enemy's  lines,  traveled  in  thirty-six  hours  one  hun 
dred  miles,  injured  the  Federal  Government  half  a  million  dol 
lars,  caused  him  to  collect  troops  at  points  heretofore  unprotected, 
thereby  weakening  his  force  in  front  of  our  army.  After  de 
stroying  the  train  at  Woodburn,  and  -being  closely  pursueol  by 
the  enemy,  we  swam  an  angry  little  stream  known  as  Drake's 
creek,  in  which  attempt  Corporal  L.  H.  McKinney  was  washed 
from  his  horse  and  drowned.  He  was  indeed  a  gallant  soldier 
and  much  beloved  by  his  comrades.  Too  much  praise  can  not 
be  given  to  Lieutenant  Porter  and  the  brave,  true  men  who  ac 
companied  me  on  this  trip,  bearing  all  the  fatigue  a'nd  danger 
incident  to  such  a  scout  without  a  murmur.  I  have  the  honor 
to  be  with  great  respect,  Your  obedient  servant, 

T.  HENRY  HINES,  Capt.  Comd'g  Scouts. 

Sometime  during  February  two  fine  regiments,  the  Fifth  and 


THE   NINTH    TENNESSEE.  359 

Sixth  Kentucky  were  added  to  the  division.  These  regiments 
were  commanded  respectively,  by  Colonels  D.  H.  Smith  and 
Warren  Grigsby.  They  had  been  recruited  while  General 
Bragg  occupied  Kentucky,  for  Buford's  brigade,  but  upon  the 
dissolution  of  that  organization  they  were  assigned  at  the  request 
of  their  Colonels,  to  General  Morgan's  command.  The  material 
composing  them  was  of  the  first  order  and  their  officers  were 
zealous  and  efficient. 

Sometime  in  the  same  month  an  order  was  issued  from  army 
headquarters,  regularly  brigading  Morgan's  command.  The 
Second,  Fifth,  Sixth  and  Ninth  Kentucky  and  Ninth  Tennessee, 
were  placed  in  one  brigade,  the  first.  The  Third,  Eighth,  Elev 
enth  and  Tenth  Kentucky,  composed  the  second  brigade.  Col 
onels  Smith  and  Grigsby  were  both  the  seniors  of  the  other 
Colonels  of  the  first  brigade,  but  each  refused  to  take  command, 
on  account  of  their  recent  attachment  to  the  command,  and 
Colonel  'Breckinridge  was  assigned  to  the  temporary  command 
of  it.  Colonel  Adam  Johnson  was  senior  Colonel  of  the  division, 
but  was  absent  during  the  greater  part  of  the  winter,  and  Col 
onel  Gano  took  command  of  the  second  brigade.  The  regi 
ments,  however,  were  so  disposed  and  scattered,  that  the  brig 
ades  were  not  practically  organized  for  some  time  after  the  order 
was  issued. 

The  history  of  the  Ninth  Tennessee  regiment  illustrates 
how  much  can  be  done  by  the  efforts  of  an  intelligent,  zealous 
and  firm  officer,  however  discouraging  may  appear  the  prospect 
when  he  undertakes  reforms.  The  men  of  this  regiment,  re 
cruited  principally  in  Sumner  and  Smith  counties  of  Middle 
Tennessee,  were  capable,  as  the  result  showed,  of  being  made 
excellent  soldiers,  but  their  training  had  commenced  under  the 
most  inauspicious  circumstances.  They  were  collected  together 
(as  has  been  previously  related)  in  August,  1862,  in  a  camp  at 
Hartsville,  and  their  organization  was  partially  effected  in  the 
neighborhood  of  a  strong  enemy,  while  they  were  entirely  with 
out  arms  or  any  support  and  protecting  force.  Several  times 


360 

during  this  period,  they  were  attacked  by  the  enemy  and  scat 
tered  in  all  directions — the  fact  that  they  always  reassembled 
promptly  demonstrating  their  excellent  character. 

When  General  Morgan  returned  from  Kentucky,  this  regiment 
joined  him  at  Gallatin.  Its  commander,  Colonel  Bennett,  was 
deservedly  popular  for  many  genial  and  noble  qualities.  He 
was  high  minded,  brave  and  generous,  but  neglected  to  enforce 
discipline  among  his  men,  and  his  regiment  was  utterly  without 
it.  Upon  his  death,  Colonel  William  Ward  succeeded  to  the 
command,  and  a  marked  change  and  improvement  was  at  once 
perceptible.  He  instituted  a  far  stricter  discipline,  and  enforced 
it  rigidly  ;  he  constantly  drilled  and  instructed  his  men,  and  re 
quiring  a  higher  standard  of  efficiency  in  the  officers,  greatly 
improved  them.  At  the  same  time  he  exercised  the  utmost  care 
and  industry  in  providing  for  all  the  wants  of  his  regiment.  In 
a  very  short  time,  the  Ninth  became,  in  all  respects,  the  equal 
of  any  regiment  in  Morgan's  division. 

Colonel  Ward's  first  exploit,  with  his  regiment  thus  reformed, 
was  to  attack  and  completely  defeat  a  foraging  party,  capturing 
several  wagons  and  seventy-five  prisoners.  He  then  performed, 
with  great  ability,  a  very  important  duty,  that  of  harassing 
General  Crook's  command,  which  had  been  stationed  opposite 
Carthage,  on  the  south  side  of  the  Cumberland.  Colonel  Ward, 
avoiding  close  battle,  annoyed  and  skirmished  with  this  force 
so  constantly,  that  it  never  did  any  damage,  and  finally  recrossed 
the  river.  From  this  time,  the  Ninth  Tennessee  did  its  fair 
share  of  dashing  and  successful  service. 

But  some  account  should  be  given  of  the  operations  of  Colonel 
Chenault,  in  Clinton  and  Wayne  counties,  Kentucky,  and  of 
Colonel  Cluke,  in  the  interior  of  the  State.  I  can  best  describe 
the  service  of  the  first  named  of  these  commands  by  copying, 
verbatim,  from  the  diary  of  a  gallant  field  officer  of  the  regiment. 
He  says :  "The  regiment  started"  (January  15th)  "in  a  pelting 
rain  for  Albany,  Kentucky — we  marched  through  mud,  rain 
and  snow  for  five  days,  swimming  both  Collins  and  Obie  rivers, 


SCOUT    TO   MONTICELLO.  861 

and  reached  Albany  on  the  morning  of  the  22d  of  January, 
186  ,  all  much  exhausted,  and  many  men  dismounted.  We  find 
Albany  a  deserted  village.  It  was  once  a  flourishing  village  of 
five  hundred  inhabitants,  and  is  the  county  seat  of  Clinton 
county.  It  is  now  tenantless  and  deserted,  store  houses,  hotel, 
lawyers'  offices,  churches,  dwelling  houses  and  court  house  un 
occupied  and  going  to  decay.  Where  was  once  joy,  peace, 
prosperity  and  busy  bustling  trade,  wicked  war  has  left  nought 
but  desolation,  ruin  and  solitude.  We  camped  in  the  town,  and 
were  surrounded  with  a  country  teeming  with  good  rations  and 
abundance  of  forage. 

"January  24th.  With  one  hundred  men  I  went  on  a  scout  to 
Monticello,  distant  twenty-five  miles  from  Albany,  drove  a 
Yankee  company,  commanded  by  Captain  Hare,  out  of  Monti- 
cello  and  across  the  Cumberland  river — captured  two  prisoners. 
From  this  date  until  the  15th  February,  we  scouted  and  picketed 
the  roads'  in  every  direction,  and  had  good  rations  and  forage, 
with  comfortable  quarters,  but  heavy  duty,  the  whole  regiment 
being  on  duty  every  two  days.  4  Tinker  Dave '  annoyed  us  so 
much  that  we  had  to  establish  a  chain  picket  every  night  around 
the  entire  town.  Colonel  Jacob's  Yankee  regiment  is  at  Creels- 
boro',  twelve  miles  distant,  and  Woolford's  brigade  is  at  Burkes- 
ville,  fourteen  miles  distant.  Oar  little  regiment  is  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty  miles  from  support,  and  it  is  only  by  vigilance 
and  activity  that  we  can  save  ourselves.  An  order  was  received 
yesterday  from  the  War  Department  forever  fixing  our  destiny 
with  Morgan. 

"Learning  from  newspapers,  that  our  scouts  brought  in,  that 
Woolford  would  make  a  speech  in  Burkesville  on  the  12th  day 
of  February,  I  started  from  Albany,  with  two  companies,  early 
that  morning,  and  forming  my  men  behind  a  hill,  I  watched 
from  the  bushes  near  the  river-  the  assembling  of  the  crowd  at 
the  court  house.  At  1  o'clock  the  bell  rang.  A  short  time 
before  that,  the  guard  at  the  ferry,  in  four  hundred  yards  of  the 
court  house,  composed  almost  entirely  of  soldiers,  and  after 


362  HISTORY    OF  MORGAN7'S   CAVALRY. 

speaking  commenced  I  charged  on  foot  to  a  school  house  im 
mediately  on  the  hanks  of  the  river,  and  from  there  drove  the 
pickets,  that  had  dismounted,  away  from  their  horses,  and  also 
broke  up  the  speaking  in  tremendous  disorder.  We  killed  a 
number  of  horses,  and  the  killed  and  wounded  among  the  Yankees 
were  seven.  The  boys  christened  the  school  house  Fort 
McCreary,  but  it  did  not  last  long,  for  the  night  after  we  left 
the  Yankees  crossed  the  river  and  burned  it. 

u  February  19th.  Colonel  Cluke  passed  within  a  few  miles  of 
us,  and  sent  an  order  from  General  Morgan  for  two  companies. 
Companies  D  and  E,  Captains  Dickens  and  Terrill,  were  sent 
him. 

"  March  4th.  By  order  of  General  Morgan  I  moved  with  three 
companies  from  Albany  to  Monticello  to-day ;  am  camping  in 
the  town.  The  citizens  are  hospitable  and  polite.  "Woolford, 
with  a  very  large  force,  is  around  Somerset.  I  am  kept  very 
busy  picketing  and  scouting;  it  is  General  Morgan's  object  to 
occupy  all  the  country  this  side  of  the  Cumberland  until  Cluke's 
return  from  Kentucky. 

"March  10th.  To-day  the  balance  of  the  regiment  under 
Colonel  Chenault  arrived  at  Monticello.  We  have  raised  one 
company  of  new  recruits  since  coming  to  Kentucky. 

"  March  20th.  I  crossed  Cumberland  river  with  twenty-six 
men  last  night  in  a  horse  trough,  and  then  marched  on  foot  two 
miles  to  capture  a  Yankee  picket.  The  force  at  the  picket  base 
fled,  but  I  captured  two  videttes  stationed  at  the  river.  The 
trip  was  very  severe.  I  lost  one  man. 

"April  1st.  General  Pegram's  brigade  arrived  to-day  en 
route  for  Kentucky  on  a  raid.  The  brain  fever  has  killed  seven 
teen  of  our  regiment  up  to  this  date,  among  them  Captain 
Sparr  and  Lieutenant  Covington. 

"April  llth.  Pegram  captured  Somerset,  and  moved  on  to 
Danville,  and  thence  commenced  his  retreat;  was  compelled  to 
fight  at  Somerset  and  was  defeated ;  Colonel  Chenault  moved 


BRAIN   FEVER.  363 

our  regiment  to  the  river  and  helped  him  to  cross.  His  forces 
were  much  scattered,  and  many  were  captured. 

"April  8th.  Cluke  returned  to-day  from  Kentucky  ;  the  two 
companies  that  went  from  this  regiment  were  much  injured. 
What  is  left  reported  to-day.  Captain  Terrill  and  Lieutenant 
Maupin  both  severely  wounded  at  the  Mt.  Sterling  fight,  and  left 
behind. 

"April  29th.  River  being  fordable,  the  enemy  crossed  in 
heavy  force  both  at  Mill  Springs  and  mouth  of  Greasy  Creek. 
Tucker  met  them  on  Mill  Spring  road,  and  I  met  them  on  Greasy 
Creek  road ;  Chenault  with  part  of  the  regiment  remained  at 
Monticello.  The  enemy  was  in  large  force,  and  we  were  com 
pelled  to  evacuate  Monticello  at  eleven  o'clock  to-night,  and  fell 
back  in  the  direction  of  Travisville.  Finding  on  the  1st  day  of 
May  that  the  enemy  was  not  pressing  us,  we  returned  to  Mon 
ticello,  and  skirmished  heavily  with  him ;  reinforcements  to  the 
enemy  having  arrived,  we  were  compelled  to  fall  back  to  the 
Obie  River." 

The  "  brain  fever,"  to  which  the  writer  alluded,  was  a  very 
singular  disease.  The  patient  attacked  with  it  suffered  with  a 
terrible  pain  in  the  back  of  the  head  and  along  the  spine ;  the 
extremities  soon  became  cold,  and  the  patient  sank  into  torpor. 
It  was  generally  fatal  in  a  few  hours.  I  recollect  to  have  heard 
of  no  recovery  from  it. 

As  has  already  been  mentioned,  Colonel  Cluke  was  dispatched 
to  Central  Kentucky  on  the  4th  of  February.  The  force  under 
his  command,  in  all  seven  hundred  and  fifty  effectives,  was  his 
own  regiment,  the  Eighth  Kentucky,  under  the  immediate  com 
mand  of  Major  Robert  S.  Bullock,  seventy-eight  men  of  the 
Ninth  Kentucky  and  two  companies  of  the  Eleventh,  under  com 
mand  of  Lieut. -Colonel  Robert  G.  Stoner — entitled  the  First  Bat 
talion  ;  and  two  Companies  C  and  I,  of  the  Third  Kentucky,  and 
Company  A,  of  the  Second  Kentucky,  under  command  of  Major 
Theophilus  Steele — styled  the  Second  Battalion*.  The  two 
mountain  howitzers  ("  Bull  Pups ")  were  also  attached  to  his 


364  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

command,  under  charge  of  Lieutenant  C.  C.  Corbett.  This  force 
was  ably  officered,  every  company  having  excellent  commanders. 
Colonel  Cluke  was  supplied  also  with  an  efficient  staff,  Captains 
C.  C.  and  C.  H.  Morgan  (of  the  General's  own  staff)  accompanied 
him.  Lieutenant  Mor eland  (a  staff  officer  of  the  first  brigade) 
attended  him  as  aide,  and  was  eminently  fitted  (on  account 
of  his  earnest  and  serious  turn  of  mind)  to  act  as  adviser  in 
an  expedition  wherein  so  many  delicate  and  difficult  questions 
might  arise  for  solution,  although  his  extreme  gravity  of  temper 
and  taciturn  manner  made  the  younger  and  more  mercurial 
officers  of  the  staff  somewhat  impatient  of  his  society. 

Colonel  Cluke  had  no  officer  regularly  detailed  as  A.  A.  A. 
General.  Sergeant  Lawrence  Dickerson,  clerk  of  the  Adjutant's 
office  of  the  first  brigade,  and  thoroughly  competent,  performed 
all  the  duties  of  one. 

The  advance  guard  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Shuck  of 
the  Eighth  Kentucky,  and  the  scouts  were  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Hopkins,  of  the  Second,  and  Lieutenant  S.  P.  Cun 
ningham,  of  the  Eighth.  One  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition 
and  six  days'  rations  were  issued  to  the  men  upon  the  morning 
that  the  command  marched.  The  weather  was  inclement  and 
intensely  cold,  when  this  expedition  was  commenced.  A  mauch 
through  sleet,  rain,  and  snow,  and  over  terrible  roads,  brought 
Colonel  Cluke  to  the  Cumberland  river  on  the  evening  of  the 
18th.  Lieut.-Colonel  Stoner  and  Lieutenant  Hopkins  crossed 
the  river,  with  a  few  men,  in  a  canoe,  surprised  and  captured 
the  Federal  pickets  posted  to  guard  the  ferry,  at  which  Colonel 
Cluke  wished  to  cross,  and  brought  over  flatboats  and  a  coal 
barge,  by  means  of  which  the  entire  command  was  crossed,  the 
horses  being  made  to  swim.  So  bitter  was  the  cold  that  eight 
horses  chilled  to  death  immediately  upon  emerging  from  the 
stream. 

On  the  19th  the  column  reached  Somerset.  A  strong  force 
of  the  enemy*had  been  stationed  there,  but  fell  back  to  Danville 
on  learning  of  Colonel  Cluke's  approach.  The  greater  part  of 


CLEVER   STRATEGY.  365 

the  stores  collected  there  fell  into  Cluke's  hands.  Pressing  on, 
Cluke  compelled  the  surrender  of  a  detachment  of  Federal  troops 
at  Mt.  Vernon,  and  did  not  halt  until  within  fifteen  miles  of 
Richmond.  Wretched  roads  and  a  blinding  snow  storm  ren 
dered  this  march  harassing  and  tedious.  The  scouts  moved  to 
within  ten  miles  of  Richmond,  and  Lieutenant  Hopkins  halting 
with  a  portion  of  them,  Lieutenant  Cunningham  went  on  three 
miles  further  with  eight  men.  He  found  a  picket  post  of  the 
enemy,  where  four  videttes  were  stationed.  He  ans\vered  their 
challenge  by  declaring  himself  and  party  friends,  and,  advancing 
to  the  post,  pursuaded  .the  Federals  that  they  were  an  advance 
party  of  Woolford's  regiment,  which  they  represented  to  be  re 
turning  from  Tennessee  to  Kentucky  to  assist  in  repelling  an 
anticipated  raid.  Lieutenant  Cunningham  stated  that  all  the 
various  Federal  forces  in  that  region  were  to  be  immediately 
concentrated  at  Lexington,  as  certain  information  had  been  ob 
tained  that  General  Breckinridge  had  entered  the  State  at  the 
head  of  ten  thousand  infantry.  The  sergeant  of  the  post  then 
gave  Lieutenant  Cunningham  a  statement  of  the  location  and 
strength  of  all  the  Federal  commands  in  the  vicinity,  and  in 
vited  him  to  go  to  a  house  a  short  distance  off,  where  the  picket 
detail  to  which  he  belonged  made  base.  Cunningham,  finding 
this  detail  twenty-four  strong,  made  an  excuse  to  send  back  two 
of  his  own  men  and  one  of  the  Federals,  thus  calling  Hopkins 
to  his  aid,  who,  in  an  hour  or  two,  arrived  with  the  other  eight 
men  of  the  scouts. 

A  skirmis-h  immediately  ensued  between  the  parties.  One 
Federal  was  killed  and  two  wounded — the  rest  were  made  pris- 
oners.  They  were  completely  deceived  and  surprised.  The 
whole  affair  was  as  clever  a  piece  of  strategy  as  can  be  found 
in  the  annals  of  partisan  'service.  Learning  that  two  hundred 
and  fifty  of  the  enemy  were  at  Richmond,  Cluke  broke  camp  at 
an  early  hour  and  marched  rapidly  in  hopes  to  capture  them. 
They  started  to  Lexington,  however,  before  he  got  to  Richmond. 
The  rumor  (which  had  been  industriously  circulated)  that  Breck- 


366  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

inridge  had  entered  the  State,  was  accomplishing  its  work. 
Major  Steelc  was  immediately  dispatched,  with  three  companies 
under  his  command.  He  overtook  the  rear-guard  at  Comb's 
ferry,  and  drove  it  in  upon  the  column — a  brisk  skirmish  and 
chase  ensuing — Steele  driving  them  into  Lexington.  He  came 
very  near  being  killed  shortly  afterward.  Leaving  his  command 
halted,  he  rode  to  a  picket  post  some  distance  off,  with  one  or 
two  men,  and  essayed  to  capture  the  videttes.  One  of  them 
(after  signifying  that  he  would  surrender)  suddenly  placed  his 
rifle  to  the  Major's  breast  and  fired.  A  thick  Mexican  blanket 
wrapped  tightly  in  many  folds  about  his  body,  saved  his  life ; 
yet  the  bullet  pierced  the  blanket  and  entered  his  breast,  break 
ing  a  rib.  This  wound  disabled  him,  at  a  time  when  his  services 
were  most  needed,  for  several  days. 

On  the  same  night,  Captain  C.  II.  Morgan  and  Lieutenant 
Corbett,  while  reconnoitering  near  Lexington  and  seeking  highly 
important  information,  were  captured.  Colonel  Cluke  moved 
on  the  night  of  the  22d  (crossing  the  Kentucky  river  at  Boons- 
boro')  to  Winchester,  reaching  that  place  on  the  23rd.  He  then 
sent  detachments  in  various  directions  to  excite  and  bewilder 
the  enemy  as  thoroughly  as  possible.  Major  Bullock  advancing 
toward  Lexington,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Stoner  was  sent  to  Mt. 
Sterling,  and  Lieutenant  Cunningham  was  sent  toward  Paris. 
The  most  intense  excitement  prevailed  and  reports  were  rife  and 
believed  that  rebels  were  flocking  into  the  State  from  all  direc 
tions.  Cluke  finding  that  he  had  reduced  the  enemy  to  inac 
tion,  and  could  do  so  safely,  permitted  men  who  lived  in  the 
( neighboring  counties  to  visit  their  homes  and  thus  gave  greater 
currency  to  these  rumors.  This  had  been  one  of  the  objects 
of  the  expedition.  The  other  ends  had  in  view,  in  undertaking 
it,  to-wit :  to  obtain  and  keep  a  thorough  understanding  of  the 
condition  of  affairs  in  Kentucky  during  the  winter,  and  to  enable 
the  men  to  procure  horses  and  clothing,  were  perfectly  accom 
plished.  Lieutenant  Cunningham  demonstrated  successfully  in 
the  direction  of  Paris,  confining  the  troops  there  to  the  town. 


CLUKE'S  STRATEGY.  367 

Lieut.  Colonel  Stoner  moved  rapidly  on  Mt.  Sterling  and  found 
the  enemy,  which  had  been  stationed  thereunder  Colonel  \Yads- 
worth,  just  evacuating  the  town.  Stoner  immediately  attacked 
and  completely  routed  his  enemy.  The  road  by  which  the  latter 
retreated,  was  strewn  for  miles  with  overcoats,  guns,  wrecked 
wagons,  and  all  the  debris  of  routed  and  fleeing  troops.  Stoner 
captured  many  prisoners  and  several  wagons. 

On  the  24th,  the  entire  command  was  concentrated  at  Mt. 
Sterling,  and  the  day  was  spent  in  collecting  and  distributing 
horses,  equipments,  etc.  The  enemy  at  Lexington  having  re 
covered  by  this  time  from  the  fright  given  them  on  the  21st,  by 
Major  Steele,  and  learning  the  falsity  of  the  rumors  of  a  heavy 
Confederate  advance,  now  came  out  in  search  of  Cluke.  On 
the  morning  of  the  25th,  a  brigade  dashed  into  Mt.  Sterling. 
The  command  was  much  weakened,  not  only  by  the  detachments 
which  had  again  been  sent  out,  but  by  furloughs  allowed  men 
who  lived  in  the  immediate  vicinity.  It  was  at  once  driven  out 
of  the  town  but  retreated,  unpursued,  only  a  short  distance.  It 
has  been  said  that  the  men  came  in  so  quickly,  that  the  command 
was  increased  from  two  hundred  to  six  hundred,  before  "  the 
echoes  of  the  enemy's  artillery  had  died  away."  This  brigade 
which  had  driven  out  Cluke,  established  itself  at  Mt.  Sterling. 
Cluke  now  successfully  inaugurated  a  strategy  which  has  been 
greatly  and  justly  admired  by  his  comrades.  Lieutenant  Cun 
ningham  was  sent  with  a  few  picked  men  to  the  vicinity  of  Lex 
ington  and  directed  to  spy  thoroughly  upon  the  officials  there. 
Ascertaining  enough  to  make  the  project  feasible,  the  Lieuten 
ant  sent  a  shrewd  fellow  (disguised  in  Federal  uniform)  to  the 
headquarters  of  the  officer  commanding,  upon  some  pretended 
business  which  enabled  him  to  hang  about  the  office.  While 
there  this  man  purloined  some  printed  blanks  and  brought  them 
out  with  him.  One  of  these  was  filled  up  with  an  order  (pur 
porting  to  come  from  Lexington  to  the  officer  in  command  at 
Mt.  Sterling,  instructing  him  to  march  at  once  to  Paris  to  repel 
a  raid  threatening  the  Kentucky  Central  railroad.  He  was  di- 


368  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

rected  to  leave  his  baggage  under  a  small  garrison  at  Mt.  Ster 
ling.  A  courier  properly  dressed  bore  this  order  to^Mt.  Ster 
ling,  arid  dashed  in  with  horse  reeking  with  sweat  and  every  in 
dication  of  excited  haste.  He  played  his  part  so  well  that  the 
order  was  not  criticized  and  induced  no  suspicion.  This  courier's 
name  was  Clark  Lyle — an  excellent  and  daring  scout. 

As  soon  as  the  necessary  preparations  were  made,  the  Fed 
erals  marched  to  Paris  and  Cluke  re-entered  the  town,  capturing 
the  garrison  and  stores.  He  remained  until  the  8th  of  March, 
his  scouts  harassing  the  enemy  and  keeping  him  informed  of 
their  every  movement. 

Another  heavy  advance  of  the  enemy  induced  Colonel  Cluke 
to  retreat  beyond  Slate  into  the  hills  about  Howard's  mill. 

Three  companies  were  left  in  the  vicinity  of  Mount  Sterling, 
under  Captain  Cassell.  One  stationed  upon  the  North  Middle- 
town  pike,  was  so  closely  pressed  by  the  enemy,  that  it  was 
forced  to  cross  Slate,  below  Howard's  mill.  The  other  two  were 
also  hotly  attacked  and  driven  back  to  Colonel  Cluke's  encamp 
ment,  sustaining,  however,  but  slight  loss.  Falling  back  to 
Ficklin's  tan  yard,  where  it  was  posted  in  ambush,  and  failing 
to  entice  the  enemy  into  the  snare,  Colonel  Cluke  marched  to 
Hazelgreen,  determining  to  await  there  the  arrival  of  General 
Humphrey  Marshall,  who  was  reported  to  be  approaching  (from 
Abingdon),  with  three  thousand  men. 

Captain  Calvin  Morgan  volunteered  to  carry  a  message  to 
Marshall,  and  traveled  (alone),  the  wild  country  between  Hazel- 
green  and  Pound  Gap,  a  country  infested  with  a  crowd  of  fero 
cious  bushwhackers.  About  this  time,  Cluke's  whole  force  must 
have  been  badly  off,  if  the  language  of  one  of  his  officers  be  not 
exaggerated,  who  (in  an  account  of  the  encampment  at  Hazel- 
green)  declares  that,  "the  entire  command  was  postrated  by  a 
severe  attack  of  erisipelas." 

After  the  effects  of  this  "  attack"  had  somewhat  worn  off, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Stoner  was  sent  back  to  Montgomery,  and 
maintained  himself  there  for  several  days,  with  skill  and  gallantry. 


ATTACK   ON  MT.    STERLING.  369 

Threatening  demonstrations  from  the  enemy  induced  Cluke  to 
retreat  from  Hazelgreen  and  still  further  into  the  mountains. 
He  established  himself  on  the  middle  fork  of  Licking,  near 
Saliersville.  On  the  19th,  he  found  himself  completely  sur 
rounded.  Fifteen  hundred  of  the  enemy  had  gained  his  rear, 
ten  hundred  advancing  from  Louisa,  were  on  his  right,  and 
eight  hundred  were  at  Proctor,  on  his  left.  In  his  front  was  the 
garrison  of  Mt.  Sterling,  five  hundred  strong,  but  likely  at  any 
time  to  be  reinforced  by  the  forces  then  in  Central  Kentucky. 
The  roads  in  all  directions  were  so  well  observed  that  he  could 
not  hope  to  escape  without  a  fight. 

His  command  was  reduced  to  about  three  hundred  effectives 
— the  rest  were  suffering  from  the  erisipelas.  In  this  emer 
gency,  Colonel  Cluke  conceived  a  determination  at  once  bold, 
and  exceedingly  judicious.  He  resolved  to  march  straight  on 
Mount  Sterling  and  attack  it,  at  any  hazard.  He  trusted  that 
the  enemy 'would  send  no  more  troops  there,  but  would  rather 
(anticipating  that  he  would  seek  to  escape  southward),  send  all 
that  could  be  collected  to  intercept  him  in  that  quarter. 

A  tremendous  march  of  sixty  miles  in  twenty-four  hours,  over 
mountains  and  across  swollen  streams,  brought  him  to  Mclntyre's 
ferry  of  the  Licking,  thirty  miles  from  Mt.  Sterling.  Cross 
ing  on  the  night  of  the  20th  and  morning  of  the  21st,  Major 
Steele  was  sent  with  his  battalion  via  Owingsville  (in  Bath 
county),  to  take  position  on  the  Winchester  pike,  beyond  Mount 
Sterling,  that  he  might  give  timely  information  of  the  approach 
of  reinforcements  to  the  garrison.  Colonel  Cluke  moved  with 
the  rest  of  his  command  through  Mud  Lick  Spring,  directly  to 
Mount  Sterling.  Colonel  Cluke  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  men 
entered  the  town  from  the  east,  while  Lieutenant  Colonel  Stoner 
with  the  two  companies  from  the  Eleventh  Kentucky,  the  men 
of  the  Ninth  under  Captain  McCormick,  and  Hopkins'  scouts, 
charged  in  from  the  northwest. 

The  enemy  fell  back  and  shut  themselves  up  in  the  court 
house.     Stoner  charged  them,  but  was  driven  back  by  a  terrible 
24 


370 

fire  from  the  windows — the  garrison  was  stronger  than  the  force 
he  led  against  them.  A  detachment  of  thirty  men  were  then 
ordered  to  advance  on  the  street  into  which  the  Winchester  pike 
leads,  and  burn  the  houses  in  which  the  Federals  had  ensconced 
themselves.  With  torch,  axe  and  sledge  hammer  these  men? 
under  McCormick  and  Cunningham  forced  their  way  into  the 
heart  of  the  town.  As  they  reached  the  "Old  Hotel,"  which 
was  occupied  by  a  body  of  the  Federals,  and  used  also  as  a  hos 
pital,  a  flag  of  truce  was  displayed.  McCormick,  Cunningham, 
and  six  others  entered,  and  were  coolly  informed  by  some  forty 
or  fifty  soldiers  that  the  sick  had  surrendered,  but  they  (the  sol 
dier)  had  not,  and  threatened  to  fire  upon  them,  from  the  upper 
rooms,  if  they  tried  to  escape  from  the  building.  At  the  sugges 
tion  of  Lieutenant  Saunders,  the  eight  Confederates  forced  the  sick 
men  to  leave  the  house  with  them,  in  a  mingled  crowd,  thus  ren 
dering  it  impossible  for  the  Federals  to  fire  without  endangering 
the  lives  of  their  comrades.  Before  quitting  the  house,  they  set 
it  on  fire.  In  a  short  time  the  entire  Federal  force  in  the  town 
surrendered,  and  victors  and  vanquished  went  to  work  together 
to  extinguish  the  flames. 

Colonel  Cluke  took  four  hundred  and  twenty-eight  prisoners, 
two  hundred  and  twenty  wagons  laden  with  valuable  stores,  five 
hundred  mules,  and  nearly  one  thousand  stand  of  arms.  Captain 
Virgil  Pendleton,  a  most  gallant  and  valuable  officer  was  killed 
in  this  affair.  Captain  Ferrill  and  Lieutenant  Maupin  were  se 
riously  wounded.  Cluke's  loss  was  three  killed,  ana  a  few 
wounded.  The  enemy's  but  little  greater. 

The  Union  men  of  Mount  Sterling  were  much  mortified  by 
this  last  capture  of  their  town.  The  previous  evening  bets  were 
running  high  that  Cluke  would  be  made  prisoner.  Cluke  imme 
diately  evacuated  the  town,  and  was  attacked  some  five  miles  to 
the  eastward  of  it,  by  a  force  of  Federal  cavalry,  preceding  a 
body  of  infantry  which  were  approaching  to  relieve  the  place. 
An  insignificant  skirmish  resulted,  and  Cluke  marched  to 
Owingsville  unpursued.  On  the  next  day  he  encamped  at  Me- 


371 

Intyre's  ferry,  and  collected  his  entire  command,  now  convales 
cent.  Marshall  marching  from  Pound  Gap,  about  this  time, 
dispersed  the  forces  which  had  gone  to  capture  Cluke  at  Saliers- 
villc.  On  the  25th,  Major  Steele  was  sent  across  the  Kentucky 
river  to  join  General  Pegram,  who  had  advanced  with  a  brigade 
of  Confederate  cavalry  to  Danville.  Major  Steele  reached  him 
much  further  south.  As  he  was  retreating  from  the  State,  Gen 
eral  Pegram  halted  near  Somerset  to  fight  a  strong  force  of  the 
enemy  which  was  following  him  and  was  defeated.  Major 
Steele's  battalion  was  highly  complimented  for  the  part  it  took 
in  the  action,  and  in  covering  the  subsequent  retreat.  On  the 
26th,  Colonel  Cluke  again  advanced,  and  encamped  in  the  vi 
cinity  of  Mount  Sterling.  He  received  orders  soon  after  from 
General  Morgan  to  return,  and  marched  southward  accordingly. 
Colonel  Cluke  had  good  right  to  be  proud  of  this  expedition.  He 
had  penetrated  into  the  heart  of  Kentucky,  and  maintained  him 
self,  for  more  than  a  month,  with  inferior  forces — always  fight 
ing  and  never  defeated,  the  enemy  at  last  did  not  drive  him  out. 
He  recrossed  the  Cumberland  at  the  same  point,  and  was  sta 
tioned  with  Colonel  Chcnault,  in  the  vicinity  of  Albany. 
Colonel  Cluke's  command  was  stronger  by  eighteen  men  when 
he  returned  than  when  he  set  out  upon  his  raid. 

In  order  to  trace  properly  the  history  of  the  division,  during 
this  period,  it  is  necessary  that  I  disregard  chronological  ar 
rangement,  and  return  to  the  winter  in  Tennessee.  In  the  latter 
part  of  February  a  new  regiment  was  formed  of  Major  Hamil 
ton's  battalion  and  some  loose  companies  which  had  long  been 
unattached,  and  some  which  had  recently  been  recruited  for 
General  Morgan.  Colonel  R.  C.  Morgan  (brother  of  the.  Gene 
ral),  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  this  regiment,  and  Major 
Hamilton  became  Lieutenant  Colonel.  A  month  or  two  later,  a 
valuable  addition  was  made  to  it  in  Quirk's  scouts.  Colonel 
Morgan  was  an  excellent  officer  and  had  acted  as  Assistant  Ad 
jutant  General  to  Lieutenant  General  A.  P.  Hill  through  all  the 
stern  battles  and  glorious  campaigns,  in  which  his  chief  had 


372  HISTOB.Y  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

figured  so  conspicuously.  Becoming  tired  of  staff  duty,  and 
anxious  to  exchange  the  infantry  service  for  the  less  monoto- 
nious  life  in  the  cavalry,  he  naturally  chose  his  brother's  com 
mand,  and  obtained  a  transfer  to  it.  He  became  a  dashing 
cavalry  officer,  and  as  an  essential  preliminary  relaxed  the 
rigidity  of  some  of  his  military  notions  acquired  while  serving 
on  the  staff.  He  soon  gave  in  to  the  prevalent  cavalry  opinion 
that  horses  were,  or  at  least  ought  to  be,  "common  carriers." 
During  this  winter,  more  prisoners  were  taken  than  there  were 
effective  men  in  the  division,  or  men  actively  at  work.  The  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  which  it  inflicted  was  also  severe,  and  the 
captures  of  stores,  munitions,  etc.,  were  valuable  and  heavy. 

The  exertions  made  to  equip  and  supply  the  command,  by 
the  division  Quartermaster  and  Commissary  of  Subsistence, 
Majors  Llewellyn  and  Elliot,  ought  to  be  mentioned,  if  for  no 
other  reason  than  the  injustice  which  has  been  done  them  and 
the  unmerited  censures  which  have  been  showered  upon  them. 
Even  now,  there  are,  doubtless,  few  officers  or  men  of  the  former 
Confederate  army  who  can  so  far  overcome  the  prejudice  deeply 
rooted  against  men  who  served  in  those  departments,  that  they 
can  speak  with  any  sort  of  commendation  of  Quartermasters 
and  Commissaries.  It  has  rarely  happened  that  even  the  most 
industrious,  efficient  and  honest  of  these  officers  have  escaped 
the  severest  denunciation.  I  can  testify  that  both  of  these  gen 
tlemen  strove  hard  to  provide  for  the  wants  of  the  division,  al 
though  the  tender  attention  they  paid  to  their  own,  prevented 
them  getting  credit  for  it.  They  might  have  done  better  it  is 
true,  and  the  same  can  be  said  of  all  of  us — but  they  certainly 
did  a  great  deal.  Major  Elliott  was  never  himself  except  when 
encompassed  by  difficulties — when  there  was  really  some  excuse 
for  failure,  when  supplies  were  really  hard  to  obtain,  then  he 
became  great.  The  avalanche  of  curses  which  invariably  de 
scend  upon  a  Commissary,  at  all  times,  never  disturbed  his  equa 
nimity,  except  when  he  was  in  a  barren  country — then  he  would 
display  Napoleonic  resources. 


WANT  OF   SUPPLIES.  373 

Once  a  large  lot  of  meat  stored  at  Smith ville  took  fire.  He 
issued  cooked  hams  to  the  troops,  and  the  loss  was  scarcely  felt. 
Once  he  lost  all  of  his  papers,  accounts,  receipts ;  vouchers,  mem 
oranda  all  went  down  on  abstract,  L.A  as  the  Quartermaster 
said  of  himself,  who  was  picked  off  by  a  sharpshooter.  The 
loss  did  not  disturb  him  for  a  moment.  He  declared  he  could 
supply  every  paper  from  memory,  and  produced  an  entirely  new 
set,  which  he  claimed  to  be  identical  in  substance  with  the  orig 
inals.  Of  course  every  one  laughed  at  him,  but  in  the  course 
of  time,  the  old  papers  turned  up,  and,  sure  enough,  there  was 
not  a  dollar's  difference  between  them  and  the  new. 

The  great  lack  of  supplies  necessary  to  the  comfort  of  troops, 
required  to  do  constant  and  severe  duty  in  such  weather,  told 
injuriously  upon  the  discipline  of  the  command.  It  was  impos 
sible  to  obtain  clothing,  shoes,  etc.,  in  quantities  at  all  adequate 
to  the  demand  and  the  greatest  efforts  of  energy  and  enterprise 
upon  the  part  of  the  subaltern  officers,  never  make  up  for  the 
deficiency  in  the  regular  supply  of  these  articles  from  the  proper 
sources. 

Pay  was  something  the  men  scarcely  expected,  and  it  benefited 
them  very  little  when  they  received  it.  If  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment  could  have  made  some  provision,  by  which  its  soldiers 
would  have  been  regularly  paid,  the  men  would  have  been  far 
better  satisfied,  for  there  is  something  gratifying  to  human  na 
ture  in  the  receipt  of  money  even  when  it  is  smartly  deprecia 
ted.  Certainly,  if  comfortable  clothing  and  good  serviceable 
boots  and  shoes  had  been  issued,  as  they  were  needed,  and  the 
rations  had  been  occasionally  improved  by  the  issue  of  coffee,  or 
something  which  would  have  been  esteemed  «a  delicacy,  the  dis 
cipline  and  efficiency  of  all  the  troops  would  have  been  vastly 
promoted.  It  is  hard  to  maintain  discipline,  when  men  are  re 
quired  to  perform  the  most  arduous  and  harassing  duties  without 
being  clothed,  shod,  paid  or  fed.  If  they  work  and  fight  they 
will  have  little  time  to  provide  for  themselves.  But  they  cer 
tainly  will  not  starve,  and  they  object,  decidedly,  to  doing  with- 


374  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

out  clothing  if  by  any  means  and  exertions  they  can  obtain  it. 
Then  the  converse  of  the  proposition  becomes  equally  true,  and 
if  they  provide  for  themselves,  they  will  have  little  time  to  work 
and  tight.  With  cavalry,  for  instance,  the  trouble  of  keeping 
men  in  camp  who  were  hungry  and  half  frozen,  and  who  felt 
that  they  had  done  good  service,  was  very  great.  The  infantry 
man,  even  if  equally  destitute,  could  not  well  straggle,  but  the 
cavalry  soldier  had  his  horse  to  take  him,  although  the  distance 
was  great  and  the  road  was  rough. 

When  men  once  commenced  running  about,  they  became  in 
corrigible  in  the  habit.  Hunger  might  draw  them  out  at  first, 
but  whisky  would  then  become  an  allurement,  and  a  multitude 
of  seductive  inducements  would  cause  them  to  persist  in  the 
practice.  In  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  when  a  man  became  an  invet 
erate  straggler,  he  was  no  loss  if  he  were  shot.  These  seem 
truisms,  too  palpable  to  need  mention,  but  for  three  years  they 
were  dinned  into  the  ears  of  certain  officials,  and  not  the  slight 
est 'impression  was  made.  These  gentlemen  preferred  to  at 
tribute  all  evils,  of  the  peculiar  class  which  have  just  been  men 
tioned,  to  the  inherent  and  wicked  antipathy  to  discipline,  which 
the  cavalry  (they  declared)  entertained.  They  declared,  more 
over,  that  these  articles  could  not  be  procured.  This  excuse 
passed  current  until  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  when  Federal 
raids  and  dashes  disclosed  the  fact  (by  destroying  or  cutting 
them  off  from  our  use)  unknown  to  all  but  the  officials  and  em 
ployees,  that  hoarded  and  stored  them  away,  at  the  very  time  that 
the  Confederate  armies  were  melting  away  for  the  lack  of  them. 

It  is  no  answer  to  the  charge  of  incompetency  or  malfeasance 
upon  the  part  of  men  charged  with  their  distribution  to  say,  that 
there  was  not  enough  to  supply  the  demand.  They  should  have 
been  made  to  go  as  far  as  they  would.  It  is  difficult  for  one 
unfamiliar  with  the  workings  of  these  departments  and  the  ob 
stacles  in  the  way  of  procuring  supplies,  to  suggest  a  remedy 
for  these  shortcomings,  but  it  is  certain  that  the  Confederacy 
owned  cotton  and  tobacco  and  could  have  gotten  more ;  that 


SKIRMISHING  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE  OF  MILTON.     375 

blockade  running  was  active  and  could  have  been  stimulated. 
An  abstinence  from  certain  luxurious  but  costly  experiments 
might  have  enabled  the  Confederacy  to  buy  more  clothing,  shoes, 
and  meat.  The  opinion  is  hazarded  with  diffidence,  and  is 
that  of  one  who  was  naturally  prone  to  attach  more  importance 
to  the  sustenance  of  the  military  than  of  the  naval  power  of  the 
Confederacy,  but  would  it  not  have  been  better  to  have  ex 
pended  upon  the  army  the  money  paid  for  the  construction  of 
those  fine  and  high-priced  iron-clads,  which  steamed  sportively 
about  for  a  day  or  two  after  they  left  the  stocks,  and  were  then 
inevitably  scuttled  ? 

The  winter  wore  away,  and  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Ten 
nessee,  as  described  in  the  first  part  of  this  chapter,  continued 
unchanged.  Three  times  the  enemy  advanced  in  heavy  force 
(cavalry,  infantry,  and  artillery)  to  Liberty.  Upon  each  oc- 
casion^the  regiments  stationed  there  under  Colonel  Breckin- 
ridge,  after  skillfully  and  courageously  contesting  his  advance 
for  many  miles  to  the  front  of  Liberty,  fell  back  to  Snow's  Hill, 
three  miles  to  the  east  of  it,  and  returned  to  press  hard  upon 
the  enemy's  rear  when  he  retired.  At  length,  upon  the  19th 
of  March,  when  Colonel  Ward  was  absent  with  his  regiment  re- 
connoitering  in  the  direction  of  Carthage,  and  the  force  at  Lib 
erty  was  weakened  by  other  detachments,  until  it  was  scarcely 
more  than  six  hundred  strong,  information  was  received  that 
the  enemy  were  advancing  and  were  near  Milton,  a  small  vil 
lage  about  eighteen  miles  from  Liberty.  General  Morgan  had, 
the  day  before,  notified  Colonel  Breckinridge  of  his  intention  to 
be  at  Liberty  on  the  19th.  Colonel  Breckinridge,  when  it  became 
clear  that  the  enemy  was  certainly  pressing,  posted  his  command 
in  a  good  position  upon  the  Murfreesboro'  pike,  and  sent  a 
courier  to  Gano  with  a  request  that  the  latter  would  promptly 
join  him  with  his  entire  effective  force.  Colonel  Breckinridge 
says  of  this  disposition  of  his  command:  "To  delay*the  enemy 
and  give  Gano  time  to  come  up,  the  pickets  were  strengthened 
and  thrown  forward.  The  enemy,  being  infantry,  came  on 


376  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

slowly  but  gradually  drove  our  pickets  nearly  in.  The  peculiar 
formation  of  the  ground  gave  the  brigade  great  advantage,  and 
admirably  concealed  its  weakness.  The  enemy  made  demonstr 
ations,  but  made  no  attack,  and  before  nightfall  bivouacked  in 
line  in  sight  of  our  skirmishers.  Just  at  dark  Morgan  rode 
upon  the  ground,  and  was  received  with  deafening  cheers ;  and 
soon  afterward  Colonel  Gano  came  up.  Under  cover  of  night 
the  enemy  withdrew  to  Auburn." 

General  Morgan,  in  his  official  report  of  the  fight  which  en 
sued  on  the  next  day  at  Milton,  says  :  "  On  the  evening  of  the 
19th  inst.  I  reached  Liberty,  Tenn.,  and  learned  that  the  Federals 
were  moving  upon  that  place  from  Murfreesboro',  their  numbers 
being  variously  reported  at  from  two  thousand  to  four  thousand 
infantry,  and  two  hundred  cavalry,  with  one  section  of  artillery. 
At  the  time  I  reached  my  videttes  on  the  Milton  road,  the  enemy 
was  within  five  miles  of  Liberty;  it  being  near  night,  they  fell 
back  to  Auburn,  and  encamped.  Determining  to  attack  them 
next  morning,  I  ordered  Colonels  Breckinridge  arid  Gano,  who 
were  in  command  of  brigades,  to  move  within  four  miles  of  the 
enemy,  and  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  move  at  any  mo 
ment.  In  the  meantime,  I  sent  the  '  scouts '  to  watch  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy  and  to  report,  and  to  see  if  any  reinforce 
ments  came  up;  also,  to  send  me  information  when  the  enemy 
moved,  for  I  was  determined  not  to  make  the  attack  at  Auburn,  as 
they  held  a  very  strong  position,  and  I  was  desirous  they  should 
move  beyond  a  gorge  in  the  mountains  before  the  attack  was 
commenced;  for,  if  they  had  been  permitted  to  take  position 
there,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  dislodge  them.  After 
daylight,  one  of  the  scouts  returned,  bringing  intelligence  that  the 
enemy  was  moving.  Captain  Quirk  was  ordered  to  move  for 
ward  with  his  company,  and  attack  the  enemy's  rear  when  they 
passed  the  mountain,  and  retard  their  progress  until  the  main 
column  arrived.  When  within  a  mile  of  Milton,  Captain  Quirk 
came  up  with  their  rear  guard  and  commenced  a  vigorous  attack 
upon  them.  The  enemy  immediately  halted,  deploying  their 


BATTLE    OF   MILTON.  377 

skirmishers  to  the  rear,  and,  bringing  their  pieces  into  position, 
commenced  shelling  Captain  Quirk's  men  and  the  road  upon 
which  they  had  advanced.  In  a  short  time  I  arrived  upon  the 
ground.  Finding  that  the  main  column  of  the  enemy  was  still 
falling  back,  and  their  artillery  was  unsupported  by  any  troops 
(with  the  exception  of  their  skirmishers)  I  determined,  if  pos 
sible,  to  capture  it.  I,  therefore,  ordered  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Martin  to  move  to  the  left  with  his  regiment,  and  Colonel 
Breckinridge  to  send  one  to  the  right — to  go  forward  rapidly 
and  when  within  striking  distance,  to  move  in  and  cut  off  the 
pieces.  Having  two  pieces  of  artillery,  I  ordered  them  to  go 
forward  on  the  road,  supported  by  Colonel  Ward's  regiment, 
dismounted,  and  the  remainder  of  the  command  to  move  in  col 
umn  in  supporting  distance. 

"Just  before  the  two  regiments  which  had  moved  to  the  right 
and  left  reached  the  proper  place  to  move  upon  the  artillery,  the 
enemy's  skirmishers  and  artillery  fell  back  rapidly  upon  their 
main  column,  which  occupied  a  steep  hill  covered  with  cedars. 
They  placed  their  battery  on  a  line,  with  their  column  on  the 
road  immediately  upon  their  right.  To  reach  this  position  we 
would  have  to  pass  through  a  cedar  brake,  the  ground  being  very 
rough  and  broken.  A  few  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers  were 
thrown  forward  to  that  point.  I  ordered  my  two  pieces  of 
artillery  to  move  upon  the  left  of  the  road  until  they  reached  a 
point  within  four  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  artillery  and 
then  to  silence  their  guns. 

"  They  went  forward  gallantly,  supported  by  a  part  of  Ward's 
regiment.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Martin  who  still  occupied  his  posi 
tion  on  the  left  was  ordered  forward  to  threaten  the  right  of  the 
enemy.  At  the  same  time,  I  ordered  the  command  under  Colonel 
Gano  to  move  up,  dismount  and  attack  the  enemy,  vigorously, 
immediately  in  the  front.  Colonel  Breckinridge  was  ordered  to 
move  to  the  right  with  his  command  and  attack  their  extreme 
left.  Captain  Quirk,  in  the  meantime,  had  been  ordered  to  get 
upon  the  pike,  immediately  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  which  he 


378  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALHY. 

did  in  a  most  satisfactory  manner,  capturing  fifteen  or  twenty 
prisoners. 

"  He  remained  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy  until  reinforcements 
came  to  them  from  Murfreesboro'  (being  only  thirteen  miles  dis 
tant),  when  he  was  driven  back.  When  our  artillery  opened, 
the  whole  command  moved  forward.  Colonel  Martin  charged  up 
in  most  gallant  style,  and  had  a  number  of  his  horses  killed  with 
canister,  as  the  guns  of  the  enemy  were  turned  upon  him.  The 
remainder  of  the  command  was  moved  up  to  within  one  hundred 
yards  of  the  main  column  of  the  Federals  and  dismounted. 
Moving  rapidly  to  the  front,  they  drove  in  the  enemy's  skir 
mishers,  and  pushed  forward  in  the  most  gallant  manner  upon 
the  hill  occupied  by  the  enemy,  which  was  about  sixty  yards 
from  the  cedar  brake  alluded  to.  Colonel  Breckinridge  who 
commanded  our  extreme  right,  had  his  men  dismounted,  and  went 
boldly  up,  the  enemy's  artillery  being  at  this  time  moved  from 
the  pike  to  a  position  upon  the  top  of  the  hill  immediately  in 
their  center ;  but  this  was  not  accomplished  until  it  came  near 
being  captured  by  Colonel  Grigsby,  who  was  within  fifty  yards 
of  it  and  moving  rapidly  upon  it,  when  his  ammunition  giving 
completely  out,  he  was  forced  to  halt,  and  the  battery  was  saved. 
It  was  near  this  point  that  Colonel  Napier  was  severely 
wounded  while  cheering  and  leading  his  men  up.  Colonel 
Grigsby  was  also  wounded  while  in  front  of  his  command  and 
encouraging  his  men.  At  the  same  time  the  firing  from  the 
center  of  the  line  nearly  ceased ;  a  few  scattering  shots,  now 
and  then,  gave  evidence  that  nearly  all  of  the  ammunition  was 
exhausted.  Two  more  rounds  would  have  made  our  victory 
complete,  and  two  thousand  Federals  would  have  been  the  result 
of  the  day's  fighting." 

Finding  his  ammunition  completely  gone,  General  Morgan 
ordered  a  withdrawal,  and  his  forces  fell  back  to  Milton,  the 
enemy  neither  firing  upon  nor  pursuing  them.  Here  he  found  an 
ordnance  train  and  four  pieces  of  artillery  which  had  been  sent 
from  McMinnville.  He  was  encouraged  to  renew  the  attack 


DEFEAT    OF   MILTON.  379 

hoping  to  capture  the  entire  opposing  force.  "  Martin  was  placed 
in  the  same  position  which  he  had  previously  occupied,  and 
Gano,  whose  entire  command  had  by  this  time  arrived,  was  sent  to 
the  right. 

The  artillery  took  position  in  about  eight  hundred  yards  of 
the  enemy's  battery,  and  commenced  a  rapid  and  severe  fire 
upon  them.  They  had  again  taken  position  upon  the  pike,  from 
which  they  were  soon  driven  by  Lieutenant  Lawrence,  who  was 
in  command  of  my  battery.  Our  pieces  were  served  with  the 
greatest  precision  and  coolness,  and  the  men  stood  by  their  guns 
like  veterans.  Although  they  had  but  few  men  in  the  fight, 
the  casualties  were  two  killed  and  eighteen  wounded,  showing 
the  determination  with  which  they  held  their  position.  Too 
much  praise  can  not  be  awarded  to  Lieutenant  Lawrence.  Three 
times  the  enemy  had  to  change  the  position  of  their  battery,  and 
were  silenced  until  reinforced  by  additional  guns.  While  this 
artillery  duel  was  progressing,  my  men  were  moving  to  the  front 
and  were  about  dismounting,  when  Captain  Quirk  was  driven 
from  the  rear  by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  which  had  just  ar 
rived  in  time  to  save  the  force  in  our  front.  I  immediately 
ordered  my  entire  command  to  fall  back  to  Milton,  and  from 
thence  to  Liberty.  The  enemy  did  not  follow." 

General  Morgan  expressed  his  perfect  satisfaction  with  the 
conduct  of  the  officers  and  men  in  this  fight,  and  complimented 
his  brigade  commanders  and  his  personal  staff. 

One  reason  of  the  want  of  success  in  the  first  onset  was  the 
fatigue  of  men  and  horses  by  the  long  and  rapid  ride  to  Auburn, 
and  thence  to  the  position  taken  by  the  enemy.  In  the  stretch 
ing  gallop  down  the  road,  which  General  Morgan  ordered  in  his 
impatience  to  overtake  the  enemy,  and  apprehensive  lest  they 
should  get  away,  the  column  necessarily  became  prolonged,  the 
men  scattered,  and  many  (their  horses  falling)  dropped  out  en 
tirely.  But  few  men,  consequently,  were  available  when  the 
attack  commenced.  As  the  detached  portions  of  regiments, 
divided  by  this  speedy  march,  came  up,  there  was,  necessarily, 


380 

some  confusion,  and  some  difficulty  in  putting  them,  at  once, 
promptly  and  smoothly  into  the  fight. 

For  these  reasons,  and  on  account  of  the  usual  details  for 
horse  holders,  perhaps  not  more  than  one  thousand  men  were 
engaged  on  our  side,  and  these  (as  has  been  just  explained) 
could  not  be  handled  as  effectively  as  was  necessary  to  force 
a  strong  position,  held  by  superior  numbers.  Colonel  Ward's 
regiment  is  frequently  alluded  to  in  General  Morgan's  report, 
but  it  should  be  stated  that  the  bulk  of  that  regiment  was  absent, 
only  sixty  men  (one  of  its  companies),  under  Captain  Gates, 
were  present.  The  scanty  supply  of  ammunition,  however, 
and  its  failure  at  the  critical  moment,  was  the  principal  cause 
of  the  repulse,  or  rather  withdrawal  of  our  troops.  All  who 
have  given  any  account  of  this  battle  concur  in  praising  the 
conduct  of  the  combatants.  It  was  fought  with  the  utmost  de 
termination,  and  with  no  flinching  on  either  side. 

One  incident  is  thus  described  by  an  eye-witness : 

"Just  here  Martin  performed  one  of  those  acts  of  heroic,  but 
useless  courage,  too  common  among  our  officers.  When  his 
regiment  wavered  and  commenced  to  fall  back,  he  halted  until 
he  was  left  alone ;  then  at  a  slow  walk,  rode  to  the  pike,  and 
with  his  hat  off  rode  slowly  out  of  fire.  He  was  splendidly 
mounted,  wore  in  his  hat  a  long  black  plume,  was  himself  a 
large  and  striking  figure,  and  I  have  often  thought  that  it  was 
the  handsomest  picture  of  cool  and  desperate  courage  I  saw  in 
the  war." 

Our  loss  in  this  fight  was  very  heavy,  especially  in  officers. 
The  list  of  wounded  officers  was  large.  Captains  Sale,  Marr, 
Cooper  and  Cossett,  and  a  number  of  other  officers,  were  killed. 
Captain  Sale  was  the  third  Captain  of  Company  E,  Second 
Kentucky,  who  was  killed.  Captain  Cossett,  of  the  Ninth  Ten 
nessee,  was  under  arrest  at  the  time,  for  charges  of  which  he 
was  acquitted  after  death.  He  was  killed,  fighting  with  his 
musket,  as  a  volunteer.  General  Morgan's  clothing  was  torn 
with  balls. 


RUMORED   EVACUATION   OF   MURFREESBORO',  ETC.  381 

About  this  time  an  impression  prevailed  at  General  Bragg's 
Headquarters,  that  the  enemy  was  about  to  evacuate  Murfrees 
boro'  and,  perhaps,  Nashville.  General  Morgan  had  come  to 
Liberty  on  the  19th,  in  order  to  reconnoiter  with  reference  to 
ascertaining  the  truth  of  this  rumor. 

Upon  the  day  before,  Colonel  Breckinridge  had  been  ordered 
to  move  to  Lebanon  with  his  brigade,  and  a  section  of 
Byrne's  battery,  and  was  informed  that  he  would  be  supported 
by  Gano.  In  the  order  he  was  told:  "The  object  of  these 
demonstrations  is  to  discover,  if  possible,  whether  the  rumored 
evacuation  of  Murfreesboro'  by  the  Federals  is  true,  and  if  so, 
to  what  point  they  are  moving  their  forces.  In  the  event  that 
they  are  falling  back  to  Nashville,  the  command  will  move  from 
Lebanon,  cross  the  river  and  attack  and  harass  them.  At  Leb 
anon,  or  within  twenty-four  hours  after  your  arrival  at  that 
point,  certain  information  can  be  obtained  as  to  what  is  taking 
place  on*  the  enemy's  lines.  In  the  event  your  pickets  or  scouts 
report  an  advance  from  Readyville  or  Murfreesboro',  you  will 
not  leave  your  present  position." 

Upon  the  19th  the  following  dispatch  came  from  General 
Bragg's  Headquarters  to  Wheeler : 

"To  Major  General  James  Wheeler,  McMinnville,  Tennessee: 
"Ascertain  what   direction   the   enemy  takes    after  leaving 

Gallatin. 

[Signed]  «GEO.  WM.  BREXT,  A.  A.  Gen'l." 

This  proved  conclusively  that  General  Bragg  believed  that 
Nashville  and  the  whole  of  Middle  Tennessee  was  about  to  be 
evacuated  by  the  Federal  army. 

General  Morgan  did  not  believe  so,  nor  did  Colonel  Breckin 
ridge,  who  was  charged  with  the  scouting  of  all  the  extreme 
right  flank.  The  latter  officer  says:  "It  is  true,  that,  at  this 
time,  General  Rosecrans  ordered  back  his  sick,  his  surplus 
baggage,  camp  followers,  increased  his  guard  at  every  station 
in  his  rear,  displayed  greater  vigilance  at  his  pickets,  vailed  his 


382  HISTORY  OP  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

movements  in  greater  secrecy,  and  became  stringent  in  bis  rules 
about  passes  to  and  from  his  camps  and  lines.  All  our  scouts 
reported  these  movements,  and  our  Generals  concluded  he 
meant  a  retreat.  Morgan  believed  otherwise,"  etc. 

General  Morgan,  in  reality,  believed  that  these  were  all  the 
indications  of  an  advance  rather  than  of  retreat,  and  he  confi 
dently  anticipated  the  former  in  the  early  part  of  April.  On 
the  3d  of  April  there  was  an  advance,  which,  although  not  of 
the  entire  Federal  army,  yet  comprehended  so  large  a  part  of 
it,  as  to  completely  rid  the  country,  in  which  our  command  had 
been  wintering,  of  their  presence  for  a  short  time. 

This  force  approached  Liberty  on  the  2d  of  April,  causing  the 
concentration  there  of  both  brigades,  with  the  exception  of  the 
detachments  necessarily  sent  to  observe  different  important 
points.  The  entire  command,  after  some  skirmishing,  took 
position  near  Liberty,  but  to  the  east  of  it,  and  encamped  in 
line  of  battle,  on  the  night  of  the  2d. 

The  enemy  retreated  about  a  mile  and  bivouacked.  Scouts 
were  sent  through  his  camp  that  night  and  discovered  that  be 
hind  the  cavalry,  was  a  heavy  infantry  force.  Other  scouts  also 
reported  that  Hazen  was  advancing  from  Readyville  and  Crook 
from  Carthage.  Colonel  Ward  was  sent  to  watch  the  Carthage 
roads,  and  all  the  rest  were  disposed  to  resist  the  advance  of  the 
enemy  directly  in  front.  Colonel  Gano  was  senior  officer  and 
leaving  Breckinridge  to  conduct  the  retreat  to  "  Snow's  hill," 
he  took  charge  of  the  preparations  for  defense  there. 

"  Snow's  hill "  was  regarded  by  the  majority  of  the  officers 
(who  had  served  about  Liberty)  as  a  very  strong  position,  but,  I 
believe,  that  they  all  agreed  subsequently  that  the  opinion 
was  a  mistaken  one.  As  a  defensive-  position  against  attack 
from  an  enemy  who  came  through  Liberty,  it  possessed  no  strong 
features  at  all — in  reality  the  advantages  were  all  on  the  side 
of  the  attacking  party  if  he  possessed  a  numerical  strength 
which  would  enable  him  to  occupy  all  the  approaches  to  the  po 
sition  and  maintain  a  connected  line.  It  is  a  long  slope,  or 


383 

rather  collection  of  sloping  ridges,  which,  beginning  at  the  table 
land  eastward  of  the  valley  in  which  Liberty  is  situated,  point 
due  westward. 

The  road  from  Liberty  to  Sinithville  runs  through  the  center 
of  the  position  upon  Snow's  hill,  which  was  selected  for  defense, 
but  bends  and  c.urves  according  to  the  necessities  of  the  grade. 
The  ridges  all  point  toward  Liberty  and  are  parallel  to  the  gen 
eral  direction  of  the  road.  They  can  not  be  called  rugged  and 
inaccessible,  for  although  their  northern  and  southern  sides  are 
somewhat  precipitous,  the  back-bone  of  each  is  comparatively 
smooth  and  the  ascent  is  by  no  means  abrupt  or  difficult  from  the 
points  where  they  subside  into  the  valley  to  their  summit  at  the 
eastern  ends.  The  ravines  between  these  ridges  can  be  readily 
traversed  by  troops  and  the  bluffs  at  the  eastern  extremity  of 
each,  or  where  they  "head,"  can  be  easily  climbed.  It  is  true, 
that  the  conformation  of  the  ground  presents  at  one  side,  a  se 
rious  obstacle  to  an  attacking  force.  The  base  of  these  ridges, 
which  have  been  described,  or  the  parent  hill,  of  which  they 
seem  to  be  offshoots,  is  separated  from  the  level  ground  to  the 
eastward  by  a  singular  and  deep  gulf,  some  two  or  three  hundred 
yards  wide  and  I  know  not  how  long.  This  abyss  (it  may  be 
called)  is  crossed  by  a  sort  of  natural  wall,  or  what  would  be 
termed  in  railroad  parlance,  "fill,"  the  sides  of  which  are  very 
abrupt  and  steep.  It  is  not  more  than  thirty  or  forty  feet  wide, 
and  the  road  runs  along  it.  To  the  southward  of  this  deep, 
long  chasm,  is  a  gap  in  the  hill  through  which  ran  a  road  by 
which  the  rear  of  the  entire  position  could  be  gained.  If  this 
gap  had  been  occupied  and  the  narrow  road  across  the  wide, 
deep  chasm  had  been  adequately  commanded  by  earthworks 
which  could  protect  the  defenders  from  artillery  planted  on  the 
tops  of  the  hills,  the  position  would  have  been  impregnable,  per 
haps,  from  attack  against  its  front,  and  the  enemy  could  have 
carried  it  only  by  marching  far  around  upon  one  or  the  other 
flank.  But  the  position  always  selected  by  our  forces,  stationed 
there,  for  fight,  was  about  half  way  down  the  ridges  toward 


384  HISTORY  OP  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Liberty.  Here  the  enemy's  artillery  had  full  play  at  them,  his 
infantry  marching  up  the  ravines  and  ridges  had  an  equal  chance 
with  them, for  there  was  no  cover  and  all  were  equally  exposed; 
the  regiments  defending  the  position -were  necessarily  separated 
from  each  other  and  could  not  act  in  concert,  their  horses  em 
barrassed  them,  unless  carried  a  long  distance  to  the  rear,  and 
their  every  movement  was  completely  apparent  to  the  enemy. 
The  left  flank  was,  also,  always  in  danger,  and  if  turned  by  cav 
alry,  the  retreat  would  be  necessarily  compromised. 

During  the  night  of  the  2nd,  the  Sixth  Kentucky  and  Quirk's 
scouts  were  posted  to  watch  the  enemy,  and  the  rest  of  the  com 
mand  was  withdrawn  to  the  eastward  of  Liberty  and  took  posi 
tion  upon  the  hill.  Two  guns  of  Byrne's  battery  were  planted, 
to  sweep  the  road,  a  few  hundred  yards  from  the  town.  At 
daylight  the  enemy's  cavalry  charged  the  force  in  front  of  the 
town  and  drove  it  back.  Major  Bullitt,  commanding  Sixth  Ken 
tucky,  held  them  back  for  a  while,  but  their  numbers  and  the 
dash  with  which  they  came  told,  and  they  forced  him  to  rapid 
retreat.  Soon  their  close  pursuit  brought  the  enemy  within  the 
range  of  the  guns,  and  their  fire  made  them  call  a  halt,  and 
Bullitt  and  Quirk  charged  in  their  turn.  The  Confederates, 
however,  were  borne  steadily  backward. 

To  the  eastward  of  Liberty  the  enemy  met  with  another  check 
at  the  long  covered  bridge  over  Dry  creek  about  a  mile  from  the 
town.  The  guns  were  planted  to  command  the  bridge  and 
masked;  when  the  enemy  had  crowded  it  full,  Byrnes  opened 
and  burst  his  shells  right  in  their  midst.  In  a  short  time  an 
swering  artillery  drove  the  Confederates  away. 

Established  on  Snow's  hill,  the  line  was  not  able  to  remain 
long  in  position  under  the  heavy  fire  of  artillery  and  the  attack 
of  the  infantry.  A  long  column  of  cavalry  moved  up  Dry  creek, 
and  turning  upon  the  left  flank,  came  through  the  gap  which 
has  been  mentioned.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Huffman  was  sent 
with  the  Third  Kentucky,  to  check  them,  but,  unluckily,  did  not 
reach  the  gap  in  time.  He  prevented,  however,  their  further 


RETREAT   FROM    SNOW'S    HILL.  385 

advance  until  the  troops  under  Colonel  Breckinridge  (which 
about  the  same  time  began  to  retreat)  had  passed  the  point 
where  this  force  could  have  cut  them  off. 

I  came  up  to  the  rear,  about  this  time,  in  company  with 
Colonel  Smith — we  had  ridden  from  McMinnville  together  and 
had  heard  cannonading,  and  learned  that  there  was  a  fight  going 
on.  We  saw  nothing  of  it,  however,  but  its  effects  upon  the 
stragglers  and  "bummers,"  who  seemed  to  have  unaccountably 
increased.  I  had  been  absent  from  the  command  for  more  than 
two  months,  but  knew  of  the  gallant  service  it  had  done,  and 
took  for  granted  that  its  morale  was  unimpaired.  Colonel 
Smith,  who  had  left  Liberty  only  two  or  three  days  before,  was 
more  surprised  than  myself  at  the  stream  of  stragglers  which  we 
met.  The  moral  condition  of  the  men  was  the  most  singular  I 
ever  witnessed.  There  was  no  panic,  no  running,  jostling,  wild 
fear.  They  rode  along  quietly,  talked  rationally,  seemed  utterly 
free  from  any  lively  and  immediate  apprehension,  but  "just 
could  n't  be  made  to  fight,"  and  yet  quiet  and  "  serene "  as 
seemed  to  be  their  timidity,  it  made  some  of  them  go  clear  off, 
swim  unfordable  streams,  and  stay  away  for  days.  We  were 
unprovided  with  a  guard,  and  although  we  could  stop  these 
fellows,  until  the  road  was  packed  and  jammed  with  them,  it 
was  utterly  impossible  to  make  them  turn  back.  At  length,  in 
disgust,  we  gave  up  the  attempt,  and  rode  on  to  see  what  was 
the  condition  of  affairs  nearer  the  scene  of  actual  fighting. 
Colonel  Smith  hastened  to  his  regiment,  and  I  went  in  quest  of 
Colonels  Gano  and  Breckinridge,  and  kept  a  watch  for  the 
Second  Kentucky. 

I  met  the  column  of  Colonel  Breckinridge  retreating,  but  in 
excellent  order ;  the  ranks  were  depleted  by  the  stragglers,  but 
the  men  who  were  left  were  as  firm  and  cool  as  ever.  The 
same  was  true  of  that  portion  of  Colonel  Gano's  brigade  which 
I  saw.  The  men  were  occasionally  cheering,  and  seemed  per 
fectly  ready  to  return,  if  necessary,  to  fight.  When  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Huffman,  in  accordance  with  orders  sent  him  by  Colonel 
25 


386  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Gano,  undertook  to  withdraw  from  his  position  upon  the  left, 
his  men  became  crowded  and  confused,  on  account  of  the  pecu 
liar  conformation  of  the  ground.  The  enemy,  taking  advantage 
of  this  confusion,  charged  him.  The  Fourth  Regulars  came 
vigorously  upon  his  rear,  and  did  smart  damage.  The  regiment 
recoiled  in  disorder  for  some  distance.  At  length,  Gano,  with 
some  thirty  or  forty  men,  charged  the  Fourth  Regulars,  and 
checked  them.  Quirk  dashed  to  his  assistance  with  about  the 
same  number  of  men,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  completely 
away.  No  further  pursuit  was  attempted,  and  the  column  re 
treated  toward  Smithville.  On  the  way  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Martin  was  sent  with  a  few  men  to  watch  the  roads  leading  from 
the  ground  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  to  the  Smithville  and 
McMinnville  road,  in  order  to  prevent  any  effort  of  the  enemy 
to  surprise  us  upon  that  road.  The  wagon  train  had  been  pre 
viously  ordered  to  move  through  Smithville  to  McMinnville  by 
this  same  road.  Some  of  Martin's  men  (dressed  in  blue  over 
coats)  came  out  upon  the  road,  suddenly,  in  front  of  She  train, 
The  teamsters  took  them  to  be  Yankees,  and  the  wildest  stam 
pede  ensued.  The  teamsters  and  wagon  attachees  ran  in  every 
direction,  crazy  with  fright.  Some  turned  their  teams  and  put 
back  to  Smithville,  others  floundered  off  of  the  road  and  tried  to 
drive  through  thickets  that  a  child's  toy  cart  could  scarcely  have 
been  hauled  through.  Many  wagons  were,  consequently, 
smashed  up  before  the  panic  could  be  abated. 

That  night  we  encamped  some  fourteen  miles  from  McMinn 
ville.  At  this  date  Colonel  Gano's  connection  with  the  com 
mand  ceased,  and  we  lost  the  benefit  of  his  character  as  an 
officer  and  man.  No  officer  had  won  more  and  better  merited 
distinction,  and  his  popularity  was  justly  very  great.  Func 
tional  disease  of  the  heart,  brought  about  by  exposure,  hard 
work  and  intense  excitement,  compelled  him  to  withdraw,  for  a 
time,  from  active  service,  and  when  he  returned,  with  re-estab 
lished  health,  to  the  field,  it  was  to  win  new  laurels  arid  accom 
plish  brilliant  work  in  the  Trans-Mississippi. 


CONSEQUENCES  OF  OUR  DEFEAT.  387 

The  division  received  more  injury  from  this  affair  than  I 
would  have  supposed  a  'hard  fight  and  serious  defeat  would  have 
done  it.  Nearly  two  weeks  were  required  to  collect  the  fugi 
tives. 

General  Morgan,  on  his  way  to  join  us  on  the  night  of  the 
3d,  met  a  straggler,  wandering  loosely  about,  and  demanded 
sternly  why  he  was  absent  from  his  regiment.  "Well,  General," 
answered  the  fellow,  ingenuously,  "I'm  scattered/' 


388  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

ON  the  5th,  the  command  under  General  Morgan,  in  person, 
moved  to  Liberty,  which  the  enemy  had  by  this  time  evacuated. 
Scouts  and  pickets  were  thrown  out,  but  although  the  enemy 
were  reported  to  be  still  at  Alexandria  in  large  force,  there  was 
no  collision  even  with  his  videttes.  After  remaining  at  Liberty 
a  few  hours,  General  Morgan  withdrew,  moving  about  ten  o'clock 
at  night,  to  Smithville  again.  He  had  no  desire  to  attack  the 
enemy,  if  in  any  such  force  as  he  was  represented  to  be,  nor 
was  he  willing  to  await  an  attack  in  the  then  condition  of  his 
command.  A  report,  too,  had  reached  him,  which  turned  out 
to  be  unfounded,  that  McMinnville  had  been  taken,  that  after 
noon,  by  another  expedition  from  Murfreesboro'. 

We  remained  at  Smithville  until  the  7th,  and  then  returned 
to  Liberty,  in  accordance  with  orders  from  General  Wheeler,  who 
had  reached  Alexandria  on  the  same  evening,  with  Wharton's 
division.  Two  or  three  days  subsequently,  General  Wheeler 
proceeded  to  Lebanon  with  all  of  the  troops  at  his  disposal,  and 
sending,  thence,  five  hundred  men  to  La  Vergne,  under  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  Ferril,  of  the  Eighth  Texas,  to  intercept  and 
capture  railroad  trains,  he  moved  with  the  remainder  of  his 
forces  to  the  "  Hermitage,"  on  the  Nashville  and  Lebanon  pike, 
twelve  miles  from  Nashville.  Here  he  left  all  of  his  command, 
except  one  regiment,  to  repel  any  advance  from  Nashville — and 
proceeded  with  that  regiment  and  two  or  three  pieces  of  artillery 
to  the  river — distant  about  four  miles — and  fired  across  it  with 
artillery  at  a  train  of  cars,  knocking  the  engine  off  the  track. 
No  movement  was  made  by  the  enemy  from  Nashville,  and  on 
the  same  evening  General  Wheeler  returned  to  Lebanon.  The 
next  day,  the  party  sent  to  La  Vergne  returned  also.  Colonel 


DRIVEN   FROM     MCMINNVILLE.  389 

Ferril  had  captured  a  train,  taking  a  number  of  prisoners,  re 
leased  some  men  of  our  division  captured  at  Snow's  hill  and  on 
their  way  to  Nashville,  and  he  had  gotten,  besides,  nearly  forty 
thousand  dollars  in  greenbacks — Qaartermaster's  funds.  This 
money,  General  Wheeler  appropriated  to  buying  fresh  horses 
for  the  men  who  had  captured  it. 

General  Wheeler  remained  at  Lebanon  three  days.  During 
that  time,  the  enemy  advanced  once  from  Murfreesboro',  but  re 
treated  before  reaching  our  pickets.  Upon  our  return  from 
Lebanon,  a  portion  of  the  forces,  only,  were  sent  to  Alexandria  ; 
more  than  half,  under  command  of  General  Wheeler,  passed 
through  Rome,  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Carthage.  Remain 
ing  here  during  the  night,  General  Wheeler,  just  at  day-light,  fell 
back  toward  Alexandria,  reaching  that  place  about  1  or  2  p.  M. 
Wharton's  division  was  again  encamped  here,  and  Morgan's  di 
vision,  under  my  command,  was  sent  to  Liberty,  except  Smith's 
regiment  which  was  stationed  near  Alexandria. 

General  Morgan  on  the  night  of  the  5th,  had  returned  to 
McMinnville,  and  had  not  since  rejoined  us.  Two  or  three  days 
after  this,  the  enemy  moved  out  from  Carthage,  so  far  as  New 
Middleton,  ten  miles  from  Alexandria,  where  General  Wheeler 
attacked  them  and  drove  them  back  to  Carthage.  On  the  19th  or 
20th,  the  enemy  advanced  upon  McMinnville  with  a  strong  force 
of  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery.  There  was  no  cavalry  force 
at  the  place  at  all,  except  General  Morgan's  escort  (forty  or 
fifty  strong),  but  there  was  some  ninety  infantry,  under  com 
mand  of  Major  Wickliffe  of  the  Ninth  Kentucky  infantry,  sta 
tioned  there.  After  a  good  deal  of  preliminary  reconnoitering 
and  some  skirmishing  with  the  men  of  the  escort,  the  enemy's 
cavalry  dashed  into  the  town,  eight  abreast,  driving  out  General 
Morgan  and  several  officers,  who  happened  to  be  collected  at 
McMinville  upon  sick  leave,  or  on  special  duty  of  some  sort. 
Among  them  were  Colonel  Cluke,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Martin, 
and  Major  McCann.  Exchanging  a  few  shots  with  the  cavalry, 
this  party  retreated  upon  the  Sparta  road — McCann's  horse  waa 


390  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

shot  in  the  melee  and  fell,  bringing  him  to  the  ground.  He  sprang 
to  his  feet  and  standing  in  front  of  the  charging  column,  shouted 
"  You  have  got  the  old  chief  at  last,"  seeking  to  produce  the 
impression  that  he  was  General  Morgan  and  so  favor  the  latter's 
escape.  He  was  ridden  over,  severely  sabred,  and  captured ; 
hut  having  been  placed  in  an  old  stable,  and  allowed  a  canteen 
of  apple  brandy,  he  got  the  guard  drunk  and  dug  out  under  the 
logs,  during  the  night,  effecting  his  escape.  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Martin  received  a  bad  wound  through  the  lungs,  but  sat  on  his 
horse  and  escaped.  All  of  the  others  escaped  uninjured.  The 
infantry  retreated,  in  perfect  order,  to  the  mountains  two  or  three 
miles  distant.  The  enemy  pursued,  but  were  driven  back  by 
the  volleys  given  them  whenever  they  pressed  closely. 

When  the  news  of  this  affair  reached  General  Wheeler's 
headquarters,  General  Wharton  urged  that  the  entire  force 
should  be  withdrawn  from  Alexandria  and  Liberty,  and  concen 
trated  at  Smithville.  He  believed  that  the  enemy,  in  withdraw 
ing  from  McMinnville,  would  come  by  Liberty — the  infantry 
moving  through  Mechanicsville,  and  the  cavalry  through  Smith 
ville.  This  route,  they  might  calculate,  would  remove  them  from 
all  danger  of  molestation  by  any  infantry  force  sent  after  them 
from  our  army,  and  would  bring  them  right  upon  the  flank  of 
our  cavalry,  which  could  annoy  their  rear  if  they  retreated 
through  Woodbury,  but  would,  perhaps,  be  driven  off  by  the 
movement  upon  Liberty.  Then,  a  good  pike  conducted  them  to 
Murfreesboro',  and  their  cavalry,  coming  on  from  Smithville, 
protected  their  rear. 

A  concentration  of  our  whole  force  at  Smithville,  would  not 
only  make  us  secure,  but  would  enable  us  to  punish  the  cavalry 
severely,  if  the  movement  was  made  as  Wharton  anticipated. 
We  remained,  however,  in  the*  same  positions,  picketing  and 
scouting  vigilantly.  The  enemy  moved  exactly  as  Wharton  had 
forseen  that  they  would  do,  and  the  troops  at  Liberty  fell  back 
to  Alexandria,  whence,  both  divisions  retreated  across  Caney 
fork,  to  Buffalo  valley. 


POSITION   OF   FORCES.  391 


The  road  by  which  we  moved  was  a  rough  and  bad  one,  and 
the  ford  at  which  we  crossed,  execrable,  making  it  a  tedious  af 
fair.  A  demonstration  was  made,  on  the  same  day,  from  Car 
thage,  but  too  late  to  interfere  with  our  retreat.  Morgan's  di 
vision,  during  these  operations,  on  account  of  heavy  detach 
ments  having  been  made  from  it,  and  pretty  heavy  straggling, 
was  very  much  reduced. 

During  a  week  or  ten  days'  stay  in  Buffalo  valley,  the  strag 
glers  were  collected  and  the  regiments  were  gotten  into  pretty 
good  order  again.  Cluke's,  Chenault's,  and  Morgan's  regiments 
were  still  stationed  upon  the  Cumberland,  in  Wayne,  Clinton 
and  Cumberland  counties.  The  latter  regiment  was  driven  away 
from  Celina,  some  time  in  the  early  part  of  May;  it  had  been 
posted  there  to  protect  the  collection  of  commissary  stores  for 
Wheeler's  corps.  After  taking  the  town  of  Celina,  the  Federal 
forces  burned  it  and  took  position  along  the  Cumberland,  on  the 
northern  side,  confronting  our  forces  on  the  southern.  Pegram's 
brigade  was  also  stationed  at  Monticello,  in  Wayne  county,  Ken 
tucky.  It  was  attacked  and  driven  away  on  the  28th  of  May. 
General  Morgan  after  these  affairs  occurred,  was  ordered  to 
move  with  his  division  to  Wayne  county,  and  drive  the  enemy 
from  the  region  south  of  the  Cumberland  ;  or  if  he  found  him 
coo  strong  to  be  driven,  and  he  manifested  an  intention  (which  ^ 
was  somewhat  feared)  of  pressing  into  East  Tennessee,  to  at 
least  retard  his  advance. 

When  General  Morgan  reached  Monticello,  which  the  enemy 
had  evacuated  shortly  after  the  affair  with  Pegram,  he  found 
Cluke,  with  his  own  regiment  and  Chenault's,  lying  in  front  of 
a  superior  Federal  force  in  Horseshoe  bottom  on  Greasy  creek, 
in  the  western  end  of  Wayne  county.  Cluke  had  been  skir 
mishing  with  them  for  two  or  three  days.  General  Morgan  sent 
couriers  to  hasten  the  march  of  his  other  regiments — the  Second, 
Third,  Fifth  and  Sixth  Kentucky,  and  Ninth  Tennessee,  and  of 
his  artillery. 

Notwithstanding  that  the  utmost  expedition  was  used,  we  did 


392 

not  arrive  upon  the  ground  until  after  3  p.  M.,  although  the 
order  arrived  at  9  or  10  A.  M.  During  the  day,  Cluke  and 
Chenault  were  fighting  with  the  enemy,  at  intervals,  neither 
losing  nor  gaining  ground.  When  we  arrived,  these  regiments 
had  almost  entirely  expended  their  ammunition,  and  averaged 
but  two  cartridges  per  man.  The  rough  road  over  which  we  had 
marched,  and  the  rapidity  with  which  the  march  was  made,  had 
not  only  caused  the  artillery  to  be  left  far  in  the  rear,  but  had 
told  severely  on  the  column.  Several  horses  dropped  dead. 
Many  gave  out  so  completely  that  they  had  to  be  left.  The 
strength  of  the  five  regiments  was  reduced  to  eight  hundred 
men,  when  they  arrived  upon  the  field. 

One  instance  of  uncommon  gallantry,  upon  the  part  of  a 
private  soldier — Theodore  Bybee  of  Company  C,  Second  Ken 
tucky — ought  to  be  related.  His  horse  fell  dead  beneath  him, 
and  he  caught  the  stirup  of  a  comrade,  and  ran  thus  eight  or 
ten  miles  to  the  scene  of  the  fighting.  As  soon  as  we  arrived, 
General  Morgan  ordered  us  to  form  for  attack.  No  one  in  the 
command  was  familiar  with  the  ground,  and  the  disposition  of 
the  line  was  made  with  reference  only  to  what  could  be  seen. 

On  the  left  of  our  position,  was  a  deep  ravine,  with  which  the 
road  ran  parallel,  and  about  one  hundred  yards  distant.  The 
whole  ground  was  covered,  in  every  direction,  with  thick  tim 
ber,  except  for  perhaps  ten  or  fifteen  acres  directly  in  front 
of  the  line  formed  by  Cluke's  and  Chenault's  regiments.  In 
this  open  space,  which  was  an  old  field  and  orchard,  and  nearly 
square,  was  situated  a  small  house.  Just  on  the  other  side  of 
jt?  and  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  the  enemy  were  posted.  The 
road  ran  through  the  center  of  it,  and,  immediately  after  enter 
ing  the  woods  at  the  northern  extremity,  turned  to  the  left, 
crossing  the  ravine. 

The  mistake  General  Morgan  made  in  supposing  that  the  road 
continued  to  run  straight,  and  thus  inducing  him  to  make  no  in 
flection  of  his  line  on  the  right  of  the  road,  toward  the  enemy's 
left  flank,  prevented  his  capturing  a  good  many  prisoners,  and 


BATTLE    OF   MONTICELLO.  393 

perhaps  the  enemy's  artillery.  Cltike's  and  Chenault's  regi 
ments  were,  together,  not  more  than  three  hundred  and  fifty 
strong,  upon  the  field.  The  Fifth  Kentucky,  and  Ninth  Tennes 
see  were  formed  about  one  hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of  Cluke 
and  Chenault,  and  were  placed  under  command  of  Colonel 
Smith.  The  Third  and  Sixth  Kentucky,  were  formed  about 
two  hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of  Colonel  Smith's  line  and  a 
little  further  to  the  right.  The  Second  Kentucky,  and  Colonel 
Morgan's  regiment,  which  had  also  arrived,  were  held  in  reserve, 
the  former  on  foot,  the  latter  mounted.  All  of  the  horses  were 
placed  on  the  left  of  the  road.  Just  as  these  dispositions  were 
completed,  the  enemy  opened  upon  us  with  two  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  which  did  no  damage,  except  to  the  horses,  several  of  which 
were  killed.  As  no  artillery  had  been  used  previously,  General 
Morgan  thought  that  its  appearance  upon  the  field  betokened 
the  arrival  of  reinforcements  to  the  enemy,  perhaps  in  consid 
erable  numbers,  and  he  thought,  for  a  moment,  of  withdrawing 
his  troops.  In  this  view,  every  officer  about  him  at  the  time, 
concurred,  except  Colonel  Morgan. 

A  few  seconds  of  time  elapsing,  it  was  demonstrated  that  be 
fore  we  could  retreat,  we  would  be  forced  to  repulse  the  enemy. 
At  the  roar  of  the  guns,  they  came  charging  across  the  open 
ground,  yelling  like  devils,  or  rebels.  The  crash  of  musketry, 
for  a  minute,  in  the  limited  space,  was  quite  heavy.  Cluke's 
line  quickly  discharged  all  of  its  ammunition,  and  then  gave 
back  before  the  enemy's  determined  rush,  without,  however, 
losing  its  formation,  or  any  of  the  men  turning  their  faces  from 
the  enemy.  These  two  regiments  were  exceedingly  reliable  in 
battle. 

After  this  line  had  lacked  some  twenty-five  paces,  Smith's 
line  came  to  its  support,  and  the  men  in  the  latter,  passing 
through  the  intervals  between  the  files  of  the  former,  poured 
into  the  faces  of  the  Federals,  at  that  time  almost  mingled  with 
the  men  of  Cluke's  and  Chenault's  regiments,  a  volley  which 
amazed  and  sent  them  back.  As  our  line  pressed  after  them 


394  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

across  the  open  ground,  the  artillery,  only  a  short  distance  off, 
told  severely  on  it  and  continued  its  fire  until  our  foremost  were 
close  upon  the  guns. 

The  enemy  made  a  stand  at  the  point  where  the  road  crosses 
the  ravine,  to  enable  the  guns  to  escape,  but  the  Third  and  Sixth 
Kentucky  coining  up,  they  were  again  driven.  So  dense  was 
the  woods,  that  pursuit  was  almost  impossible.  Colonel  Morgan 
dashed  down  the  road,  but  secured  only  a  few  prisoners.  The 
enemy  conducted  the  retreat  with  the  most'  perfect  coolness. 
About  three  hundred  yards  from  the  point  where  the  last  stand 
was  made,  one  company  halted  and  picketed  the  road,  while  all 
the  rest  (as  we  afterward  ascertained)  continued  to  rapidly  re 
treat  to  the  river.  Our  loss  in  this  skirmish,  which  lasted  about 
half  an  hour,  was,  in  the  first  brigade,  ten  killed  and  sixteen 
wounded,  and  in  the  second  five  or  six  killed  and  wounded. 
The  enemy  lost,  I  believe,  twenty-one  killed,  and  a  smaller 
number  of  wounded.  His  loss  was  in  all,  as  nearly  as  I  re 
member,  thirty-one  or  two.  Very  few  prisoners  were  taken. 
General  Morgan,  despairing  of  being  able  to  surround  or  rush 
over  the  enemy,  in  the  rugged,  wooded  country,  sent  a  flag  of 
truce,  proposing  a  surrender.  Captain  Davis,  Assistant  Adju 
tant  General  of  the  first  brigade  (who  bore  the  flag),  was  de 
tained  until  communication  could  be  had  with  Colonel  Jacobs, 
who  commanded  all  the  United  States  forces  in  that  immediate 
region.  Colonel  Jacobs  was  some  distance  off,  on  the  other  side 
of  the  river,  and  it  was  growing  dark.  General  Morgan  sent 
another  message,  demanding  the  release  of  Captain  Davis,  and 
declaring  his  intention  of  advancing  as  soon  as  that  was  done. 
Immediately  upon  the  return  of  Captain  Davis,  the  column  was 
moved  forward.  The  pickets  saluted  the  advance  guard  with  a 
.volley,  and  gracefully  fell  back,  and  although  we  pressed  on 
close  to  the  river,  we  saw  nothing  more  of  them.  As  late  as 
the  close  of  the  war,  no  answer  had  been  received  from  Colonel 
Jacobs,  although  that  officer  was  distinguished  for  his  courtesy 
as  well  as  gallantry. 


APPARENT   INACTIVITY.  395 

The  division  remained  on  the  line  of  the  Cumberland,  picket 
ing  from  Stagall's  ferry  to  Celina  for  nearly  three  weeks.  The 
headquarters  of  the  first  brigade  was  at  Albany,  county  seat  of 
Clinton  county,  that  of  the  second  at  Monticello,  county  sent  of 
Wayne.  In  that  time  the  ranks  filled  up  again,  nearly  all  ab 
sentees,  with  or  without  leave,  returning.  The  horses  were 
grazed  on  the  rich  grass  and  carefully  attended  to,  and  got  in 
excellent  condition  again.  Several  scouting  expeditions  were 
undertaken,  during  this  period,  against  the  enemy  on  the  north 
side  of  the  river,  the  most  successful  of  which  were  under  com 
mand  of  Captain  Davis  and  Captain  Thomas  Franks,  of  the 
Second  Kentucky.  Each  of  these  officers,  with  two  companies, 
penetrated  far  into  the  enemy's  lines,  and  attacking  and  routing 
the  forces  that  they  met,  with  small  loss  to  themselves,  brought 
off  prisoners,  horses,  and  captured  property  of  various  kinds. 
These  expeditions  were  not  only  of  essential  use  in  annoying 
the  enemy,  but  were  absolutely  necessary  to  the  maintenance 
of  a  proper  spirit  and  energy  among  our  men,  whose  morale  and 
discipline  were,  invariably,  sensibly  impaired  by  an  indolent 
and  monotonous  life. 

This  period  of  the  history  of  Morgan's  cavalry  has  been  gen 
erally  esteemed  one  of  entire  inaction,  upon  the  part  of  both 
leader  and  men.  *It  is  true  that  nothing  was  done  in  all  this 
period,  which  would  at  all  compare  with  the  dashing,  enterpris 
ing  career  of  the  previous  year.  But  a  great  deal  of  useful,  if 
not  brilliant  service,  was  performed,  and  a  vast  deal  of  hard 
work  was  cheerfully  gone  through  with.  The  public  had  be 
come  so  accustomed  to  expect  "raids"  and  "dashes"  from 
Morgan,  that  they  thought  his  command  idle  and  useless,  when 
engaged  in  the  performance  of  regular  routine  duty.  It  should 
be  remembered  that,  at  the  very  time  when  Morgan's  division 
was  thought  to  be  so  inactive,  it  was  constantly  occupied  with 
exactly  the  kind  of  service  at  which  the  other  cavalry,  except 
Forrest's,  were  always  engaged. 

During  the  winter  and  spring  of  1863,  and  until  nearly  the 


396  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

middle  of  the  summer,  our  command  was  guarding  and  picketing 
a  long  front,  and  scouting  thoroughly  a  great  extent  of  country 
besides.  For  six  months  the  country  about  Liberty,  Alexandria 
and  Lebanon,  and  that  about  Monticello  and  Albany,  was  in  a 
great  measure  committed  to  Morgan's  care.  This  gave  him  a 
front  of  quite  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  to  watch  and  guard, 
and  at  least  half  of  the  time  he  had  to  do  it  single-handed. 
Then  there  was  a  great  portion  of  Middle  Tennessee,  arid  of 
Southern,  Central  and  Eastern  Kentucky,  which  his  scouts  con 
stantly  traversed.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  from  January  to  July, 
1863,  inclusive,  the  period  of  the  supposed  inaction,  during 
which  time  Morgan  made  no  "raid,'  nor  achieved  any  very 
brilliant  success,  that  in  all  that  time,  our  division  was  as  con 
stantly  serving,  fought  and  won  as  many  skirmishes,  guarded 
and  scouted  as  great  an  extent  of  country,  captured  as  many 
prisoners,  and  gave  the  Confederate  Government  as  little  trouble 
on  the  subject  of  supplies,  as  any  other  cavalry  division  in  the 
Confederate  army. 

But,  in  this  year,  the  glory  and  the  prestige  began  to  pass 
away  from  the  Southern  cavalry.  It  was  not  that  their  oppo 
nents  became  their  superiors  in  soldiership,  any  more  than  in 
individual  prowess.  Although  the  Federal  cavalry  had  greatly 
improved,  had  become  formidable  for  its  enterprise  and  fighting 
capacity,  it  can  yet  be  said  that  the  Confederate  cavalry,  when 
in  proper  condition,  still  asserted  its  superiority  up.on  every 
field  where  there  was  an  equality  of  forces.  But  it  was  daily 
becoming  more  and  more  difficult  to  keep  the  Confederate  cav 
alry  in  good  condition.  An  impression  prevailed,  no  doubt  a 
correct  one,  that  as  for  the  great  efforts  of  war,  the  infantry 
was  so  much  more  useful  and  necessary^  a  far  greater  care  ought 
to  be  taken  of  it  than  of  the  cavalry ;  and,  then,  an  idea  ob 
tained  that,  inasmuch  as  our  cavalry  supplied  itself  so  often,  and 
occasionally  so  well,  by  its  own  captures,  it  ought  to  do  so  all 
the  time.  A  corollary  resulted  from  these  two  propositions, 
which  played  the  wild  with  the  cavalry,  viz :  that  it  was  highly 


INFANTRY  VS.    CAVALRY.  397 

improper  to  issue  anything  which  the  Government  had  to  fur 
nish  to  that  arm  of  the  service.  So  it  happened  that,  while  to  the 
cavalry  were  entrusted  the  most  responsible  and  important  du 
ties,  scarcely  any  encouragement  or  assistance  was  afforded 
it ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  a  tone  and  conduct  w  ere  adopted  toward 
it  apparently  expressly  intended  to  disgust  it.  I  speak  in  refer 
ence  to  Western  cavalry  and  Western  affairs  altogether,  for  I 
served  at  no  time  with  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  know 
nothing  of  it  but  the  bare  outline  of  its  glorious  and  unequaled 
record.  Cavalry  officers,  after  long  and  arduous  service,  and  a 
thorough  initiation  into  all  the  mysteries  of  their  craft,  were  re 
warded  and  encouraged  by  having  some  staff  officer,  or  officer 
educated  to  shoot  heavy  artillery,  run  steamships,  or  mix  chem 
ical  preparations,  promoted  over  their  heads ;  and  were  expected 
to  be  delighted  with  him,  although  he  might  not  practically  know 
whether  a  horse-shoe  was  put  on  with  nails  or  with  hooks  and 
eyes,  and  whether  pickets  were  posted  to  look  out  for  an  enemy, 
or  to  show  Brigadier-Generals  the  way  to  their  headquarters 
when  they  were  lost. 

Cavalry  which  was  expected  to  be  constantly  engaging  the 
enemy,  and  upon  whose  efficiency  and  success  a  vast  deal  de 
pended,  were  grudgingly  provided  with  or  altogether  denied 
arms  and  ammunition,  unless  they  could  be  captured  from  the 
enemy.  Hard  and  constant  as  was  the  service  the  cavalryman 
performed,  exposed  as  he  was  to  the  severity  of  all  sorts  of 
climate,  without  shelter,  and  often  without  the  means  of  building 
the  fire  which  stood  him  in  stead  of  tent,  and  sometimes  had  to 
furnish  him  the  strength  and  cheer  of  the  food  he  lacked,  he  was 
yet  snubbed  mercilessly,  and  Generals  commanding  stared  aghast 
if  he  presumed  to  ask  for  anything.  The  infantryman,  lying 
snug  and  idle  in  camp,  was  given  his  blanket  and  his  tent,  good 
clothing  (if  it  could  possibly  be  had)  and  stout  shoes  (I  speak, 
of  course,  in  a  Confederate  sense) ;  all  was  done  for  him  to  get 
him  in  condition  for  the  day  of  battle  ;  they  fattened  him  for 
the  sacrifice.  But  the  cavalryman,  had  it  not  been  for  his  own 


398  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

exertions,  and  the  energy  with  which  he  indemnified  himself  for 
his  Government's  neglect  of  him,  would  not  have  been  worth 
killing.  When  I  reflect  upon  the  privations  I  have  seen  the 
men  endure,  and  remember  that  they  well  knew  that  there  was  no 
escape  from  them,  except  by  taking  what  they  wanted  wherever 
they  found  it ;  and  remember,  further,  the  chances  that  were  of 
fered,  I  am  lost  in  astonishment  at  their  honesty  and  forbearance. 
I  am  aware  that  our  "distant  brethren"  of  the  North,  or  those, 
rather,  who  will  be  our  brethren,  it  is  inferred,  when  an  amend 
ment  to  the  Constitution  decides  who  and  what  we  are — it  is  a 
matter  perfectly  well  understood  that  they  will  concede  no  such 
honesty  to  us,  and  naturally  enough.  It  is  a  stale,  but  all  the 
more  certain-on-that-account  fact,  that  they  have  discovered 
that  "  the  earth  belongs  to  the  saints,"  and  that  they  "  are  the 
saints."  Therefore,  to  take  anything  (upon  this  continent,  at 
least),  in  any  manner,  is  to  rob  the  "saints ;"  and,  while  a  man  may 
pardon  a  fellow  who  robs  his  neighbor,  it  is  not  in  reason  that 
he  should  forgive  the  rogue  who  robs  him. 

One  special  cause  of  the  degeneracy  of  the  Southern  cavalry, 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  was  the  great  scarcity  of  horses  and 
the  great  difficulty  of  obtaining  forage  within  the  Confederate 
lines,  and  consequently,  of  keeping  the  horses  which  we  had  in 
good  condition.  Morgan's  men  had  the  reputation,  and  not  un 
justly,  of  procuring  horses  with  great  facility  and  economy. 
Adepts  as  we  were,  in  the  art  of  "  horse-pressing,"  there  was 
this  fact  nevertheless  to  be  said  in  favor  of  the  system  which  we 
adopted:  while  making  very  free  with  the  horse-flesh  of  the 
country  into  which  we  would  raid,  there  was  never  any  wanton 
waste  of  the  article.  We  did  not  kill  our  tired  stock,  as  did  the 
Federal  commanders  on  their  "raids,"  when  we  got  fresh  ones. 
The  men  of  our  command  were  not  permitted  to  impress  horses 
in  a  friendly  country.  It  is  true  that  horses  were  sometimes 
stolen  from  people  who  were  most  devoted  to  our  cause,  and  who 
lived  within  our  lines,  but  such  thefts  did  not  often  occur,  and 
the  perpetrators  were  severely  punished.  The  witty  editors  of 


PRESSING    AeftSES/          \  399 


Yankee -land  would  doubtless  have  explained  our  rebuke  of  this 
practice,  by  an  application  of  the  old  saying  that  "there  is  honor 
among  thieves,"  which  would  have  been  very  just  and  apposite. 
The  difference  between  our  thieves  and  those  on  the  other  side 
was,  that  the  latter  were  entirely  destitute  of  every  sort  of  honor. 
General  Morgan  took  fresh  horses  to  enable  his  command  to 
make  the  tremendous  marches  which  ensured  so  much  of  his  suc 
cess,  and  to  prevent  his  men  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  but  he  hedged  around  the  practice  with  limitations  which 
somewhat  protected  the  citizen.  He  required  that,  in  every  in 
stance  where  a  man  desired  to  exchange  his  tired  horse  for  a 
fresh  one,  he  should  have  his  horse  inspected  by  his  company 
commander,  who  should  certify  to  the  condition  of  the  horse  and 
the  necessity  of  the  exchange.  If  the  company  commander  cei> 
tified  that  his  horse  was  unfit  for  service,  the  man  obtained  from 
his  regimental  commander  permission  to  obtain  a  fresh  one, 
which  had  also,  before  it  was  valid,  to  be  approved  by  the 
brigade  commander.  Whenever  it  was  practicable,  the  ex 
change  was  required  to  be  made  in  the  presence  of  a  commis 
sioned  officer,  and,  in  every  case,  a  horse,  if  the  soldier  had  it, 
was  ordered  to  be  left  in  the  place  of  the  one  impressed.  When 
a  man  was  without  a  horse,  altogether,  his  company  commander 
could  impress  one  for  him.  No  doubt,  this  seems  to  the  unmili- 
tary  reader,  only  systematic  robbery — but  is  not  that  going  on 
all  the  time,  all  over  the  world?  Is  it  riot,  too,  a  great  comfort 
to  the  citizen,  to  know  that  (when  he  is  robbed),  there  are  laws 
and  the  "proper  papers"  for  it ! 

When  men  or  officers  were  detected  with  led  horses,  they 
were  punished,  and  the  horses  were  taken  away  from  them,  un 
less  they  could  prove  that  they  were  entitled  to  them.  Morgan's 
men  were  habitually  styled  "  horse-thieves"  by  their  enemies, 
and  they  did  not  disclaim  the  title — I  should  like  to  see  a  sta 
tistical  report  showing  the  number  of  horses  stolen  in  Ken 
tucky  by  the  respective  belligerents — we  would  lose  some 
laurels.  The  Confederate  Government  could  not,  and  did  not 


400 

attempt  to  supply  the  cavalry  of  its  armies  with  horses.  The 
cavalry  soldier  furnished  his  own  horse,  and  (if  he  lost  him),  had 
to  make  the  best  shift  he  could  for  another.  The  cavalryman 
was  not  subjected  to  the  rigid  discipline  of  the  infantryman,  for 
the  reason  that  he  was  harder  to  catch.  It  is  more  difficult  to 
regulate  six  legs  than  two.  For  the  very  reason  that  it 
was  outside  of  the  pale  of  regular  discipline  and  the  highest 
military  civilization,  it  was  more  necessary  to  give  to  the 
cavalry  officers  who  practically  understood  that  sort  of  service, 
as  well  as  were  men  of  controlling  character.  Such  men  could 
make  of  the  cavalryman,  a  soldier — with  an  inferior  officer  or 
one  who  was  awkward  at  cavalry  business  over  him,  he  became 
an  Ishrnael. 

There  existed  among  the  infantry,  not  exactly  a  prejudice 
against  cavalry  (for  they  all  wanted  to  join  it),  but  that  sort  of 
feeling  against  it,  which  is  perhaps  natural  upon  the  part  of  the 
man  who  walks  against  the  man  who  rides.  When  the  "web- 
feet"  called  us  "buttermilk  rangers,"  we  did  not  get  angry  with 
them,  for  we  knew  that  they  were  gallant  fellows  and  that  much 
walking  tries  the  temper — but  we  did  not  admire  the  official 
prejudice  against  us,  and  thought  an  affected  contempt  of  our 
arm  in  very  bad  taste,  upon  the  part  of  Generals  who  not  only 
never  won  battles  but  who  never  tried  to  win  them. 

In  the  spring  and  summer  of  1863,  supplies  could  be  obtained 
for  neither  men  nor  horses  of  the  cavalry  of  Bragg's  army,  with 
out  the  greatest  difficulty  and  great  oppression  of  the  citizens. 
It  was  not  the  custom  to  issue  (out  of  army  supplies),  rations  to 
the  men,  or  forage  to  the  horses  of  the  cavalry  commands — they 
were  required  to  provide  for  themselves  in  these  respects.  It 
was  impracticable,  too,  to  supply  them  from  the  stores  collected 
for  army  use.  Certain  regions,  therefore,  in  which,  for  the  proper 
protection  of  the  lines,  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  keep  large 
bodies  of  cavalry — sections  of  country  not  fertile  and  at  no  time 
abounding  in  supplies — were  literally  stripped  of  meat,  grain  and 
every  thing  edible.  All  that  would  feed  man  or  horse  disap- 


CAUSE  OF  DEGENERACY  OF  CONFEDERATE  CAVALRY.    401 

peared,  as  if  a  cloud  of  Titanic  and  omnivorous  locusts  had  set 
tled  upon  the  land — and  after  the  citizens  were  reduced  to  the 
extremity  of  destitution  and  distress,  the  soldiers  arid  their 
horses  suffered,  also,  with  slow  famine. 

One  instance  of  the  kind  will  serve  to  show  how  destructive 
of  the  efficiency  of  cavalry  was  service  under  such  circumstances. 
When  the  division  was  ordered  to  Wayne  and  Clinton  counties. 
Kentucky,  the  Ninth  Kentucky,  one  of  the  best  regiments  in 
the  cavalry  of  the  West,  was  sent  to  Woodbury  to  picket  that 
immediate  section  of  country.  For  many  miles  around  this 
little  place,  the  country  had  been  exhausted  of  provisions  and 
forage  by  the  constant  requisition  upon  it  during  the  winter  and 
spring.  The  men  of  the  Ninth  Kentucky  suffered  severely  for 
want  of  rations,  but  they  esteemed  their  own  sufferings  lightly, 
compared  with  those  of  their  horses.  Long  forage  (oats,  fodder, 
etc.)  could  not  be  procured  at  all;  and  corn  had  to  be  hauled  a 
distance  of  over  thirty  miles,  from  a  region  whence  other  cavalry 
commands  were  also  drawing  supplies  of  forage,  or  else  it 
could  only  be  gotten  from  Tullahoma  out  of  the  forage  stored 
there  for  army  consumption.  Consequently,  corn  was  rare  at  that 
time  at  Woodbury  ;  two  or  three  ears  per  day  to  each  horse  was 
the  usual  issue.  Upon  some  days  none  was  issued.  Every 
blade  of  grass  in  the  vicinity  of  the  camp  was  eaten,  and  the 
trees  were  barked  by  the  poor  animals  as  high  as  they  could 
reach. 

The  men  stood  picket  on  foot ;  all  of  the  stock  was  rendered 
-.-utterly  unserviceable,  and  one  fourth  of  it  died.  By  such  usage 
(necessary,  however,)  this  regiment  was  made  unfit  for  active 
and  efficient  service  for  months,  and  its  discipline  and  morals 
were  seriously,  although  only  temporarily,  impaired.  More 
than  half— at  any  rate,  a  large  proportion  of  the  cavalry  of 
General  Bragg's  army  were  suffering,  at  that  time,  precisely  as 
this  regiment  was.  In  this  condition  of  things  is  to  be  found  the 
explanation  of  the  apparent  degeneracy  of  the  Confederate  cav 
alry,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  war. 
26 


402  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Another  fact,  too,  should  not  be  lost  sight  of.  In  common 
with  every  other  arm  of  the  service,  our  cavalry  become  very 
greatly  reduced  in  numbers  as  the  war  wore  on.  We  could  not 
fill  up  our  regiments  as  easily  as  the  Federals  could  fill  their 
wasted  organizations.  Those  who  wonder  why  well  known  Con 
federate  regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions  did  not  accomplish 
as  much  in  the  latter  as  in  the  early  part  of  the  war,  do  not 
know,  or  do  not  reflect,  that  it  was  because  they  were  reduced 
to  a  fourth  or  a  fifth  of  their  original  strength.  This,  however, 

O  O 

was  not  the  case  at  the  period  of  which  I  write.  It  was,  too, 
in  the  summer  of  1863  that  serious  doubt  of  the  successful  es 
tablishment  of  Southern  independence  began  to  gain  ground 
among  the  masses  of  the  Southern  people;  and  a  lukewarmness 
first,  and  next  a  feeling  almost  of  disaffection  to  the  Confederate 
Government  and  cause  widely  prevailed.  This  indifference  was 
very  unlike  the  strange  absence  of  anxiety  and  solicitude  about  the 
result  of  the  war,  which  characterized  its  early  stages.  The  latter 
feeling  proceeded  from  a  blind  and  overweening  confidence,  and 
those  who  entertained  it  were  not  the  less  intensely  patriotic 
and  devoted  to  the  cause.  Nor  was  this  species  of  disaffection, 
which  began  to  influence  so  many,  characterized  by  the  slightest 
tendency  toward  treachery  or  renegadeism.  Hundreds  of  citizens, 
•who  were  fiercely  opposed  to  the  administration,  and  cordially  dis 
liked  Mr.  Davis,  who  had  even  lost  much  of  their  interest  in  the 
•Confederate  army  and  its  fortunes,  nevertheless  hated  the  North 
ern  people,  the  Federal  Government,  and  the  invading  army,  with 
a  hatred  immeasurably  more  thorough,  rabid,  and  ineradicable, 
than  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  ere  they  knew  practically  what 
invasion  was  like.  With  a  strange  inconsistency,  these  men 
would  have  done  any  thing  to  have  injured  the  enemy,  even 
when  adverse  to  making  further  sacrifices  for  the  benefit  of  the 
Confederacy.  So  far  from  renegading  and  pandering  the  Fed 
eral  rule  and  success,  the  large  majority  of  this  class  ^YOuld  have 
pawned  their  souls  for  power  to  crush  the  Federal  arms.  This  is 
why  the  Southern  renegade  is  regarded  by  the  Southern  people 


LOATHING  FOR  SOUTHERN  RENEGADES.          403 

with  loathing,  scorn,  and  hatred,  burning  and  inextinguishable. 
Although  destitution  and  suffering  were  not  general,  at  this 
time,  in  the  South,  they  had  prevailed,  and  to  a  fearful  extent,  in 
many  sections ;  and  everywhere  a  solemn  and  well-founded  ap 
prehension  was  felt  upon  the  subject.  Still  it  took  two  years 
more  of  disaster — of  an  invasion  which  probed  every  nook  and 
corner  of  the  South,  and  a  condition  of  almost  famine,  to  finally 
break  the  spirit  of  the  Southern  people,  and  make  them,  in  the 
abjectness  of  their  agony,  actually  welcome  a  peace  which  her 
alded  subjugation  as  a  relief  from  the  horrors  of  war.  It  was 
the  submission  of  the  people  which  took  the  steel  out  of  the 
army. 

It  is  the  fashion,  with  a  certain  class  of  Southern  writers,  to 
denounce  Mr.  Davis  as  the  author  of  this  condition  of  things, 
and  to  revile  the  Southern  people  because  of  their  ultimate  de 
spair  and  surrender.  Many  and  great  blunders  were  committed 
in  the  conduct  of  the  civil  and  military  affairs  of  the  Confed- 
feracy,  and  doubtless  Mr.  Davis  was  responsible  for  some  of 
them. 

In  an  affair  of  such  magnitude,  as  was  the  Southern  move 
ment  and  the  consequent  war,  errors  would  have  characterized, 
in  all  probability,  the  administration  of  the  most  practiced  and 
skillful  military  and  political  chiefs — how  then  could  the  ad 
ministration  of  men,  unschooled  in  the  practical  arts  of  managing 
revolutions  and  wars,  be  free  from  them  ?  The  wonder  is,  not 
that  blunders  were  made,  but  that  the  bad  effect  of  so  many 
was  partially  repaired.  The  faults,  which  marred  our  fortunes, 
were  the  natural  concomitants  of  a  state  of  prolonged  and  con 
stant  warfare,  and  the  latter  weakening  of  our  people  was  the 
inevitable  result  of  a  struggle  against  adverse  circumstances  and 
superior  numbers  and  resources.  The  only  way  to  have  lessened 
the  number  of  the  former,  and  to  have  prevented  the  latter, 
would  have  been  to  fight,  not  a  waiting,  but  a  quick  war. 

On  the  26th,  the  division  was  ordered  back  to  Liberty  and 
Alexandria.  That  country  had  been  occupied  and  picketed, 


404  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

just  before  our  return  from  Albany  and  Monticello,  by  a  brigade 
of  Wharton's  division,  commanded  by  Colonel  (afterward  Briga 
dier  General)  Harrison,  of  the  Eighth  Texas,  a  gallant  and 
highly  esteemed  officer.  Breckinridge's  regiment  (the  Ninth 
Kentucky)  was  still  kept  at  Woodbury.  About  this  time  Colo 
nel  A.  R.  Johnson  returned  from  Texas,  and  was  immediately 
assigned,  by  General  Morgan,  to  the  command  of  the  second 
brigade — his  rank  entitled  him  to  be  second  in  command.  This 
brigade  had  been  ably  commanded,  since  Gano's  absence,  by 
Cluke.  Colonel  Johnson  retained  none  of  the  former  brigade 
staff,  except  Lieutenant  Sidney  Cunningham,  a  brave  and  effi 
cient  officer,  who  was  afterward  Lieutenant  Colonel  of  the  Fif 
teenth  Kentucky.  The  effective  strength  of  the  division,  at  this 
time,  was  twenty-eight  hundred  men.  The  horses  were  in  better 
condition,  and  the  men  were  better  provided  for  in  every  re 
spect,  than  at  any  period  since  the  "December  raid."  New  and 
excellent  clothing  had  been  issued  them  while  on  the  Cumber 
land — a  thing  unprecedented  in  the  history  of  the  command — 
and  their  general  equipment  was  much  superior  to  what  it  had 
been  at  the  close  of  the  winter.  All  were  well  armed,  and  with 
the  kind  of  guns  which  were  always  preferred  in  Morgan's 
cavalry.  The  Second  Kentucky  had  managed  to  get  rid  of  a 
great  many  guns,  during  the  latter  part  of  the  winter  and  early 
part  of  the  spring.  The  men  of  this  regiment  were  styled  by 
General  Morgan  his  "  Regulars,"  on  account  of  their  veteranship 
and  proficiency  in  drill,  etc.,  and,  yet,  notwithstanding  its  ex 
cellent  reputation,  this  unsoldierly  practice  of  losing  and  throw 
ing  away  guns,  had  prevailed  to  such  an  extent  in  the  regiment, 
that,  at  one  time,  nearly  one  half  of  its  members  were  unarmed. 
The  men  did  not  seem  to  do  it,  to  escape  duty,  or  going  into 
battle,  for  they  all  remained  in  camp  and  answered  to  the  bugle 
— it  seemed  to  be  a  fashion  which  they  had  suddenly  adopted. 
This  practice  is  one  of  the  few,  for  which  officers,  inclined  to  be 
lenient  in  most  particulars,  may  well  be  willing  to  have  their 
men  shot.  Except  that  T  have  seen  it  prevail,  at  times,  among 


UNSOLDIERLY   CONDUCT.  405 

troops  of  unquestionable  bravery  and  fidelity,  I  would  say  that 
the  most  cowardly  and  treacherous  spirit  induces  it.  The  Second 
Kentucky  was  a  regiment  which  never  had  its  superior — it  pos 
sessed,  not  only  courage  and  steadiness,  but  the  highest  "dash" 
and  inflexible  constancy,  and  yet,  at  one  period,  the  practice 
which  has  been  mentioned,  prevailed  in  it  to  an  extraordinary 
extent.  Major  Webber,  commanding  it  at  the  time,  made  every 
man  lacking  a  gun,  after  punishment  in  other  ways,  carry  a 
heavy  fence  rail  upon  his  shoulder,  until  he  procured  an  Enfield 
or  Springfield  rifle.  The  facility  with  which  the  men  found  the 
required  arms  at  the  country  houses,  induced  a  suspicion  that 
many  of  them  had  previously  deposited  the  same  guns  where 
they  subsequently  got  them.  They  were  also  threatened  with 
being  left  behind  on  the  next  expedition  to  Kentucky,  and  with 
being  sent  to  the  infantry,  if  they  did  not  speedily  arm  them 
selves,  both  of  which  intimations  had  an  excellent  effect. 

The  first  brigade  made  headquarters  at  Alexandria.  The 
regiments  composing  it,  and  Morgan's  regiment  (ordered  to 
temporarily  report  to  it)  were  encamped  on  the  Lebanon  pike, 
and  the  roads  to  Carthage  and  Statesville.  The  second  brigade, 
with  its  headquarters  at  Auburn,  was  disposed  upon  the  road  to 
Murfreesboro',  and  between  Auburn  and  Statesville.  One  regi 
ment  was  posted  at  Statesville,  which  little  place  was  nearly 
equi-distant  from  Auburn  and  Alexandria.  The  country  around 
was  picketed  and  scouted  thoroughly  in  every  direction,  and  the 
disposition  of  the  regiments  gave  us  such  command  of  all  the 
roads,  that  we  could  have  concentrated  without  difficulty,  and  as 
the  exigency  might  require,  at  Auburn,  Alexandria,  or  Liberty. 
The  period  that  we  remained  here  was  passed  in  assiduous  and 
diligent  instruction  of  the  troops.  Drills,  dress-parades,  in 
spections,  etc.,  were  constantly  had — we  had  never  before  had 
so  much  time  for  those  duties,  when  the  division  was  so  nearly 
concentrated.  The  strictest  vigilance  was  maintained  in  our 
camps,  to  prevent  the  passage  through  them  of  Federal  spies, 
who,  at  this  period  and  at  this  quarter  of  our  lines,  were  un- 


406  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

usually  numerous,  cunning,  and  audacious.  The  strict  guard 
and  watch  maintained  to  frustrate  and  detect  these  parties, 
operated  favorably  upon  our  own  men,  who  were  necessarily 
restricted,  by  the  unusual  precautions  adopted,  of  much  of  the 
liberty  they  had  previously  enjoyed.  The  division  was,  per 
haps,  never  in  as  high  and  salutary  a  state  of  discipline  as  at 
this  time. 

The  enemy  came  near  us  but  once  during  this,  our  last  so. 
journ  in  this  country.  Colonel  Morgan  had  been  sent  to  Baird's 
mill,  and  returning,  halted  all  night  at  Lebanon.  The  enemy 
advanced  upon  him  at  Lebanon,  and  as  he  fell  back  slowly  to 
ward  Alexandria,  followed  him.  I  reinforced  him  with  the 
Second  Kentucky,  and  believing  that  it  was  a  large  force, 
formed  my  brigade  in  front  of  Alexandria,  and  requested  Colo 
nel  Johnson  to  reinforce  me  with  his  brigade.  He  immediately 
set  out  to  do  so,  leaving  pickets  to  watch  the  Murfreesboro' 
pike.  While  we  were  awaiting  his  arrival,  Colonel  Morgan, 
Major  Brent,  (whom  I  should  have  stated  was  with  him,  in  com 
mand  of  a  small  detachment  of  the  Fifth  Kentucky),  and  a  por 
tion  of  the  Second  Kentucky  under  Captain  Franks,  were  skir 
mishing  with  the  enemy,  who  continued  slowly  but  steadily  to 
advance,  until  reaching  a  locality  called  Watertown,  he  halted. 
Nothing  had  been  learned  definitely  of  his  strength,  but  we  be 
lieved  it  to  be  large,  simply  because  every  force  previously  sent 
against  us,  in  this  quarter,  had  greatly  outnumbered  us.  When 
Colonel  Johnson  arrived  (about  1  P.  M.,)  we  at  once  moved  for 
ward  to  attack,  but  had  proceeded  only  a  short  distance,  when 
Colonel  Morgan  reported  that  the  enemy  were  again  in  motion, 
pressing  briskly  upon  him,  and  apparently  determined  to  fight. 
This  information  induced  me  to  return  to  the  position  I  had  just 
left — an  admirable  one,  both  to  receive  and  return  an  attack — 
it  was  about  three  quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  rear  of  the  head  of 
the  column,  which  had  not  yet  gotten  clear  of  it.  This  was  a 
mistake  greatly  to  be  regretted,  and  prevented  the  fight.  The 
enemy  came  within  a  mile  of  the  position,  maneuvered  a  little 


407 

while,  and  fell  back.  By  this  time  it  was  getting  late.  We 
followed  him  with  two  companies  and  two  pieces  of  artillery, 
skirmished  with  and  shelled  him. 

That  night,  while  we  still  doubted  their  strength  and  intentions 
— they  went  off  entirely.  I  learned,  then,  that  they  were  not 
more  than  eighteen  hundred  strong,  while  we  were  at  least 
twenty-five  hundred.  This  affair  would  not  be  worth  mentioning, 
except  that  it  illustrated  how  a  lack  of  enterprise,  and  a  too 
great  fancy  for  "good  positions"  will  sometimes  prevent  excel 
lent  opportunities  from  being  improved.  If  I  had  attacked 
promptly,  the  whole  force,  in  all  likelihood,  would  have  been 
captured.  The  enemy  for  some  reason  conceived  a  very  exag 
gerated  idea  of  our  strength.  Shortly  after  this,  it  was  reported 
in  Murfreesboro',  if  the  papers  we  captured  spoke  truth,  that 
Wheeler's  entire  corps  and  some  infantry  were  stationed  at 
Alexandria  and  Liberty,  harvesting  the  magnificent  wheat  crop, 
with  which  the  adjacent  country  teemed. 

On  the  10th  of  June,  General  Morgan  arrived  at  Alexandria, 
and  orders  were  at  once  issued  to  prepare  the  division  to  march 
on  the  next  day.  It  soon  became  known  to  all  the  officers  at 
least,  that  he  was  about  to  undertake  an  expedition  which  he  had 
long  contemplated,  and  which  he  had  often  solicited  permission 
to  make.  This  was  the  greatest  of  all  his  "  raids,"  the  one 
known  as  the  "Ohio  raid."  Although  it  resulted  disastrously  to 
his  own  command,  it  had  a  great  influence  upon  the  pending 
campaign  between  Bragg  and  Rosecrans,  and  greatly  assisted 
the  former.  It  was  beyond  all  comparison  the  grandest  enter 
prise  he  ever  planned,  and  the  one  which  did  most  honor  to  his 
genius. 

The  military  situation  in  Tennessee,  at  that  time,  may  be 
briefly  described  : 

General  Bragg's  army  lay  around  Tullahoma,  his  cavalry 
covering  his  front  and  stretching  far  out  upon  both  wings. 
General  Buckner'was  in  East  Tennessee,  with  a  force  entirely 
inadequate  to  the  defense  of  that  important  region.  General 


408  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Bragg,  confronted  by  Rosecrans  with  a  vastly  superior  force, 
dared  not  detach  troops  to  strengthen  Buckner.  The  latter 
could  not  still  further  weaken  his  small  force  by  sending  aid  to 
General  Bragg — if  the  latter  should  need  it.  General  Burnside 
was  preparing  (in  Kentucky),  a  force,  variously  estimated,  at 
from  fifteen  to  more  than  thirty  thousand  men,  for  the  invasion 
of  East  Tennessee.  With  this  force  he  could  easily  drive  out 
Buckner.  It  was  estimated  that  at  various  points  in  Southern 
Kentucky,  Bowlinggreen,  Glasgow,  and  along  the  Cumberland 
river — and  at  Carthage  in  Tennessee,  and  other  points  in  that 
vicinity,  there  were  from  eight  to  twelve  thousand  Federal  troops 
— the  greater  part  of  them  under  thp  command  of  a  General 
Judah,  'whose  headquarters  were  at  Glasgow.  Of  these  forces, 
some  five  thousand  were  excellent  cavalry.  General  Judah's 
official  papers  (captured  on  the  Ohio  raid),  gave  the  exact 
strength  of  his  forces,  but  I  have  forgotten  it. 

There  was  perfect  unanimity  of  opinion  (among  the  Confed 
erate  officers),  about  the  plan  and  method  of  the  anticipated 
Federal  movement.  Rosecrans  (all  believed),  would  press  hard 
upon  General  Bragg — Burnside,  simultaneously,  or  as  soon  af 
terward  as  was  practicable,  would  move  against  Buckner. 
Judah's  force  could  be  used  to  keep  open  direct  communication 
between  these  two  armies,  and  also  as  a  reserve.  When  the  ad 
vance  was  fairly  inaugurated,  Judah,  who  in  the  meantime  might 
guard  against  the  raids  of  our  cavalry,  could  be  concentrated 
and  moved  through  Burkesville,  Livingston  and  Sparta — turning 
then,  if  General  Bragg  staid  to  fight,  upon  the  right  flank  of 
the  army  at  Tallahoma — or,  if  General  Bragg  retreated,  pressing 
down  through  the  Sequatchie  valley  to  Chattanooga.  A  junc 
tion  of  all  these  forces,  it  was  thought,  would  be  made,  and  the 
Confederate  army  would  then  confront  a  host  too  formidable  to 
be  beaten. 

This  was  the  belief  which  prevailed  in  our  army  regarding  the 
intentions  of  the  enemy.  It  may  have  been  incorrect — the 
feature,  which  we  of  Morgan's  cavalry  especially  dwelt  upon,  to- 


BRAGG  OPPOSED  TO  OHIO  RAID.  409 


wit,  the  part,  in  the  supposed  programme,  to  be  played  by  Ju- 
dali,  may  have  been  altogether  uncontemplated  —  perhaps  he  was 
not  a  man  capable  of  having  executed  it.  But  whatever  may 
have  been  the  Federal  plan  of  the  campaign,  it  is  certain  that 
terrible  dangers  menaced  the  army  of  General  Bragg,  and  all 
the  salient  points  of  his  department. 

General  Bragg  regarded  the  peril  with  just  apprehension  — 
he  took  in  its  full  proportions.  He  decided  and  (as  was  conceded 
by  all  who  understood  the  situation),  with  good  and  sufficient 
reasons,  to  retreat  beyond  the  Tennessee  river,  and  then  some 
where  near  Chattanooga,  turning  upon  his  foes,  fight  the  battle 
which  had  to  be  delivered  for  the  protection  of  his  department. 
But  that  retreat  would  be  very  hazardous.  He  was  right  in  the 
path  of  the  avalanche,  and  the  least  movement  upon  his  part 
might  precipitate  it  upon  him.  The  difficulty  and  danger  of 
crossing  the  Tennessee,  with  Rosecrans  hard  upon  his  rear,  would 
be  greatly  augmented,  if  these  other  Federal  forces  were  poured 
down  upon  his  flank. 

General  Bragg,  it  may  be  repeated,  knew  how  to  use,  and  in 
variably  used,  his  cavalry  to  good  purpose,  and  in  this  emer 
gency  he  resolved  to  employ  some  of  it  to  divert  from  his  own 
hazardous  movement,  and  fasten  upon  some  other  quarter,  the 
attention  of  a  portion  of  the  opposing  forces.  He  hoped,  not 
only  to  give  them  enough  to  do,  to  prevent  them  from  an 
noying  and  endangering  his  retreat,  but,  also,  to  draw  off  a  part 
of  their  forces  from  the  great  battle  which  he  expected  to  fight. 
He  selected  Morgan  as  the  officer  who  should  accomplish  this 
design. 

In  the  conference  between  them,  General  Morgan  expressed 
a  perfect  confidence  in  his  ability  to  effect  all  that  was  desired 
of  him,  but  dissented  from  General  Bragg  in  one  important  par 
ticular.  The  latter  wished  him  to  confine  himseljf  to  Kentucky  — 
giving  him  carte  llanche  to  go  wherever  he  pleased  in  that  State, 
and  urging  him  to  attempt  the  capture  of  Louisville.  General  Mor 
gan  declared,  that,  while  he  could  by  a  dash  into  Kentucky  and 


410  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

a  march  through  that  State,  protect  General  Bragg's  withdrawal 
fronn  the  position  his  army  then  held,  he  could  not  thus  accom 
plish  the  other  equally  important  feature  of  the  plan,  and  draw 
off  troops  which  vrould  otherwise  strengthen  Rosecrans  for  the 
decisive  battle. 

A  raid  into  Kentucky  would  keep  Judah  busy,  and  hold  Burn- 
sides  fast  until  it  was  decided,  but,  he  contended  it  would  be 
decided  very  soon,  and  he  would  be  driven  out  or  cut  to  pieces 
in  a  few  days,  leaving  the  Federal  forces  so  disposed  that  they 
could  readily  commence  their  previously  determined  operations. 
A  raid  into  Indiana  and  Ohio,  on  the  contrary,  he  contended, 
would  draw  all  the  troops  in  Kentucky  after  him,  and  keep  them 
employed  for  weeks.  Although  there  might  be  sound  military 
reasons  why  Judah  and  Burnsides  should  not  follow  him,  but 
should  stick  to  what  the  Confederate  officers  deemed  the  original 
programme  of  Rosecrans,  General  Morgan  urged,  that  the  scare 
and  the  clamor  in  the  States  he  proposed  to  invade,  would  be  so 
great,  that  the  military  leaders  arid  the  administration  would  be 
compelled  to  furnish  the  troops  that  would  be  called  for.  He 
thought  that,  even  if  he  lost  his  command,  he  could  greatly 
benefit  General  Bragg  by  crossing  the  Ohio  river  and  only  in 
that  way. 

General  Bragg  refused  him  permission  to  make  the  raid  as  he 
desired  to  make  it  and  ordered  him  to  confine  himself  to  Ken 
tucky.  I  was  not  present  at  the  interview  between  them,  but 
General  Morgan  told  me  that  General  Bragg  had  ordered  him 
to  operate  in  Kentucky,  and  further  stated  that  he  intended,  not 
withstanding  his  orders,  to  cross  the  Ohio.  I  do  not  mean  to 
justify  his  disobedience  of  orders,  but  simply  to  narrate  the 
facts  as  I  learned  them,  and  to  explain  General  Morgan's  ideas 
regarding  the  movement,  which  were  definite  and  fixed.  This 
expedition  into  the  Northwestern  States  had  long  been  a  favorite 
idea  with  him  and  was  but  the  practical  development  of  his  the 
ory  of  the  proper  way  to  make  war,  to-wit:  by  going  deep  into 
the  country  of  the  enemy.  lie  had  for  several  weeks  foreseen 


STARTING    ON    THE     RAID. 


the  necessity  of  some  such  diversion  in  General  Bragg' s  behalf,   \ 
and  believed  that  the  period  for  the  accomplishment  of  his  great 
desire  was  at  hand. 

He  had  ordered  me,  three  weeks  previously,  to  send  intelli 
gent  men  to  examine  the  fords  of  the  upper  Ohio — that  at  Buf- 
fington  among  them — and  it  is  a  fact,  of  which  others,  as  well 
as  myself,  are  cognizant,  that  he  intended — long  before  he 
crossed  the  Ohio — to  make  no  effort  to  recross  it,  except  at 
some  of  these  fords,  unless  he  found  it  more  expedient,  when 
he  reached  that  region,  to  join  General  Lee,  if  the  latter  should 
still  be  in  Pennsylvania. 

Never  had  I  been  so  impressed  with  General  Morgan's  re 
markable  genius — his  wonderful  faculty  of  anticipating  the  exact 
effect  his  action  would  have  upon  all  other  men  and  of  calculating 
their  action — his  singular  power  of  arriving  at  a  correct  estimate 
of  the  nature  and  capacities  of  a  country,  which  he  knew  only  by 
maps  and  the  most  general  description — and  the  perfect  accu 
racy  with  which  he  could  foretell  the  main  incidents  of  a  march 
and  campaign — ^s  when  he  would  briefly  sketch  his  plan  of  that 
raid.  All  who  heard  him  felt  that  he  was  right  in  the  main, 
and  although  some  of  us  were  filled  with  a  grave  apprehension, 
from  the  first,  we  felt  an  inconsistent  confidence  when  listening 
to  him.  He  did  not  disguise  from  himself  the  great  dangers  he 
encountered,  but  was  sanguine  of  success.  As  it  turned  out, 
only  the  unprecedented  rise  in  the  Ohio  caused  his  capture — he 
had  avoided  or  had  cut  his  way  through  all  other  dangers. 

On  the  llth  of  June,  the  division  marched  from  Alexandria 
to  the  Cumberland,  and  crossed  the  river  not  far  from  the  little 
town  of  Rome.  General  Morgan  desired  to  attack  the  Federal 
force  stationed  at  Carthage,  and  strongly  fortified.  General 
Bragg  had  authorized  him  to  do  so.  f 

The  division  encamped  two  or  three  miles  from  the  northern 
bank  of  the  river,  and  not  far  from  the  turnpike  which  runs  from 
Carthage  to  Hartsville.  Information  had  been  received  that  the 
mail  passed  on  this  road  twice  or  three  times  a  week,  guarded 


412  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

by  a  small  escort,  and  that  comfortably  lined  sutlers'  wagons 
sometimes  accompanied  the  cavalcade  for  the  benefit  of  the  pro 
tection  the  escort  afforded.  Colonel  Ward  was  sent,  with  two 
or  three  companies  of  his  regiment,  to  a  point  on  the  pike  some 
eight  miles  from  Carthage,  and  two  or  three  from  our  encamp 
ment.  He  reached  it  just  before  sundown,  and  shortly  after 
ward  the  mail  train,  accompanied  by  several  sutlers'  wagons, 
and  under  charge  of  an  escort  eighty  or  a  hundred  strong,  came 
by,  no  one  apparently  suspecting  the  slightest  danger,  arid  all 
keeping  careless  watch.  When  the  procession  came  opposite  to 
where  Colonel  Ward  had  posted  his  men  (some  seventy  yards  from 
the  road),  the  Colonel  gave  the  order  to  fire  in  a  loud  voice. 
At  the  unexpected  command,  which  so  suddenly  indicated  dan 
ger,  mail-carriers,  sutlers,  and  guard  halted  in  amazement,  and 
when  the  answering  volley  broke  upon  them,  they  went  in  every 
direction  in  the  wildest  confusion.  Not  a  shot  was  fired  in  re 
turn,  but  the  escort  manifested  plainly  that  it  felt  a  very  inferior 
degree  of  interest  in  the  integrity  of  postal  affairs. 

Few  prisoners  were  taken,  but  the  mail  and  the  wagons  were 
secured.  In  one  of  the  latter,  a  corpulent  sutler  was  found/" 
wedged  in  a  corner,  and  much  alarmed.  He  was  past  speaking 
when  drawn  out,  but  faintly  signed  that  a  bottle  he  had  in  his 
pocket  should  be  placed  to  his  lips. 

That  evening  a  staff  officer  arrived  from  General  Bragg  with 
orders  to  General  Morgan.  He  was  instructed  to  make  no  at 
tack  upon  Carthage,  but  to  march  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Mon- 
ticello,  and  strive  to  intercept  a  Federal  raiding  party  which 
had  broken  into  East  Tennessee,  under  Brigadier  General  Saun- 
ders,  and  was  threatening  Knoxville.  Upon  the  next  morning, 
consequently,  we  recrossed  the  Cumberland  and  marched  in  the 
direction  ordered.  After  passing  through  Gainesboro',  we  got 
into  a  very  rugged  country  and  upon  the  very  worst  roads.  At 
Livingston  we  were  overtaken  by  a  tremendous  rain,  which 
lasted  for  two  or  three  days,  and  rendered  the  road  almost  im 
passable  for  artillery.  This  retarded  our  march  very  greatly. 


MAP 


(413) 


414  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

and  we  arrived  at  Albany  three  days  later  than  we  would  other 
wise  have  done,  to  learn  that  the  enemy  had  already  passed  out 
of  East  Tennessee  by  way  of  Jamestown. 

The  second  brigade  was  encamped  in  Turkey-neck  Bend  of 
the  Cumberland  river,  some  fifteen  miles  in  direct  line  from 
Burkesville.  The  first  brigade  was  encamped  along  the  river, 
from  a  point  opposite  Burkesville  to  Irish  Bottom.  The  division 
remained  here  for  three  or  four  days,  awaiting  the  return  of 
General  Morgan,  who  had  left  us  at  the  recrossing  of  the  Cum 
berland  to  go  to  McMinnville  and  hurry  forward  some  supplies 
and  ammunition.  These  stores  were  hauled  to  our  camp  in  six 
wagons,  which  had  nearly  not  gotten  to  UB  at  all.  The  heavy 
rains  which  had  so  retarded  the  march  of  the  division  to  Albany, 
had  made  the  roads  which  these  wagons  had  traveled  perfect 
quagmires.  When  they  reached  the  Obie  and  Wolf  rivers, 
which  are  six  miles  apart  at  the  points  where  the  road  from 
Sparta  to  Monticello  crosses  them,  they  met  with  a  very  dis 
couraging  sight.  These  little  rushing  mountain  streams  were 
much  swollen  and  too  deep  for  any  kind  of  fording.  General 
Morgan  instructed  his  Acting  Inspector,  Captain  D.  R.  Wil 
liams,  an  officer  of  great  energy,  to  have  the  wagons  taken  to 
pieces,  and  stowed,  with  their  contents,  in  canoes,  and  so  ferried 
across.  In  this  manner,  all  were  crossed  in  a  single  night.  The 
mules  were  made  to  swim. 

On  the  2nd  of  July,  the  crossing  of  the  Cumberland  began, 
the  first  brigade  crossing  at  Burkesville  and  Scott's  ferry,  two 
miles  above,  and  the  second  crossing  at  Turkey-neck  Bend. 
The  river  was  out  of  its  banks,  and  running  like  a  mill-race. 
The  first  brigade  had,  with  which  to  cross  the  men  and  their  ac- 
couterments,  and  artillery,  only  two  crazy  little  flats,  that  seemed 
ready  to  sink  under  the  weight  of  a  single  man,  and  two  or  three 
canoes.  Colonel  Johnson  was  not  even  so  well  provided.  The 
horses  were  made  to  swim. 

Just  twelve  miles  distant  upon  the  other  side,  at  Marrowbone, 
lay  Judah's  cavalry,  which  had  moved  to  that  point  from  Glas- 


JUDAH    CHECKED.  415 

gow,  in  anticipation  of  some  such  movement  upon  Morgan's 
part  as  he  was  now  making.  Our  entire  strength  was  twenty- 
four  hundred  and  sixty  effective  men — the  first  brigade  number 
ing  fourteen  hundred  and  sixty,  the  second  one  thousand.  This, 
however,  was  exclusive  of  artillery,  of  which  we  had  four  pieces 
— a  section  of  three-inch  Parrots  attached  to  the  first  brigade, 
and  a  section  of  twelve-pound  howitzers  attached  to  the  second. 
Videttes,  posted  at  intervals  along  the  river  bank,  would  have 
given  General  Judah  timely  information  of  this  bold  crossing, 
and  he  would  have  been  enabled  to  strike  and  crush  or  capture 
the  whole  force.  But  he  depended  on  the  swollen  river  to  deter 
Morgan,  forgetting  that  Morgan  invariably  did  that  which  was 
least  expected  of  him.  As  soon  as  the  latter  learned  of  the  strange 
supirieness  and  lack  of  vigilance  of  his  foe,  he  commenced  and 
hastened  the  work  of  crossing  the  river.  About  two  or  three 
P.  M.,  the  enemy  began  to  threaten  both  brigades,  but  did  not 
advance  with  determination.  The  Sixth  Kentucky  and  Ninth 
Tennessee  had  all  been  gotten  across  at  Burkesville  by  this 
time,  and  portions  of  the  other  regiments  were  also  across,  as 
well  as  two  pieces  of  artillery.  General  Morgan  formed  this 
entire  force,  and  led  it  to  attack  the  enemy  threatening  Burkes 
ville.  He  placed  a  portion  of  it  in  ambush  at  a  point  about  a 
mile  from  the  town,  and,  when  the  head  of  the  enemy's  column 
approached,  fired  such  a  volley  into  it  as  made  it  at  once  recoil. 
Then  charging,  he  drove  the  enemy  back  in  confusion  and  at 
full  speed,  never  letting  them  halt  until  they  reached  the  en 
campment  at  Marrowbone.  He  pursued  the  force  which  he  had 
routed  into  the  camp,  but  was  repulsed  in  an  attack  upon  the 
latter  by  the  artillery  and  reserve  forces  there. 

The  effect  of  this  bold  dash,  was  to  draw  back  the  force 
threatening  Johnson,  also,  and  allow  him  to  cross  without  mo 
lestation.  Our  loss  was  very  slight — among  other  gallant  fel 
lows  who  were  hurt,  Captain  Quirk  was  so  severely  wounded  in 
the  arm  that  he  could  go  no  further  upon  the  expedition. 
Several  prisoners  were  taken.  The  enemy,  after  this  hint  not 


416  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

to  interfere,  remained  shut  up  in  his  encampment  until  we  were 
no  longer  in  any  danger. 

The  division  encamped  that  night  about  ten  miles  from  the 
river,  on  the  road  to  Columbia.  A  large  party  of  Commissaries 
of  Subsistence  were  with  us,  sent  by  General  Bragg  to  collect 
supplies  north  of  the  Cumberland  and  bring  them  to  Tullahoma, 
escorted  by  one  of  Morgan's  regiments.  A  variety  of  causes 
conspired  to  prevent  these  gentlemen  from  returning  at  the 
time,  and  in  the  manner  contemplated  by  General  Bragg.  In 
the  first  place,  we  learned,  immediately  after  we  had  crossed 
the  Cumberland,  by  men  who  came  from  the  rear,  that  General 
Bragg  had  already  commenced  his  retreat — this  would  consider 
ably  lengthen  the  distance  which  the  Commissaries  would  have 
to  drive  their  cattle.  Secondly,  General  Morgan  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  he  had  use  for  all  of  his  troops,  and  that  he 
would  not  detach  the  regiment  which  was  to  have  guarded  the 
cattle.  This  resolution  not  only  prevented  the  cattle  from  being 
driven  to  General  Bragg,  but  also  decided  the  Commissaries  not 
to  return  immediately.  The  country  through  which  they  would 
have  had  to  pass,  was  infested  by  a  set  of  bush-Avhackers,  in 
comparison  with  whose  relentless  ferocity,  that  of  Bluebeard 
and  the  Welch  giants  sinks  into  insignificance.  Chief  among 
them  was  "Tinker  Dave  Beattie,"  the  great  opponent  of  Champ 
Ferguson.  This  patriarchal  old  man  lived  in  a  cove,  or  valley 
surrounded  by  high  hills,  at  the  back  of  which  was  a  narrow 
path  leading  to  the  mountain.  Here,  surrounded  by  his  clan, 
he  led  a  pastoral,  simple  life,  which  must  have  been  very  fascin 
ating,  for  many  who  ventured  into  the  cove  never  came  away 
again.  Sometimes  Champ  Ferguson,  with  his  band,  would  enter 
the  cove,  harry  old  Dave's  stock  and  goods,  and  drive  him  to  his  re 
treat  in  the  mountain,  to  which  no  man  ever  followed  him.  Then, 
again,  when  he  was  strong  enough,  he  would  lead  his  henchmen 
against  Champ,  and  slay  all  who  did  not  escape.  But  it  must  not 
be  understood  that  he  confined  his  hostility  to  Captain  Ferguson 
and  the  latter's  men :  on  the  contrary,  he  could  have  had,  had 


DAVE  BEATTIE  AND  CHAMP  FERGUSON.         417 

he  so  chosen,  as  many  scalps  drying  in  his  cabin  as  ever  rattled 
in  the  lodge  of  a  Camanche  war-chief,  and  taken  with  promis 
cuous  impartiality.  There  were  not  related  of  Beattie  so  many 
stories,  illustrative  of  his  personal  strength  and  bull-dog  courage, 
as  of  Champ  Ferguson.  I  have  heard  of  the  latter  having  gone, 
on  one  occasion,  into  a  room  where  two  of  his  bitter  enemies 
lay  before  the  fire,  both  strong  men  and  armed,  and,  throwing 
himself  upon  them,  he  killed  both  (after  a  hard  struggle)  with 
his  knife.  But  Beattie  possessed  a  cunning  and  subtlety  which 
the  other,  -in  great  measure,  lacked.  Perhaps  he  was  more 
nearly  civilized.  Both  of  these  men  were  known  to  have  spared 
life  on  some  rare  occasions,  and  perhaps  none  were  so  much 
astonished,  thereat,  as  themselves.  On  one  occasion,  Ferguson 
was  called  upon  to  express  an  opinion  regarding  the  character 
of  a  man  who  had  been  arrested  near  a  spot  where  bush-whack 
ers  had  just  fired  upon  the  party  he  (Ferguson)  was  with,  and, 
from  several  suspicious  indications,  this  man  was  thought  to  be 
one  of  them.  By  way  of  giving  him  a  chance,  it  was  decided 
that  Ferguson,  who  knew  every  man  in  that  country,  should  de 
clare  his  doom,  influenced  by  his  previous  knowledge  of  him. 
Ferguson,  somewhat  to  the  astonishment  of  the  tribunal,  begged 
that  he  should  be  released,  saying,  that  he  knew  he  was  a  Union 
man,  but  did  not  believe  that  he  was  a  bush-whacker.  The  man 
was  released.  Subsequently,  Ferguson  said,  after  a  long  fit  of 
silence,  "I  have  a  great  notion  to  go  back  and  hunt  that  man. 
I  am  afraid  I  have  done  wrong,  for  he  is  the  best  shot  in  this 
part  of  the  State,  and,  if  he  does  turn  bush-whacker,  he  will  kill 
a  man  at  every  shot."  Such  extreme  nicety  of  conscience  was 
not  attributed  to  Beattie,  nor  was  he  said  to  be  as  faithful  to  his 
friends  as  was  Ferguson. 

Such  were  the  kind  of  men  whom  our  friends,  of  the  Sub 
sistence  Department,  would  have  had  to  encounter,  if  they  had 
gone  back.  There  were,  at  the  time,  no  Confederate  troops  in 
that  country,  and  Champ  Ferguson  was  resting  in  inglorious 
ease'at  Sparta.  Dave  Beattie  had  broken  out  of  his  cove,  and 
27 


418  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

was  ready  to  hold  "bloody  assizes"  as  soon  as  he  secured  his 
victims.  Our  friends  were  not  accustomed  to  "  raiding"  and  to 
cavalry  habits,  but,  after  thorough  reflection,  they  resolved,  with 
a  heroism  that  would  have  done  honor  to  the  heavy  artillery 
service,  not  to  return,  but  to  face  all  the  hardships  and  dangers 
of  the  expedition.  They  were  gallant  men,  and  endured  the 
tremendous  fatigue,  and  shared  the  hardships  as  cheerfully  as  if 
they  had  come  legitimately  by  them. 

The  chief  of  this  party,  Major  Highley  (from  Mobile),  was  as 
full  of  dash  and  as  fond  of  adventure,  as  a  man  could  be.  He 
sought  the  front  on  all  occasions,  and  soon  became  a  thorough 
cavalryman  in  all  respects.  General  Morgan  placed  him  upon 
his  staff  and  he  proved  a  very  efficient  officer,  and  seemed  much 
gratified  that  his  commissaries  had  been  cut  off. 

There  was  one  case  of  almost  abduction,  however,  which  ex 
cited  universal  regret  and  commisseration : 

An  old  gentleman,  from  Sparta,  had  come  with  the  division  to 
Burkesville  to  get  a  barrel  of  salt — as  there  was  none  to  be  had 
at  Sparta.  His  benevolent  virtues  had  endeared  him  to  all  who 
knew  him,  and,  so,  when  it  became  apparent  that  he  must  go 
;back,  leaving  behind  him  his  purchase,  and  at  the  risk  of  fearful 
•  dangers,  or  follow  us  through  the  whole  raid,  he  received  much 
and  unaffected  condolence.  He  perfectly  realized  his  situation. 
He  knew  that,  if  he  fell  into  "  Tinker  Dave's"  hands,  he  would 
be  pickled  without  salt,  .and  he  had  not  the  slightest  idea  of  try 
ing  it  on.  And  yet  he  felt  a  natural  sorrow  at  going  so  far 
away  from  home.  Some  two  weeks  later,  when  we  were  in 
Ohio,  and  being  peppered  by  the  militia,  he  said  to  an  officer  of 
the  first  brigade  with  tears  in  his  eyes,  and  a  touching  pathos  in 
his  voice :  "  Captain,  I  would  give  my  farm  in  White  county, 
Tennessee,  and  all  the  salt  in  Kentucky  (if  I  had  it),  to  stand 
once  more — safe  and  sound — on  the  banks  of  the  Calf-killer 
creek." 

On  the  morning  of  the  3d,  the  division  resumed  its  march, 
pushing  on  to  Columbia.  Colonel  Morgan's  regiment,  although 


CAPTURE    OF   COLUMBIA.  419 

included  in  the  field  return  of  the  first  brigade,  was  detached  and 
used  as  an  advance-guard  for  the  column.  In  the  afternoon,  as 
we  neared  Columbia,  this  regiment  came  upon  the  enemy 
moving  out  from  the  town.  In  the  skirmish  which  ensued,  Col 
onel  Morgan  lost  a  few  wounded — among  the  number  Captain  J. 
T.  Cassell,  who  was  shot  in  the  thigh  as  he  was  charging  with 
his  accustomed  gallantry.  He  was  placed  in  an  ambulance  and 
went,  in  that  way,  through  the  raid,  and  escaped  capture.  Cap 
tain  Cassell  had  been  ordered  to  report  to  Colonel  Morgan  with 
his  company,  a  few  weeks  previously,  and  was  acting  as  second 
in  command  of  the  advance-guard.  Captain  Franks  of  the 
Second  Kentucky  was  ordered  to  report  to  Colonel  Morgan,  to 
fill  the  position  left  vacant  by  the  disabling  of  Captain  Cassell. 
After  this  skirmish  had  lasted  a  short  time,  the  Second  Ken 
tucky  was  ordered  up  to  support  Colonel  Morgan.  Major  Webber 
dismounted  his  men  and  attacked  with  great  vigor.  The  enemy 
did  not  stand  a  moment — were  driven  back  into  the  town,  fought 
a  short  time  from  the  houses,  and  were  soon  dislodged  and 
driven  pell-mell  out  of  the  town.  Major  Webber  lost  two  men 
killed.  The  enemy's  loss  was  also  slight.  It  was  a  detachment 
of  Woolford's  regiment,  and  retreated  toward  Jimtown.  Some 
disgraceful  scenes  occurred  in  Columbia  as  the  troops  were 
passing  through.  One  or  two  stores  were  broken  into  and  plun 
dered.  General  Morgan  immediately  went  to  the  spot,  arrested 
the  marauders,  punished  them,  and  compelled  the  restitution  of 
the  goods. 

On  that  evening  the  division  encamped  six  or  eight  miles 
from  Columbia.  A  regiment  of  Federal  infantry  was  stationed 
at  Green  river  bridge,  where  the  road  from  Columbia  to  Camp- 
bellsville  and  Lebanon  crosses  the  Green  river.  General  Mor 
gan  sent  Captain  Franks  to  watch  them,  who  reported  that, 
during  the  entire  night,  he  heard  the  ringing  of  axes  and  the 
crash  of  falling  timber.  The  next  morning  we  learned  what  it 
meant.  Early  on  the  4th  the  column  was  put  in  motion,  and  the 
.second  brigade  (marching  in  front),  soon  came  upon  the  enemy 


v\ 


_y 

420  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Colonel  Moore,  the  officer  commanding  the  Federal  force  (a 
Michigan  regiment),  had  selected  the  strongest  natural  position, 
I  ever  saw,  and  had  fortified  it  with  a  skill  equal  to  his  judgment 
in  the  selection.  The  Green  river  makes  here  a  tremendous  and 
sweeping  bend,  not  unlike  in  its  shape  to  the  bowl  of  an  immense 
spoon.  The  bridge  is  located  at  the  tip  of  the  bowl,  and  about 
a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  southward,  where  the  river  returns  so 
nearly  to  itself  that  the  peninsula  (at  this  point)  is  not  more 
than  one  hundred  yards  wide — at  what,  in  short,  may  be  termed 
the  insertion  of  the  handle — Colonel  Moore  had  constructed  an 
earthwork,  crossing  the  narrow  neck  of  land,  and  protected  in 
front  by  an  abattis.  The  road  upon  which  we  were  advancing, 
runs  through  this  position.  The  peninsula  widens  again,  ab 
ruptly,  to  the  southward  of  this  extremely  narrow  neck,  and  just 
in  front  of  the  skirt  of  woods,  in  which  the  work  and  abattis 
was  situated,  is  an  open  glade,  about  two  hundred  yards  in  ex 
tent  in  every  direction.  Just  in  front  of,  or  south  of  this  plat 
of  cleared  ground,  runs  a  ravine  deep  and  rugged,  rendering 
access  to  it  difficult,  except  by  the  road.  The  road  runs  not  di 
rectly  through,  but  to  the  left  of  this  cleared  place.  All  around 
it  are  thick  woods,  and  upon  the  east  and  west  the  river  banks 
are  as  steep  and  impassable  as  precipices.  At  the  southern  ex 
tremity  of  the  open  ground,  and  facing  and  commanding  the 
road,  a  rifle-pit  had  been  dug,  about  one  hundred  and  twenty 
feet  long — capable  of  containing  fifty  or  sixty  men,  and  about 
that  number  were  posted  in  it.  When  Colonel  Johnson's  brig 
ade  neared  the  enemy,  he  sent  Cluke  with  his  own  regiment 
and  the  Tenth  Kentucky,  then  greatly  reduced  in  numbers,  to 
cross  the  river  at  a  ford  upon  the  left  of  the  road,  and  take  posi 
tion  on  the  northern  side  of  the  river,  and  commanding  the 
bridge. 

This  was  intended  to  prevent  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  and 
keep  off  reinforcements  that  might  approach  from  the  northward. 
A  flag  of  truce  was  then  sent  to  Colonel  Moore,  demanding  the 
surrender  of  his  command.  He  answered,  "  It  is  a  bad  day  for 


UNSUCCESSFUL    ASSAULT.  421 


surrenders,  and  I  would  rather  not."  Captain  Byrnes  had  planted 
one  of  the  Parrots,  about  six  hundred  yards  from  the  rifle-pit, 
and  skirmishers  had  been  thrown  out  in  front  of  it.  As  soon 
as  the  bearer  of  the  flag  returned,  Byrnes  opened  with  the  gun. 
He  fired  a  round  shot  into  the  parapet  thrown  up  in  front  of  the 
trench,  knocking  the  fence  rails,  with  which  it  was  riveted,  into 
splinters,  and  probing  the  work.  One  man  in  the  trench  was 
killed,  by  this  shot,  and  the  rest  ran  (just  as  our  skirmishers 
dashed  forward)  and  retreated  across  the  open  ground  to  the 
work  in  the  woods  beyond.  Now  the  serious  business  com 
menced.  Artillery  could  not  be  used  to  dislodge  them  from  the 
position  which  was  meant  to  be  defended  in  earnest.  This  open 
ground,  between  the  points  where  were  constructed  the  rifle-pit 
(which  was  only  a  blind)  and  the  strong  work  where  Moore  in 
tended  to  fight,  is  the  flat  summit  (for  crest,  properly  speaking, 
it  has  none)  of  a  hill,  or  rather  swell  of  land,  which  slopes 
gently  away  on  both  the  northern  and  southern  sides.  Guns 
planted  anywhere,  except  upon  this  plateau,  and  near  its  center, 
could  not  have  borne  upon  the  enemy's  position  at  all  —  and,  if 
they  had  been  planted  there,  every  cannoneer  would  have  been 
killed  before  a  shot  could  have  been  fired.  The  only  way  to 
take  the  work  was  by  a  straight  forward  attack  upon  it,  and 
Colonel  Johnson  moved  against  it  his  brigade,  or  rather  the 
two  regiments  of  it,  left  on  the  southern  side  of  the  river.  The 
men,  gallantly  led,  dashed  across  the  open  ground  and  plunged 
into  the  woods  beyond. 

The  Federal  force,  some  four  hundred  strong,  was  disposed 
behind  the  work  and  abattis,  holding  a  line  not  much  more  than 
a  hundred  yards  lon^.  The  first  rush  carried  the  men  close  to 

«/  O 

the  work,  but  they  were  stopped  by  the  fallen  timber,  and  drop 
ped  fast  under  the  close  fire  of  the  enemy.  Colonel  Clienault 
was  killed  in  the  midst  of  the  abattis  —  his  brains  blown  out  as 
he  was  firing  his  pistol  into  the  earthwork  and  calling  on  his  men 
to  follow.  The  second  brigade  had  started  with  an  inadequate 
supply  of  ammunition,  and  the  fire  of  the  attacking  party  soon 


422  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

slackened  on  that  account.  General  Morgan  ordered  me  to  send 
a  regiment  to  Colonel  Johnson's  assistance,  and  I  sent  the  Fifth 
Kentucky.  Colonel  Smith  led  his  men  at  a  double-quick  to  the 
abattis,  where  they  were  stopped  as  the  others  had  been,  and 
suffered  severely.  The  rush  through  a  hundred  yards  of  under 
growth,  succeeded  by  a  jam  and  crowding  of  a  regiment  into 
the  narrow  neck,  and  confronted  by  the  tangled  mass  of  prostrate 
timber  and  the  guns  of  the  hidden  foe — was  more  than  the  men 
could  stand.  They  would  give  way,  rally  in  the  thick  woods, 
try  it  again,  but  unsuccessfully.  The  fire  did  not  seem,  to  those 
of  us  who  were  not  immediately  engaged,  to  be  heavy.  There 
were  no  sustained  volleys.  It  was  a  common  remark  that  the 
shots  could  almost  be  counted — but  almost  every  shot  must  have 
taken  effect. 

Our  loss  in  less  than  half  an  hour's  fighting,  and  with  not 
over  six  hundred  men  engaged,  for  only  portions  of  the  regi 
ments,  sent  into  the  fight,  were  engaged,  was  thirty-six  killed, 
and  forty-five  or  six  wounded.  Twenty,  or  more  of  the  wounded 
were  able  to  ride,  and  in  a  few  days  returned  to  duty.  The  loss 
of  the  enemy  (according  to  the  most  authoritative  account)  was 
nine  killed,  and  twenty-six  wounded. 

Many  fine  officers  were  included  in  our  list  of  casualties. 
Colonel  Chenault,  whose  death  has  been  described — an  officer 
who  had  no  superior  in  bravery  and  devotion  to  the  cause  he 
fought  for — was  a  noble  gentleman.  Major  Brent,  of  the  Fifth 
Kentucky,  was  killed.  He  was  an  officer  who  was  rapidly 
taking — in  reputation  and  popularity— the  place  among  the  field 
officers  of  the  division  which  Hutchinsonhad  held.  He  was  reck 
lessly  brave,  and  possessed  a  natural  military  aptitude,  and  a 
resolution  in  exacting  duty  from  his  subordinate  officers  and 
men,  which  made  him  invaluable  to  his  regiment.  Captain 
Treble,  who  a  short  time  previously  had  been  transferred  from 
the  Second  to  the  Eleventh  Kentucky  (Chenault's  regiment)  was 
also  killed.  He  displayed,  in  this  his  last  battle,  the  same  high 
courage  which  ever  animated  him.  Lieutenant  Cowan,  of  the 


SEVERE   LOSS   OF    OFFICERS.  423 

Third  Kentucky,  and  Lieutenants  Holloway  and  Ferguson,  of 
the  Fifth  Kentucky — all  very  fine  officers  were  also  among  the 
killed.  Among  the  wounded  officers,  of  the  Fiftli  Kentucky,  was 
the  gallant  and  efficient  Adjutant,  Lieutenant  Joseph  Bowmar. 

When  General  Morgan  learned  that  the  men  were  falling  fast, 
and  that  no  impression  was  being  made  upon  the  enemy,  he  or 
dered  their  withdrawal.  He  had  not  been  fully  aware,  when  the 
attack  commenced,  of  the  exceeding  strength  of  the  position, 
although  he  knew  it  to  be  formidable,  and  he  thought  it  proba 
ble  that  the  garrison  would  surrender  to  a  bold  attack.  It  was 
his  practice  to  attack  and  seek  to  capture  all,  but  the  strongest, 
of  the  forces  which  opposed  his  advance  upon  his  raids,  and  this 
was  the  only  instance  in  which  he  ever  failed  of  success  in  this 
policy.  He  believed  that  the  position  could  have  been  eventually 
carried,  but  (as  the  defenders  were  resolute)  at  a  cost  of  time  and 
life  which  he  could  not  afford.  Colonel  Moore  ought  to  have 
been  -able  to  defend  his  position,  against  direct  attacks,  had  an 
army  been  hurled  against  him.  But  this  does  not  detract  from 
the  credit  of  his  defense.  His  selection  of  ground  showed  ad 
mirable  judgment;  and,  in  a  brief  time,  he  fortified  it  with  sin 
gular  skill.  He  deliberately  quitted  a  strong  stockade,  near  the 
bridge  (in  which  other  officers  would  probably  have  staid)  and 
which  our  artillery  would  have  battered  about  his  ears  directly, 
to  assume  the  far  better  position;  and  his  resolute  defense, 
showed  he  appreciated  and  meant  to  hold  it  to  the  last.  We 
expected  to  hear  of  his  promotion — men  had  been  promoted  for 
beatings  received  from  Morgan. 

Crossing  the  river  at  the  same  ford  at  which  Cluke  had  pre 
viously  crossed,  the  division  marched  toward  Campbellsville. 
Our  wounded  and  dead  were  left  under  the  charge  of  Surgeons 
and  Chaplains,  who  received  every  assistance,  that  he  could  fur 
nish,  from  Colonel  Moore,  who  proved  himself  as  humane  as  he 
was  skillful  and  gallant.  We  passed  through  Campbellsville 
without  halting.  On  that  evening  a  horrible  affair  occurred. 
A  certain  Captain  Murphy  took  a  watch  from  a  citizen  who  was 


424  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

being  held,  for  a  short  time,  under  guard,  to  prevent  his  giving 
information  of  our  approach  and  strength  to  the  garrison  at 
Lebanon.  Captain  Magenis,  Assistant  Adjutant  General  of  the 
division,  discovered  that  this  theft  had  been  perpetrated,  and 
reported  it  to  General  Morgan,  who  ordered  Murphy  to  be  ar 
rested.  Murphy  learned  that  Magenis  had  caused  his  arrest, 
and  persuaded  the  guard  (who  had  not  disarmed  him)  to  permit 
him  to  approach  Magenis.  When  near  him,  Murphy  drew  and 
cocked  a  pistol,  and  denounced  the  other  furiously,  at  the  same 
time  striking  him.  Captain  Magenis  attempted  to  draw  his 
saber,  and  Murphy  fired,  severing  the  carotid  artery  and  pro 
ducing  almost  instant  death.  Murphy  made  his  escape  on  the 
night  that  General  Morgan  had  ordered  a  court-martial  to  try 
him — the  night  before  we  crossed  the  Ohio.  The  wretch  ought 
to  have  been  butchered  in  his  tracks,  immediately  after  the 
murder  had  been  committed.  There  was  no  officer  in  the  entire 
Confederate  army,  perhaps,  so  young  as  he  was,  who.  had 
evinced  more  intelligence,  aptitude  and  zeal,  than  had  Captain 
Magenis.  Certainly,  there  was  not  among  them  all  a  more 
true-hearted,  gallant,  honorable  gentleman.  General  Morgan 
deeply  regretted  him.  His  successor,  Captain  Hart  Gibson, 
was  in  every  way  qualified  to  discharge,  with  ability  and  suc 
cess,  the  duties  of  the  position,  doubly  difficult  in  such  a  com 
mand  and  under  such  circumstances. 

On  the  night  of  the  4th,  the  division  encamped  five  miles  from 
Lebanon,  upon  the  ground  whence  we  drove  the  enemy's  pickets. 
Lebanon  was  garrisoned  by  Colonel  Hanson's  regiment,  the 
Twentieth  Kentucky,  and  not  far  off,  on  the  road  to  Harrods- 
burg,  two  Michigan  regiments  were  stationed.  On  the  morning 
of  the  5th,  the  division  approached  the  town,  and  a  demand  for 
its  surrender  was  made,  which  was  declined.  The  first  brigade 
was  formed  on  the  right  of  the  road,  with  two  regiments  in  re 
serve.  The  second  was  assigned  the  left  of  the  road.  The  ar 
tillery  was  planted  in  the  center,  and  at  once  opened  upon  the 
slight  works  which  were  thrown  up,  south  of  the  town.  As  the 


CAPTURE    OF   LEBANON.  425 

regiments  in  the  front  line  advanced,  the  enemy  retreated  into 
the  town.  Both  brigades  lost  slightly  in  effecting  this,  and 
succeeded,  immediately  afterward,  in  dislodging  the  enemy  from 
the  houses  in  the  edge  of  the  town,  both  on  the  left  and  on  the 
right.  The  enemy,  then,  mainly  concentrated  in  the  large  de 
pot  building  upon  the  railroad ;  a  few  sought  shelter  in  other 
houses.  Grigsby's  and  Ward's  regiments,  of  the  first  brigade, 
held  the  right  of  the  town  and  the  houses  looking  upon  the  depot 
in  that  quarter.  From  these  houses  they  kept  up  a  constant 
fire  upon  the  windows  of  the  depot.  Cluke's  and  Chenault's 
regiments,  the  latter  under  command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Tucker,  were  as  effectively  located  and  employed  upon  the  left. 
Our  artillery,  although  under  able  officers,  proved  of  little  use 
to  us  in  this  affair.  On  account  of  the  situation  of  the  depot  in 
low  ground,  the  shots  took  effect  in  the  upper  part  of  the  build 
ing  (when  they  struck  at  all),  doing  the  occupants  little  damage. 
Lieutenant  Lawrence,  however,  at  length  posted  one  of  his  guns 
— the  Parrots — on  a  hill  immediately  overlooking  the  building, 
and,  greatly  depressing  it,  prepared  to  fire  into  it  at  an 
angle  which  threatened  mischief.  But  the  sharp-shooters  pre 
vented  his  men  from  working  the  guns  effectively.  This  state 
of  affairs  lasted  for  two  or  three  hours.  The  Michigan  re^i- 

o  o 

ments,  before  mentioned,  drew  near  and  threatened  interference, 
and  General  Morgan,  who  had  sought  to  reduce  the  garrison 
without  storming  their  stronghold,  in  order  to  save  his  own  men, 
at  length  ordered  it  to  be  carried  by  assault.  Smith's  regiment, 
at  first  held  in  reserve  in  the  first  brigade,  had,  previously  to 
this  determination  upon  the  part  of  the  General,  been  engaged, 
but  the  Second  Kentucky  was  still  in  reserve.  Major  Webber 
was  now  ordered  to  bring  that  regiment  forward,  enter  the  town 
and  storm  the  buildings  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  Second 
Kentucky  had  tried  that  sort  of  work  before,  and  advanced  with 
serious  mien,  but  boldly  and  confidently.  Major  Webber  skill 
fully  aligned  it  and  moved  it  forward.  The  heavy  volley  it 
poured  into  the  windows  of  the  depot,  drove  the  defenders  away 


426  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

from  them  before  the  regiment  reached  the  building,  and  Colonel 
Hanson  surrendered.  The  other  houses  occupied  by  the  enemy 
were  surrendered  shortly  afterward. 

At  the  last  moment  of  the  fight,  a  sad  loss  befell  us.  Lieu 
tenant  Thomas  Morgan,  younger  brother  of  the  General,  was 
killed  just  before  the  enemy  surrendered.  He  was  first  Lieu 
tenant  of  Company  I,  of  the  Second  Kentucky,  but  was  serving 
at  the  time  of  his  death  upon  my  staff.  lie  habitually  sought 
and  exposed  himself  to  danger,  seeming  to  delight  in  the  excite 
ment  it  afforded  him.  He  had  repeatedly  been  remonstrated 
with  on  that  day,  regarding  his  reckless  exposure  of  his  person, 
and  General  Morgan  had  once  ordered  him  to  leave  the  front. 
He  was  stricken  by  the  fate  which  his  friends  feared  for  him. 
When  the  Second  Kentucky  advanced,  he  rushed  in  front  of  it, 
and,  while  firing  his  pistol  at  the  windows  of  the  depot,  was  shot 
through  the  heart.  He  exclaimed  to  his  brother  Calvin,  that  he 
was  killed,  and  fell  (a  corpse)  into  the  latter's  arms.  He  was 
but  nineteen  when  killed,  but  was  a  veteran  in  service  and  expe 
rience.  The  first  of  six  brothers  to  join  the  Confederate  army, 
he  had  displayed  his  devotion  to  the  cause  he  had  espoused  in 
the  field  and  the  prison.  I  have  never  known  a  boy  of  so  much 
genius,  and  of  so  bright  and  winning  a  temper.  His  handsome, 
joyous  face  and  gallant,  courteous  bearing  made  him  very  pop 
ular.  He  was  the  pet  and  idol  of  the  Second  Kentucky.  General 
Morgan  (whose  love  for  the  members  of  his  family  was  of  the 
most  devoted  character)  was  compelled  to  forego  the  indulgence 
of  his  own  grief  to  restrain  the  Second  Kentucky,  furious  at  the 
death  of  their  favorite.  When  his  death  became  generally 
known,  there  was  not  a  dry  eye  in  the  command. 

Although  our  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  not  heavy  m 
numbers,  it  included  some  valuable  officers  and  some  of  our  best 
men.  We  lost  eight  or  nine  killed,  and  twenty-five  or  thirty 
wounded.  In  the  early  part  of  the  fight,  Captain  Franks  led  a 
party  of  the  advance  guard  to  the  southern  end  of  the  depot, 
and  set  it  on  fire.  He  was  severely  wounded  in  doing  this. 


STORES    CAPTURED    AT    LEBANON.  427 

making  the  third  officer,  occupying  the  position  of  second  in 
command  of  the  advance  guard,  wounded  in  four  days.  The 
loss  in  the  guard  fell  principally  upon  members  of  the  "  Old 
Squadron."  Of  these  were  killed  Lieutenant  Gardner  and  pri 
vate  Worsham ;  and  Sergeant  William  Jones  and  privates  Log 
wood  and  Hawkins  were  badly  wounded,  all  very  brave  men  and 
excellent  soldiers.  A  gallant  deed  was  performed,  on  that  day, 
by  private  Walter  Ferguson,  one  of  the  bravest  men  I  ever 
knew ;  poor  fellow,  he  was  hung  by  Burbridge  afterward.  His 
friend  and  messmate  Logwood  lay  helpless  not  far  from  the 
depot,  and  Ferguson  approached  him  under  the  galling  fire  from 
the  windows,  lifted  and  bore  him  off.  Several  men  were  lost  out 
of  the  Second  Kentucky ;  among  them  Sergeant  Franklin,  for 
merly  Captain  of  a  Mississippi  company  in  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia. 

A  large  quantity  of  ammunition,  many  fine  rifles,  an  abundant 
supply  of  medicines,  and  a  field  full  of  ambulances  and  wagons 
were  the  fruits  of  this  victory.  The  prisoners  were  double- 
quicked  to  Springfield,  eight  miles  distant,  for  the  dilatory 
Michiganders  had  at  length  began  to  move,  and  there  was  no 
reason  for  fighting,  although  we  could  have  whipped  them.  At 
Springfield  the  prisoners  were  paroled.  Company  H,  of  the 
Second  Kentucky,  was  detached  here,  and  a  company  of  the 
Sixth  Kentucky  went  off  without  leave  or  orders.  Company  H 
was  sent  to  Harrodsburg  to  occupy  the  attention  of  Burnsides' 
cavalry.  The  division  marched  all  night,  reaching  Bardstown 
at  4  o' clock  on  the  morning  of  the  6th.  During  the  night  Lieut. - 
Colonel  Alston  (acting  chief  of  staff  to  General  Morgan)  lay  down 
to  sleep  in  the  porch  of  a  house,  and  awakened  to  find  himself  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

At  Bardstown,  Captain  Sheldon,  of  Company  C,  Second  Ken 
tucky,  detached  at  Muldraugh's  hill  to  reconnoiter  to  ward  Louis 
ville,  and  rejoin  us  at  Bardstown,  was  patiently  watching  a  party 
of  twenty  Federal  soldiers,  whom  he  had  penned  up  in  a  stable. 
The  tramp  of  the  column  marching  through  the  town  alarmed 


428  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

them,  and  they  surrendered.  Leaving  Bardstown  at  ten  A.  M. 
on  the  6th,  the  division  marched  steadily  all  day.  Just  at  dark 
the  train  from  Nashville  was  captured  at  a  point  some  thirty 
miles  from  Louisville.  A  little  of  Ellsworth's  art  applied  here 
discovered  for  us  the  fact  that  Morgan  was  expected  at  Louis 
ville,  confidently  and  anxiously,  but  that  an  impression  prevailed 
that  he  would  meet  with  a  warm  reception.  He  had  no  idea  of 
going  to  receive  it. 

We  marched  during  the  entire  night,  and  on  the  next  morn 
ing,  after  crossing  the  bridge  over  Salt  river,  halted  for  two  or 
three  hours.  Captains  Taylor  and  Merriwether,  of  the  Tenth 
Kentucky,  were  sent  forward  to  capture  boats  to  enable  us  to 
cross  the  Ohio,  and  went  about  their  errand  in  good  earnest. 
On  the  afternoon  of  that  day,  Captain  Davis,  A.  A.  General  of 
the  first  brigade,  was  selected  by  General  Morgan  to  undertake 
a  service  very  important  to  the  success  of  the  expedition.  He 
was  directed  to  proceed,  with  Company  D  of  the  Second  Ken 
tucky,  and  Company  A,  of  Cluke's  regiment,  to  cross  the  river 
at  Twelve  Mile  Island,  seize  boats  and  cross  the  river,  keep  the 
militia  of  lower  Indiana  employed  in  watching  their  own  "fire 
sides,"  chicken  coops,  and  stables,  so  that  the  column  might  be 
comparatively  free  from  molestation,  in  at  least  one  direction, 
and  to  rejoin  the  division  at  Salern,  Indiana.  These  two  com 
panies,  the  two  detached  at  Springfield — or  rather  one  detached 
there  ;  the  other  marched  off  without  leave — and  Captain  Suiter's 
company  detached  near  Columbia,  to  attract  Burnsid'es  atten 
tion  to  the  country  around  Crab  Orchard,  Stanford,  etc.,  (whither 
he  at  once  hastened  and  did  splendid  service,  keeping  the  enemy 
as  busily  employed  as  an  ordinary-sized  brigade  might  have 
done),  these  companies  made  five,  in  all,  which  were  permanently 
detached  from  the  division. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  7th,  the  column  halted  at  Garnetts- 
ville,  in  Hardin  county,  and  went  into  camp.  It  has  been  fre 
quently  surmised,  in  the  North,  that  Morgan  crossed  the  Ohio 
river  to  escape  from  Hobson.  Of  all  the  many  wildly  and  ut- 


LOATHING   FOR   SOUTHERN   RENEGADES.  429 

terly  absurd  ideas  which  have  prevailed  regarding  the  late  war, 
this  is.  perhaps,  the  most  preposterous.  It  is  difficult  to  under 
stand  how,  even  the  people  whose  ideas  of  military  operations 
are  derived  from  a  vague  rendition  of  the  newspaper  phrases  of 
"bagging"  armies,  "dispositions  made  to  capture,"  "  deriving 
material  advantages,"  when  the  derivers  were  running  like 
scared  deer,  it  is  hard  to  comprehend  how  even  such  people,  if 
they  ever  look  upon  maps,  or  reflect  for  a  moment  upon  what 
they  read,  can  receive,  as  correct,  such  assertions  as  the  one 
under  consideration.  Hobson  was  from  twenty-four  to  thirty- 
six  hours  behind  us.  He  was  pursuing  us,  it  should  be  stated, 
with  the  cavalry  of  Judah's  corps — he  was,  at  any  rate,  a  good 
fifty  miles  in  our  rear,  and  could  learn  our  track  only  by  follow 
ing  it  closely.  General  Morgan,  if  anxious  to  escape  Hobson, 
and  actuated  by  no  other  motive,  would  have  turned  at  Bards- 
town,  and  gone  out  of  Kentucky  through  the  western  part  of 
the  State,  where  he  would  have  encountered  no  hostile  force 
that  he  could  not  have  easily  repulsed.  It  was  not  too  late  to 
pursue  the  same  general  route  when  we  were  at  Garnettsville. 
Roads,  traversable  by  artillery  and  excellent  for  cavalry,  ran 
thence  in  every  direction.  Hobson  would  have  had  as  little 
chance  to  intercept  us,  as  a  single  hunter  has  to  corner  a  wild 
horse  in  an  open  prairie.  To  rush  across  the  Ohio  river,  as  a 
means  of  escape,  would  have  been  the  choice  of  an  idiot,  and 
yet  such  conduct  has  been  ascribed  to  the  shrewdest,  most  wide' 
awake,  most  far-seeing  Captain  (in  his  own  chosen  method  of 
warfare),  the  greatest  master  of  "  cavalry  strategy,"  that  ever 
lived.  That  military  men  in  the  North  should  have  entertained 
this  opinion,  proves,  only,  that  in  armies  so  vast,  as  that  which 
the  United  States  put  into  the  field,  there  must  necessarily  be 
many  men  of  very  small  capacity.  General  Morgan  certainly 
believed  that  he  could,  with  energy  and  care,  preserve  his  com 
mand  from  capture  after  crossing  the  Ohio,  but  he  no  more  be 
lieved  that  it  would  be  safer,  after  having  gained  the  Northern 


430  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

side  of  the  river,  than  he  believed  that  it  was  safer  in  Kentucky 
than  south  of  the  Cumberland. 

The  division  marched  from  Garnettsville,  shortly  after  mid 
night,  and  by  9  or  10  A.  M.  we  were  in  Brandenburg,  upon  the 
banks  of  the  river.  Here  we  found  Captains  Samuel  Taylor 
and  Clay  Merriwether,  awaiting  our  arrival.  They  had  sue* 
ceeded  in  capturing  two  fine  steamers ;  one  had  been  taken  at 
the  wharf,  and,  manning  her  strongly,  they  cruised  about  the 
river  until  they  found  and  caught  the  other.  We  were  rejoined 
here  by  another  officer,  whose  course  had  been  somewhat  ec 
centric,  and  his  adventure  very  romantic.  This  was  Captain 
Thomas  Hines,  of  the  Ninth  Kentucky,  then  enjoying  a  high 
reputation  in  our  command  for  skill,  shrewdness,  and  exceeding 
gallantry,  but  destined  to  become  much  more  widely  celebrated. 
While  the  division  was  lying  along  the  Cumberland  in  May, 
Captain  Hines  had  been  sent  to  Clinton  county,  with  the  men 
of  the  Ninth  Kentucky,  whose  horses  were  especially  unservice 
able,  to  place  them  where,  with  good  feeding,  rest  and  attention, 
the  stock  might  be  recruited — to  establish,  in  other  words,  what 
was  technically  known  as  a  "convalescent  camp,"  and  in  regi 
mental  "slang,"  a  "dead  horse  camp."  Captain  Hiries  estab 
lished  his  camp  and  put  it  into  successful  operation,  but  then 
sought  permission  to  undertake  more  active  and  exciting  work. 
He  was  not  exactly  the  style  of  man  to  stay  quiet  at  a  "  con 
valescent  camp ;"  it  would  have  been  as  difficult  to  keep  him 
there,  as  to  confine  Napoleon  to  Elba,  or  force  the  "Wandering 
Jew"  to  remain  on  a  cobler's  bench.  He  obtained  from  Gen 
eral  Morgan  an  order  to  take  such  of  his  men  as  were  best 
mounted,  and  scout  "north  of  the  Cumberland."  He,  therefore, 
selected  thirty  or  forty  of  his  "convalescents,"  whose  horses 
were  able  to  hobble,  and  crossed  the  river  with  them.  Immed 
iately  exchanging  his  crippled  horses  for  good,  sound  ones,  he 
commenced  a  very  pleasant  and  adventurous  career,  which  lasted 
for  some  weeks.  lie  attacked  and  harassed  the  marching  col 
umns  of  the  enemy,  and  kept  the  smaller  garrisons  constantly 


CAPTAIN   BINES,  431 

in  fear,  and  moved  about  with  such  celerity  that  there  was  no 
getting  at  him,  occasionally  interluding  his  other  occupations 
by  catching  and  burning  a  railroad  train.  He  once  came  very 
near  being  entirely  destroyed.  The  enemy  succeeded,  on  one 
occasion,  in  eluding  his  vigilance  and  surprising  him.  While 
he  and  his  men  were  peacefully  bathing  in  a  creek,  molesting 
no  one,  they  were  suddenly  attacked.  Several  were  captured 
and  the  rest  were  dispersed,  but  Hines  collected  them,  again,  in 
a  day  or  two. 

After  a  while,  finding  Kentucky  grow  warm  for  him,  and  not 
wishing  to  return  to  the  command  to  be  remanded  to  the  "con 
valescent  camp,"  he  determined  to  cross  over  into  Indiana  and 
try  and  stir  up  the  "copperheads."  He  thought  that  (accord 
ing  to  the  tenor  of  his  instructions),  he  had  the  right  to  do  so. 
The  order  did  not  specify  when  he  should  return  from  his  scout, 
and  Indiana  was  certainly  "north  of  the  Cumberland."  He  ac 
cordingly  crossed  into  Indiana — made  his  presence  known  to  the 
people  of  the  State  in  various  ways — and  penetrated  as  far  into 
the  interior  of  the  State,  as  Seymour,  at  the  junction  of  the 
Ohio  and  Mississippi  and  Cincinnati  and  Indianapolis  Railroads. 
He  here  effected  a  junction  with  a  greatly  more  numerous 
body  of  militia,  which  induced  him  to  retrace  his  steps  rapidly 
to  the  Ohio  (which  he  recrossed),  and  arrived  at  Brandenburg  on 
the  very  day  that  we  got  there.  We  found  him  leaning  against 
the  side  of  the  wharf-boat,  with  sleepy,  melancholy  look — appa 
rently  the  most  listless,  inoffensive  youth  that  was  ever  imposed 
upon.  I  do  not  know  what  explanation  he  made  General  Mor 
gan  (of  the  lively  manner  in  which  he  had  acted  under  his  order), 
but  it  seemed  to  be  perfectly  satisfactory,  and  he  was  ordered  to 
report  to  Colonel  Morgan  to  assume  the  position  left  vacant  by 
the  wounding  of  Captain  Franks. 

Just  before  the  crossing  of  the  river  was  commenced,  an  un 
expected  fusillade  was  delivered,  from  the  Indiana  shore,  upon 
the  men  who  showed  themselves  in  the  little  town  and  upon  the 
boats,  which  was  soon  followed  by  the  sharp  report  of  a  rifled- 


432  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

cannon.  The  river  at  this  point  is  some  eight  hundred  or  a 
thousand  yards  wide — and  the  musketry  produced  no  effect. 
The  shell,  however,  from  the  piece  of  artillery  pitched  into  a 
group  on  the  river  bank,  scattering  it,  and  wounding  Captain 
Wilson,  Quartermaster  of  the  First  Brigade.  The  mist,  hanging 
thick  over  the  river,  had  prevented  us  from  seeing  the  parties  who 
directed  this  firing,  take  position.  Soon  the  mist  lifted  or  was 
dispersed  by  the  bright  sun,  and  disclosed  a  squad  of  combatants 
posted  behind  one  or  two  small  houses,  a  clump  of  hay  stacks, 
and  along  the  brink  of  the  river  on  the  other  side.  Apparently, 
from  the  mixture  of  uniforms  and  plain  clothes,  which  could  be 
discovered  by  the  glass,  this  force  was  composed  of  militia  and 
some  regular  troops.  Several  shots  were  fired  from  the  gun 
while  we  were  getting  our  pieces  in  readiness  to  reply — but  as 
soon  as  Lawrence  opened  upon  them  with  his  Parrots,  a  manifest 
disposition  to  retire  was  seen  among  our  friends  who  had  shown 
themselves  so  anxious  to  give  us  a  warm  and  early  welcome. 
They  attempted  to  carry  the  piece  of  artillery  off  with  them,  but 
were  induced  by  Lawrence  to  relinquish  it.  It  was  mounted 
upon  the  wheels  of  a  wagon  from  which  the  body  had  been  re 
moved,  and,  as  they  moved  it  by  hand,  its  transportation  was 
difficult  and  tedious  and  very  disagreeable  under  fire. 

Leaving  the  piece,  they  fell  back  to  a  wooded  ridge  five  or  six 
hundred  yards  from  the  river  bank  and  parallel  with  it.  The 
Second  Kentucky  and  Ninth  Tennessee  were  immediately  put 
across  the  river,  leaving  their  horses  on  the  Kentucky  shore, 
and  were  formed  under  the  bluff  bank.  As  they  ascended  the 
bank  they  were  greeted  by  a  volley  from  the  enemy  which  did 
no  damage,  and  Colonel  Ward  and  Major^Vebber  at  once  pressed 
them  on  toward  the  ridge.  Scarcely  had  the  boats  returned,  and 
while  yet  the  two  regiments  on  the  other  side  were  moving 
across  the  open  fields  between  the  river  and  the  ridge,  when  a 
small  boat  which  had  for  some  minutes  been  in  sight,  steaming 
rapidly  down  the  river,  began  to  take  a  part  in  the  affair.  We 
had  watched  her  with  great  interest,  and  were  inclined  to  think, 


CROSSING   THE    OHIO.  433 

from  her  bold  unhesitating  advance,  that  she  was  a  river  gun 
boat,  and  when  she  came  within  a  mile  of  the  town  all  doubts 
upon  the  subject  were  dispelled.  Suddenly  checking  her  way, 
she  tossed  her  snub  nose  defiantly,  like  an  angry  beauty  of  the 
coal-pits,  sidled  a  little  toward  the  town,  and  commenced  to  scold. 
A  bluish-white,  funnel-shaped  cloud  spouted  out  from  her  left- 
hand  bow  and  a  shot  flew  at  the  town,  and  then  changing  front 
forward,  she  snapped  a  shell  at  the  men  on  the  other  side.  The 
ridge  was  soon  gained  by  the  regiments,  however,  the  enemy 
not  remaining  to  contest  it,  and  they  were  sheltered  by  it  from 
the  gun-boat's  fire.  I  wish  I  were  sufficiently  master  of  nautical 
phraseology  to  do  justice  to  this  little  vixen's  style  of  fighting, 
but  she  was  so  unlike  a  horse,  or  a  piece  of  light  artillery,  even, 
that  I  can  not  venture  to  attempt  it.  She  was  boarded  up  tightly 
with  tiers  of  heavy  oak  planking,  in  which  embrasures  were  cut 
for  the  guns,  of  which  she  carried  three  bronze  twelve-pounder 
howitzers',  apparently.  Captain  Byrnes  transferred  the  two 
Parrots  to  an  eminence  just  upon  the  river  and  above  the  town, 
and  answered  her  fire.  His  solid  shot  skipped  about  her,  in 
close  proximity,  and  his  shells  burst  close  to  her,  but  none 
seemed  to  touch  her — although  it  was  occasionally  hard  to  tell 
whether  she  was  hit  or  not.  This  duel  was  watched  with  the 
most  breathless  interest  by  the  whole  division  ;  the  men  crowded 
in  intense  excitement  upon  the  bluffs,  near  the  town,  to  witness 
it,  and  General  Morgan  exhibited  an  emotion  he  rarely  permitted 
to  be  seen. 

Two  of  his  best  regiments  were  separated  from  him  by  the 
broad  river,  and  were  dismounted,  a  condition  which  always  ap 
peals  to  a  cavalryman's  strongest  sympathies  ;  they  might  at  any 
moment,  he  feared,  be  attacked  by  overwhelming  forces,  for  he 
did  not  know  what  was  upon  the  other  side,  or  how  large  a 
swarm  Hines  had  stirred  up  in  the  hornet's  nest.  He  himself 
might  be  attacked,  if  delayed  too  long,  by  the  enemy  that  he 
well  knew  must  be  following  his  track.  Independently  of  all 
considerations  of  immediate  danger,  he  was  impatient  at  delay 
28 


434  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

and  anxious  to  try  his  fortune  in  the  new  field  he  had  selected. 
There  were  many  with  him  who  could  appreciate  his  feelings. 
Behind  us  two  broad  States  separated  us  from  our  friends — a 
multitude  of  foes,  although  we  thought  little  of  them,  were 
gathering  in  our  rear. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  great  river  were  our  comrades 
needing  our  aid,  perhaps  never  to  be  received.  When  we,  too, 
were  across,  we  would  stand  face  to  face  with  the  hostile  and 
angry  North — an  immense  and  infuriated  population,  and  a  sol 
diery  out-numbering  us  twenty  to  one,  would  confront  us.  Tel 
egraph  lines,  tracing  the  country  in  every  direction,  would  tell 
constantly  of  our  movements  ;  railways  would  bring  assailants 
against  us  from  every  quarter,  and  we  would  have  to  run  this 
gauntlet,  night  and  day,  without  rest  or  one  moment  of  safety, 
for  six  hundred  miles.  As  we  looked  on  the  river,  rolling  be 
fore  us,  we  felt  that  it  divided  us  from  a  momentous  future,  and 
we  were  eager  to  learn  our  fate.  After  an  hour  perhaps  had 
elapsed,  but  which  seemed  a  dozen,  the  gunboat  backed  out  and 
steamed  up  the  river.  Her  shells  had  nearly  all  burst  short, 
doing  no  damage.  The  boats  were  put  to  work  again  without  a 
moment's  delay,  to  ferry  the  command  over.  First,  the  horses 
of  the  men  on  the  other  side  were  carried  to  them,  affording 
them  exquisite  gratification.  Although  no  time  was  lost,  and 
the  boats  were  of  good  capacity,  it  was  nearly  dark  before  the 
first  brigade  was  all  across.  The  gunboat  returned  about  five 
p.  M.,  accompanied  by  a  consort,  but  a  few  shots  from  the  Par 
rots,  which  had  been  kept  in  position,  drove  them  away  without 
any  intermission  having  occurred  in  the  ferriage.  The  second 
brigade  and  the  artillery  were  gotten  across  by  midnight.  One 
of  the  boats,  which  was  in  Government  employ,  was  burned;  the 
other  was  released. 

The  first  brigade  encamped  that  night  about  six  miles  from 
the  river.  "A  great  fear"  had  fallen  upon  the  inhabitants  of 
that  part  of  the  State  of  Indiana.  They  had  left  their  houses, 
with  open  doors  and  unlocked  larders,  and  had  fled  to  the 


CAPTURE  OP  CORYDOX  AND  SALEM.  435 

thickets  and  "caves  of  the  hills."  At  the  houses  at  which  I 
stopped,  every  thing  was  just  in  the  condition  in  which  the  fu 
gitive  owners  had  left  it,  an  hour  or  two  before.  A  bright  fire 
was  blazing  upon  the  kitchen  hearth,  bread  half  made  up  was  in 
the  tray,  and  many  indications  convinced  us  that  we  had  inter 
rupted  preparations  for  supper.  The  chickens  were  strolling 
before  the  door  with  a  confidence  that  was  touching,  but  mis 
placed.  General  Morgan  rode  by  soon  afterward,  and  was  in 
duced  to  "  stop  all  night."  We  completed  the  preparations,  so 
suddenly  abandoned,  and  made  the  best  show  for  Indiana  hos 
pitality  that  was  possible  under  the  disturbing  circumstances. 

On  the  next  day,  the  9th,  the  division  marched  at  an  early 
hour,  the  second  brigade  in  advance.  At  the  little  town  of 
Corydon,  Colonel  Morgan's  advance  guard  found  a  body  of 
militia  posted  behind  rail  barricades.  He  charged  them,  but 
they  resolutely  defended  their  rail  piles,  killing  and  wounding 
several  men,  among  the  latter  Lieutenant  Thorpe,  of  Company 
A,  Second  Kentucky,  Colonel  Morgan's  acting  Adjutant,  and  a 
very  fine  young  officer.  A  demonstration  was  made  upon  the 
flank  of  the  enemy,  by  one  regiment  of  the  second  brigade,  and 
Colonel  Morgan  again  advanced  upon  their  front,  when,  not  un 
derstanding  such  a  fashion  of  fighting  upon  two  or  three  sides 
at  once,  the  militia  broke  and  ran,  with  great  rapidity,  into  the 
town,  their  progress  accelerated  (as  they  got  fairly  into  the 
streets)  by  a  shot  dropped  among  them  from  one  of  the  pieces. 

Passing  through  Corydon,  we  took  the  Salem  road,  and  en 
camped  some  sixteen  or  eighteen  miles  from  the  latter  place.  On 
the  morning  of  the  10th,  we  set  out  for  Salem.  Major  Webber  was 
ordered  to  take  the  advance,  and  let  nothing  stop  him.  He  ac 
cordingly  put  his  regiment  at  the  head  of  the  column,  and  struck 
out  briskly.  Lieutenant  Welsh,  of  Company  K,  had  the  ex 
treme  advance  with  twelve  men.  As  he  neared  Salem,  he  saw 
the  enemy  forming  to  receive  him,  and,  without  hesitation, 
dashed  in  among  them.  The  party  he  attacked  was  about  one 
hundred  and  fifty  strong,  but  badly  armed  and  perfectly  raw, 


436  HISTORY  or  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

and  he  quickly  routed  them.  He  pursued  as  they  fled,  and  soon, 
supported  by  Captain  W.  J.  Jones'  company,  drove  them  pell- 
mell  into  the  town.  Here  some  two  or  three  hundred  were  col 
lected,  but,  as  the  Second  Kentucky  came  pouring  upon  them, 
they  fled  in  haste,  scattering  their  guns  in  the  streets.  A  small 
swivel,  used  by  the  younger  population  of  Salem  to  celebrate 
Christmas  and  the  Fourth  of  July,  had  been  planted  to  receive 
us :  about  eighteen  inches  long,  it  was  loaded  to  the  muzzle9 
and  mounted  in  the  public  square  by  being  propped  against  a 
stick  of  fire  wood.  It  was  not  fired,  however,  for  the  man  de 
puted  to  perform  that  important  duty,  somewhat  astounded  by 
the  sudden  dash  into  the  town,  dropped  the  coal  of  fire  with 
which  he  should  have  touched  it  off,  and  before  he  could  get  an 
other  the  rebels  captured  the  piece.  The  shuddering  imagina 
tion  refuses  to  contemplate  the  consequences  had  that  swivel 
been  touched  off.  Major  Webber  might  have  had  some  trouble 
with  this  force,  which  was  being  rapidly  augmented,  but  for  the 
promptness  and  vigor  of  his  attack.  He  made  favorable  men 
tion  of  Captain  Cooper,  of  Company  K,  and  Lieutenant  West, 
of  Company  I,  for  gallant  and  judicious  conduct. 

A  short  halt  was  made  in  Salem  to  feed  men  and  horses,  and 
during  that  time  several  railroad  bridges  were  burned.  The 
Provost  guard  had  great  difficulty  in  restraining  the  men  from 
pillaging,  and  was  unsuccessful  in  some  instances.  Major 
Steele,  of  the  Third  Kentucky,  had  been  appointed  Provost 
Marshal  of  the  division,  and  was  assisted  by  picked  officers 
and  men  from  each  of  the  brigades.  Major  Steele  was  a  most 
resolute,  vigilant,  energetic  officer,  and  yet  he  found  it  impos 
sible  to  stop  a  practice  which  neither  company  nor  regimental 
officers  were  able  to  aid  him  in  suppressing.  This  disposition 
for  wholesale  plunder  exceeded  any  thing  that  any  of  us  had 
ever  seen  before.  The  men  seemed  actuated  by  a  desire  to 
"pay  off"  in  the  " enemy's  country"  all  scores  that  the  Federal 
army  had  chalked  up  in  the  South.  The  great  cause  for  ap 
prehension,  which  our  situation  might  have  inspired,  seemed 


MANIA   FOR   PILLAGING.  437 

only  to  make  them  reckless.  Calico  was  the  staple  article  of 
appropriation — each  man  (who  could  get  one)  tied  a  bolt  of  it 
to  his  saddle,  only  to  throw  it  away  and  get  a  fresh  one  at  the 
first  opportunity.  They  did  not  pillage  with  any  sort  of  method 
or  reason — it  seemed  to  be  a  mania,  senseless  and  purposeless. 
One  man  carried  a  bird-cage,  with  three  canaries  in  it,  for  two 
days.  Another  rode  with  a  chafing-dish,  which  looked  like  a 
small  metallic  coffin,  on  the  pummel  of  his  saddle,  until  an  offi 
cer  forced  him  to  throw  it  away.  Although  the  weather  was 
intensely  warm,  another,  still,  slung  seven  pairs  of  skates  around 
his  neck,  and  chuckled  over  his  acquisition.  I  saw  very  few 
articles  of  real  value  taken — they  pillaged  like  boys  robbing  an 
orchard.  I  would  not  have  believed  that  such  a  passion  could 
have  been  developed,  so  ludicrously,  among  any  body  of  civil 
ized  men.  At  Piketon,  Ohio,  some  days  later,  one  man  broke 
through  the  guard  posted  at  a  store,  rushed  in  (trembling  with 
excitement  and  avarice),  and  filled  his  pockets  with  horn  buttons. 
They  would  (with  few  exceptions)  throw  away  their  plunder 
after  awhile,  like  children  tired  of  their  toys. 

Leaving  Salem  at  one  or  two  o'clock,  we  marched  rapidly  and 
steadily.  At  nightfall  we  reached  Vienna,  on  the  Indianapolis 
and  Jeffersonville  railroad.  General  Morgan  placed  Ellsworth 
in  the  telegraph  office  here,  the  operator  having  been  captured 
before  he  could  give  the  alarm.  Ellsworth  soon  learned  all  the 
news  to  be  had  from  Louisville  and  Indianapolis,  some  of  it 
valuable  to  us.  General  Morgan  ascertained  also  that  orders 
had  been  issued  to  the  militia  to  fell  timber  and  blockade  all  of 
the  roads  we  would  be  likely  to  travel — our  rapid  marching  had, 
hitherto,  saved  us  this  annoyance.  That  night  we  went  into 
camp  near  Lexington,  a  little  place  six  or  seven  miles  from 
Vienna.  General  Morgan  slept  in  the  town  with  a  small  escort, 
and  during  the  night  a  party  of  Federal  cavalry  entered  the 
town  and  advanced  as  far  as  the  house  in  which  he  slept,  but 
retired  as  suddenly  as  they  came.  We  moved  at  an  early  hour 
on  the  road  to  Paris — Colonel  Smith  was  detached  to  feint 


438  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

against  Madison,  in  order  to  hold  there  troops  who  might 
prove  troublesome  if  they  came  out.  The  division  moved 
quietly  through  Paris,  and  in  the  afternoon  arrived  in  sight 
of  Vernon.  Here  Colonel  Smith  rejoined  us.  A  strong 
force  was  posted  in  Vernon,  which  General  Morgan  did  not  care 
to  attack.  Fortunately,  there  were  men  in  the  command  who 
knew  the  country,  and  the  General  was  enabled  to  carry  the 
division  around  the  place  to  the  Dupont  road.  Skirmishers 
were  thrown  out  on  the  road,  leading  into  the  town  which  we 
had  left,  and  also  upon  the  other  road,  while  this  movement  was 
being  executed.  General  Morgan  sent  a  demand  for  the  sur 
render  of  the  place,  which  was  declined,  but  the  officer  com 
manding  asked  two  hours  to  remove  the  non-combatants,  which 
reasonable  request  General  Morgan  granted.  Humane  consid 
erations  are  never  inopportune.  By  the  time  that  the  non- 
combatants  were  safely  removed,  the  column  had  become 
straightened  out  on  the  new  road,  and  the  skirmishers,  after 
they  had  burned  a  bridge  or  two,  were  withdrawn. 

We  encamped  that  night  at  12  M.,  and  moved  next  morning 
at  3.  The  fatigue  of  the  marches,  from  the  date  of  the  crossing 
of  the  Ohio  to  the  period  of  the  close  of  the  raid,  was  tremendous. 
We  had  marched  hard  in  Kentucky,  but  we  now  averaged 
twenty-one  hours  in  the  saddle.  Passing  through  Duporit  a 
little  after  daylight,  a  new  feature  in  the  practice  of  appropria 
tion  was  developed.  A  large  meat  packing  establishment  was 
in  this  town,  and  each  man  had  a  ham  slung  at  his  saddle. 
There  was  no  difficulty  at  any  time  in  supplying  men  and  horses, 
in  either  Indiana  or  Ohio — forage  and  provisions  were  to  be 
had  in  abundance,  stop  where  we  would.  There  is  a  custom 
prevailing  in  those  States,  which  is  of  admirable  assistance  to 
soldiery,  and  should  be  encouraged — a  practice  of  baking  bread 
once  a  week  in  large  quantities.  Every  house  is  full  of  it. 
The  people  were  still  laboring  under  vast  apprehensions  regard 
ing  us,  and  it  was  a  rare  thing  to  see  an  entire  family  remain 
ing  at  home.  The  men  met  us  oftener  in  their  capacity  of 


POSITION    OF    FORCES.  439 

militia  than  at  their  houses,  and  the  "Copperheads"  and  "Val- 
landighammers  "  fought  harder  than  the  others.  Wherever  we 
passed,  bridges  and  depots,  water-tanks,  etc.,  were  burned  and 
the  railroads  torn  up,  but  I  knew  of  but  one  private  dwelling 
being  burned  upon  the  entire  raid,  and  we  were  fired  upon  from 
that  one.  The  country,  for  the  most  part,  was  in  a  high  state 
of  cultivation,  and  magnificent  crops  of  wheat,  especially,  at 
tracted  our  notice  on  all  sides. 

What  was  peculiarly  noticeable,  however,  to  men  who  were 
fighting  against  these  people,  and  just  from  thinned  out  "  Dixie," 
was  the  dense  population,  apparently  untouched  by  the  demands 
of  the  war.  The  country  was  full,  the  towns  were  full,  and  the 
ranks  of  the  militia  were  full.  I  am  satisfied  that  we  saw  often 
as  many  as  ten  thousand  militia  in  one  day,  posted  at  different 
points.  They  would  frequently  fight,  if  attacked  in  strong  po 
sition,  but  could  be  dispersed  by  maneuvering.  Had  they  come 
upon  us  as  the  fierce  Kentucky  Home-guards  would  have  done, 
if  collected  in  such  numbers,  we  could  not  have  forced  our  way 
through  them. 

In  this  immediate  country  had  been  recruited  the  regiment 
which  burned  the  homes  of  Company  F,  the  Mississippi  company 
of  the  Second  Kentucky.  Colonel  Grigsby  was  detached  with 
his  regiment  to  press  on  and  burn  the  bridges  near  Versailles. 
He  dashed  into  the  town,  where  several  hundred  militia  were  col 
lected  devising  the  best  means  of  defending  the  place,  and  broke 
up  the  council.  He  captured  a  large  number  of  horses,  rather 
better  stock  than  had  hitherto  been  procured  in  Indiana. 
Marching  on  steadily  all  day  and  the  greater  part  of  the  next 
night,  we  reached  a  point  on  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  road, 
twenty-five  miles  from  Harrison,  called  Summansville.  Here 
twenty -five  hundred  militia  lay  loaded  into  box  cars.  We  halted 
to  rest,  and,  unconscious  of  our  presence,  although  we  were  close 
upon  them,  they  moved  off  in  the  morning  toward  Cincinnati. 
Moving  at  5  A.  M.,  we  reached  Harrison  by  one  o'clock  of  the 
loth.  Here  General  Morgan  began  to  maneuver  for  the  benefit 


440  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

of  the  commanding  officer  at  Cincinnati.  He  took  it  for  granted 
(for  it  was  utterly  impossible  moving  as  rapidly  as  ^we  wero 
forced  to  do,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  strange  and  hostile  popula 
tion,  to  get  positive  information  regarding  any  matter),  that  there 
was  a  strong  force  of  regular  troops  in  Cincinnati.  Burnside 
had  them  not  far  off,  and  General  Morgan  supposed  that  they 
would,  of  course,  be  brought  there.  If  we  could  get  past  Cin 
cinnati  safely,  the  danger  of  the  expedition,  he  thought,  would 
be  more  than  half  over.  Here  he  expected  to  be  confronted  by 
the  concentrated  forces  of  Judah  and  Burnside,  and  he  antici 
pated  great  difficulty  in  eluding  or  cutting  his  way  through  them. 
Once  safely  through  this  peril,  his  escape  would  be  certain,  un 
less  the  river  remained  so  high  that  the  transports  could  carry 
troops  to  intercept  him  at  the  upper  crossings.  The  cavalry 
following  in  his  rear  could  not  overtake  him  as  long  as  he  kept 
in  motion,  and  the  infantry  could  not  be  transported  so  rapidly 
by  rail  to  the  eastern  part  of  the  State  that  it  could  be  concen 
trated  in  sufficient  strength  to  stop  him.  His  object,  therefore, 
entertaining  these  views  and  believing  that  the  great  effort  to 
capture  him  would  be  made  as  he  crossed  the  Hamilton  and 
Dayton  railroad,  was  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  exact  point 
where  he  would  cross  this  road,  and  denude  that  point  as  much 
as  possible  of  troops.  He  sent  detachments  in  various  direc 
tions,  seeking,  however,  to  create  the  impression  that  he  was 
marching  to  Hamilton. 

After  two  or  three  hours'  halt  at  Harrison,  the  division  moved 
directly  toward  Cincinnati,  the  detachment  coming  in  in  the 
course  of  that  afternoon.  Hoping  that  his  previous  demonstra 
tions  would  induce  the  sending  of  the  bulk  of  the  troops  up  the 
road,  and  that  if  any  were  left  at  Cincinnati  his  subsequent  threat 
ening  movements  would  cause  them  to  draw  into  the  city,  re 
main  on  the  defensive,  and  permit  him  to  pass  around  it  without 
attacking  him,  he  sought  to  approach  the  city  as  nearly  as  pos 
sible  without  actually  entering  it  and  involving  his  command  in  a 
fight  with  any  garrison  which  might  be  there.  He  has  been 


(441) 


442  HISTORY  OP  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

sometimes  accused  of  a  lack  of  enterprise  in  not  capturing  Cin 
cinnati.  It  must  be  remembered  that  Cincinnati  was  not  the 
objective  point  of  this  raid ;  it  was  not  undertaken  to  capture 
that  city.  General  Morgan  kne^y  nothing,  and,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  could  know  nothing  of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  city, 
or  whether  it  was  weakly  or  strongly  garrisoned. 

Starting  that  morning  from  a  point  fifty  miles  distant  from 
Cincinnati,  and  reaching  the  vicinity  of  the  city  after  nightfall, 
he  must  have  possessed  more  than  human  means  of  obtaining 
information,  had  he  known  these  things  then,  and  he  did  not 
have  a  rapping  medium  on  his  staff.  Moreover,  of  the  twenty- 
four  hundred  and  sixty  effectives  with  which  he  had  started,  he 
had  not  two  thousand  left.  He  could  get  fights  enough  to  em 
ploy  this  force  handsomely,  without  running  into  a  labyrinth  of 
streets,  and  among  houses  (each  one  of  which  might  be  made  a 
fortification),  with  the  hope  that  the  town  might  be  unoccupied 
with  troops,  or  that  it  might  be  surrendered.  Our  "  Copperhead 
friends,"  who  could  have  given  us  the  necessary  information, 
were  too  loyal,  or  too  busy  dodging  Burnside's  Dutch  corporals 
to  come  out. 

The  men  in  our  ranks  were  worn  down  and  demoralized  with  the 
tremendous  fatigue,  which  no  man  can  realize  or  form  the  faint 
est  conception  of  until  he  has  experienced  it.  It  is  as  different 
from  the  fatigue  of  an  ordinary  long  march,  followed  by  some 
rest,  as  the  pain  given  by  an  hour's  deprivation  of  water  is  un 
like  the  burning,  rabid  thirst  of  fever.  Had  the  city  been  given 
up  to  us,  and  had  the  least  delay  occurred  in  getting  boats  with 
which  to  cross  the  river,  the  men  would  have  scattered  to  all 
quarters  of  the  city,  and  twenty-four  hours  might  have  been  re 
quired  to  collect  them.  In  that  time  the  net  would  have  been 
drawn  around  us.  But  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  (independently 
of  all  these  considerations)  that  General  Morgan  had  given  him 
self  a  particular  work  to  accomplish.  He  determined,  as  has 
been  stated,  to  traverse  Ohio. 

To  have  recrossed  the  river  at  Cincinnati,  would  have  short- 


THE    DEMONSTRATION    ON   CINCINNATI.  443 

ened  the  raid  by  many  days,  have  released  the  troops  pursuing 
us,  and  have  abandoned  the  principal  benefits  expected  to  be  de 
rived  from  the  expedition. 

In  this  night  march  around  Cincinnati,  we  met  with  the  great 
est  difficulty  in  keeping  the  column  together.  The  guides  were 
all  in  front  with  General  Morgan,  who  rode  at  the  head  of  the 
second  brigade  then  marching  in  advance.  This  brigade  had  no 
trouble  consequently.  But  the  first  brigade  was  embarrassed 
beyond  measure.  Cluke's  regiment  was  marching  in  the  rear  of 
the  second  brigade,  and  if  it  had  kept  closed  up,  we  would  have 
had  no  trouble,  for  the  entire  column  would  have  been  directed  by 
the  guides.  But  this  regiment,  although  composed  of  superb 
material,  and  unsurpassed  in  fighting  qualities,  had,  from  the  pe 
riod  of  its  organization,  been  under  lax  and  careless  discipline, 
and  the  effect  of  it  was  now  observable.  The  rear  companies 
straggled,  halted,  delayed  the  first  brigade,  for  it  was  impossible 
to  ascertain  immediately,  whether  the  halt  was  that  of  the  brig 
ade  in  advance,  or  only  of  these  stragglers,  and  when  forced  to 
move  on,  they  would  go  off  at  a  gallop.  A  great  gap  would  be 
thus  opened  between  the  rear  of  one  brigade  and  the  advance  of 
the  other,  and  we  who  were  behind  were  forced  to  grope  our 
way  as  we  best  could.  When  we  would  come  to  one  of  the  many 
junctions  of  roads  which  occur  in  the  suburbs  of  a  large  city,  we 
would  be  compelled  to  consult  all  sorts  of  indications  in  order  to 
hit  upon  the  right  road.  The  night  was  intensely  dark,  and  we 
would  set  on  fire  large  bundles  of  paper,  or  splinters  of  wood  to 
afford  a  light.  The  horses'  tracks  (on  roads  so  much  traveled), 
would  give  us  no  clue  to  the  route  which  the  other  brigade  had 
taken,  at  such  points,  but  we  could  trace  it  by  noticing  the  di 
rection  in  which  the  dust  "settled,"  or  floated.  When  the  night 
is  calm,  the  dust  kicked  up  by  the  passage  of  a  large  number  of 
horses  will  remain  suspended  in  the  air  for  a  considerable  length 
of  time,  and  it  will  also  move  slowly  in  the  same  direction  that 
the  horses  which  have  disturbed  it  have  traveled.  We  could  also 
trace  the  column  by  the  slaver  dropped  from  the  horses'  mouths. 


444  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

It  was  a  terrible,  trying  march.  Strong  men  fell  out  of  their 
saddles,  and  at  every  halt  the  officers  were  compelled  to  move 
continually  about  in  their  respective  companies  and  pull  and  haul 
the  men  who  would  drop  asleep  in  the  road — it  was  the  only  way 
to  keep  them  awake.  Quite  a  number  crept  off  into  the  fields 
and  slept  until  they  were  awakened  by  the  enemy.  The  rear  of 
the  first  brigade  was  prevented  from  going  to  pieces,  principally 
by  the  energetic  exertions  of  Colonel  Grigsby.  Major  Steele 
was  sent  in  the  extreme  advance  to  drive  pickets,  scouts,  and 
all  parties  of  the  enemy  which  might  be  abroad  from  the  road. 
He  was  given  a  picked  body  of  men,  and  executed  the  mission  in 
fine  style. 

At  length  day  appeared,  just  as  we  reached  the  last  point 
where  we  had  to  anticipate  danger.  We  had  passed  through 
Glendule  and  across  all  of  the  principal  suburban  roads,  and  were 
near  the  Little  Miami  Railroad.  Those  who  have  marched  much 
at  night,  will  remember  that  the  fresh  air  of  morning  almost  in 
variably  has  a  cheering  effect  upon  the  tired  and  drowsy,  and 
awakens  and  invigorates  them.  It  had  this  effect  upon  our  men 
on  this  occasion,  and  relieved  us  also  from  the  necessity  of  grop 
ing  our  way. 

We  crossed  the  railroad  without  meeting  with  opposition,  and 
halted  to  feed  the  horses  in  sight  of  Camp  Dennison.  After  a 
short  rest  here,  and  a  picket  skirmish,  we  resumed  our  march, 
burning  in  this  neighborhood  a  park  of  Government  wagons. 
That  evening  at  4  p.  M.  we  were  at  Williamsburg,  twenty-eight 
miles  east  of  Cincinnati,  having  ma.rched,  since  leaving  Summans- 
ville,  in  Indiana,  in  a  period  of  about  thirty-five  hours,  more 
than  ninety  miles — the  greatest  march  that  even  Morgan  had 
ever  made. 

Feeling  comparatively  safe  here,  General  Morgan  permitted 
the  division  to  go  into  camp  and  remain  during  the  night.  One 
great  drawback  upon  our  marches,  was  the  inferiority  of  the  In 
diana  and  Ohio  horses  for  such  service.  After  parting  with  our 
Kentucky  stock,  the  men  were  compelled  to  exchange  constantly. 


CONSTANT    SKIRMISHING.  445 

Sometimes  three  or  four  times  in  twenty  four  hours.  The  horses 
obtained  were,  not  only  unable  to  endure  the  hard  riding  for  a 
reasonable  length  of  time,  but  they  were  also  unshod  and  grew 
lame  directly.  After  leaving  Williamsburg,  we  marched  through 
Piketon  (Colonel  Morgan  was  sent  with  his  regiment  by  way  of 
Georgetown),  Jackson,  Vinton  and  Berlin  (at  which  latter  place 
we  had  a  skirmish  with  the  militia),  and  several  towns  whose 
names  I  have  forgotten,  as  well  as  the  order  in  which  they  came. 
In  the  skirmish  at  Berlin,  Tom  Murphy,  popularly  known  as 
the  "  Wild  Irishman,"  and  technically  described  by  his  officers  as 
the  "goingest  man"  (in  the  advance-guard),  was  severely 
wounded.  Small  fights  with  the  militia  were  of  daily  occur 
rence.  They  hung  around  the  column,  wounding  two  or  three 
men  every  day  and  sometimes  killing  one.  We  captured  hun 
dreds  of  them  daily,  but  could  only  turn  them  loose  again  after 
destroying  their  guns. 

On  one  occasion  a  very  gallant  fellow  of  the  Second  Ken 
tucky,  Charlie  Haddox,  came  upon  five  of  them,  who  had  made 
some  of  the  command  prisoners.  He  captured  them,  in  turn, 
and  brought  them  in.  The  prisoners  who  could  be  taken  by 
such  men  hardly  deserved  to  be  released.  Two  men  distinguished 
themselves  very  much  as  advance  videttes,  privates  Carneal 
Warfield  and  Burks.  The  latter  frequently  caused  the  capture 
of  parties  of  militia,  without  blood-shed  on  either  side,  by  boldly 
riding  up  to  them,  representing  himself  as  one  of  the  advance 
guard  of  a  body  of  Federal  cavalry,  and  detaining  them  in  con 
versation  until  the  column  arrived.  But  it  is  impossible  to  re 
count  the  one  tenth  part  of  the  incidents  of  this  nature  which 
occurred.  At  Wilkesville  we  halted  again  before  nightfall,  and 
remained  until  3  o'clock  next  morning.  The  militia,  about  this 
time,  turned  their  attention  seriously  to  felling  trees,  tearing 
up  bridges,  and  impeding  our  progress  in  every  conceivable 
way.  The  advance  guard  was  forced  to  carry  axes  to  cut  away 
the  frequent  blockades.  In  passing  near  Pomeroy,  on  the  18th, 
there  was  one  continual  fight,  but,  now,  not  with  the  militia 


446  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

only,  for  some  regular  troops  made  their  appearance  and  took 
part  in  the  programme.  The  road  we  were  traveling  runs  for 
several  miles  at  no  great  distance  from  the  town  of  Pomeroy, 
which  is  situated  on  the  Ohio  river.  Many  bye-roads  run  from 
the  main  one  into  the  town,  and  at  the  mouths  of  these  roads 
we  always  found  the  enemy.  The  road  runs,  also,  for  nearly 
five  miles  through  a  ravine,  and  steep  hills  upon  each  side  of  it. 
These  hills  were  occupied,  at  various  points,  by  the  enemy,  and 
we  had  to  run  the  gauntlet.  Colonel  Grigsby  took  the  lead 
with  the  Sixth  Kentucky,  and  dashed  through  at  a  gallop,  halt 
ing  when  fired  on,  dismounting  his  men  and  dislodging  the 
enemy,  and  again  resuming  his  rapid  march.  Major  Webber 
brought  up  the  rear  of  the  division  and  held  back  the  enemy, 
who  closed  eagerly  upon  our  track. 

About  1  o'clock  of  that  day  we  reached  Chester  and  halted, 
for  an  hour  and  a  half,  to  enable  the  column  to  close  up,  to 
breathe  the  horses,  and  also  to  obtain  a  guide,  if  possible  (Gen 
eral  Morgan  declaring  that  he  would  no  longer  march  without 
one).  That  halt  proved  disastrous — it  brought  us  to  Buffington 
ford  after  night  had  fallen,  and  delayed  our  attempt  at  crossing 
until  the  next  morning. 

Before  quitting  Ohio,  it  is  but  just  to  acknowledge  the  kind 
hospitality  of  these  last  two  days.  At  every  house  that  we  ap 
proached,  the  dwellers  thereof,  themselves  absent,  perhaps  un 
able  to  endure  a  meeting  that  would  have  been  painful,  had  left 
warm  pies,  freshly  baked,  upon  the  tables.  This  touching  at 
tention  to  our  tastes  was  appreciated.  Some  individuals  were 
indelicate  enough  to  hint  that  the  pies  were  intended  to  propi 
tiate  us  and  prevent  the  plunder  of  the  houses. 

We  reached  Portland,  a  little  village  upon  the  bank  of  the 
river,  and  a  short  distance  above  Buffington  Island,  about  8  P. 
M.,  and  the  night  was  one  of  solid  darkness.  General  Morgan 
consulted  one  or  two  of  his  officers  upon  the  propriety  of  at 
once  attacking  an  earthwork,  thrown  up  to  guard  the  ford. 
From  all  the  information  he  could  gather,  this  work  was  manned 


ARRIVAL    AT   BUFFINGTON.  447 

with  about  three  hundred  infantry — regular  troops — and  two 
heavy  guns  were  mounted  in  it.  Our  arrival  at  this  place  after 
dark  had  involved  us  in  a  dilemma.  If  we  did  not  cross  the 
river  that  night,  there  was  every  chance  of  our  being  attacked 
on  the  next  day  by  heavy  odds.  The  troops  we  had  seen  at 
Pomeroy  were,  we  at  once  and  correctly  conjectured,  a  portion 
of  the  infantry  which  had  been  sent  after  us  from  Kentucky, 
and  they  had  been  brought  by  the  river,  which  had  risen  several 
feet  in  the  previous  week,  to  intercept  us.  If  transports  could 
pass  Pomeroy,  the  General  knew  that  they  could  also  run  up 
to  the  bar  at  Buffington  Island.  The  transports  would  cer 
tainly  be  accompanied  by  gun-boats,  and  our  crossing  could 
have  been  prevented  by  the  latter  alone,  because  our  artillery 
ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted — there  was  not  more  than 
three  cartridges  to  the  piece,  and  we  could  not  have  driven  off 
gun-boats  with  small  arms.  Moreover,  if  it  was  necessary,  the 
troops  could  march  from  Pomeroy  to  Buffington  by  an  excellent 
road,  and  reach  the  latter  place  in  the  morning.  This  they  did- 
General  Morgan  fully  appreciated  these  reasons  for  getting 
across  the  river  that  night,  as  did  those  with  whom  he  advised, 
but  there  were,  also,  very  strong  reasons  against  attacking  the 
work  at  night ;  and  without  the  capture  of'  the  work,  which 
commanded  the  ford,  it  would  be  impossible  to  cross.  The 
night,  as  I  have  stated,  was  thoroughly  dark.  Attacks  in  the 
dark  are  always  hazardous  experiments — in  this  case  it  would 
have  been  doubly  so.  We  knew  nothing  of  the  ground,  and 
could  not  procure  guides.  Our  choice  of  the  direction  in  which 
to  move  to  the  attack  would  have  been  purely  guess  work.  The 
defenders  of  the  work  had  only  to  lie  still  and  fire  with  artillery 
and  musketry  directly  to  their  front,  but  the  assailants  would 
have  had  a  line  to  preserve,  and  would  have  had  to  exercise 
great  care  lest  they  should  fall  foul  of  each  other  in  the  ob 
scurity.  If  this  is  a  difficult  business  at  all  times,  how  much  is 
the  danger  and  trouble  increased  when  it  is  attempted  with 
broken-down  and  partially  demoralized  men  ? 


448  HISTORY  or  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

General  Morgan  feared,  too,  that  if  the  attacking  party  was 
repulsed,  it  would  come  back  in  such  disorder  and  panic  that 
the  whole  division  would  be  seriously  and  injuriously  affected. 
He  determined,  therefore,  to  take  the  work  at  early  dawn  and  in 
stantly  commence  the  crossing,  trusting  that  it  would  be  effected 
rapidly  and  before  the  enemy  arrived.  By  abandoning  the  long 
train  of  wagons  which  had  been  collected,  the  wounded  men, 
and  the  artillery,  a  crossing  might  have  been  made,  with  little 
difficulty,  higher  up  the  river  at  deeper  fords,  which  we  could 
have  reached  by  a  rapid  march  before  the  enemy  came  near 
them.  But  General  Morgan  was  determined  (after  having  already 
hazarded  so  much)  to  save  all  if  possible,  at  the  risk  of  losing 
all.  He  ordered  me  to  place  two  regiments  of  my  brigade  in 
position,  as  near  the  earthwork  as  I  thought  proper,  and  attack 
it  at  daybreak.  I  accordingly  selected  the  Fifth  and  Sixth 
Kentucky,  and  formed  them  about  four  hundred  yards  from  the 
work,  or  from  the  point  where  I  judged  it  to  be  located.  Lieu 
tenant  Lawrence  was  also  directed  to  place  his  Parrots  upon  a 
tongue  of  land  projecting  northward  from  a  range  of  hills  run 
ning  parallel  with  the  river.  It  was  intended  that  he  should 
assist  the  attacking  party,  if,  for  any  reason,  artillery  should 
be  needed.  Many  efforts  were  made,  during  the  night,  to  find 
other  fords,  but  unsuccessfully. 

As  soon  as  the  day  dawned,  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Kentucky 
were  moved  against  the  work,  but  found  it  unoccupied.  It  had 
been  evacuated  during  the  night.  Had .  our  scouts,  posted  to 
observe  it,  been  vigilant,  and  had  this  evacuation,  which  oc 
curred  about  two  P.  M.,  been  discovered  and  reported,  we  could 
have  gotten  almost  the  entire  division  across  before  the  troops 
coming  from  Pomeroy  arrived.  The  guns  in  the  work  had  been 
dismounted  and  rolled  over  the  bluff.  I  immediately  sent  Gen. 
Morgan  information  of  the  evacuation  of  the  work,  and  instructed 
Colonel  Smith  to  take  command  of  the  two  regiments  and  move 
some  four  or  five  hundred  yards  further  on  the  Pomeroy  road, 
by  which  I  supposed  that  the  garrison  had  retreated.  In  a  few 


FIGHT   AT   BUFFINGTON.  449 

minutes  I  heard  the  rattle  of  musketry  in  the  direction  that  the 
regiments  had  moved,  and  riding  forward  to  ascertain  what  oc 
casioned  it,  found  that  Colonel  Smith  had  unexpectedly  come 
upon  a  Federal  force  advancing  upon  this  road.  He  attacked 
and  dispersed  it,  taking  forty  or  fifty  prisoners  and  a  piece  of 
artillery,  and  killing  and  wounding  several.  This  force  turned 
out  to  be  General  Judah's  advance  guard,  and  his  command  was 
reported  to  be  eight  or  ten  thousand  strong,  and  not  far  off. 
Among  the  wounded  was  one  of  his  staff,  and  his  Adjutant- 
General  was  captured.  I  instructed  Colonel  Smith  to  bring  the 
men  back  to  the  ground  where  they  had  been  formed  to  attack 
the  work,  and  rode  myself  to  consult  General  Morgan  and  re 
ceive  his  orders.  He  instructed  me  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check, 
and  call  for  such  troops  as  I  might  need  for  that  purpose.  This 
valley  which  we  had  entered  the  night  before,  and  had  bivouacked 
in,  was^  about  a  mile  long,  and  perhaps  eight  hundred  yards 
wide  at  the  southern  extremity  (the  river  runs  here  nearly  due 
north  and  south),  and  gradually  narrows  toward  the  other  end, 
until  the  ridge,  which  is  its  western  boundary,  runs  to  the  water's 
edge.  This  ridge  is  parallel  with  the  river  at  the  southern  end 
of  the  valley,  but  a  few  hundred  yards  further  to  the  northward 
both  river  and  ridge  incline  toward  each  other.  About  half 
way  of  the  valley  (equi-distant  from  either  end)  the  road,  by 
which  we  had  marched  from  Chester,  comes  in. 

Colonel  Smith  had  posted  his  men,  in  accordance  with  direc 
tions  given  him,  at  the  southern  extremity  of  the  valley,  with 
the  ridge  upon  his  right  flank.  At  this  point  the  ridge,  I  should 
also  state,  bends  almost  at  right  angles  to  the  westward.  As  I 
returned  from  consultation  with  General  Morgan,  I  found  both 
of  the  regiments  under  Colonel  Smith  in  full  retreat.  When 
the  main  body  of  the  enemy  (which  was  now  close  upon  us)  ap 
peared,  an  order  had  been  issued  by  some  one  to  "  rally  to  horses.'-' 
While  doing  this,  the  line  was  charged  by  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
of  which  they  had  three  regiments,  two  of  them,  the  Seventh 
and  Eighth  Michigan,  Avere  very  fine  ones.  A  detachment  of 
29 


450  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

the  Fifth  Indiana  (led  by  a  very  gallant  officer,  Lieutenant 
O'Neil)  headed  this  charge.  The  men  rallied  and  turned,  as 
soon  as  called  on  to  do  so,  and  had  no  difficulty  in  driving  back  the 
cavalry,  but  a  portion  of  the  Fifth  Kentucky  was  cut  off  by  this 
charge,  and  did  not  take  part  in  the  fight  which  succeeded.  These 
two  regiments  were  not  more  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  strong 
each,  and  they  were  dismounted  again,  and  formed  across  the 
valley.  The  Parrot  guns  had  been  captured,  and,  although  our 
line  was  formed  close  to  them,  they  were  not  again  in  our  pos 
session.  I  sent  several  couriers  to  General  Morgan,  asking  for 
the  Second  Kentucky,  a  portion  of  which  I  wished  to  post  upon  the 
ridge,  and  I  desired  to  strengthen  the  thin,  weak  line  with  the 
remainder.  Colonel's  Johnson's  rear  videttes  (still  kept  during 
the  night  upon  the  Chester  road)  had  a  short  time  previously 
been  driven  in,  and  he  had  formed  his  brigade  to  receive  the 
enemy  coming  from  that  direction.  Colonel  Johnson  offered 
me  a  detachment  of  his  own  brigade  with  which  to  occupy  the 
part  of  the  ridge  immediately  upon  my  right — the  necessity  of 
holding  it  was  immediately  apparent  to  him.  Believing  that 
the  Second  Kentucky  would  soon  arrive,  I  declined  his  offer. 

The  force  advancing  upon  the  Chester  road  was  General  Hob- 
son's,  which  our  late  delays  had  permitted  to  overtake  us. 
Neither  Judah  nor  Hobson  was  aware  of  the  other's  vicinity, 
until  apprised  of  it  by  the  sound  of  their  respective  guns.  We 
could  not  have  defeated  either  alone,  for  Judah  was  several 
thousand  strong,  and  Hobson  three  thousand.  We  were  scarcely 
nineteen  hundred  strong,  and  our  ammunition  was  nearly  ex 
hausted — either  shot  away  or  worn  out  in  the  pouches  or  cart 
ridge-boxes.  The  men,  had  on  an  average,  not  more  than  five 
rounds  in  their  boxes.  If,  however,  either  Judah  or  Hobson  had 
attacked  us  singly,  we  could  have  made  good  our  retreat,  in 
order,  and  with  little  loss, 

The  attack  commenced  from  both  directions,  almost  simulta 
neously,  and  at  the  same  time  the  gun-boats  steamed  up  and 
commenced  shelling  us  without  fear  or  favor.  I  heartily  wished 


FEARFUL   ODDS.  451 

that  their  fierce  ardor,  the  result  of  a  feeling  of  perfect  security, 
could  have  been  subjected  to  the  test  of  two  or  three  shots 
through  their  hulls.  They  were  working,  as  well  as  I  could 
judge,  five  or  six  guns,  Hobson  two,  and  Judah  five  or  six. 
The  shells  coming  thus  from  three  different  directions,  seemed 
to  fill  the  air  with  their  fragments.  Colonel  Johnson's  line,  con 
fronting  Hobson,  was  formed  at  right  angles  to  mine,  and  upon 
the  level  and  unsheltered  surface  of  the  valley,  each  was  equally 
exposed  to  shots  aimed  at  the  other.  In  addition  to  the  infantry 
deployed  in  front  of  my  line,  the  ridge  upon  the  right  of  it  was 
soon  occupied  by  one  of  the  Michigan  regiments,  dismounted 
and  deployed  as  skirmishers.  The  peculiar  formation  we  were 
forced  to  adopt,  exposed  our  entire  force  engaged  to  a  severe 
cross  fire  of  musketry.  The  Second  Kentucky  and  Ninth  Ten 
nessee,  of  the  first  brigade,  were  not  engaged  at  all — nor  the 
Eight  and  Eleventh  Kentucky,  of  the  second  brigade.  These 
regiments,  however,  were  as  completely  under  fire,  in  the  com 
mencement  of  the  action,  as  were  the  others  which  were  pro 
tecting  the  retreat. 

The  scene  in  the  rear  of  the  lines  engaged,  was  one  of  in 
describable  confusion.  While  the  bulk  of  the  regiments,  which 
General  Morgan  was  drawing  oft",  were  moving  from  the  field  in 
perfect  order,  there  were  many  stragglers  from  each,  who  were 
circling  about  the  valley  in  a  delirium  of  fright,  clinging  instinc 
tively,  in  all  their  terror,  to  bolts  of  calico  and  holding  on  to  led 
horses,  but  changing  the  direction  in  which  they  galloped,  with 
every  shell  which  whizzed  or  burst  near  them.  The  long  train 
of  wagons  and  ambulances  dashed  wildly  in  the  only  direction 
which  promised  escape,  and  becoming  locked  and  entangled  with 
each  other  in  their  flight,  many  were  upset,  and  terrified  horses 
broke  lose  from  them  and  plunged  wildly  through  the  mass. 
Some  of  them  in  striving  to  make  their  way  out  of  the  valley,  at 
the  northern  end,  ran  foul  of  the  section  of  howitzers  attached 
to  the  second  brigade,  and  guns  and  wagons  were  rolled  head 
long  into  the  steep  ravine.  Occasionally  a  solid  shot  or  shell 


452  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

would  strike  one  and  bowl  it  over  like  a  tumbled  ten-pin.  All 
this  shelling  did  little  damage,  and  only  some  twenty-odd  men 
were  killed  by  the  musketry — the  enemy  lost  quite  as  many — but 
the  display  of  force  against  us,  the  cross  fire,  and  our  lack  of 
ammunition,  seriously  disheartened  the  men,  already  partially 
demoralized  by  the  great  and  unremitted  fatigue. 

The  left  flank  of  my  line,  between  which  and  the  river  there 
was  an  interval  of  at  least  three  hundred  yards,  was  completely 
turned,  and  the  Sixth  Kentucky  was  almost  surrounded.  This 
regiment  (under  the  command  of  Major  William  Bullitt,  an 
officer  of  the  calmest  and  most  perfect  bravery),  behaved  nobly. 
It  stood  the  heavy  attack  of  the  enemy  like  a  bastion.  At 
length  seeing  that  General  Morgan  had  gotten  out  of  the  valley 
with  the  rest  of  the  division,  Colonel  Johnson  and  myself,  upon 
consultation,  determined  to  withdraw  simultaneously.  We  had 
checked. this  superior  force  for  more  than  half  an  hour — which, 
as  much  as  our  assailants  boasted  of  their  victory,  was  quite  as 
good  as  an  equal  number  of  the  best  of  them  could  have  done 
against  such  odds. 

The  men  were  remounted  without  confusion,  and  retreated  in 
column  of  fours  from  right  of  companies,  and  for  quite  a  mile 
in  perfect  order.  The  Sixth  Kentucky  formed  to  the  "rear  into 
line"  three  times,  and  with  empty  guns,  kept  the  pursuing 
cavalry  at  bay.  But  when  we  neared  the  other  end  of  the  valley 
and  saw  that  there  were  but  two  avenues  of  escape  from  it — the 
men  broke  ranks  and  rushed  for  them.  In  a  moment,  each  was 
blocked.  The  gun-boats  sought  to  rake  these  roads  with  grape 
— and  although  they  aimed  too  high  to  inflict  much  injury,  the 
hiss  of  the  dreaded  missiles  increased  the  panic.  The  Seventh 
Michigan  soon  carne  up  and  dashed  pell-mell  into  the  crowd  of 
fugitives.  Colonel  Smith,  Captain  Campbell,  Captain  Thorpe, 
and  myself,  and  some  fifty  other  officers  and  men,  were  forced 
by  the  charge  of  this  regiment  into  a  ravine  on  the  left  of  the 
road  and  soon  afterward  captured.  Captain  Thorpe  saved  me 
from  capture  at  an  earlier  date,  only  to  ultimately  share  my  fate. 


INEFFECTUAL    EFFORT    TO    CROSS    THE    RIVER.  453 

He  had  acted  as  Adjutant  General  of  the  First  Brigade,  since  the 
detachment  of  Captain  Davis,  and  had  performed  all  of  his 
duties  with  untiring  assiduity  and  perfect  efficiency.  On  this 
day,  there  was  allowed  opportunity  for  the  display  of  courage 
only,  and  for  that  he  was  ever  distinguished. 

About  seven  hundred  prisoners  were  taken  from  us  in  this 
fight  Among  the  officers  captured  were  Colonels  Ward  and 
Morgan,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Huffman,  who  was  also  severely 
wounded,  and  Majors  Bullock  and  Bullitt. 

On  the  next  day,  the  20th,  we  were  marched  down  the  river 
bank  some  ten  miles  to  the  transport  which  was  to  take  us  to 
Cincinnati,  and  she  steamed  off  as  soon  as  we  were  aboard  of 
her.  A  portion  of  the  Ninth  Tennessee  had  been  put  across  the 
river,  in  a  small  flat,  before  the  tight  fairly  commenced,  and 
these  men,  under  command  of  Captain  Kirkpatrick.  pressed 
horses  and  made  their  escape.  Colonel  Grigsby  and  Captain 
Byrnes  also  crossed  the  river  here,  and  succeeded  in  escaping. 
Between  eleven  and  twelve  hundred  men  retreated  with  Gen 
eral  Morgan,  closely  pursued  by  Hobson's  cavalry — the  indefat 
igable  Woolford,  as  usual,  in  the  lead.  Some  three  hundred  of 
the  command  crossed  the  river  at  a  point  about  twenty  miles 
above  Buffington.  Colonel  Johnson  and  his  staff  swam  the  river 
here  and  got  safely  ashore,  with  the  exception  of  two  or  three 
of  the  latter,  who  were  drowned  in  the  attempt. 

The  arrival  of  the  gun  boats  prevented  the  entire  force  from 
crossing.  General  Morgan  had  gained  the  middle  of  the  river, 
and,  having  a  strong  horse,  could  have  gained  the  other  shore 
without  difficulty,  but  seeing  that  the  bulk  of  his  command  would 
be  forced  to  remain  on  the  Ohio  side,  he  returned  to- it.  At  this 
point,  a  negro  boy  named  Box,  a  great  favorite  in  the  Second 
Kentucky,  thorough  rebel  and  deeply  impressed  with  a  sense 
of  his  own  importance,  entered  the  river  and  started  across; 
General  Morgan  called  to  him  to  return,  fearing  that  he  would 
be  drowned.  "  Marse  John,"  said  Box,  "  If  dey  catches  you, 
dey  may  parole  you,  but  if  dis  nigger  is  cotched  in  a  free  State 


454  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

he  ain't  a  gwine  to  git  away  while  de  war  lasts."  He  swam 
the  river  safely  although  nearly  run  down  by  a  gun  boat.  From 
this  time,  for  six  days,  it  was  a  continual  race  and  scramble. 
That  men  could  have  endured  it,  after  the  previous  exhausting 
inarches,  is  almost  incredible. 

The  brigades  were  reorganized,  Colonel  Cluke  was  placed  in 
command  of  the  second,  Major  Webber  of  the  first,  each  was  a 
little  more  than  four  hundred  strong.  "  The  bold  Cluke  "  had 
need  of  all  of  his  audacity  and  vigor  during  these  six  days  of 
trial.  It  is  impossible  for  the  reader  to  appreciate  the  true  con 
dition  in  which  these  brave  men  were  placed.  Worn  down  by 
tremendous  and  long  sustained  exertion,  encompassed  by  a  mul 
titude  of  foes,  and  fresh  ones  springing  up  in  their  path  at  every 
mile,  allowed  no  rest,  but  driven  on  night  and  day ;  attacked, 
harassed,  intercepted  at  every  moment,  disheartened  by  the  dis 
asters  already  suffered — how  magnificent  was  the  nerve,  energy 
and  resolution  which  enabled  them  to  bear  up  against  all  this 
and  struggle  so  gallantly  to  the  very  last  against  capture. 
Major  Webber  had  long  been  suffering  from  a  painful  and  ex 
hausting  disease,  and  when  he  started  upon  the  raid  he  could  not 
climb  into  his  saddle  without  assistance.  But  he  could  not  en 
dure  the  thought  of  being  absent  from  such  an  expedition.  He 
was  one  of  the  very  best  officers  in  the  Confederate  cavalry,  and 
his  ideas  of  duty  were  almost  fanatical.  All  through  the  long 
march  to  Buffington,  he  rode  at  the  head  of  the  "  old  regulars," 
without  a  murmur  escaping  his  lips  to  tell  of  the  pain  which 
paled  his  brave,  manly  face,  but  could  not  bend  his  erect  form. 
Of  his  conduct  after  the  Buffington  disaster,  General  Morgan, 
and  his  comrades  spoke  in  enthusiastic  praise — one  officer  in  de 
scribing  his  unflinching  steadiness  called  him  the  "  Iron  man." 
No  description  could  do  justice  to  these  six  days,  and  I  will  not 
.attempt  one.  One  incident  will  serve  to  show  how  constantly 
the  enemy  pressed  the  command.  Once,  when  there  seemed 
leisure  for  it,  General  Morgan  called  a  council  of  his  officers. 
While  it  was  in  session,  the  enemy  were  skirmishing  with  the 


GETTING    OUT   OF   A    TRAP.  455 

advance  and  rear-guards  of  the  column,  and  were  upon  both 
flanks.  A  bullet  struck  within  two  inches  of  the  General's  head, 
while  he  was  courteously  listening  to  an  opinion.  When  the 
council  was  closed,  General  Morgan  moved  the  column  back  to 
ward  "Blennerhassett's  Island,"  where  he  had  previously  at 
tempted  to  cross  the  river.  Clouds  of  dust  marked  his  march 
(although  he  quitted  the  main  road)  and  also  the  track  of  his 
enemies,  and  in  that  way  the  exact  position  of  all  the  columns 
was  known  to  each.  That  night  he  halted  with  a  bold  mountain 
upon  one  side  of  him  and  the  enemy  on  the  other  three.  His 
pursuers  evidently  thought  that  the  morning  would  witness  his 
surrender,  for  they  made  no  effort  to  force  him  to  yield  that 
evening.  But  when  night  had  fairly  fallen  and  the  camp  fires 
of  his  foes  were  burning  brightly,  he  formed  his  men,  partially 
ascended  the  mountain,  stole  noiselessly  and  in  single  file  along 
its  rough  slope  and  by  midnight  was  out  of  the  trap,  and  again 
working  hard  for  safety. 

Here  is  a  description  from  Major  Webber's  diary,  of  how 
General  Morgan  eluded  the  enemy  posted  to  ensnare  him  when 
he  should  cross  the  Muskingum.  He  had  been  compelled  to 
drive  off  a  strong  force  in  order  to  obtain  a  crossing ;  after  he 
had  crossed  he  found  himself  thus  situated.  "  The  enemy  had 
fallen  back  on  all  of  the  roads — guarding  each  one  with  a  force 
in  ambush  much  larger  than  ours — and  to  make  our  way  through 
seemed  utterly  impossible;  while  Hobson  had  made  his  appear 
ance  with  a  large  force  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Musking- 
ham  so  that  to  retrace  our  steps  would  be  ruin.  Finding  every 
road  strongly  guarded,  and  every  hill  covered  with  troops,  it 
would  have  been  impossible  for  any  one  except  Morgan  to  have 
led  a  column  out  of  such  a  place,  and  he  did  it  by  what  the  cit 
izens  tell  us,  is  the  only  place  which  a  horse  can  go ;  and  that 
down  a  narrow  pass  leading  up  a  narrow  spring  branch  hundreds 
of  feet  below  the  tops  of  the  hills,  the  perpendicular  sides  of 
which  pressed  closely  on  our  horses  as  we  passed  in  single  file. 
And  then  we  went  up  another  hill,  or  rather  mountain  side,  up 


456  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

which  nobody  but  a  Morgan  man  could  have  carried  a  horse. 
Up  that  hill,  for  at  least  one  thousand  feet,  we  led  our  tired 
horses,  where  it  seemed  that  a  goat  could  n't  climb,  until  we 
reached  the  plain,  and  were  soon  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy  and 
on  our  road  again.  Colonel  Cluke  who  was  in  the  rear  lost  two 
men  killed. 

In  looking  around  for  a  place  to  carry  the  column,  Adjutant 
S.  F.  McKee  and  two  of  our  men  ran  into  an  ambuscade,  and 
were  fired  on,  about  thirty  yards  distant,  by  three  hundred 
men,  without  striking  either  of  them  or  their  horses."  But  all 
this  brave,  persistent  effort,  was  unavailing.  General  Morgan 
maintained  his  high  spirit  to  the  last,  and  seemed  untouched  by 
the  weariness  which  bore  down  every  one  else,  but  he  was  forced 
at  last  to  turn  at  bay,  and  a  fresh  disaster  on  the  26th,  reducing 
his  command  to  two  hundred  and  fifty  men,  and  a  fresh  swarm 
of  enemies  gathering  around  this  remnant,  left  him  no  alterna 
tive  (in  justice  to  his  men)  but  surrender.  I  may  be  permitted 
to  mention  (with  natural  pride),  that  the  last  charge  made  upon 
this  expedition,  was  made  by  Company  C,  of  my  old  regiment, 
the  Second  Kentucky,  the  "Regulars."  This  company  had 
maintained  its  organization  and  discipline  without  any  deteriora 
tion,  although  greatly  reduced  in  numbers.  In  this  last  fight, 
it  was  ordered  to  charge  a  body  of  Federal  cavalry,  who  were 
dismounted  and  lay  behind  a  worm  fence,  firing  upon  the  column 
with  their  Spencer  rifles.  Led  by  its  gallant  Captain,  Ralph 
Sheldon,  one  of  the  best  of  our  best  officers,  this  company  dashed 
down  upon  the  enemy.  The  tired  horses  breasted  the  fence, 
without  being  able  to  clear  it,  knocking  off  the  top  rails.  But 
with  their  deadly  revolvers  our  boys  soon  accomplished  the 
mission  upon  which  they  were  sent. 

General  Morgan  surrendered  in  a  very  peculiar  manner.  He 
had,  many  days  before,  heard  of  the  retreat  of  General  Lee, 
after  Gettysburg,  from  Pennsylvania,  and  of  the  fall  of  Vicks- 
burg.  In  at  least  twenty  towns  through  which  we  had  passed, 
in  Indiana  and  Ohio,  we  had  witnessed  the  evidences  of  the 


SURRENDER   OF   COMMAND.  457 

illuminations  in  honor  of  these  events.  He  feared  that,  in  con 
sequence  of  the  great  excess  of  prisoners  thus  coming  in  Fed 
eral  possession,  the  cartel  (providing  for  the  exchange  of  pri 
soners  and  the  paroling  of  the  excess  upon  either  side,  within  a 
short  period  after  their  capture)  would  be  broken.  He  was 
anxious,  therefore,  to  surrender  "upon  terms."  Aware  that  he 
was  not  likely  to  get  such  terms  as  he  wished,  from  any  officer 
of  the  regular  troops  that  were  pursuing  him,  unless  he 
might  happen  to  hit  upon  Woolford,  who  was  as  noted  for  gen 
erosity  to  prisoners  (if  he  respected  their  prowess)  as  for  vigor 
and  gallantry  in  the  field,  he  looked  around  for  some  militia 
officer  who  might  serve  his  turn.  In  the  extreme  eastern  part 
of  Ohio  (where  he  now  was),  he  came  into  the  "district"  of  a 
Captain  Burbeck,  who  had  his  militia  under  arms.  General 
Morgan  sent  a  message  to  Captain  Burbeck,  under  flag  of  truce, 
requesting  an  interview  with  him.  Burbeck  consented  to  meet 
him,  and,  after  a  short  conference,  General  Morgan  concluded  a 
treaty  with  him,  by  which  he  (Morgan)  engaged  to  take  and 
disturb  nothing,  and  do  no  sort  of  damage  in  Burbeck's  district, 
and  Burbeck,  on  his  part,  covenanted  to  guide  and  escort  Mor 
gan  to  the  Pennsylvania  line.  After  riding  a  few  miles,  side  by 
side,  with  his  host,  General  Morgan,  espying  a  long  cloud  of 
dust  rolling  rapidly  upon  a  course  parallel  with  his  own  (about 
a  mile  distant),  and  gaining  his  front,  thought  it  was  time  to  act. 
So  he  interrupted  a  pleasant  conversation,  by  suddenly  asking 
Burbeck  how  he  would  like  to  receive  his  (Morgan's)  surrender. 
Burbeck  answered  that  it  would  afford  him  inexpressible  satis 
faction  to  do  so.  "  But,"  said  Morgan,  "  perhaps  you  would  not 
give  me  such  terms  as  I  wish."  "General  Morgan,"  replied 
Burbeck,  "you  might  write  your  own  terms,  and  I  would  grant 
them."  "Very  well,  then,"  said  Morgan;  "it  is  a  bargain.  I 
will  surrender  to  you."  He,  accordingly,  formally  surrendered 
to  Captain  Burbeck,  of  the  Ohio  militia,  upon  condition  that 
officers  and  men  were  to  be  paroled,  the  latter  retaining  their 
horses,  and  the  former  horses  and  side-arms.  When  General 


458  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Shackleford  (Ilobson's  second  in  command,  and  the  officer  who 
was  conducting  the  pursuit  in  that  immediate  region)  arrived, 
he  at  once  disapproved  this  arrangement,  and  took  measures  to 
prevent  its  being  carried  into  effect.  Some  officers  who  had 
once  been  Morgan's  prisoners,  were  anxious  that  it  should  be 
observed,  and  Woolford  generously  interested  himself  to  have  it 
done.  The  terms  of  this  surrender  were  not  carried  out.  The 
cartel  (as  Morgan  had  anticipated)  had  been  repudiated,  and  the 
terms  for  which  he  had  stipulated,  under  that  apprehension, 
were  repudiated  also. 

Although  this  expedition  resulted  disastrously,  it  was,  even 
as  a  failure,  incomparably  the  most  brilliant  raid  of  the  entire 
war.  The  purposes  sought  to  be  achieved  by  it  were  grander 
and  more  important,  the  conception  of  the  plan  which  should 
regulate  it,  was  more  masterty,  and  the  skill  with  which  it  was 
conducted  is  unparalleled  in  the  history  of  such  affairs.  It  was 
no  ride  across  a  country  stripped  of  troops,  with  a  force  larger 
than  any  it  should  chance  to  encounter. 

It  was  not  an  expedition  started  from  a  point  impregnably 
garrisoned,  to  dash  by  a  well  marked  path  to  another  point  oc 
cupied  by  a  friendly  army.  It  differed  from  even  the  boldest  of 
Confederate  raids,  not  only  in  that  it  was  vastly  more  ex 
tended,  but  also  in  the  nerve  with  which  the  great  natural  ob 
stacles  were  placed  between  the  little  band  with  which  it  was 
undertaken  and  home,  and  the  unshrinking  audacity  with  which 
that  slight  force  penetrated  into  a  populous  and  intensely  hos 
tile  territory,  and  confidently  exposed  itself  to  such  tremendous 
odds,  and  such  overwhelming  disadvantages.  Over  one  hundred 
thousand  men  were  in  arms  to  catch  Morgan  (although  not  all 
employed  at  one  time  and  place),  and  every  advantage  in  the 
way  of  transporting  troops,  obtaining  information,  and  disposing 
forces  to  intercept  or  oppose  him,  was  possessed  by  his  enemy, 
and  yet  his  wily  strategy  enabled  him  to  make  his  way  to  the 
river,  at  the  very  point  where  he  had  contemplated  recrossing 
it  when  he  started  from  Tennessee ;  and  he  was  prevented  from 


(455 


Of  those  who  made 

THEIR    ESCAPE    FROM   OHIO, 
July  and  August;  1803. 


460  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

recrossing  and  effecting  his  escape  (which  would  then  have  been 
certain)  only  by  the  river  having  risen  at  a  season  at  which  it 
had  not  risen  for  more  than  twenty  years  before. 

The  objects  of  the  raid  were  accomplished.  General  Bragg' s 
retreat  was  unmolested  by  any  flankirTg  forces  of  the  enemy,  and 
I  think  that  military  men,  who  will  review  all  the  facts,  will 
pronounce  that  this  expedition  delayed  for  weeks  the  fall  of  East 
Tennessee,  and  prevented  the  timely  reinforcement  of  Rosecrans 
by  troops  that  would  otherwise  have  participated  in  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga.  It  destroyed  Morgan's  division,  however,  and 
left  but  a  remnant  of  the  Morgan  cavalry.  The  companies  in 
Kentucky  became  disintegrated — the  men  were  either  captured 
or  so  dispersed  that  few  were  ever  again  available.  Captain 
Davis  crossed  into  Indiana,  with  the  two  companies  assigned 
him,  but  failed  to  rejoin  the  division,  and  was  surrounded  by 
overwhelming  numbers,  and  himself  and  the  greater  part  of  his 
command  captured.  Some  of  the  men  in  those  companies  es 
caped — the  majority  of  them  returned  to  the  South,  others 
remained  in  Kentucky  to  "guerrilla."  Two  fine  companies  of 
the  Ninth  Tennessee,  under  Captains  Kirkpatrick  and  Sisson, 
crossed  the  river  at  Buffington;  two  companies  of  the  Second 
Kentucky,  under  Captains  Lea  and  Cooper,  effected  a  crossing  a 
day  or  two  later.  Besides  these  organized  bodies  of  men,  there 
were  stragglers  from  all  the  regiments  to  the  number  of  three 
or  four  hundred,  who  escaped.  These  men  were  collected  by 
Colonels  Johnson  and  Grigsby,  and  marched  through  Western 
Virginia  to  Morristown,  in  East  Tennessee,  where  all  that  was 
left  of  Morgan's  command  was  rendezvoused. 

Although  the  consequences  were  so  disastrous,  although  upon 
the  greater  part  of  those  who  followed  Morgan  in  this  raid 
was  visited  a  long,  cruel,  wearisome  imprisonment,  there  are 
few,  I  imagine,  among  them  who  ever  regretted  it.  It  was  a 
sad  infliction  upon  a  soldier,  especially  upon  one  accustomed 
to  the  life  the  "Morgan  men"  had  led,  to  eat  his  heart  in 
the  tedious,  dreary  prison  existence,  while  the  fight  which  he 


EFFECT   OF   THE   RAID.  461 

should  have  shared  was  daily  growing  deadlier.  But  to  have, 
in  our  turn,  been  invaders,  to  have  carried  the  war  north  of  the 
Ohio,  to  have  taught  the  people,  who  for  long  months  had  been 
pouring  invading  hosts  into  the  South,  something  of  the  agony 
and  terror  of  invasion — to  have  made  them  fly  in  fear  from  their 
homes,  although  they  returned  to  find  those  homes  not  laid  in 
ashes  ;  to  have  scared  them  with  the  sound  of  hostile  bugles, 
although  no  signals  were  sounded  for  flames  and  destruction — 
these  luxuries  were  cheap  at  almost  any  price.  It  would  have 
been  an  inexpiable  shame  if,  in  all  the  Confederate  army,  there 
had  been  no  body  of  men  found  to  carry  the  war,  however 
briefly,  across  the  Ohio,  and  Morgan  by  this  raid  saved  us,  at 
least,  that  disgrace. 

One  of  the  many  articles  which  filled  the  Northern  papers, 
upon  the  disastrous  termination  of  this  expedition,  prophetically 
declared  the  true  misfortune  which  would  result  to  Morgan  him 
self  from  his  ill-success  to-wit :  the  loss  of  his  unexampled  pres 
tige — hitherto  of  itself  a  power  adequate  to  ensure  him  victories, 
but  never  to  be  recovered.  This  writer  more  sagacious,  as  well 
as  more  fair  than  others  of  his  class,  said  : 

im  The  raid  through  Indiana  and  Ohio  has  proved  an  unfortu 
nate  business  to  him  and  his  command.  His  career,  hitherto  has 
been  dashing  and  brilliant,  and  but  few  rebel  commanders  had 
won  a  higher  reputation  throughout  the  South.  He  had  been 
glorified  by  rebels  in  arms  everywhere,  but  this  last  reckless  ad 
venture  will  doubtless  rob  hi*  name  of  half  its  potency.  The 
prestige  of  success  is  all  powerful,  while  a  failure  is  death  to 
military  reputation.  It  would  now  be  a  diflicult  matter  to  rally 
to  his  standard  as  many  enthusiastic  and  promising  young  men, 
who  infatuated  and  misguided,  joined  him  during  the  period  of 
his  success.  Many  of  them  blindly  seemed  to  entertain  the  opi 
nion  that  no  reverse  could  befall  him,  and  all  he  had  to  do  was 
to  march  along,  and  victory  after  victory  would  perch  upon  his 
banner.  They  could  n't  even  dream  of  a  disaster  or  an  end  to 
his  triumphs.  Many  of  them  have  already  sadly  and  dearly  paid 


462 

for  their  infatuation,  while  others  are  doomed  to  a  similar  fate. 
This  remarkable  raid,  certainly  the  most  daring  of  the  war,  is 
about  at  an  end.  Morgan  is  trapped  at  last  and  his  forces  scat 
tered,  and  if  he  escapes  himself  it  will  only  be  as  a  fugitive.  The 
race  he  has  run  since  crossing  the  Cumberland  river,  eluding  the 
thousands  of  troops  which  have  been  put  upon  his  track,  proved 
him  a  leader  of  extraordinary  ability.  The  object  of  the  raid  is 
yet  a  mystery.  Time  alone  will  develop  the  plan,  if  plan  there 
was.  Moving  on  with  such  a  force,  far  from  all  support — at  the 
very  time,  too,  that  Bragg's  army  was  falling  back  and  scatter 
ing — makes  the  affair  look  like  one  of  simple  bravado,  as  if  the 
leader  was  willing  to  be  captured,  provided  he  could  end  his  ca 
reer  in  a  blaze  of  excitement  created  by  his  dash  and  daring. 
But  it  is  useless  to  speculate  now.  Broken  into  squads,  some 
few  of  his  men  will  doubtless  escape  across  the  river,  and  make 
their  way  singly  to  the  Confederacy,  to  tell  the  story  of  their 
long  ride  through  Indiana  and  Ohio  ;  but  the  power  of  the  noted 
partisan  chieftain  and  his  bold  riders  is  a  thing  of  the  past." 


PRISON   EXPERIENCE.  463 


CHAPTER    XV. 

THE  prisoners  taken  at  Buffington  were  carried  to  Cincinnati 
as  rapidly  as  the  low  stage  of  water,  and  the  speed  of  the  little 
boat,  upon  which  we  were  placed,  would  permit.  We  were  some 
three  days  in  making  the  trip.  Fortunately  for  us,  the  officers 
and  men  appointed  to  guard  us,  were  disposed  to  ameliorate  our 
condition  as  much  as  possible.  Our  private  soldiers,  crowded 
on  the  hurricane  decks,  were,  of  course,  subjected  to  inconven 
ience,  but  the  wish  of  the  guards  was  evidently  to  remedy  it  as 
much  as  possible.  This  crowding  enabled  a  number  of  them  to 
make  their  escape  by  leaping  into  the  river  at  night,  as  the  sen 
tries  could  riot  possibly  detect  or  prevent  their  efforts  at  escape. 
Captain  Day,  General  Judah's  inspector,  who  was  in  immediate 
charge  of  us,  while  he  was  rigidly  careful  to  guard  against 
escape,  showed  us  the  most  manly  and  soldierly  courtesy.  As 
the  only  acknowledgment  we  could  make  him,  the  officers  united 
in  requesting  him  to  accept  a  letter  which  we  severally  signed, 
declaring  our  appreciation  of  his  kindness.  We  trusted  that, 
if  he  should  ever  be  so  unfortunate  as  to  become  a  prisoner 
himself,  this  evidence  of  his  consideration  for  our  situation 
would  benefit  him. 

It  was  habitually  remarked  that,  in  the  first  two  years  of  the 
war  at  least,  there  was  a  prevalent  disposition  among  the  men 
of  both  armies  who  served  in  "  the  front,"  to  show  courtesy  to 
prisoners.  The  soldiers  who  guarded  us  from  Buffington  to 
Cincinnati  were  characterized  by  this  spirit  in  an  unusual  de 
gree,  and  carried  out  this  practice,  which  even  those  who  neg 
lect  it,  approve,  more  thoroughly,  I  must  say,  than  any  troops  I 
had  ever  seen.  We  met  with  treatment  so  different,  afterward, 
that  we  had  occasion  to  remember  and  compare.  For  my  own 
part,  I  was  more  than  once  compelled,  during  my  long  and 


464  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

chequered  imprisonment,  to  express  my  sense  of  courteous  and 
considerate  treatment;  and,  as  I  believe, that  a  gentleman  ought 
not  to  say,  at  any  time  or  in  any  event,  that  which  he  can  not 
unhesitatingly  confirm,  however  changed  may  be  the  circum 
stances  (every  legitimate  ruse-de-guerre,  being,  of  course,  an 
exception),  I  shall  take  great  pains,  in  the  course  of  this  chapter, 
to  specify  wherein  and  by  whom  such  treatment  was  accorded 
me,  or  my  comrades.  I  am  aware  that  this  is  not  customary, 
and  the  contrary  habit,  may  have  become  an  established  canon 
of  this  sort  of  literature,  the  violation  of  which  will  occasion 
grave  criticism.  But  my  own  people  will  appreciate  my  ex 
planation.  I  should  have  accepted  no  kindness  at  the  hands  of 
my  captors  ;  I  ought  to  have  repelled  every  courtesy  offered  me, 
if  clearly  prompted  by  a  generous  and  manly  spirit ;  if  I  were 
capable  of  altogether  omitting  mention  of  such  acts,  in  a  descrip 
tion,  purporting  to  be  truthful  and  accurate,  of  my  prison  expe 
rience. 

In  all  else,  my  readers  may  rest  assured  that  the  rule  shall  be 
observed.  He  would  be  a  poor-spirited  prisoner,  who  would  riot 
tell  all  the  mean  things  he  knows  about  his  jailors,  and  since 
Wirtz  was  hung,  at  any  rate,  such  gentry  have  become  fair 
game. 

When  we  arrived  at  Cincinnati,  we  met  with  a  grand  ovation. 
The  fact  that  none  of  the  citizens  had  come  out  to  meet  us,  when 
we  marched  around  the  city,  had  caused  us  to  conceive  a  very 
erroneous  impression  regarding  them.  They  pressed  closely 
upon  the  guard  of  soldiers  who  were  drawn  up  around  us,  as 
we  were  marched  through  the  streets  to  the  city  prison,  and 
attempted  many  demonstrations  of  their  feeling  toward  us. 
There  seemed  to  be  little  sympathy  between  the  soldiers  and  the 
populace.  The  former  muttered  pretty  strong  expressions  of 
disgust  for  the  previous  tameness  and  present  boldness  of  the 
latter,  and  once  or  twice  when  jostled,  plied  their  bayonets.  The 
privates  were  immediately  sent  to  camps  Morton  and  Douglass. 
The  officers  were  kept  at  the  city  prison  in  Cincinnati  for  three 


TAKEN   TO   JOHNSON'S   ISLAND.  465 

clays.  During  that  time,  we  were  reinforced  by  a  good  many 
others,  taken  in  the  two  or  three  days  which  succeeded  Buffing- 
ton  fight. 

On  the  last  day  of  our  sojourn  here,  we  learned  of  General 
Morgan's  capture.  We  had  hoped  and  almost  felt  confident, 
that  he  would  escape. 

We  were  removed  from  this  prison  on  the  second  of  July  (or 
within  a  day  or  two  of  that  date),  and  taken  to  Johnson's  Island. 
At  every  station  on  the  railroad,  from  Cincinnati  to  Sandusky, 
large  and  enthusiastic  crowds  assembled  to  greet  us.  The 
enthusiasm,  however,  was  scarcely  of  a  nature  to  excite  agree 
able  emotions  in  our  bosoms.  There  seemed  to  be  "  universal 
suffrage  "  for  our  instant  and  collective  execution,  and  its  pro 
priety  was  promulgated  with  much  heat  and  emphasis.  A 
change  seemed  to  have  come  over  the  people  of  Ohio  in  the 
past  two  weeks.  In  our  progress  through  the  State,  before  our 
capture,  the  people  left  their  homes — apparently  from  a  modest 
disinclination  to  see  us.  But,  now,  they  crowded  to  stare  at  us. 

When  we  reached  Sandusky,  we  were  transferred  to  a  small 
steam  tug,  and,  in  twenty  minutes,  were  put  across  the  arm  of 
the  lake  which  separates  Johnson's  Island  from  the  main  land. 
We  were  marched,  as  soon  as  landed,  to  the  adjutant's  office, 
and  after  roll-call,  and  a  preliminary  scrutiny  to  ascertain  if  we 
had  money  or  weapons  upon  our  persons,  although  it  was,  per 
haps,  the  strict  rule  to  .search — the  word  of  each  man  in  our 
party  was  taken — we  were  introduced  into  the  prison  inclosure. 
It  was  the  custom,  in  those  days,  in  the  various  prisons  for  the 
older  inmates  to  collect  about  the  gates  of  the  "Bull-pen"  when 
"  Fresh  fish,"  as  every  lot  of  prisoners  just  arrived  were  termed, 
were  brought  in,  and  inspect  them.  We,  consequently,  met  a 
large  crowd  of  unfortunate  rebels,  when  we  entered,  in  which  were 
not  a  few  acquaintances,  and  some  of  our  own  immediate  com 
rades.  The  first  mun  I  saw,  or,  at  least,  the  first  one  to  whom 
my  attention  was  attracted,  was  First  Lieutenant  Charles  Don- 
egan,  of  the  Second  Kentucky.  He  had  been  a  private  in  the 
30 


466  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

heroic  Fourth  Alabama,  and,  when  his  term  of  service  had 
expired  in  that  regiment,  he  "joined  Morgan/'  becoming  a 
private  in  Company  A,  of  the  "  old  squadron."  When  the 
Second  Kentucky  was  organized,  he  was  made  a  non  commis 
sioned  officer,  and  was  shortly  afterward  promoted  to  First 
Lieutenant  for  gallantry,  excellent  conduct,  and  strict  attention 
to  duty.  In  the  prison  he  met  with  his  old  comrades  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  and  was  prompt  to  welcome  all  of  the 
"  Morgan  men  "  who  "  happened  in,"  and  to  initiate  them  in  the 
art  of  making  life  in  a  prison  endurable.  A  few  months  before, 
I  had  visited  his  father,  one  of  the  most  hospitable  men  in 
Huntsville,  famed  for  that  virtue,  and  he  charged  me  with  a 
message  to  "  Charlie,"  which  I  delivered  in  the  barracks  at 
Johnson's  Island.  Lieutenant  Donegan  remained  in  prison 
more  than  twenty  months — one  of  those  men  whose  patient 
heroism  will  never  be  justly  appreciated. 

It  is  only  by  citing  personal  instances  of  this  kind,  that  the 
history  of  the  Southern  soldiery  can  be  written  so  that  it  will 
be  understood. 

The  Gettysburg  prisoners  had  arrived,  only  a  few  days  before, 
and  from  them  we  heard  the  first  intelligible  account  of  the 
great  battle.  Not  a  whit  was  the  courage  and  fire  of  these 
gallant  representatives  of  the  army  of  heroes  abated.  They 
seemed  to  have  perfect  faith  in  the  invincibility  of  their  com 
rades,  and  they  looked  for  the.  millenium  to  arrive,  much  sooner, 
than  for  serious  discomfiture  to  befall  "  Uncle  Robert." 

Johnson's  Island  was  the  most  agreeable  prison  I  ever  saw — 
which  is  much  as  if  a  man  were  to  allude  to  the  pleasantest  dose 
of  castor  oil  he  ever  swallowed.  However,  there  is  little  doubt 
-but  that  it  would  have  been  pleasant  (for  a  short  time),  if  it  had 
•not  been  a  prison.  The  climate  in  the  summer  is  delightful,  and 
the  prospect  highly  gratifying — except  to  a  man  who  would  like 
to  escape  and  can  not  swim.  The  winters,  there,  are  said  to  have 
been  very  severe — but  then  the  barracks  were  open  and  airy. 
We,  who  were  shortly  afterward  transferred  to  the  Ohio  Peniten- 


CONFINED   IN   OHIO   PENITENTIARY.  467 

tiary,  thought  and  spoke  of  Johnson's  Island  as  (under  the  cir 
cumstances),  a  very  "  desirable  location."  The  rations  were 
good,  and  we  were  permitted  to  purchase  any  thing  we  wished 
from  the  sutler.  As  we  were  there  only  four  days,  however,  it 
is  possible  that  some  others  who  remained  nearly  two  years, 
may  be  right  in  contending  that  the  regime  (in  process  of 
time),  underwent  some  change. 

It  was  not  uncommon  to  hear  men  say,  that  they  would  rather 
be  sent  to  that  locality  which  is  conceded  by  all  sects  to  be  ex 
ceedingly  uncomfortable,  than  go  again  to  Johnson's  Island — 
but  a  shuddering  recollection  of  the  bitter  winter  weather,  evi 
dently  induced  the  preference.  After  remaining  at  Johnson's 
Island  four  days,  some  forty  of  us  were  called  for  one  morning, 
and  bidden  to  prepare  for  departure — whither  we  were  not  in 
formed.  But  our  worst  fears  were  realized,  when  we  were  taken 
off  of  the  cars  at  Columbus  and  marched  to  the  penitentiary. 
The  State  of  Ohio  claimed  Morgan  and  his  officers,  as  her  pecu 
liar  property — because  we  had  been  captured  on  her  soil  by 
Michiganders,  Kentuckians,  etc.,  and  demanded  us,  that  we  might 
be  subjected  to  the  same  treatment  which  she  inflicted  upon  her 
felons.  It  was  rumored,  also,  that  Colonel  Streight,  an  Ohio 
officer,  captured  by  Forrest,  had  been  placed  in  the  penitentiary 
in  Georgia,  and  we  were  told  that  we  were  being  penitentiaried  in 
retaliation.  It  turned  out  subsequently  that  Colonel  Streight  was 
treated  precisely  as  the  other  prisoners  in  the  South,  but  the 
Governor  of  Ohio  having  gotten  hold  of  a  batch  of  Confederate 
soldiers,  captured  for  him  by  troops  from  other  States,  was  dis 
posed  to  make  the  most  of  them,  and  would  not  consent  to  let 
them  out  of  his  hands. 

Two  men  figured  in  the  "Ohio  raid"  and  the  subsequent 
treatment  of  the  raiders,  with  a  peculiar  eclat,  The  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  department,  who  prepared  to  flee  from  the  city 
where  his  headquarters  were  established,  upon  the  approach  of 
two  thousand  wearied  men,  whom  with  an  army  of  fine  troops  he 
could  not  stop — was  one  of  them.  The  other  was  the  Governor 


468  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

of  a  State  lie  could  not  defend  ;  but  who  could  torture  if  he  could 
not  fight.  Burnsidc  turned  us  over  to  Todd — but  instructed 
that,  "these  men  shall  be  subjected  to  the  usual  prison  disci 
pline."  He  could  part  with  his  prisoners  and  enjoin,  in  doing 
so,  that  they  be  treated  as  convicted  felons.  But  his  name  would 
blister  the  tongue  of  a  brave  man,  and  I  should  apologize  for 
writing  it. 

When  we  entered  this  gloomy  mansion  of  "  crime  and  woe," 
it  was  with  misery  in  our  hearts,  although  an  aifected  gaiety  of 
manner.  We  could  not  escape  the  conviction,  struggle  against 
it  as  we  would,  that  we  were  placed  there  to  remain  while  the 
war  lasted,  and  most  of  us  believed  that  the  war  would  outlast 
the  generation.  We  were  told,  when  we  went  in,  that  we  "were 
there  to  stay,"  and  there  was  something  infernal  in  the  gloom 
and  the  massive  strength  of  the  place,  which  seemed  to  bid  us 
"leave  all  hope  behind."  While  we  were  waiting  in  the  hall,  to 
which  we  were  assigned,  before  being  placed  in  our  cells,  a  con 
vict,  as  I  supposed,  spoke  to  me  in  a  low  voice  from  thf}  grated 
door  of  one  of  the  cells  already  occupied.  I  made  some  remark 
about  the  familiarity  of  our  new  friends  on  short  acquaintance, 
when  by  the  speaker's  peculiar  laugh  I  recognized  General  Mor 
gan,  He  was  so  shaven  and  shorn,  that  his  voice  alone  was  re 
cognizable,  for  I  could  not  readily  distinguish  his  figure.  We 
were  soon  placed  in  our  respective  cells  and  the  iron  barred 
doors  locked.  Some  of  the  officers  declared  subsequently,  that 
when  left  alone,  and  the  eyes  of  the  keepers  were  taken  off  of 
them,  they  came  near  swooning.  It  was  not  the  apprehension 
of  hardship  or  harsh  treatment  that  was  so  horrible ;  it  was  the 
stifling  sense  of  close  cramped  confinement.  The  dead  weight 
of  the  huge  stone  prison  seemed  resting  on  our  breasts.  On  the 
next  day  we  were  taken  out  to  undergo  some  of  the  "  usual 
prison  discipline,"  and  were  subjected  to  a  sort  of  dress-parade. 
We  were  first  placed  man  by  man,  in  big  hogsheads  filled  with 
water  (of  which  there  were  two),  and  solemnly  scrubbed  by  a 
couple  of  negro  convicts.  This  they  said  was  done  for  sanitary 


HAIR   CUTTING.  469 

reasons.  The  baths  in  the  lake  at  Johnson's  Island  were  much 
pleasanter,  and  the  twentieth  man  who  was  ordered  into  either 
tub,  looked  ruefully  at  the  water,  as  if  he  thought  it  had  already 
done  enough  for  health.  Then  we  were  seated  in  barber  chairs, 
our  beards  were  taken  off,  and  the  officiating  artists  were  or 
dered  to  give  each  man's  hair  "  a  decent  cut."  We  found  that 
according  to  the  penitentiary  code,  the  decent  way  of  wearing 
the  hair  was  to  cut  it  all  off — if  the  same  rule  had  been  adopted 
with  regard  to  clothing,  the  Digger  Indians  would  have  been 
superfluously  clad  in  comparison  with  (what  would  have  been), 
our  disheveled  condition.  Some  young  men  lost  beards  and 
moustaches  on  this  occasion,  which  they  ha(J  assiduously  culti 
vated  with  scanty  returns,  for  years.  Colonel  Smith  had  a 
magnificent  beard  sweeping  down  to  his  waist,  patriarchal  in  all 
save  color — it  gave  him  a  leonine  aspect  that  might  have  awed 
even  a  barber.  He  was  placed  in  the  chair,  and  in  less  time, 
perhaps,  than  Absalom  staid  on  his  mule  after  his  hair  brought 
him  to  grief,  he  was  reduced  to  ordinary  humanity.  He  felt  his 
loss  keenly.  I  ventured  to  compliment  him  on  features  which  I 
had  never  seen  till  then,  and  he  answered,  with  asperity,  that  it 
was  "  no  jesting  matter." 

When  we  returned  to  the  hall,  we  met  General  Morgan,  Colo 
nel  Cluke,  Calvin  Morgan,  Captain  Gibson,  and  some  twentj^-six 
others — our  party  numbered  sixty-eight  in  all.  General  Mor 
gan  and  most  of  the  officers  who  surrendered  with  him,  had  been 
taken  to  Cincinnati  and  lodged  in  the  city  prison  (as  we  had 
been),  with  the  difference,  that  we  had  been  placed  in  the  upper 
appartments  (which  were  clean),  and  he  and  his  party  were  con 
fined  in  the  lower  rooms,  in  comparison  with  which  the  stalls  of 
the  Augean  stables  were  boudoirs.  After  great  efforts,  General 
Morgan  obtained  an  interview  with  Burnsides,  and  urged  that 
the  terms  upon  which  he  had  surrendered  should  be  observed, 
but  with  no  avail.  He  and  the  officers  with  him,  were  taken  di 
rectly  from  Cincinnati  to  the  Ohio  Penitentiary,  and  had  been 
there  several  days  when  we  (who  came  from  Johnson's  Island). 


470 

arrived.  It  is  a  difficult  thing  to  describe,  so  that  it  will  be 
clearly  understood,  the  interior  conformation  of  any  large  build 
ing,  and  I  will  have  to  trust  that  my  readers  will  either  catch  a 
just  idea  of  the  subject  from  a  very  partial  and  inadequate  des 
cription,  or  that  they  will  regard  it  as  a  matter  of  little  import 
ance  whether  or  no  they  shall  understand  the  internal  plan  and 
strupture  of  the  Ohio  State  Prison.  For  my  purpose,  it  is  only 
necessary  that  the  architecture  of  one  part  of  it  shall  be  under 
stood.  Let  the  reader  imagine  a  large  room  (or  rather  wing  of 
a  building),  four  hundred  feet  in  length,  forty-odd  in  width,  and 
with  a  ceiling  forty-odd  feet  in  hight.  One  half  of  this  wing, 
although  separated,  from  the  other  by  no  traverse  wall,  is  called 
the  "  East  Hail." 

In  the  walls  of  this  hall  are  cut  great  windows,  looking  out 
upon  one  of  the  prison  yards.  If  the  reader  will  further 
imagine  a  building  erected  in  the  interior  of  this  hall  and  reach 
ing  to  the  ceiling,  upon  each  side  of  which,  and  between  its  walls 
and  the  walls  of  the  hall,  are  alleys  eleven  feet  wide  arid  running 
the  entire  length  of  the  hall,  and  at  either  extremity  of  this 
building,  spaces  twenty  feet  in  width — he  will  have  conceived  a 
just  idea  of  that  part  of  the  prison  in  which  General  Morgan  and 
his  officers  were  confined.  In  the  interior  building  the  cells  are 
constructed — each  about  three  feet  and  a  half  wide  and  seven 
feet  long.  The  doors  of  the  cells — a  certain  number  of  which 
are  constructed  in  each  side  of  this  building — open  upon  the 
alleys  which  have  been  described.  At  the  back  of  each,  and  of 
course  separating  the  ranges  of  cells  upon  the  opposite  sides  of 
the  building,  is  a  hollow  space  reaching  from  the  floor  to  the 
ceiling,  running  the  whole  length  of  the  building,  and  three  or 
four  feet  wide.  This  space  is  left  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
more  thorough  ventilation,  and  the  back  wall  of  every  cell  is 
perforated  with  a  hole,  three  or  four  inches  in  diameter,  to  admit 
the  air  from  this  passage. 

We  were  placed  in  the  cells  constructed  in  that  face  of  the 
building  which  looks  toward  the  town.  No  convicts  were  quar- 


PRISON   REGULATIONS.  471 

tered  in  the  cells  on  that  side,  except  on  the  extreme  upper 
tiers,  but  the  cells  on  the  other  side  of  the  building  were  all  oc 
cupied  by  them.  The  cells  are  some  seven  feet  in  hight,  and 
are  built  in  ranges,  or  tiers,  one  above  the  other.  They  are 
numbered,  range  first,  second,  third,  and  so  on — commencing  at 
the  lower  one.  The  doors  are  grates  of  iron — the  bars  of  which 
are  about  an  inch  and  a  quarter  wide,  and  half  an  inch  thick,  and 
are,  perhaps,  two  inches  apart,  leaving,  as  they  are  placed  up 
right  and  athwart,  open  spaces  of  two  inches  square  between 
them.  In  front  of  each  range  of  cells  were  balconies  three  feet 
wide,  and  ladders  led  from  each  one  of  these  to  the  other  just 
above  it. 

We  were  permitted  to  exercise,  during  the  day,  in  the  alley 
in  front  of  our  cells,  although  prohibited  from  looking  out  of  the 
windows.  Twice  a  day  we  were  taken  to  meals,  crossing  (when  we 
went  to  breakfast)  a  portion  of  the  yard,  before  mentioned,  and 
passing  through  the  kitchen  into  the  large  dining-hall  of  the  in 
stitution.  Here,  seated  at  tables  about  two  feet  wide  and  the 
same  distance  apart,  a  great  many  prisoners  could  be  fed  at  the 
same  time.  We  were  not  allowed  to  breakfast  and  dine  with 
the  convicts,  or  they  were  not  allowed  to  eat  with  us — I  could 
never  learn  exactly  how  it  was.  We  crossed  the  yard,  on  the 
way  to  breakfast,  for  the  purpose  of  washing  our  faces,  which 
was  permitted  by  the  prison  regulations,  but  a  certain  method 
of  doing  it  was  prescribed.  Two  long  troughs  were  erected  and 
filled  with  water.  The  inhabitants  of  the  First  Range  washed 
in  one  trough,  and  tnose  of  the  Second  Range  used  the  other. 
We  soon  obtained  permission  to  buy  and  keep  our  own  towels. 
In  returning  from  breakfast,  and  in  going  to  and  returning  from 
dinner,  we  never  quitted  the  prison  building,  but  marched  through 
a  wing  of  the  dining-room  back  to  the  long  wing,  in  one  end  of 
which  was  our  hall. 

At  seven  p.  M.  in  summer  (earlier  afterward),  we  were  re 
quired  to  go  to  our  respective  cells  at  the  tap  of  the  turnkey's 
key  on  the  stove,  and  he  passed  along  the  ranges  and  locked  us 


472  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

in  for  the  night.  In  a  little  while,  then,  we  would  hear  the 
steady,  rolling  tramp  of  the  convicts,  who  slept  in  the  hall  at 
the  other  end  of  the  wing,  as  they  marched  in  with  military 
step  and  precision,  changing  after  awhile  from  the  sharp  clatter 
of  many  feet  simultaneously  striking  the  stone  floor  to  the  hur 
ried,  muffled  rattle  of  their  ascent  (in  a  trot)  of  the  stairways. 
Then  when  each  had  gained  his  cell,  and  the  lockirig-in  com 
menced,  the  most  infernal  clash  and  clang,  as  huge  bolts  were 
fastened,  would  be  heard  that  ever  startled  the  ear  of  a  sane  man. 
When  Satan  receives  a  fresh  lot  of  prisoners,  he  certainly  must 
torture  each  half  by  compelling  it  to  hear  the  other  locked  into 
cells  with  iron  doors. 

The  rations  furnished  us  for  the  first  ten  days  were  inferior 
to  those  subsequently  issued.  The  food  allowed  us,  although 
exceedingly  coarse,  was  always  sufficiently  abundant.  After 
about  ten  days  the  restriction,  previously  imposed,  preventing 
us  from  purchasing  or  receiving  from  our  friends  articles  edible, 
or  of  any  other  description,  was  repealed,  and  we  were  allowed 
to  receive  every  thing  sent  us.  Our  Kentucky  friends  had  been 
awaiting  this  opportunity,  and  for  fear  that  the  privilege  would 
be  soon  withdrawn,  hastened  to  send  cargoes  of  all  sorts  of  food 
and  all  kinds  of  dainties.  For  a  few  days  we  were  almost  sur 
feited  with  good  things,  and  then  the  trap  fell.  When  piles  of 
delicacies  were  stacked  up  in  his  office,  the  Warden  of  the  prison, 
Captain  Merion,  confiscated  all  to  his  own  use,  forbade  our  re 
ceiving  any  thing  more,  and  rather  than  the  provisions  should 
be  wasted,  furnished  his  own  table  with  them. 

For  several  weeks  one  or  two  soldiers  were  habitually  kept 
in  the  hall  with  us,  during  the  day.  The  turnkey,  who  was  the 
presiding  imp  in  that  wing — the  ghoul  of  our  part  of  the  cata 
combs — was  rarely  absent,  but  passed  back  and  forth,  prying 
and  suspicious.  Scott  (familiarly  Scotty)  was  the  name  of  the 
interesting  creature  who  officiated  as  our  immediate  keeper,  for 
the  first  four  months  of  our  confinement  in  this  place.  He  was 
on  duty  only  during  the  day.  At  night  a  special  guard  went 


PRISON   AMUSEMENTS.  473 

the  rounds.  The  gas-burners,  with  which  each  cell  was  fur 
nished,  were  put  into  use  as  soon  as  we  were  locked  up,  and  we 
were  allowed  (for  a  time)  to  burn  candles  for  an  hour  after  the 
hour  for  which  the  gas  was  turned  on  had  expired.  We  were 
permitted  to  buy  books  and  keep  them  in  our  cells,  and  for  some 
weeks  were  not  restricted  in  the  number  of  letters  which  we 
might  write.  Indeed  for  a  period  of  nearly  three  months  our 
condition  was  uncomfortable  only  on  account  of  the  constant 
confinement  within  the  walls  of  the  prison — the  lack  of  exercise, 
and  sun -light,  and  free  air,  and  the  penning  up  at  night  in  the 
close  cells.  To  a  man  who  has  never  been  placed  in  such  a  sit 
uation,  no  words  can  convey  the  slightest  idea  of  its  irksome- 
ness.  There  was  not  one  of  us  who  would  not  have  eagerly 
exchanged  for  the  most  comfortless  of  all  the  prisons,  where  he 
could  have  spent  the  days  in  the  open  air,  and  some  part  of  the 
time  have  felt  that  the  eyes  of  the  gaolers  were  not  upon  him. 
Every  conceivable  method  of  killing  time,  and  every  practical 
recreation  was  resorted  to.  Marbles  were  held  in  high  estima 
tion  for  many  days,  and  the  games  were  played  first,  and  dis 
cussed  subsequently  with  keen  interest.  A  long  ladder,  which 
had  been  left  in  the  hall,  leaning  against  the  wall,  was  a  perfect 
treasure  to  those  who  most  craved  active  exercise.  They  prac 
ticed  all  sorts  of  gymnastics  on  this  ladder,  and  cooled  the  fever 
in  their  blood  with  fatigue.  Chess  finally  became  the  standard 
amusement,  and  those  who  did  not  understand  the  game  watched 
it  nevertheless  with  as  much  apparent  relish  as  if  they  under 
stood  it.  Chess  books  were  bought  and  studied  as  carefully  as 
any  work  on  tactics  had  ever  been  by  the  same  men,  and  groups 
would  spend  hours  in  discussing  this  gambit  and  that,  and  an 
admiring  audience  could  always  be  collected  at  one  end  of  the 
hall  to  hear  how  Cicero  -Coleman  had  just  checkmated  an  antag 
onist  at  the  other,  by  a  judicious  flank  movement  with  his 
"  knight,"  or  some  other  active  and  effective  piece. 

In  spite,  however,  of  every  effort  to  sustain  health  and  spirits, 
both   suffered.     The  most  robust  could  not  endure  the  life  to 


474  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

which  we  were  condemned,  without  injury.  I  am  satisfied  that 
hard  labor — furnishing  at  once  occupation  and  exercise — alone 
prevents  the  inmates  of  these  prisons  (sentenced  to  remain  so 
many  years,  as  some  of  them  are)  from  dying  early.  The  effect 
of  this  confinement  is  strange,  and  will  doubtless  appear  incon 
sistent.  It  affected  every  man  of  our  party  with  (at  the  same 
time)  a  lethargy  and  a  nervousness.  While  we  were  physically 
arid  mentally  impaired  by  it — and  every  faculty  was  dulled,  and 
all  energy  was  sapped — every  man  was  restless  without  aim  or 
purpose,  and  irritable  without  cause  or  reason.  These  effects 
of  imprisonment  became  far  more  apparent  and  difficult  to  re 
press,  after  a  few  months  had  elapsed. 

The  method  adopted  in  the  Ohio  Penitentiary,  for  punishing 
the  refractory  and  disobedient,  was  to  confine  them  in  cells 
called  the  "  dungeons  " — and  dungeons  indeed  they  were.  Cap 
tain  Foster  Cheatham  was  the  first  man,  of  our  party,  who  ex 
plored  their  recesses.  His  private  negotiations,  with  one  of 
the  military  guard,  for  liquids  of  stimulating  properties  (which 
he  thought  would  benefit  his  health)  were  not  only  unsuccessful, 
but  were  discovered  by  the  "Head-devil,"  and  the  Captain  was 
dragged  to  a  "  loathsome  dungeon."  He  remained  twenty-four 
hours  and  came  out  wiser,  on  the  subject  of  prison  discipline, 
and  infinitely  sadder  than  when  he  went  in.  The  next  victim 
was  Major  Higley.  One  of  the  keepers  was  rough  to  him,  and 
Iligley  used  strong  language  in  return.  Disrespectful  language 
to,  or  about,  officials  was  not  tolerated  in  the  institution,  and 
Higley  "  came  to  grief."  He  also  remained  in  the  dungeon  for 
the  space  of  a  solar  day.  He  was  a  man  of  lean  habit  and  ex 
citable  temperament,  when  in  his  best  state  of  health — and  he 
returned  from  the  place  of  punishment,  looking  like  a  ghost  of 
dissipated  habits  and  shattered  nervous  system.  Pale  and  sha 
king — he  gave  us  a  spirited  and  humorous  account  of  his  inter 
view  with  the  superior  gaolers,  and  his  experience  in  the  dark 
stilling  cell. 

It  was  claimed  that  while  punishment  was  invariably  inflicted 


DEATH  OF  COLONEL  CLUKE.  475 

for  violation  of  the  rules,  those  rules  were  clearly  defined.  That 
no  man  need  infringe  the  regulations — that  every  one  could  (if 
he  chose)  avoid  punishment.  An  incident  happened  which  did 
not  strongly  corroborate  this  beautiful  theory.  Shortly  after 
Major  Iligley's  misfortune,  Captain  Cheatham  was  again  hon 
ored  with  an  invitation  to  inspect  the  dungeons,  and  take  up  his 
quarters  in  one  of  them.  He,  with  great  modesty,  protested 
that  he  had  done  nothing  to  deserve  such  a  distinction,  but  his 
scruples  were  overruled  and  he  was  induced  to  go.  The  offense 
charged  was  this  :  An  anonymous  letter  had  been  picked  up  in 
the  hall — in  which  the  prison  officials  were  ridiculed.  Merion 
fancied  that  the  handwriting  of  this  letter  resembled  Cheat- 
ham's — there  was  no  other  evidence.  So  far  as  the  proof  went, 
there  was  as  much  right  to  attribute  it  to  one  of  the  prison 
corps  as  to  one  of  the  prisoners,  and  to  any  other  one  of  the 
prisoners  as  to  Cheatham.  After  he  was  placed  in  the  dungeon, 
where  he  remained  forty-eight  hours,  and  it  became  known  upon 
what  charge,  and  that  he  denied  it,  General  Morgan  first,  and 
soon  many  others,  demanded  that,  if  another  prisoner  had  writ 
ten  the  letter,  he  should  own  it  and  suffer  for  it.  There  was 
not  a  man  in  the  sixty-eight  of  our  party  (with  four  exceptions) 
who  would  have  permitted  a  comrade  to  be  punished  for  an  of 
fense  committed  by  himself. 

It  was  never  known  who  wrote  the  letter.  Captain  Cheathaiii 
always  denied  having  done  so.  So  justice  was  not  always  so 
impartially  administered  in  the  sacrificial  temple  of  the  Ohio 
law,  and  the  governed  had  it  not  always  in  their  power  to  escape 
punishment. 

After  we  had  been  in  the  penitentiary  some  three  or  four 
weeks,  Colonel  Cluke  and  another  officer  were  taken  out  and 
sent  to  McLean  barracks,  to  be  tried  by  court-martial  upon  the 
charge  of  having  violated  some  oath,  taken  before  they  entered 
the  Confederate  service.  They  were  acquitted  and  Colonel 
Cluke  was  sent  to  Johnson's  Island,  where  during  the  ensuing 


476  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

winter  lie  died  of  diphtheria.  He  was  exceedingly  popular  in  the 
division,  and  was  a  man  of  the  most  frank,  generous  and  high- 
toned  nature.  But  he  possessed  some  high  soldierly  qualities. 
In  the  field,  he  was  extremely  bold  and  tenacious — and  when 
threatened  by  a  dangerous  opponent,  no  one  was  more  vigilant 
and  wary.  He  displayed  great  vigor  and  judgment  on  many 
occasions,  both  as  a  regimental  and  brigade  commander. 
The  news  of  his  death  excited  universal  sorrow  among  his  com 
rades. 

Shortly  before  Colonel  Cluke's  removal,  Major  Webber  and 
Captains  Sheldon  and  McCann  had  been  brought  to  the  peniten 
tiary  from  Camp  Chase.  They,  of  course,  declined  the  tonsorial 
ceremonies  and  were  remanded  to  Camp  Chase.  In  the  course 
of  two  or  three  weeks  Captains  Bennett  and  Merriweather,  of 
the  Tenth  Kentucky,  were  sent  from  Camp  Chase  to  the  peni 
tentiary,  for  having  attempted  to  make  their  escape,  and  with 
them  came  Captain  Sheldon  again,  for  the  same  offense.  This 
time  no  questions  were  asked,  but  hair  and  beards  came  off. 

Somewhat  later,  Major  Webber  was  sent  back  also.  He  was 
placed  in  solitary  confinement,  in  a  cell  in  a  remote  part  of  the 
prison,  and  permitted  to  hold  no  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  us. 
The  reason  of  his  receiving  this  treatment,  was  that  he  had 
written  a  letter  in  which  occurred  the  following  passage  :  "I 
can't  say  how  long  I  will  be  a  prisoner.  Until  the  end  of  time ; 
yes,  until  eternity  has  run  its  last  round,  rather  than  that  our 
Government  shall  acknowledge  the  doctrine  of  negro  equality, 
by  an  exchange  of  negro  soldiers.  I  wish  that  all  negroes,  and 
their  officers  captured  with  them,  will  be  hung.  I  am  willing  to 
risk  the  consequences."  Webber  unhesitatingly  confirmed  this 
language,  stating  that  he  had,  from  the  commencement  of  the 
war,  entertained  such  sentiments,  and  that  he  felt  his  right  to 
express  them  as  a  prisoner  of  war,  as  well  as  in  any  other  con 
dition.  He  claimed  that  the  very  fact  that  the  letters  of  all 
prisoners  were  examined,  and  suppressed  if  disapproved  by  the 


TREATMENT   OF   PRISONERS.  477 

officer  appointed  to  examine  them,  gave  the  prisoners  a  right  to 
use  such  language  as  they  chose.  If  the  language  was  thought 
improper,  the  letter  could  be  burned,  and  no  one  but  the  exam 
iner  would  be  any  the  wiser.  This  would  seem  to  be  the  correct 
and  manly  view  to  take  of  the  matter.  If  a  prisoner  were 
detected  in  clandestine  correspondence,  it  was,  perhaps,  right 
and  fair  that  he  should  be  punished,  but  I  do  not  believe  that  in 
any  army  whose  officers  are,  for  the  most  part  gentlemen,  a 
man  would  be  countenanced,  who  would  cause  prisoners  to  send 
letters  to  his  office  for  perusal,  with  the  understanding  that  they 
should  be  suppressed  if  disapproved,  and  would  then  punish  the 
prisoner  who  wrote  sentiments  which  did  not  accord  with  his  own. 

There  were  officers  in  position  at  Camp  Chase,  when  I  was 
sent  there  some  months  afterward,  who,  I  believe,  could  have 
been  induced  by  no  combination  of  influences  to  do  such  a  thing, 
or  to  tolerate  the  man  who  would  do  it. 

Major  Webber's  description  of  his  initiation  into  prison  usages 
is  very  graphic,  and  as  many  of  my  readers  know  him,  it  will 
be  highly  amusing  to  them,  although  any  thing  but  amusing  to 
the  Major.  He  says  :  "  In  the  office  of  the  penitentiary,  I  was 
stripped  of  my  clothing  and  closely  searched.  Everything  in 
the  way  of  papers,  knife,  money,  tooth-pick,  and  even  an  old 
buckeye,  which  I  had  carried  in  my  pocket  all  through  the  war, 
at  the  request  of  a  friend,  were  taken  from  me.  I  was  then 
marched  to  the  wash-room,  stripped  again,  and  placed  in  a  tub 
of  warm  water,  about  waist  deep,  where  a  convict  scrubbed  me 
with  a  large,  rough,  horse  brush  and  soap  ;  while  a  hang- dog 
looking  scoundrel,  and  the  deputy- warden  Dean,  urged  the  con 
vict  to  '  scrub  the  d — d  horse-thief,'  and  indulged  in  various 
demoniacal  grins  and  gesticulations  of  exultation  at  my  suffer 
ings  and  embarrassment."  The  Major  describes  "  his  feelings," 
in  the  strong  language  of  which  he  never  lacked  command ;  but 
it  is  unnecessary  to  quote  from  him  farther — there  is  no  man, 
so  devoid  of  imagination,  that  he  can  not  divine  what  the 
patients'  feeling  must  have  been  under  such  treatment. 


478  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

When  two  or  three  months  had  elapsed,  General  Morgan's 
impatience  of  the  galling  confinement  and  perpetual  espionage 
amounted  almost  to  frenzy.  He  restrained  all  exhibition  of  his 
feelings  remarkably,  but  it  was  apparent  to  his  fellow  prisoners 
that  he  was  chafing  terribly  under  the  restraint,  more  irksome 
to  him  than  to  any  one  of  the  others. 

The  difficulty  of  getting  letters  from  our  families  and  friends  in 
the  South,  was  one  of  the  worst  evils  of  this  imprisonment;  and  if  a 
letter  came  containing  anything  in  the  least  objectionable,  it  was. 
as  likely  as  not,  destroyed,  and  the  envelope  only  was  delivered 
to  the  man  to  whom  it  was  written.  Generally,  the  portion  of 
its  contents,  which  incurred  Merion's  censure,  having  been  erased, 
it  was  graciously  delivered,  but  more  than  once  a  letter  which 
would  have  been  valued  beyond  all  price,  was  altogether  with 
held,  and  the  prisoner  anxiously  expecting  it,  was  mocked,  as  I 
have  stated,  with  being  given  the  envelope  in  which  it  came,  as 
evidence  that  he  was  robbed  of  it.  The  reader  can  imagine  the 
feelings  of  a  man,  whose  wife  and  children  were  in  far  off 
"Dixie,"  Avhile  he  lay  in  prison  tortured  with  anxiety  to  hear 
from  them,  and  who,  when  the  letter  which  told  of  them  at  last 
came,  should  be  deprived  of  it  because  it  contained  some  womanly 
outburst  of  feeling,  and  should  be  tantalized  with  the  evidence 
of  his  loss. 

The  introduction  of  newspapers  was  strictly  forbidden, 
except  when  Merion,  as  a  great  favor,  would  send  in  some  out 
rageously  abusive  sheet,  in  which  was  published  some  particularly 
offensive  lie.  If  the  newspapers,  which  the  convicts  who  occa 
sionally  passed  through  our  hall  in  the  transaction  of  their 
duties,  some  times  smuggled  into  us,  were  discovered  in  any 
man's  hands  or  cell,  woe  be  unto  him — a  first  class  sinner  could 
be  easier  prayed  out  of  purgatory,  than  he  could  avoid  the 
dungeon. 

Captain  Calvin  Morgan  was  once  reading  a  newspaper,  that 
had  urun  the  blockade,"  in  his  cell  at  night,  and  had  become 


NEWS   OF   BATTLE    OP   CHICKAMAUGA.  479 

deeply  interested  in  it,  when  the  "  night  guard,"  stealing  along 
with  noiseless  step,  detected  him. 

The  customary  taps  (by  the  occupants  of  the  other  cells  who 
discovered  his  approach  and  thus  telegraphed  it  along  the 
range)  had  been  (this  time)  neglected.  "  What  paper  is  that," 
said  the  guard.  "  Come  in  and  see,"  said  Morgan.  "  No,"  said 
the  guard,  "you  must  pass  it  to  me  through  the  bars."  "I'll 
do  nothing  of  the  kind,"  was  the  answer.  "If  you  think  that 
I  have  a  paper  which  was  smuggled  into  me,  why  unlock  the 
door,  come  in,  and  get  it."  The  fellow  apparently  did  not  like 
to  trust  himself  in  the  cell  with  Captain  Morgan,  who  was  much 
the  more  powerful  man  of  the  two,  and  he  hastened  off  for  re 
inforcements.  During  his  absence  Morgan  rolled  the  paper  up 
into  a  small  compass,  and,  baring  his  arm,  thrust  it  far  up  into 
the  ventillator  at  the  back  part  of  the  cell.  Fortunately  there 
was  in  the  cell  a  newspaper  given  him  that  day  by  one  of  the 
sub-wardens  named  Hevay — a  very  kind  old  man.  Morgan  un 
folded  this  paper  and  was  seated  in  the  same  attitude  (as  when 
first  discovered)  reading  it,  when  the  guard  returned.  The  latter 
brought  Scott  with  him  and  unlocked  the  door.  "  Now  give  me 
that  paper,"  he  said.  "There  it  is,"  said  Morgan  handing  it 
him,  "  Old  man  Hevay  gave  it  to  me  to-day."  The  guard  in 
spected  it  closely  and  seemed  satisfied.  "Why  did  you  not  give 
it  to  me  before,"  he  asked.  "Because,"  returned  Captain  Mor 
gan,  "  I  thought  you  had  no  right  to  ask  it,  and  I  had,  more 
over  no  assurance  that  you  would  return  it."  With  a  parting 
injunction  to  do  so  no  more,  or  the  dungeon  would  reveal  him  its 
secrets,  the  guard  after  a  thorough  search  to  find  another  paper 
(if  there  should  have  been  a  deception  practiced  upon  him)  left 
the  cell.  He  examined  the  ventillator,  but  Morgan's  arm  being 
the  longer  the  paper  was  beyond  his  reach.  Captain  Morgan's 
literary  pursuits  were  suspended,  however,  for  that  night. 

When  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  was  coming  in, 
and  we  were  half  wild  with  excitement  and  eagerness  to  learn 
the  true  aversion  of  the  reports  that  prevailed — for  every  thing 


480  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY 

told  us  by  the  prison  officials  was  garbled — we  by  good  luck  got 
in  two  or  three  newspapers  containing  full  accounts  of  the  battle. 
I  shall  never  forget  listening  to  them  read,  in  General  Morgan's 
cell,  while  four  or  five  pickets  (regularly  relieved)  were  posted 
to  guard  against  surprise.  These  papers  were  read  to  the  whole 
party  in  detachments — while  one  listened,  the  succeeding  one 
awaited  its  turn  in  nervous  impatience.  As  I  have  said,  Gen 
eral  Morgan  grew  more  restless  under  his  imprisonment,  every 
day,  and  finally  resolved  to  effect  his  escape,  at  any  hazard,  or 
labor. 

Several  plans  were  resolved  and  abandoned,  and  at  length  one 
devised  by  Captain  Hines  was  adopted.  This  was  to  "tunnel" 
out  of  the  prison — as  the  mode  of  escape  by  digging  a  trench, 
to  lead  from  the  interior  to  the  outside  of  the  prisons,  was  tech 
nically  called.  But  to  "  tunnel "  through  the  stone  pavement 
and  immense  walls  of  the  penitentiary — concealing  the  tremen 
dous  work  as  it  progressed — it  required  a  bold  imagination  to 
conceive  such  an  idea.  Hines  had  heard,  in  some  way,  a  hint 
of  an  air  chamber,  constructed  under  the  lower  range  of  cells — 
that  range  immediately  upon  the  ground  floor.  He  thought  it 
probable  that  there  was  such  a  chamber,  for  he  could  account  in 
no  other  way  for  the  dryness  of  the  cells  in  that  range.  At  the 
first  opportunity  he  entered  into  conversation  with  Old  Ilevay, 
the  deputy-warden  mentioned  before.  This  old  man  was  very 
kind-hearted,  and  was  also  an  enthusiast  upon  the  subject  of  the 
architectual  grandeur  of  that  penitentiary.  Hines  led  the  con 
versation  into  that  channel,  and  finally  learned  that  his  surmise 
was  correct.  If,  then,  he  could  cut  through  the  floor  of  his  cell 
and  reach  this  air  chamber,  without  detection,  he  would  have,  he 
saw,  an  excellent  base  for  future  operations.  He  communicated 
his  plan  to  General  Morgan,  who  at  once  approved  it.  Five 
other  men  were  selected  (whose  cells  were  on  the  first  range) 
as  assistants. 

The  work  was  commenced  with  knives  abstracted  from  the 
table.     These  knives — square  at  the  end  of  the  blade  instead  of 


WORKING   IN   THE    TUNNEL.  481 

pointed — made  excellent  chisels,  and  were  the  very  best  tools 
for  the  inauguration  of  the  labor.  Putting  out  pickets  to  pre 
vent  surprise,  they  pecked  and  chiseled  away  at  the  hard  floor, 
which  was  eighteen  inches  thick  of  stone  cement  and  brick — 
concealing  the  rubbish  in  their  handkercheifs  and  then  throwing 
part  of  it  into  the  stoves,  and  hiding  the  rest  in  their  beds. 
They  soon  dug  a  hole  in  the  floor  large  enough  to  permit  the 
body  of  a  man  to  pass.  The  iron  bedsteads,  which  stood  in 
each  cell,  could  be  lifted  up  or  let  down  at  pleasure.  Ilines 
would  prop  his  up,  each  morning,  sweep  out  his  cell  (in  which 
the  aperature  had  been  cut)  and  throw  a  carpet  sack  carelessly 
over  the  mouth  of  the  shaft  he  had  sunk,  and  when  the  guard 
would  come  and  look  in,  every  thing  would  appear  so  neat  and 
innocent,  that  he  would  not  examine  further.  One  kick  given 
that  hypocritical  carpet  bag  (with  its  careless  appearance)  would 
have  disclosed  the  plot,  at  any  time  from  the  date  of  the  incep 
tion  of  the  work  to  its  close.  After  the  air  chamber  was 
reached,  a  good  many  others  were  taken  into  the  secret,  in  order 
that  the  work  might  go  constantly  on. 

The  method  adopted,  then,  was  for  two  or  three  to  descend 
and  go  to  work,  while  the  others  kept  watch ;  in  an  hour  or  two 
a  fresh  relief  would  be  put  on,  and  the  work  would  be  kept  up 
in  this  way  throughout  the  day,  until  the  hour  of  locking  up  ar 
rived,,  except  at  dinner  time,  when  every  man  who  was  absent 
from  the  table  had  to  give  a  reason  for  his  absence.  The  work, 
conducted  underground,  was  tedious  and  difficult,  but  all  labored 
with  a  will.  The  candles  which  had  been  purchased  and  hoarded 
away,  now  did  good  service.  Without  them  it  would  have  been 
almost  impossible  to  finish  the  task.  A  code  of  signals  was  in 
vented  to  meet  every  possible  contingency.  By  pounding  a 
bar  of  wood  upon  the  stone  floor,  those  above  communicated  to 
those  underneath  information  of  every  danger  which  threatened, 
and  called  on  them  to  come  forth,  if  necessary.  The  walls  of 
the  air  chamber  were  two  or  three  feet  thick,  and  built  of  hu^e 
stones.  Two  or  three  of  these  stones  were  removed,  and  a  tun- 
31 


482  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

nel  was  run  straight  to  the  outer  Avail  of  the  hall.  Fortune 
favored  the  workmen,  at  this  juncture,  and  threw  in  their  way 
an  adequate  tool  with  which  to  accomplish  this  part  of  their 
work.  Some  one  had  discovered  lying  in  the  yard  through  which 
we  passed  on  our  way  to  breakfast,  an  old  rusty  spade  with  a 
broken  handle.  It  was  at  once  determined  that  the  said  spade 
must  be  secured.  Accordingly  men  were  detailed  and  instructed 
in  their  proper  parts,  and  at  the  first  opportunity  the  spade  was 
transferred  to  the  air  chamber,  and  put  to  work  in  digging  the  tun 
nel.  This  is  the  manner  in  which  that  valuable,  that  priceless, 
old,  rusty,  broken  spade  was  gotten  :  One  man  was  selected  to 
secrete  the  spade  about  his  person — him  I  will  call  No.  1.  He 
wore,  for  the  occasion,  a  long,  loose  sack  coat.  Six  or  seven 
other  men  were  his  accomplices.  It  was  a  usual  occurrence  for 
those  who  were  awaiting  their  turns  at  the  washing  troughs,  to 
romp  and  scuffle  with  each  other  in  the  yard.  The  conspirators 
wero,  this  morning,  exceedingly  frolicsome.  At  length  No.  1 
fell,  apparently  by  an  accident,  upon  the  spade,  his  accomplices 
tumbled  in  a  heap  upon  him.  No.  1  dexterously  slipped  the 
spade  under  his  coat,  and  buttoned  it  up.  He  went  into  break 
fast  with  it,  and  sat  wonderfully  straight,  and  carried  it  safely 
into  the  hall  and  down  into  the  air  chamber. 

When  the  main  wall  of  the  hall  was  reached,  the  heavy  stones 
of  its  foundation  were  removed  in  sufficient  number  to  admit  of 
the  passage  of  a  man.  But  it  was  then  discovered  that  the  tun 
nel  led  right  under  an  immense  coal  pile.  It  was  necessary  that 
this  difficulty  should  be  remedied;  but  how?  Without  a  view 
of  the  ground  just  outside  of  the  wall,  no  one  could  calculate 
how  far,  or  in  what  direction  to  run  the  tunnel,  so  that  when  it 
was  conducted  to  the  surface,  all  obstructions  might  be  avoided. 
In  this  emergency,  General  Morgan  engaged  Scott  in  conversa 
tion  about  the  remarkable  escape  of  some  convicts,  which  had 
occurred  a  year  or  two  previously,  and  which  Scott  was  very 
fond  of  describing.  These  convicts  had  climbed  by  the  balconies, 
in  front  of  the  ranges  of  cells,  to  the  ceiling,  and  had  passed  out 


RUSE    TO   OBTAIN   INFORMATION.  483 

through  the  skylight  to  the  roof  of  the  prison.  Scott  declared 
his  belief  that  there  were  no  two  other  men  on  the  continent 
who  could  perform  the  feat  of  ascending  by  the  balconies. 

"  Why,"  says  General  Morgan,  "Captain  Sam.  Taylor,  small 
as  he  is,  can  do  it." 

Thereupon  a  discussion  ensued,  ending  by  Scott's  giving  Tay 
lor  permission  to  attempt  it.     Taylor,  who,  although  very  small, 
was  as  active  as  a  squirrel,  immediately  commenced  the  ascent, 
and   sprang  from  one  to  the  other  of  the  balconies,  until   he 
reached  the  top  one.     He  was  one  of  the  men  who  had  been  se 
lected  to  escape  with  General  Morgan,  and  comprehended  im 
mediately  the  latter's  object  in  having  him  attempt  this  feat.    It 
would  afford  him  a  chance  to  glance  out  of  the  windows  at  the 
ground  just  beyond  the  wall.     As  he  leisurely  swung  himself 
down,  he  studied  "  the  position  "  carefully,  and  his  observations 
enable^  them   to   direct   the   tunnel   aright.     Once  during  the 
tunneling,  while  Captain  Hockersmith  (another  of  the  projectors 
of  the  plan)  was  at   work  underground,  Scott   called  for  him 
and  seemed  anxious  to  find  him   at  once.     General  Morgan's 
presence  of  mind  prevented  a  discovery,  or,  at  least,  a  strong 
suspicion  of  the  plot  from  at  once  resulting  from  Hockersmith's 
absence.     The  General  said  to  Scott,   "Hockersmith   is   lying 
down  in  my  cell;  he  is  sick,"  and  he  requested  Scott  to  examine 
and  give  his  opinion  upon  a  memorial  which  he  (the  General) 
held  in  his  hand,  and  which  he  proposed  forwarding  to  Wash 
ington.     It  was  something  regarding  our  removal  to  a  military 
prison.     Scott  (highly  flattered  by  this  tribute  to  his  judgment) 
took  the  memorial,  looked  at  it  attentively  for  some  minutes, 
and  returned  it,  saying,  "  I  think  it  will  do  first  rate."     It  did 
do.     In  the  mean  time,  Hockersmith  had  been  signaled,  and  had 
"  come  up,"  and  he  made  his  appearance  complaining  of  a  serious 
indisposition. 

While  the  work  was  going  on,  General  Morgan  and  those  who 
were  to  escape  with  him  habitually  slept  with  their  faces  cov 
ered  and  their  hands  concealed.  This  was  done  to  accustom  the 


484  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

night  guard  to  take  their  presence  in  the  cells  for  granted,  by 
the  appearance  of  the  bulk  upon  the  beds,  without  actually  see 
ing  them.  This  guard  went  the  rounds  at  the  expiration  of 
every  two  hours  during  the  night,  and  he  would  place  his  lan 
tern  close  to  each  cell  door,  in  order  that  the  light  should  fill 
the  cell  and  show  the  occupant.  General  Morgan  used  to  say 
that  a  peculiar  shuddering  and  creeping  of  the  flesh  would  as 
sail  him  whenever  this  man  approached.  He  would  frequently 
creep  about  with  list  slippers  on  his  feet,  and  he  moved  then 
without  the  slightest  noise.  He  used  to  remind  me  of  a  sly, 
cruel,  bloated,  suspicious,  night-prowling  spide'r. 

When  the  tunneling  approached  its  completion,  all  the  other 
necessary  preparations  were  made.  The  prison  yard,  into  which 
they  would  emerge  from  the  tunnel,  was  sorrounded  by  a  wall 
twenty-five  feet  high,  and  means  for  scaling  that  had  to  be  pro 
vided.  There  was  an  inner  wall  running  from  the  corner  of  the 
"East  Hall"  to  a  smaller  building,  in  which  some  of  the 
female  convicts  were  imprisoned,  but  it  was  comparatively 
low,  and  they  anticipated  little  difficulty  in  getting  over  it. 
The  coverlids  of  several  beds  were  torn  into  strips,  and  the 
strips  were  plaited  into  a  strong  rope  nearly  thirty  feet  in 
length.  A  strong  iron  rod,  used  for  stirring  the  fires  in  the 
stoves,  was  converted  into  a  hook,  and  the  rope  was  attached  to 
it.  Rope  and  hook  were  taken  down  into  the  air-chamber, 
where  all  the  "valuables"  were  stored. 

General  Morgan  had  managed  to  get  a  suit  of  citizen's  cloth 
ing,  and  the  six  men  who  were  going  to  escape  with  him,  were 
similarly  provided.  The  Warden  had  prohibited  the  introduction 
into  the  prison  of  uniform  clothing,  but  occasionally  allowed  plain 
suits  to  be  received.  The  General  had  also  gotten  a  card  of 
the  schedule  time  on  the  Little  Miami  Railroad,  and  knew  when 
the  train  left  Columbus,  and  when  it  arrived  in  Cincinnati — for 
this  he  paid  fifteen  dollars,  the  only  money  used  in  effecting  his 
escape. 

Despite  the  strict  search  instituted,  when  we  first  entered  the 


THE   NUMBER   TO   ESCAPE.  485 

penitentiary,  several  of  the  party  had  managed  to  secrete  money 
so  that  it  was  not  found.  This  was  now  divided  among  the 
seven  who  were  to  escape.  These  were,  besides  General  Mor 
gan,  Captains  Thomas  H.  Hines,  Ralph  Sheldon,  Sam  Taylor, 
Jacob  Bennett,  James  Hockersmith,  and  Gustavus  McGee.  It 
is  plain  that,  as  each  man  was  locked  in  a  separate  cell,  and 
could  not  get  out  of  it  by  the  door,  without  an  interview  with  the 
night-guard,  it  was  necessary  to  cut  an  opening  into  the  air- 
chamber,  through  the  floor  of  each  cell,  from  which  each  one  of 
the  seven  would  escape.  If  these  apertures  were  cut  from  the 
top  of  the  floors  of  the  cells,  the  risk  of  detection  would  be  pro 
portionally  increased;  so  an  accurate  measurement  of  the  dis 
tance  between  the  cells  was  taken,  and  with  Hines'  cell  as  a 
point  of  departure,  it  was  easy  to  calculate  where  to  commence 
cutting  from  underneath,  in  order  that  the  floors  of  all  these 
particular  cells  should  be  perforated.  A  thin  crust,  only,  of  the 
cement  was  left,  but  to  all  outward  appearance,  the  floor  was  as 
sound  as  ever. 

By  means  of  an  arrangement  which  had  been  perfected  for 
obtaining  all  absolutely  necessary  articles,  each  one  of  the  party 
about  to  escape  had  procured  a  stout,  sharp  knife — very  effective 
weapons  in  case  of  surprise  and  an  attempt  to  stop  their  escape. 
When  every  thing  was  ready,  they  waited  several  nights  for  rain 
— trusting  to  elude  the  vigilance  of  the  guards  more  easily  in  the 
obscurity  of  such  a  night — and  taking  the  chance,  also,  that  the 
dogs  which  were  turned  loose  every  night  in  the  yard,  would  be 
driven  by  the  rain  into  their  kennels,  which  were  situated  on  the 
other  side  of  the  yard  from  that  where  they  would  emerge.  Two 
or  three  days  before  the  effort  was  made,  General  Morgan  re 
ceived  a  letter  from  an  Irishwoman  in  Kentucky,  warning  him 
not  to  attempt  to  make  his  escape,  from  which,  she  predicted, 
great  evils  to  him  would  result.  She  alluded  to  his  kindness  to 
the  poor  in  Lexington,  and  claimed  that  she  was  informed  of  the 
future  in  some  supernatural  manner. 

On  the  26th  of  November,  General  Morgan  learned  that  there 


486  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

had  been  a  change  of  military  commandants  at  Columbus.  "Well 
knowing  that  this  would  be  followed  by  an  inspection  of  the 
prison  and  a  discovery  of  the  plot,  he  determined  that  the  effort 
should  be  made  that  very  night.  His  own  cell  was  in  the  second 
range,  from  which  it  was  impossible  to  reach  the  air-chamber 
and  tunnel,  but  the  cell  of  his  brother,  Colonel  Richard  Morgan, 
had  been  prepared  for  him,  and  when  Scott  tapped,  as  usual.,  on 
the  stove,  as  a  signal  for  each  man  to  retire  to  his  cell,  the 
exchange  was  effected.  There  was  a  sufficient  resemblance  be- 
ween  them  to  deceive  a  man  who  would  not  look  closely — espe 
cially  when  they  were  seated  with  their  faces  turned  away  from 
the  door. 

At  any  rate,  Scott  and  the  night  guard,  were  both  deceived, 
and  efforts  were  made  by  the  occupants  of  the  cells  near  to  both 
of  those,  where  close  inspection  would  have  been  dangerous,  to 
attract  to  themselves  the  attention  of  the  guard  when  he  went 
the  rounds.  As  it  was  especially  necessary,  on  this  occasion,  to 
know  certainly  when  the  night-guard  approached,  small  bits  of 
coal  had  been  sprinkled,  just  before  the  hour  for  locking  up  on 
the  floor  of  the  first  range,  so  that  (tread  as  lightly  as  he  would), 
the  slinking  cur  could  riot  help  making  loud  noise. 

It  had  been  arranged  that,  just  after  the  twelve  o'clock  visit 
from  the  guard,  Captain  Taylor  should  descend  into  the  air- 
chamber  and  give  the  signal  underneath  the  floor  of  each  cell. 
Fortunately,  the  only  man  who  was  vile  enough  to  have  betrayed 
the  plan,  was  absent  in  the  hospital.  Six  hours  elapsed  after 
the  locking-in ;  regularly  during  that  time  the  night-guard  went 
his  rounds,  making  an  awful  crackling  as  he  passed  along  the 
lower  range.  Sixty-odd  men  lay  awake,  silent  arid  excited — 
with  hearts  beating  louder  and  blood  rushing  faster  through  their 
veins  than  the  approach  of  battle  had  ever  occasioned.  Perhaps 
the  coolest  of  all  that  number,  were  the  seven  who  were  about  to 
incur  the  risk. 

Twelve  o'clock  struck,  and  the  clang  of  the  bell  seemed  to  be 
in  the  hull  itself — the  guard  passed  with  his  lantern — a  few 


TIIE   SUCCESSFUL   ESCAPE.  487 

minutes  elapsed  (while  the  adventurers  lay  still  lest  he  should 
slip  back),  and  then  at  the  signal  they  sprang  from  their  beds  ; 
hastily  stuffed  flannel  shirts  with  material  prepared  beforehand, 
and  made  up  bundles  to  lie  in  their  beds  and  represent  them. 
Then  stamping  upon  the  floor  above  the  excavations,  the  thin 
crust  of  each  gave  way  and  they  descended  into  the  air-chamber. 
They  passed  one  by  one  along  the  tunnel,  until  the  foremost 
man  reached  the  terminus,  and  with  his  knife  cut  away  the  sod 
which  had  of  course  been  left  untouched.  Then  they  emerged 
into  the  open  air  and  inner  yard. 

The  early  part  of  the  night  had  been  bright  and  clear,  but 
now  it  was  cloudy,  and  rain  was  falling.  They  climbed  the  low 
wall  and  descended  into  the  large  yard.  The  rain  had  caused 
the  sentries  to  seek  shelter,  and  had  driven  the  dogs  to  their 
kennels.  They  moved  cautiously  across  the  yard — if  detected, 
their  knives  must  have  saved  or  avenged  them.  Discovery 
would  have  been  hard  upon  them,  but  it  would  have,  also,  been 
unhealthy  for  the  discoverer.  They  were  resolved  to  be  free— 
they  were  powerful  and  desperate  men — and  if  they  failed,  they 
were  determined  that  others,  besides  themselves,  should  have 
cause  for  sorrow.  But  they  reached  and  climbed  the  outer  wall 
in  safety.  There  was  a  coping  upon  it  which  they  grappled 
with  the  hook,  and  they  climbed,  hand  over  hand,  to  the  top. 
When  all  had  ascended,  the  hook  was  grappeled  upon  the  inner 
shelf  of  the  coping,  and  they  let  themselves  down.  "When  they 
were  all  on  the  ground,  they  strove  to  shake  the  hook  loose, 
but  it  held  fast  and  they  were  forced  to  leave  the  rope  hang 
ing.  That  circumstance  caused  the  detection  of  their  escape 
two  hours  sooner  than  it  would  otherwise  have  happened,  for  the 
rope  was  discovered  at  day  light,  and  the  alarm  was  given.  But 
time  enough  had  been  allowed  the  fugitives  to  make  good  their 
escape.  They  at  once  broke  into  couples. 

General  Morgan  and  Hines  went  straight  to  the  depot.  Hines 
bought  tickets  to  Cincinnati,  and  when  the  train  came  they  got 
on  it. 


488  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

General  Morgan  was  apprehensive  that  they  would  be  asked 
for  passes  or  permits  to  travel,  and  arrested  for  not  having 
them.  He  saw  an  officer  of  field  rank,  seated  in  the  car  which 
he  entered,  and  it  occurred  to  him  that  if  he  were  seen  in  famil 
iar  conversation  with  this  officer,  he  would  not,  perhaps,  be 
asked  for  a  pass.  He  spoke  to  Hines  and  they  seated  them 
selves  near  this  officer  and  courteously  addressed  him — he  re 
plied  as  suavely.  After  a  short  conversation,  General  Morgan 
produced  a  liquor  flask,  they  were  very  generally  carried  then, 
and  invited  the  officer  to  take  a  drink  of  brandy,  which  invita 
tion  was  gracefully  accepted.  Just  then  the  train  moved  past 
the  penitentiary.  "  That  is  the  hotel  at  which  Morgan  stops  I 
believe,"  said  the  officer.  "  Yes,"  answered  the  General,  "  and 
will  stop,  it  is  to  be  hoped.  He  has  given  us  his  fair  share  of 
trouble,  and  he  will  not  be  released.  I  will  drink  to  him.  "  May 
he  ever  be  as  closely  kept  as  he  is  now." 

This  officer  was  a  pleasant  and  well  informed  gentleman,  and 
General  Morgan  passed  the  night  in  an  agreeable  and  instruc 
tive  conversation  with  him — asking  many  questions  and  re 
ceiving  satisfactory  replies. 

When  the  suburbs  of  Cincinnati  were  reached,  a  little  after 
daylight,  it  was  time  to  get  off.  General  Morgan  pulled  the 
bell  rope  and  moved  to  one  platform  ;  Hines  went  to  the  other, 
and  they  put  the  brakes  down  with  all  their  strength.  The 
speed  of  the  train  slackened  and  they  sprang  off. 

Two  or  three  soldiers  were  sitting  on  a  pile  of  lumber,  near 
where  General  Morgan  alighted.  "  What  in  the  h — 11  are  you 
jumping  off  the  train  for  ?  "  asked  one  of  them.  "  What  in  the 
d — 1  is  the  use  of  a  man  going  on  to  town  when  he  lives  out 
here  ?  "  responded  the  General.  "  Besides  what  matter  is  it  to 
you  ?  "  "  Oh  nothing,"  said  the  soldier,  and  paid  him  no  fur 
ther  attention.  Reaching  the  river,  which  runs  close  to  this  point, 
they  gave  a  little  boy  two  dollars  to  put  them  across  in  a  skiff. 

In  Newport,  Kentucky,  they  found  friends  to  aid  them,  and 
before  the  telegraph  had  given  to  Cincinnati  the  information 


ASSISTED    BY   FRIENDS   IN    KENTUCKY.  489 

of  liis  escape,  he  was  well  on  liis  way  to  Boone  county — sure 
asylum  for  such  fugitives.  In  Boone  fresh  horses,  guides, 
and  all  that  was  necessary  were  quickly  obtained.  He  felt  no 
longer  any  apprehension  :  he  could  travel  from  Boone  to  Har 
rison,  or  Scott  counties,  thence  through  Anderson  to  Nelson, 
and  thence  to  the  Tennessee  line  ;  and,  during  all  that  time,  no 
one  need  know  of  his  whereabouts  but  his  devoted  friends,  who 
would  have  died  to  shield  him  from  harm. 

A  writer  who  described  his  progress  through  Kentucky,  short 
ly  after  it  occurred,  says,  truly  :  "  Everybody  vied  with  each 
other  as  to  who  should  show  him  the  most  attention — even  to 
the  negroes  ;  and  young  ladies  of  refinement  begged  the  honor 
of  cooking  his  meals."  He  assumed  more  than  'one  disguise, 
and  played  many  parts  in  his  passage  through  Kentucky — now 
passing  as  a  Government  contractor  buying  cattle,  and  again  as 
a  quartermaster  or  inspector. 

When  he  reached  the  Little  Tennessee  river,  his  serious  diffi 
culties  began ;  in  passing  through  a  portion  of  Tennessee,  he 
had  met  friends  as  truly  devoted  to  him  as  any  of  those  who 
had  assisted  him  in  Kentucky. 

In  portions  of  Middle  Tennessee,  he  was  so  constantly  recog 
nized,  that  it  was  well  for  him  that  he  was  so  universally  popular 
there.  One  day  he  passed  a  number  of  citizens,  and  one  woman 
commenced  clapping  her  hands  and  called  out,  "  Oh  I  know 
who  it  is,"  then  suddenly  catching  herself,  turned  away.  The 
region  in  which  he  struck  the  Little  Tennessee  river,  was 
strongly  Union,  and  the  people  would  have  betrayed  him  to  a 
certainty,  if  they  had  discovered  who  he  was.  The  river  was 
guarded  at  every  point,  and  there  was  no  boat  or  raft  upon  it, 
which  was  not  in  possession  of  the  enemy.  He  was,  in  this 
vicinity,  joined  by  some  thirty  nomadic  Confederates,  and  they 
set  to  work  and  constructed  a  raft  for  him  to  cross  upon. 

When  it  was  finished,  they  insisted  that  he  and  Hines  should 
cross  first — the  horses  were  made  to  swim.  While  General 
Morgan  was  walking  his  horse  about,  with  a  blanket  thrown 


490  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

over  him,  to  recover  him  from  the  chill  occasioned  by  immersion 
in  the  cold  water — he  suddenly  (he  subsequently  declared)  was 
seized  with  the  conviction  that  the  enemy  were  coming  upon 
them,  and  instantly  commenced  to  saddle  his  horse,  biddinw 
Hinc's  do  the  same.  Scarcely  had  they  done  so,  when  the  enemy 
dashed  up  in  strong  force  on  the  other  side  and  dispersed  the 
poor  fellows  who  were  preparing  to  cross  in  their  turn.  He  and 
Hines  went  straight  up  the  mountain  at  the  foot  of  which  they 
had  landed.  It  grew  dark  and  commenced  to  rain — he  knew 
that  if  he  remained  all  night  on  the  mountain,  his  capture  would 
be  a  certain  thing  in  the  morning,  and  he  determined  to  run  the 
gauntlet  of  the  pickets,  at  the  base  of  the  mountain,  on  the  op 
posite  side,  before  the  line  was  strengthened.  As  he  descended, 
leading  his  horse,  he  came  immediately  upon  one  of  the  pickets. 
As  he  prepared  to  shoot  him,  he  discovered  that  the  fellow  slept, 
and  stole  by  without  injuring  or  awakening  him. 

At  the  house  of  a  Union  man  not  far  from  the  base  of  the 
mountain,  the  two  tired  and  hunted  wanderers  found  shelter  and 
supper,  and  General  Morgan,  representing  himself  as  a  Federal 
Quartermaster,  induced  the  host,  by  a  promise  of  a  liberal  sup 
ply  of  sugar  and  coffee,  to  guide  them  to  Athens.  Every  mile 
of  his  route  through  this  country  was  marked  by  some  adven 
ture.  Finally  Hines  became  separated  from  him.  The  General 
sent  him,  one  evening,  to  a  house,  to  inquire  the  way  to  a  cer 
tain  place,  while  he  himself  remained  a  short  distance  off  upon 
the  road.  In  a  few  minutes  he  heard  shots  and  the  tramp  of 
several  horses  galloping  in  the  opposite  direction,  and  he  knew 
at  once  that  Hines  was  cut  off  from  him.  That  night  he  nar 
rowly  escaped  being  shot — that  fate  befell  a  man  mistaken  for 
him.  At  length,  after  hazard  and  toil  beyond  all  description,  he 
reached  the  Confederate  lines.  Hines  was  captured  by  the  party 
who  pursued  him  from  the  house,  and  he  was  confined  in  a  little 
log  hut  that  night,  in  which  his  captors  also  slept.  He  made 
himself  very  agreeable — told  a  great  many  pleasant  stories, 
with  immense  effect.  At  length  the  sentry,  posted  at  the  door, 


THE    OFFICIALS    DISCOVER   THE   ESCAPE.  491 

drew  near  the  fire,  at  the  other  end  of  the  room,  to  hear  the 
conclusion  of  a  very  funny  anecdote.  Hines  seized  the  oppor 
tunity  and  sprang  through  the  door — bade  the  party  good  night, 
and  darted  into  the  bushes.  He  effected  his  escape  and  reached 
Dixie  in  safety. 

When  the  escape  of  General  Morgan,  and  the  others,  was  dis 
covered  on  the  morning  after  it  was  effected — there  was  an  ex 
traordinary  degree  of  emotion  manifested  by  the  penitentiary 
officials.  The  rope,  hanging  upon  the  wall,  was  seen  by  some 
one  at  day  light ;  it  was  apparent  that  some  body  had  escaped, 
the  alarm  was  given  to  the  warden,  and  his  suspicion  at  once 
turned  toward  the  prisoners  of  war. 

About  6  A.  M.,  a  detachment  of  guards  and  turnkeys  poured 
into  the  hall  and  began  running  about,  unlocking  doors  and  call 
ing  on  various  men  by  name,  in  the  wildest  and  most  frantic 
manner.  For  some  time  they  were  puzzled  to  determine  who 
had  escaped.  Colonel  Morgan  was  still  taken  for  the  General, 
and  the  "dummies"  in  the  cells,  which  had  been  vacated,  for 
a  while,  deceived  them  into  the  belief  that  those  cells  were  still 
occupied.  But  at  length,  a  more  careful  and  calm  examination 
revealed  the  fact  and  the  method  of  the  escape,  and  then  the 
hubbub  broke  out  afresh.  In  the  midst  of  it  Captain  Bennett 
called  out,  "  Well  gentlemen,  I  like  a  moderate  stir,  but  you  are 
going  it  too  brash,"  an  expression  of  opinion  which,  to  judge 
from  the  unanimous  shout  of  approval  from  the  prisoners  and 
the  laughter  they  could  no  longer  restrain,  met  with  their  cor 
dial  indorsement. 

It  was  generally  feared  that  Colonel  Morgan  would  be  severely 
dealt  with,  and  he  expected  a  long  term  of  service  in  the  dun 
geon  ;  but  to  the  surprise  and  gratification  of  all  of  us,  it  was 
announced  that  he  was  thought  no  more  guilty  than  the  rest, 
and  should  be  punished  no  more  harshly.  The  first  step  taken 
was  to  remove  all  of  the  first  range  men  to  the  third  range. 
Then  a  general  and  thorough  search  was  instituted.  Every  cell 
was  carefully  examined,  every  man  was  stripped  and  inspected, 


492  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

every  effort  was  made,  after  the  bird  was  flown,  to  make  the 
cage  secure. 

It  was  the  desire  of  every  prisoner,  to  secure  General  Mor 
gan's  escape — that  was  of  paramount  importance.  We  were 
willing  to  trust  to  his  efforts  to  effect  our  release.  We  were  now 
constantly  locked  up  in  our  cells,  night  and  day,  except  when 
we  were  marched  to  our  meals  and  straight  back.  The  cells 
were,  I  have  already  said,  very  small,  and  the  bed  took  up  half 
of  each.  The  only  method  we  had  of  exercising,  was  to  step 
sideways  from  one  end  of  the  cells  to  the  other.  The  weather 
was  intensely  cold,  and  when  the  stone  flooring  of  the  hall  was 
removed  and  a  deep  trench  cut,  in  order  that  the  damage  done 
by  the  tunneling  might  be  repaired,  the  chill  arising  from  the 
damp  earth  was  terrible. 

Every  thing  which  we  had  been  allowed  in  the  way  of  lux 
uries  was  now  forbidden,  except  books.  We  were  forbidden  to 
speak  while  at  the  table,  to  speak  aloud  in  our  cells  after  the 
gas  was  lit  at  night,  to  address  one  of  the  convicts,  even  those 
who  frequented  the  hall  in  which  we  were  confined,  no  matter 
what  the  necessity  might  be.  It  would  be  difficult  to  enumerate 
the  restrictions  which  were  now  imposed  upon  us,  confinement 
in  the  dungeon  being  the  inevitable  penalty  attached  to  the  vio 
lation  of  any  of  these  rules.  These  dungeons  were  really  very 
unpleasant  places  in  which  to  spend  even  the  hours  of  a  peni 
tentiary  life — hours  which  (without  the  proper  experience) 
might  have  appeared  unsusceptible  of  additional  embittermcnt. 
I  saw  the  inside  of  one  of  them  during  my  stay  in  the  "  Institu 
tion,"  and  speak  advisedly  when  I  say  that  the  pious  stock 
company  which  proposed  "to  build  a  hell  by  subscription"  for 
the  especially  heretical,  could  have  found  no  better  model  for 
their  work  than  it.  These  cells  were  rather  smaller  than  the 
cells  in  which  we  were  habitually  confined,  and  the  doors  were 
half  a  foot  thick,  with  sheet-iron  nailed  on  the  outside,  and  so 
contrived  that  (extending  beyond  the  edges  of  the  door)  it  ex 
cluded  every  ray  of  air  and  light.  In  all  seasons,  the  air  within 


PRISON   POLEMICS.  493 

them  was  stagnant,  foul,  and  stifling,  and  would  produce  violent 
nausea  and  headache.  In  summer,  these  places  were  said  to 
be  like  heated  ovens,  and  in  winter  they  were  the  coldest 
localities  between  the  South  Pole  and  Labrador.  The  rations  al 
lowed  the  inmates  of  them  were  a  piece  of  bread  about  the  size 
of  the  back  of  a  pocket  account  book  (and  perhaps  with  as  much 
flavor)  and  half  a  tin-cup  full  of  water,  repeated  twice  a  day.  If 
a  man's  stomach  revolted  at  the  offer  of  food  (after  the  foul  reek 
of  the  dungeon)  the  crop-eared  whelp  of  a  she-wolf  (who  was 
boss-inquisitor)  would  pronounce  him  sulky  and  double  his  term 
of  stay. 

Merion,  the  Warden,  would  about  realize  the  Northern  ideal 
of  a  Southern  overseer.  He  was  an  obstinate  man,  and  his 
cruelty  was  low,  vulgar,  and  brutal  like  his  mind.  He  would 
have  been  hypocritical,  but  that  his  character  was  too  coarse 
grained  to  be  pliant  enough  for  successful  dissimulation.  The 
members  of  the  Board  of  Directors  (with  one  or  two  exceptions) 
were  men  of  much  the  same  stamp  as  the  Warden — with  rather 
more  cultivation  perhaps,  and  less  force.  He  entirely  controlled 
them  all.  He  knew  enough  of  medicine  to  pronounce  quinine 
"  a  luxury,"  but  he  directed  the  treatment  of  the  sick,  as  he  did 
all  else. 

After  some  three  weeks  of  close  confinement,  we  were  per 
mitted  to  exercise  in  the  hall  for  four  hours  during  the  day,  and 
were  locked  in  for  the  rest  of  the  time.  The  nervous  irritability 
induced  by  this  long  and  close  confinement,  sometimes  showed 
itself  in  a  manner  which  would  have  amused  a  man  whose  mind 
was  in  a  healthy  condition.  Just  as  soon  as  we  were  permitted 
to  leave  our  cells  in  the  morning  and  meet  in  the  hall,  the  most 
animated  discussions,  upon  all  sorts  of  topics,  would  begin. 
These  would  occasionally  degenerate  into  clamorous  and  angry 
debates.  The  disputants  would  become  as  earnest  and  excited 
over  subjects  in  which  perhaps  they  had  never  felt  the  least  in 
terest  before,  as  if  they  had  been  considering  matters  of  vital 
and  immediate  importance.  A  most  heated,  and  finally  acri- 


494  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

monious  dispute  once  arose  regarding  General  Joseph  E.  John 
ston's  higlit.  One  party  asserted  positively  that  his  stature  was 
just  five  feet  nine  inches  and  a  quarter.  The  other  affirmed, 
with  a  constancy  that  nothing  could  shake,  that  he  was  no  taller 
than  five  feet  eight  inches  and  a  half.  Numerous  assertions 
were  made  by  as  many  men,  that  they  had  frequently  stood  near 
him,  and  that  he  was  about  their  hight.  If  these  declarations 
were  all  as  true  as  they  were  dogmatic,  the  General's  stature 
must  have  varied  in  a  remarkable  manner,  and  his  tailor  could 
have  had  little  peace  of  mind.  Warm  friendships,  of  long  stand 
ing,  were  interrupted  by  this  issue  for  entire  days,  until  happily 
a  new  question  was  sprung,  and  parties  were  reorganized.  A 
grave  and  radical  difference  of  opinion  arose  as  to  whether  Selma 
was  on  the  east  or  the  west  bank  of  the  Alabama  river.  Two 
intimate  friends  got  into  an  argument  regarding  the  relative  ex 
cellence  of  the  ancients  and  moderns  in  material  civilization  and 
the  mechanical  arts.  The  discussion  lasted  three  weeks;  during 
its  continuance  each  alluded  (in  support  of  his  position)  to  archi 
tectural  and  engineering  triumphs,  which  the  most  learned  en 
cyclopedist  might  in  vain  consult  his  books  or  torture  his  mem 
ory  to  verify.  It  was  at  last  dropped,  unsettled.  But  for  months 
the  most  casual  reference  by  either  to  the  Egyptian  Pyramids, 
or  the  bridge  over  the  Menai  Straits,  would  produce  a  coolness 
between  them.  The  battle  of  Waterloo  was  an  inexhaustible 
theme  of  contention.  Wellington  did  not  wish  for  night  on  the 
day  itself  half  as  cordially  as  he  would  have  wished  for  it,  if  he 
had  been  a  prisoner  at  the  penitentiary  and  condemned  to  listen 
to  the  conflicting  opinions  about  his  strategy. 

Exchange  and  escape,  however,  were  the  topics  of  most  ear 
nest  and  constant  thought.  One  or  the  other  was  the  first 
thought  which  came  into  our  minds  in  the  morning,  and  the  last 
that  occupied  them  at  night.  Victor  Hugo  has,  in  his  wonder 
ful  book,  "Les  Miserables,"  dagucrreotyped  the  thoughts  and  the 
feelings  of  a  prisoner.  That  book  was  a  great  favorite  with  the 
inmates  of  our  hall  and  the  admiration  it  excited  was  so  general 

o 


A    CHANGE    OF   PRISON   GUARD.  495 

and  honest,  that  (it  is  a  literal  fact)  there  was  not  more  than 
one  or  two  disputes  about  it.  Two  of  the  officers  who  escaped 
with  General  Morgan,  Captains  Sheldon  and  Taylor,  were  re 
captured,  and  brought  back  to  the  penitentiary.  They  ventured 
into  Louisville,  where  they  were  well  known,  were  recognized, 
and  arrested. 

After  General  Morgan's  escape,  the  treatment  we  received 
was  not  only  more  rigorous,  but  the  sneaking,  spying  instincts 
of  the  keepers  seemed  stimulated.  It  was,  of  course,  to  be  ex 
pected  that  they  would  be  suspicious  (especially  after  the  lesson 
they  had  received),  but  these  creatures  evinced  suspicion,  not  as 
I  had  been  accustomed  to  see  men  show  it — they  stole  and  pried 
about,  eaves-dropping,  creeping  upon  and  glaring  at  us  (when 
they  thought  they  could  do  so  undetected)  like  cellar  bred,  yel 
low-eyed,  garbage-fed  curs.  Their  manner  gave  one  an  impres 
sion  of  cold  cruelty  and  slinking  treachery  that  is  indescribable, 
it  was  snakish. 

A  military  guard  was  placed  at  the  prison  immediately  after 
the  General's  escape,  and  for  some  time  sentinels  (with  bayonets 
fixed)  paced  the  hall.  None  of  us  had  imagined  that  we  could 
welcome  the  presence  of  Federal  soldiers  with  so  much  satisfac 
tion.  The  difference  in  the  tone  and  manner  of  the  soldiers 
from  that  of  the  convict-drivers,  made  it  a  relief  to  have  any 
thing  to  say  to  the  former.  They  were  evidently  disgusted  with 
their  associate  goalers.  There  was  a  sergeant  with  this  guard 
(named  Lowe,  I  think,)  who,  while  he  rigidly  discharged  his 
duty,  seemed  desirous  to  avoid  all  harshness. 

In  February  I  was  removed,  at  the  solicitation  of  friends,  to 
Camp  Chase.  Having  made  no  application  for  this  removal, 
nor  having  heard  that  one  had  been  made  in  my  behalf,  I  was 
surprised  when  the  order  for  it  came,  and  still  more  surprised 
when  I  learned  at  Camp  Chase  that  I  was  to  be  paroled.  I  was 
permitted  to  go  freely  where  I  pleased  within  the  limits  of  the 
camp,  excellent  quarters  were  assigned  me,  and  my  condition 
was,  in  all  respects,  as  comfortable  as  that  of  the  officers  on  duty 


496  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

there.  Colonel  Richardson,  the  commandant,  was  a  veteran  of 
the  army  of  the  Potomac,  and  had  accepted  the  charge  of  the 
prison  after  he  had  been  disabled  by  wounds.  If  the  treatment 
which  I  received  at  his  hands,  was  a  fair  sample  of  his  conduct 
toward  prisoners  generally,  it  is  certain  that  none  had  a  right  to 
complain  of  him,  and  it  would  have  been  a  fortunate  thing  if 
just  such  men  had  been  selected  (upon  both  sides)  to  be  placed 
over  -those  whose  condition  depended  so  entirely  upon  the  will 
and  disposition  of  the  officers  in  charge  of  them.  Finding  that 
my  parole  was  not  likely  to  result  in  my  exchange,  and  that 
there  was  no  other  Confederate  officer  similarly  indulged,  I  ap 
plied  to  be  sent  back  to  the  penitentiary.  Enough  had  reached 
my  ears  to  convince  me  that  others  would  be  granted  paroles  in 
order  to  tempt  them  to  take  the  oath,  and  I  did  not  care  to  be 
caught  in  such  company. 

When  I  left  Camp  Chase,  where  every  one  had  been  uniformly 
polite  and  respectful  in  demeanor,  and  I  had  enjoyed  privileges 
which  amounted  almost  to  liberty,  the  gloom  of  the  penitentiary 
and  the  surly,  ban-dog  manner  of  the  keepers  were  doubly  dis 
tasteful,  and  the  feeling  was  as  if  I  were  being  buried  alive.  I 
found  that,  during  my  absence,  the  prisoners  had  been  removed 
from  the  hall,  which  they  had  all  the  time  previously  occupied,  to 
another  in  which  the  negro  convicts  had  formerly  slept,  and  this 
latter  was  a  highly-scented  dormitory.  The  cause  of  the  removal 
was  that  (desperate  at  their  long  confinement  and  the  treatment 
they  were  receiving)  a  plan  had  been  concocted  for  obtaining 
knives  and  breaking  out  of  the  prison  by  force.  A  thorough  knowl 
edge  of  the  topography  of  the  entire  building  was  by  this  time 
possessed  by  the  leaders  in  this  movement.  They  had  intended 
to  secure  Merion,  and  as  many  as  possible  of  the  underlings,  by 
enticing  them  into  the  hall  upon  some  pretext,  and  then  gagging, 
binding,  and  locking  them  up  in  the  cells.  Then  giving  the 
signal  for  the  opening  of  the  doors,  they  expected  to  obtain  pos 
session  of  the  office  and  room  where  the  guns  were  kept.  One 
of  the  party  was  to  have  been  dressed  in  convict  garb,  to  give 


THE   IXFAMOUS   INFORMER.  497 

the  necessary  signal,  in  order  that  all  suspicion  might  have  been 
avoided.  It  is  barely  possible  that,  with  better  luck,  the  plan 
might  have  succeeded,  but  it  was  frustrated  by  the  basest 
treachery. 

Among  the  sixty-eight  prisoners  of  war  confined  in  the  peni- 
entiary,  there  were  four  whose  nerves  gave  way  and  they  took 
the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States  in  other  words,  they 
deserted.  One  of  this  four  betrayed  the  plan  to  the  warden. 
Men  were  sometimes  induced  "to  take  the  oath"  by  a  lack  of 
pride  and  fortitude,  and  absence  of  manly  stamina,  who  would 
have  done  nothing  else  prejudicial  to  the  cause  which  they  aban 
doned,  or  that  would  have  compromised  their  former  comrades. 
There  were  men,  however,  who  added  treachery  to  apostacy, 
find  this  man  was  one  of  that  infamous  class.  The  four  were  so 
fearful  of  exciting  the  suspicion  of  the  other  prisoners,  and  so 
well  aware  of  the  bitter  scorn  and  resentment  which  their  con 
duct  would  raise  against  them,  that  they  carefully  concealed 
their  design  to  the  last  moment.  It  was  not  until  our  release 
from  prison,  that  the  proofs  of  the  utter  and  base  treachery  of 
the  spying  and  informing  villian  were  obtained. 

There  is  a  reason  why  the  name  of  this  wretch  should  not  be 
given  here.  Enough  know  of  his  crime  to  damn  him  forever  in 
the  estimation  of  all  honorable  men,  and  gallant  and  devoted 
men,  than  whom  no  truer  gentlemen  and  braver  soldiers  served 
under  the  Confederate  banner,  bear  the  same  name.  His  rela 
tives  {who  fought  throughout  the  war  and  quit  with  records  upon 
which  there  are  no  stains),  must  not  see  the  name  (which  they 
made  honorable),  associated  with  his  shame. 

Search  was  at  once  made  for  the  knives  which  the  prisoners 
had  obtained  and  for  other  evidence  which  might  corroborate 
the  inf'rmer's  report.  Fifteen  knives  had  been  introduced  into 
the  hall,  and  were  in  the  hands  of  as  many  prisoners.  The  search 
was  inaugurated  secretly  and  conducted  as  quietly  as  possible, 
during  the  time  that  the  prisoners  were  locked  in  the  cells,  but/ 
information  was  gotten  along  the  ranges  that  it  was  going  on,  and 
32 


498  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

only  seven  knives  were  discovered.  The  remaining  eight  were 
hidden,  so  ingeniously,  that,  notwithstanding  the  strict  hunt 
after  every  thing  of  the  kind,  they  were  not  found.  Merlon's 
fury  at  the  idea  of  any  danger  threatening  him  was  like  that  of 
some  great  cowardly  beast  which  smells  blood  and  is  driven  mad 
with  fear.  All  of  the  party  were  at  once  closely  confined  again,  and 
the  seven  who  were  detected  with  the  knives,  were  sent  to  the  dun 
geons,  where  they  were  kept  seven  days,  until  the  surgeon  de 
clared  that  a  longer  stay  would  kill  them. 

They  passed  the  period  of  their  confinement  in  almost  con 
stant  motion  (such  as  the  limits  of  the  cell  would  permit),  and 
said  that  they  had  no  recollection  of  having  slept  during  the  whole 
time.  When  they  came  out  they  were  almost  blind  and  could 
scarcely  drag  themselves  along. 

One  of  the  party,  Captain  Barton,  was  so  affected,  that  the 
blood  streamed  from  under  his  finger  nails.  When  I  returned 
(after  a  month  passed  at  Camp  Chase),  I  was  startled  by  the  ap 
pearance  of  those,  even,  who  had  not  been  subjected  to  punish 
ment  in  the  dungeon.  They  had  the  wild,  squalid  look  and 
feverish  eager  impression  of  eye  which  lunatics  have  after  long 
confinement. 

At  last,  in  March  1864,  all  were  removed  to  Fort  Delaware, 
and  the  change  was  as  if  living  men,  long  buried  in  subterranean 
vaults,  had  been  restored  to  upper  earth.  About  the  same  time 
one  hundred  and  ten  officers  of  Morgan's  division,  who  had  been 

O 

confined  in  the  Pennsylvania  Penitentiary,  were  transferred  to 
Point  Lookout.  These  officers  described  the  treatment  which- 
they  received  as  having  been  much  better  than  that  adopted  to 
ward  us,  yet  one  of  their  number  had  become  insane.  All  that 
I  have  attempted  to  describe,  however,  must  have  been  ease  and 
'luxury  compared  with  the  hardship,  hunger  and  harsh  cruelty 
inflicted  upon  the  Confederate  private  soldiers  imprisoned  at 
Camps  Morton  and  Douglass  and  at  Rock  Island.  These  men 
v.ould  often  actually  pick  up  and  devour  the  scraps  thrown  out 
V>f  the  scavenger  carts.  Some  of  them  froze  to  death — insuffi- 


TREATMENT   OF   CONFEDERATE    PRISONERS.  499 

cicnt  fuel  was  furnished,  when  it  was  furnished  at  all,  and  the 
clothing  sent  them  by  friends  was  rarely  given  them.  The  men 
of  my  regiment  told  me  of  treatment,  inflicted  upon  them 
at  Camp  Douglass,  which  if  properly  described  and  illustrated 
with  engravings,  and  if  attributed  to  Confederate  instead  of 
Federal  officials,  would  throw  the  whole  North  into  convulsions. 
Many  of  these  men,  of  this  regiment,  had  escaped  in  the  first  two 
or  three  months  of  their  imprisonment,  and  a  bitter  hatred  was  then 
excited  against  the  less  fortunate.  They  were,  in  some  instances, 
tied  up  and  beaten  with  the  belts  of  the  guards,  until  the  print 
of  the  brass  buckles  were  left  on  the  flesh ;  others  were  made  to 
sit  naked  on  snow  and  ice,  until  palsied  with  cold ;  others,  again, 
were  made  to  "ride  Morgan's  mule"  (as  a  scantling  frame,  of 
ten  or  twelve  feet  in  hight,  was  called),  the  peculiar  and  beauti 
ful  feature  of  this  method  of  torture,  was  the  very  sharp 
back  of  "the  mule."  Sometimes,  heavy  blocks,  humorously 
styled  spurs,  were  attached  to  the  feet  of  the  rider.  As  for 
the  shooting  of  men  for  crossing  the  "  dead  line"  (upon  which 
so  much  stress  has  been  laid  in  accounts  of  Andersonville),  that 
was  so  well  understood,  that  it  was  scarcely  thought  worthy  of 
mention.  But  an  elaborate  description  of  life  in  the  Federal 
prisons  is  unnecessary. 

The  eighty  thousand  Confederate  prisoners  of  1864  and  1865, 
or  rather  the  survivors  of  that  host,  have  already  told  it  far  bet 
ter  than  I  can,  in  their  Southern  homes,  and  we  have  had  suffi 
cient  experience  of,  the  value  of  sympathy  away  from  home,  to 
make  no  effort  for  it.  Moreover,  a  contest  with  the  Yankee 
journalists  is  too  unequal — they  really  write  so  well,  and  are  so 
liberal  in  their  ideas  regarding  the  difference  between  fact  and 
falsehood,  have  so  little  prejudice  for,  or  against  either,  that 
they  possess,  and  employ,  a  tremendous  advantage.  And  then 
the  pictorials — a  special  artist  has  only  to  catch  a  conception, 
in  a  Philadelphia  or  New  York  hospital,  and  straightway  he 
works  off  an  "  Andersonville  prisoner,"  which  carries  conviction 
to  those  who  can  not  read  the  essay,  upon  the  same  subject,  by 


500  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

his  co-laborers  with  the  pen.  What  chance  has  a  Southern 
writer  against  men  who  possess  such  resources  ?  At  Fort  Del 
aware,  General  Schoeff,  the  commandant,  placed  some  eighteen 
or  twenty  of  us  in  the  rooms  built  in  the  casemates  of  the  fort, 
and  allowed  us,  for  some  time,  the  privilege  of  walking  about 
the  island,  upon  our  giving  him  our  paroles  not  to  attempt  escape. 

General  M.  Jeff.  Thompson,  of  Missouri,  was  the  only  Con 
federate  officer  at  that  prison,  before  our  party  arrived,  but 
many  others  from  Camp  Chase,  came  about  the  same  time. 
General  Thompson's  military  career,  is  well  known  to  his  coun 
trymen,  but  only  his  prison  companions  know  how  kind  and 
manly  he  can  be,  under  circumstances  which  severely  try  the 
temper.  His  unfailing  flow  of  spirits  kept  every  one  else,  in  his 
vicinity,,  cheerful  and  his  hopefulness  was  contagious.  He  pos 
sessed,  also,  an  amazing  poetical  genius.  He  wrote  with  surpris 
ing  fluency,  and  his  finest  compositions  cost  him  neither  trouble 
nor  thought.  Shut  him  up  in  a  room  with  plenty  of  stationery, 
and  in  twenty-four  hours,  he  would  write  himself  up  to  the  chin 
in  verse.  His  muse  was  singularly  prolific  and  her  progeny 
various.  He  roamed  recklessly  through  the  realm  of  poesy. 
Every  style  seemed  his — blank  verse  and  rhyme,  ode  and  epic, 
lyrical  and  tragical,  satiric  and  elegiac,  sacred  and  profane,  sub 
lime  and  ridiculous,  he  was  equally  good  at  all.  His  poetry 
might  not  perhaps  have  stood  a  very  strict  classification,  but  he 
produced  a  fair,  marketable  sample,  which  deserved  (his  friends 
thought)  to  be  quoted  at  as  liberal  figures  as  some  about  which 
much  more  was  said.  General  Thompson  would  doubtless  have 
been  more  successful  as  a  poet,  if  he  had  been  a  less  honest  and 
practical  business  man.  He  persisted  in  having  some  meaning 
in  all  that  he  wrote,  and  only  a  first  class  poet  can  afford  to  do 
that. 

The  cunning  New  England  method  is  also  the  safest  in  the 
long  run — when  a  versifier  suspects  that  he  lacks  the  true  in 
spiration,  he  had  better  try  the  confidence  game,  and  induce  the 
public  to  admire  by  writing  that  which  no  one  can  understand. 


PRISON   REGULATIONS.  501 

It  would  seem,  too,  that  writing  poetry  and  playing  on  the  fiddle 
have  this  much  in  common,  that  a  true  genius  at  either  is  fit  for 
nothing  else.  The  amateurs  can  take  care  of  themselves,  but 
the  born-masters  display  an  amiable  worthlessness  for  every 
thing  but  their  art.  Now  General  Thompson  was  thoroughly 
wide-awake  and  competent  in  all  practical  matters. 

At  Fort  Delaware  the  prevailing  topic  of  conversation  was 
exchange  ;  men  who  were  destined  to  many  another  weary  month 
of  imprisonment,  sustained  themselves  with  the  hope  that  it 
would  soon  come.  At  last  a  piece  of  good  fortune  befell  some 
of  us.  It  was  announced  that  General  Jones,  the  officer  in  com 
mand  at  Charleston,  had  placed  fifty  Federal  officers  in  a  part 
of  the  city  where  they  would  be  exposed  to  danger  from  the 
batteries  of  the  besiegers.  An  order  was  issued  that  fifty  Con 
federate  officers,  of  corresponding  rank,  should  be  selected  for 
retaliation.  Five  general  and  forty-five  field  officers  were  ac 
cordingly  chosen  from  the  different  prisons,  Fort  Delaware 
furnishing  a  large  delegation  for  that  purpose.  The  general 
officers  selected  were  Major  General  Frank  Gardner,  the 
gallant  and  skillful  commander  of  Port  Hudson  ;  Major-Gen 
eral  Edward  Johnson,  one  of  the  fighting  Generals  of  the  array 
of  Northern  Virginia  (which  is  to  say  one  of  the  bravest 
of  the  very  brave),  and  a  true  man,  whose  sterling  worth,  intel 
ligence  and  force  of  character  would  win  him  respect  and  influ 
ence  wherever  those  qualities  were  valued;  Brigadier-General 
Stewart,  of  the  Maryland  brigade,  another  officer  who  had  won 
promotion  in  that  heroic  army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  had 
identified  his  name  with  its  deathless  fame.  There  was  still 
another  of  these  fortunate  men — fortunate  in  having  helped  to 
win  fields  where  Confederate  soldiers  had  immortalized  the  title 
— Brigadier- General  Archer  was  the  fourth  general  officer.  A 
favorite  officer  of  General  A.  P.  Hill,  he  was  in  every  respect 
worthy  of  a  hero's  friendship  and  confidence.  The  fifth  was 
Brigadier- General  M.  Jeff.  Thompson.  Among  the  field  officers 
who  went  were  seven  of  the  penitentiary  prisoners — Colonels 


502 

Ward,  Morgan,  and  Tucker,  Majors  Webber,  Steele,  and  Iligley 
and  myself. 

We  left  our  comrades  with  a  regret,  felt  for  their  bad  fortune, 
for  we  felt  assured  that  our  apparent  ill-luck  would  terminate  in 
an  exchange.  Colonel  Coleman,  who  had  been  confined  in  the 
Fort  with  the  party  of  which  so  many  were  sent  on  this  "  expe 
dition,"  was  bitterly  disappointed  at  being  left  behind,  and  we 
regretted  it  equally  as  much.  Three  of  our  companions  through 
so  many  vicissitudes,  we  never  saw  again — three  of  the  worthiest 
— Captains  Griffin,  Mullins,  and  Wardour  died  shortly  afterward. 

On  the  26th  of  June,  we  were  put  on  board  of  a  steamer,  and 
puffed  away  down  the  Delaware  river.  It  was  confidently  affirmed 
that  we  were  going  to  be  placed  on  Morris  Island,  where  the 
Charleston  batteries  would  have  fair  play  at  us,  so  that  our 
friends  (blissfully  unconscious  of  how  disagreeable  they  were 
making  themselves)  might  speedily  finish  us.  The  prospect  was 
not  absolutely  inviting,  but  after  the  matter  was  talked  over, 
and  General  Gardner,  especially,  consulted  (as  he  had  most  ex 
perience  in  heavy  artillery),  we  felt  more  easy.  General  Thomp 
son,  who  had  fought  that  way  a  good  deal,  said  that  "  a  man's 
chance  to  be  struck  by  lightning  was  better  than  to  be  hit  by  a 
siege  gun."  This  consoled  me  very  little,  for  I  had  all  my  life 
been  nervously  afraid  of  lightning.  However,  we  at  last  settled  it 
unanimously  that,  while  we  would  perhaps  be  badly  frightened 
by  the  large  bombs,  there  was  little  likelihood  of  many  being  hurt, 
and,  at  any  rate,  the  risk  was  very  slight  compared  with  the 
brilliant  hope  of  its  resulting  in  exchange. 

After  we  got  fairly  to  sea,  very  little  thought  was  wasted  on 
other  matters.  The  captain  of  the  vessel,  said  that  there  was 
"no  sea  on,"  or  some  such  gibberish,  and  'talked  as  if  we  were 
becalmed,  at  the  very  time  that  his  tipsy  old  boat  was  bobbing 
about  like  a  green  rider  on  a  trotting  horse.  It  is  a  matter  of 
indifference,  what  sort  of  metal  encased  the  hearts  of  those  who 
first  tempted  the  fury  of  the  seas,  but  they  must  have  had  stomachs 
lined  with  mahogany.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  men,  when  they 


TRIP    TO   HILTON   HEAD.  503 

unblushingly  declare  that  they  go  to  sea  for  pleasure.  There 
has  been  a  great  deal  of  pretentious  declamation  about  the  poetry 
and  beauty  of  the  ocean. 

Some  people  go  off  into  raptures  about  a  "vast  expanse'7  of 
dirty  salt  water,  which  must,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  associ 
ated  in  every  one's  mind  with  sick  stomachs  and  lost  dinners. 
The  same  people  get  so  tired  of  their  interminable  view  of  poetry, 
that  they  will  nearly  crowd  each  other  overboard,  to  get  sight 
of  a  stray  flying  fish,  or  porpoise,  or  the  back  fin  of  a  shark 
sticking  out  of  the  water.  This  trip  to  Hilton  Head  came  near 
taking  the  poetry  out  of  General  Thompson. 

Ten  of  us  were  lodged  in  a  cabin  on  the  upper  deck,  where  we 
did  very  well,  except  that  for  one  half  of  the  time  we  were  too 
sick  to  eat  any  thing,  and  for  the  other  half  we  were  rolling  and 
tumbling  about  in  such  a  manner  that  we  could  think  of  nothing 
but  keeping  off  of  the  cabin's  roof.  The  others  were  stowed 
away  '^amidships,"  or  in  some  other  place,  down  stairs,  and  as 
all  the  ports  and  air-holes  were  shut  up,  when  the  steamer  be 
gan  to  wallow  about,  they  were  nearly  smothered,  and  their  nau 
sea  was  greatly  increased.  They  were  compelled  to  bear  it,  for 
they  could  not  force  their  way  on  deck  and  they  had  nothing 
with  which  to  scuttle  the  ship.  One  western  officer  declared  to 
me  afterward,  that  he  seriously  thought,  at  one  time,  that  he  had 
thrown  up  his  boot  heels. 

When  we  reached  Hilton  Head,  we  were  transferred  to  the 
brig  "  Dragoon"  (a  small  vessel  lying  in  the  harbor),  and  she 
was  then  anchored  under  the  guns  of  the  frigate  Wabash.  Here 
•we  remained  five  weeks.  The  weather  was  intensely  hot.  During 
the  day  we  were  allowed  to  go  on  deck,  in  reliefs  of  twenty-five 
each,  und  stay  alternate  hours,  but  at  night  we  were  forced  to 
remain  below  decks.  A  large  stove  (in  full  blast  until  after 
nightfall),  at  one  end  of  the  hold  in  which  we  were  confined,  did 
not  make  the  temperature  any  more  agreeable.  The  ports  were 
kept  shut  up,  for  fear  that  some  of  the  party  would  jump  out 
and  swim  eight  miles  to  the  South  Carolina  shore.  As  there 


504  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

were  fifty  soldiers  guarding  us  and  three  ship's  boats  (full  of 
men),  moored  to  the  vessel,  there  was  little  reason  to  apprehend 
any  thing  of  the  kind. 

The  sharks  would  have  been  sufficient  to  have  deterred  any  of 
us  from  attempting  to  escape  in  that  way.  There  was  a  diffe 
rence  of  opinion  regarding  their  appetite  for  human  flesh,  but  no 
man  was  willing  to  personally  experiment  in  the  matter.  A  con 
stant  negotiation  was  going  on  during  these  five  weeks,  between 
the  authorities  at  Hilton  Head  and  Charleston,  which  seemed 
once  or  twice  on  the  point  of  being  broken  off,  but  fortunately 
managed  each  time  to  survive. 

We  were  never  taken  to  Morris'  Island,  although  our  chances 
for  that  situation,  seemed  more  than  once,  extremely  good.  Sub- 
^sequently  a  party  of  six  hundred  Confederate  officers  were  taken 
there,  and  quartered  where  they  would  have  the  full  benefit  of 
the  batteries.  None,  however,  were  injured  by  the  shells,  but 
three  fourths  of  them  were  reduced  to  a  condition  (almost  as  bad 
as  death),  b}7  scurvy  and  other  diseases,  brought  about  by  expo 
sure  and  bad  food.  At  last,  on  the  1st  of  August,  it  was  au- 
thoritively  announced  that  we  were  to  be  taken  on  the  next  day 
to  Charleston  to  be  exchanged.  Only  those  who  have  them 
selves  been  prisoners,  can  understand  what  our  feelings  then 
-were— when  the  hope  that  had  become  as  necessary  to  our  lives 
as  the  breath  we  drew,  was  at  length  about  to  be  realized.  That 
night  there  was  little  sleep  among  the  fifty — but  they  passed  it 
in  alternate  raptures  of  congratulation  at  their  good  luck,  or 
shivering  apprehension  lest,  after  all,  something  might  occur  to 
prevent  it. 

But  when  the  next  day  came  and  we  were  all  transferred  to  a 
steamer,  a.nd  her  head  was  turned  for  Charleston,  we  began  to 
master  all  doubts  and  fears.  We  reached  Charleston  harbor  very 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  3rd,  lay  at  anchor  for  two  or  three 
hours,  and  then  steamed  slowly  in  toward  the  city,  until  we 
passed  the  last  monitor,  and  halted  again.  In  a  short  time,  a 
small  boat  came  out  from  Charleston,  with  the  fifty  Federal  pris- 


EXCHANGED   AT   LAST.  505 

oners  on  board  and  officers  of  General  Jones'  staff,  authorized  to 
conclude  the  exchange.  When  she  came  alongside,  the  final  ar 
rangements  were  effected,  but  not  until  a  mooted  point  hau 
threatened  to  break  off  the  negotiation  altogether.  Happily  for 
us,  we  knew  nothing  of  this  difficulty  until  it  was  all  over,  but 
we  were  made  very  nervous  by  the  delay.  When  all  the  de 
tails  were  settled,  we  were  transferred  to  the  Confederate  boat, 
and  the  Federal  officers  were  brought  on  board  of  the  steamer 
which  we  left ;  then  touching  hats  to  the  crew  we  parted  from, 
we  bade  our  captivity  farewell. 

Twelve  months  of  imprisonment,  of  absence  from  all  we  loved, 
was  over  at  last.  No  man  of  that  party  could  describe  his  feel 
ings  intelligibly — a  faint  recollection  of  circumstances  is  all  that 
can  be  recalled  in  such  a  tumult  of  joy.  As  we  passed  down  the 
bay,  the  gallant  defenders  of  those  works  around  Charleston,  the 
names  of  which  have  become  immortal,  stood  upon  the  parapets 
and  cheered  to  us,  and  we  answered  like  men  who  were  hailing 
for  life.  The  huge  guns,  which  lay  like  so  many  grim  watch 
dogs  around  the  city,  thundered  a  welcome,  the.  people  of  the 
heroic  city  crowded  to  the  wharves  to  receive  us.  If  anything 
could  repay  us  for  the  wretchedness  of  long  imprisonment  and 
our  forced  separation  from  families  and  friends,  we  found  it  in 
the  unalloyed  happiness  of  that  day. 

General  Jones  had  then  (and  has  now),  the  profound  gratitude 
of  fifty  of  his  comrades.  Ever  doing  his  duty  bravely  and  un 
flinchingly,  he  had,  now,  ransomed  from  the  enemy,  men  who 
would  have  consented  to  undergo  any  ordeal  for  that  boon.  The 
citizens  of  Charleston  hastened  to  offer  us  the  traditional  hospi 
tality  of  their  city.  General  Jones  had  informed  them  of  the 
names  of  our  party,  and  they  had  settled  among  themselves 
where  each  man  was  to  be  taken  care  of.  If  that  party  of  "ran 
somed  sinners"  shall  ever  become  "praying  members"  the 
Charlestonians  will  have  a  large  share  in  their  petitions 

But  the  recollection  of  our  gallant  comrades  left  behind  would 
intrude  itself  and  make  us  sad,  ever  in  the  midst  of  our  good 


506  HISTORY    OF   MORGAN  S   CAVALRY. 

fortune.  Some  of  them  were  not  released  until  the  summer 
after  the  close  of  the  war. 

No  men  deserve  more  praise  for  constancy  than  the  Confed 
erate  prisoners,  especially  the  private  soldiers,  who  in  the  trials 
to  which  they  were  subjected  steadfastly  resisted  every  induce 
ment  to  violate  the  faith  they  had  pledged  to  the  cause. 

A  statistical  item  may  not  come  amiss,  in  concluding  this 
chapter.  There  were,  in  all  during  the  war,  261,000  Northern 
prisoners  in  Southern  prisons,  and  200,000  Confederate  prisoners 
in  Northern  prisons. ;  22,576  Northern  prisoners  died,  and 
22,535  Confederate  prisoners  died;  or  two  Federals  died  out  of 
every  twenty-three,  and  two  Confederates  died  out  of  every 
fifteen. 


REORGANIZATION  UNDER  COLONEL  JOHNSON.       507 


CHAPTER    XVI. 

THE  men  who  made  their  escape  from  Ohio,  after  the  disastrous 
fight  at  Buffington,  marched  for  many  a  weary  mile  through  the 
mountains  of  Virginia.  At  last,  worn  down  and  half  famished, 
they  gained  the  Confederate  lines,  and  first  found  rest  at  the 
beautiful  village  of  Wytheville,  in  Southwestern  Virginia. 

Thence  they  passed  leisurely  down  the  fair  valley,  not  then 
scarred  by  the  cruel  ravages  of  war,  to  -the  vicinity  of  Knoxville. 
Colonel  Adam  R.  Johnson  then  endeavored  to  collect  and  or 
ganize  them  all.  "  On  the  —  of  August,  1863,"  says  an  officer 
who  was  a  valuable  assistant  in  this  work,  "  Colonel  Johnson 
issued  orders,  under  instructions  from  General  Buckner,  De 
partment  Commander,  for  all  men  belonging  to  Morgan's  com 
mand  to  report  to  him  (Colonel  J.)  at  Morristown,  in  East  Ten 
nessee.  These  orders  wrere  published  in  the  Knoxville  papers, 
and  upon  it  becoming  known  that  there  was  a  place  of  rendez 
vous,  every  man  who  had  been  left  behind  wrhen  General  Morgan 
started  on  the  Ohio  raid  now  pushed  forward  eagerly  to  the 
point  designated.  When  that  expedition  was  undertaken,  many 
had  been  sent  back  from  Albany  as  guards  for  returning  trains, 
and  because  their  horses  were  unserviceable.  Many,  too,  had 
to  be  left  on  account  of  sickness  or  disability  from  wounds.  In 
a  week  or  ten  days,  Colonel  Johnson  had  collected  between  four 
and  five  hundred  men  (including  those  who  made  their  escape 
from  Ohio)  in  his  camp  at  Morristown.  These  men  were  organ 
ized  into  two  battalions — one  commanded  by  Captain  Kirkpa- 
trick,  representing  the  first  brigade  of  the  division,  and  the  other 
commanded  by  Captain  Dortch,  representing  the  second  brigade. 

"  The  camp  was  well  selected,  with  wood  and  water  in  abun 
dance,  and  plenty  of  forage  in  the  neighborhood.  Colonel  J. 


508  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

was  making  great  efforts  to  have  the  men  paid  off,  and  properly 
armed,  clothed,  etc.,  when  the  enemy  moved  upon  Knoxville. 
The  evacuation  of  that  place  by  our  troops  made  it  necessary 
for  us  to  leave  our  comfortable  resting  place.  We  immediately 
broke  camp  at  Morristown,  and  joined  General  Buckner,  who 
was  moving  to  reinforce  General  Bragg  in  front  of  Chatta 
nooga.  *,/***  *  At  Calhoun,  the 
men  were  paid  off,  and  received  a  scanty  supply  of  clothing. 
Many  of  them  had  not  been  paid  before  for  fourteen  months. 
From  Calhoun  we  were  ordered  to  Lafayette,  from  Lafayette  to 
Dalton,  thence  to  Tunnel  Hill.  On  the  morning  of  the  18th  of 
September,  the  whole  army  moved  out  for  battle.  Our  small 
force  was  ordered  to  report  to  General  Forrest,  and  did  so  about 
ten  A.  M.  on  the  field.  We  were  immediately  deployed  as  skir 
mishers,  mounted,  in  front  of  Hood's  division,  of  Longstreet's 
Corps,  just  come  from  Virginia.  As  the  men  galloped  by  For 
rest,  he  called  to  them  in  language  which  inspired  them  with 
still  higher  enthusiasm.  He  urged  them  to  do  their  whole  duty 
in  the  battle.  He  spoke  of  their  chief,  who  had  been  insulted 
with  a  felon's  treatment,  and  was  then  lying  in  the  cell  of  a 
penitentiary.  He  gave  them  'Morgan'  for  a  battle-cry,  and 
bade  them  maintain  their  old  reputation. 

"  The  infantry  objected  to  having  '  the  d — d  cavalry  '  placed  in 
front  of  them  in  a  fight.  But  they  did  not  easily  catch  up  with 
'the  d — d  cavalry.'  After  moving  briskly  forward  for  perhaps 
half  a  mile,  through  the  tangled  undergrowth  of  pine,  the  clear 
crack  of  rifles  told  that  the  enemy  was  on  the  alert.  Driving  in 
their  pickets,  we  pushed  on  and  found  a  regiment  of  cavalry  in 
line  to  receive  us.  This  fled  upon  the  receipt  of  the  first  volley. 
The  undergrowth  was  too  thick  for  maneuvering  on  horseback, 
and  we  were  dismounted  and  advanced  at  double-quick.  Our 
boys  were  anxious  to  drive  the  enemy  and  keep  them  going 
without  letting  the  infantry  overtake  us.  The  enemy  first  en 
gaged  fell  back  upon  a  supporting  regiment.  We  soon  drove 
both  back  upon  a  third.  By  this  time  our  small '  Lay  out '  found  the 


BATTLE     OF    CHICKAMAUGA.  509 

figliting  rather  interesting.  Engaging  three  time  our  number, 
and  attacking  every  position  the  enemy  chose,  was  very  glorious 
excitement,  but  rather  more  of  it  than  our  mouths  watered  for. 
Yet  no  man  faltered — all  rushed  on  as  reckless  of  the  opposing 
array  of  danger  as  of  their  own  alignment.  * 

"The  enemy  had  formed  in  the  edge  of  a  woods,  in  front  of 
which  was  an  open  field.  This  field  was  fought  over  again  and 
again,  each  side  charging  alternately,  and  forced  back.  At  last 
a  charge  upon  our  part,  led  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Martin,  was 
successful.  The  enemy  fell  back  still  farther.  We  now  saw 
clearly  from  many  indications,  and  were  told  by  prisoners,  that 
the  Federal  line  of  battle,  the  main  force,  was  not  far  off.  We, 
therefore,  moved  more  cautiously.  Just  about  sundown,  we 
found  the  enemy's  cavalry  drawn  up  directly  in  front  of  the  in 
fantry,  but  they  made  little  resistance.  After  one  or  two  vol 
leys,  they  fell  back  behind  the  protecting  'Web-feet.'  Night  falling 
stopped  all  further  operations  for  that  day.  We  camped  in  line 
of  battle,  and  picketed  in  front.  On  the  morning  of  the  19th, 
we  were  ordered  to  report  to  Colonel  Scott,  and  found  him  en 
gaging  the  enemy  on  our  extreme  right,  at  the  '  Red  House. 
Colonel  Scott  gave  us  position,  dismounted,  and  put  us  in.  The 
fighting  continued  at  intervals  throughout  the  day. 

"Late  in  the  evening  Scott  made  a  vigorous  charge  and  drove 
the  enemy  handsomely.  We  learned  from  prisoners  that  we  had 
been  fighting  a  select  body  of  infantry  commanded  by  General 
Whitaker  of  Kentucky,  which  had  been  detailed  to  guard  the 
ford,  here,  across  the  Chickamauga.  The  fighting  ceased  at 
nightfall  and  we  were  again  camped  in  line  of  battle.  The 
fighting  of  the  next  day  was  very  similar  to  that  of  the  previous 
ones — the  enemy  falling  back  slowly  with  his  face  toward  us. 
But  late  in  the  evening  the  retreat  became  a  rout.  The  army 
made  no  attack  on  the  21st.  In  the  afternoon  Colonel  Scott 
was  sent  with  his  brigade  over  Missionary  ridge  into  the  valley, 
and  engaged  a  few  scattered  cavalry  and  an  Illinois  regiment 
of  infantry — capturing  nearly  all  of  the  latter  before  they  could 


510  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

reach  the  works    around  Chattanooga.     Formin^   his   brigade 

o  o  o 

Colonel  Scott  sent  a  portion  of  our  command,  on  foot,  to  recon- 
noiter  the  enemy's  position.  The  reconnoitering  party  drove  in 
the  pickets,  took  the  outside  rifle  pits,  and  forced  the  enemy  to 
their  breastworks  and  forts. 

"This  closed  the  battle  of  Chickamauga — Morgan's  men  firing 
the  first  and  last  shot  in  that  terrible  struggle. 

"  General  Forrest  and  Colonel  Scott,  both  complimented  our 
little  command  more  than  once  during  the  battle.  Immediately 
after  the  battle,  the  entire  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee 
was  actively  employed.  The  two  battalions  of  our  command 
were  separated.  Dortch  going  with  Forrest  up  the  Chattanooga 
and  Knoxville  railroad.  Kirkpatrick  went  with  Wheeler  on  his 
raid  through  Middle  Tennessee.  Dortch  was  in  the  fight  (against 

O  O  \     O 

Woolford)  at  Philadelphia — in  the  skirmishes  at  Loudon  and 
Marysville,  and  was  at  the  siege  of  Knoxville.  Kirkpatrick's 
battalion  was  at  the  fights  at  McMinnville,  Murfreesboro',  Shel- 
byville  and  Sugar  creek.  In  the  latter  fight,  Wheeler's  whole 
force  fell  back  rapidly,  and  Kirkpatrick  was  kept  in  the  rear 
until  we  reached  the  Tennessee  river.  When  we  returned  to  the 
army,  Kirkpatrick's  battalion  was  placed  on  severe  picket  duty — 
its  line  extending  from  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga  up  the 
Tennessee  some  three  miles,  where  it  connected  with  the  line 
of  the  First  Kentucky  cavalry. 

tk  This  duty  was  exceedingly  heavy.  The  pickets  stood  in 
squads  of  three  every  four  hundred  yards,  with  mounted  patrols 
to  ride  the  length  of  the  whole  line.  One  would  suppose  that 
men  who  had  ridden  through  the  States  of  Tennessee,  Kentucky, 
Ohio,  Indiana,  Virginia  and  Georgia,  and  been  in  as  many  as 
twenty-five  or  thirty  engagements,  in  the  space  of  three  months, 
•  would  be  completely  worn  out,  discouraged,  and  disheartened. 
Not  so,  however,  the  few  left  were  willing  and  anxious  to  thor 
oughly  do  soldier's  duty." 

The  writer  goes  on  to  narrate  how  after  all  these  trials,  came 
the  order  to  dismount  Morgan's  men — generous  reward  for  their 


OVATIONS  TO  GENERAL  MORGAN.  511 

toil  and  sacrifices.  He  speaks  of  Forrest's  gallant  stand  against 
it — preventing  the  execution  of  the  order,  but  costing  the  liigh- 
souled  chief  his  own  command,  forcing  him  to  seek  other  fields 
of  enterprise,  and  with  an  organization  of  conscripts  and  ab-' 
sentees  win  fights  that  a  romancer  would  not  dare  to  imagine. 
He  speaks,  too,  of  unhappy  dissensions  among  officers  which 
added  to  the  discouraging  condition  of  the  little  command. 

C         O 

But  the  brave  fellows  patiently  endured  all — watching  and 
hoping  fondly  for  the  return  of  the  imprisoned  leader.  The  two 
battalions  were  at  length  placed  in  a  brigade  commanded  by 
Colonel  Grigsby;  in  which  were  the  Ninth  and  First  Ken 
tucky. 

The  writer  describes  the  dreary  days  and  long  cold  nights  of 
that  winter.  The  arduous  duty — men  shivering  through  the 
dark,  dragging  hours,  with  eyes  fixed  on  the  enemy's  signal 
lights  burning  on  Waldron's  ridge  and  Lookout  mountain. 
Then  the  Federal  battalions  pouring,  one  night,  across  the  river 
— the  bright  blaze  and  quick  crash  of  rifles,  suddenly  breaking 
out  along  the  picket  line.  The  hurried  saddling  and  rapid  re 
inforcement,  but  the  steady  Federal  advance  driving  the  cavalry 
back.  Even  amid  the  snarl  of  musketry  and  roar  of  cannon, 
could  be  heard  the  splash  of  the  boats  plying  from  shore  to 
shore.  Couriers  were  sent  to  army  headquarters,  with  the  in 
formation,  but,  losing  their  way  in  the  pitch  darkness,  did  not 
report  until  day  light.  Next  day  came  the  grand  Federal  at 
tack  and  the  terrible  and  unaccountable  <l  stampede  "  of  the  en 
tire  Confederate  army  from  Missionary  ridge — that  army  which 
a  few  weeks  before  had  won  the  great  victory  of  Chickamauga.  * 

When  General  Bragg  halted  at  Dalton,  this  brigade  was  again 
posted  on  the  front  and  suffered,  hungry,  half  clad  (many  bare 
footed),  through  that  awful  winter. 

But  a  great  joy  awaited  them — before  the  spring  came  it 
brought  them  relief.  General  Morgan  made  his  way  safely 
(after  bis  escape)  to  the  Confederate  lines.  All  along  his  route 
through  South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  he  was  met  by  a  series  of 


512  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

heart-felt  ovations.  Crowds  flocked  to  congratulate  him.  All 
the  people  united  in  greeting  him.  The  officials  in  all  the  towns 
he  visited,  prepared  his  reception.  The  highest  and  lowest  in 
the  land  were  alike  eager  to  do  him  honor.  The  recollection  of 
his  former  career  and  the  romantic  incidents  of  his  escape  com 
bined  to  create  a  wonderful  interest  in  him.  Perhaps  no  man 
ever  received  such  a  welcome  from  the  people  of  his  choice.  At 
Richmond,  the  interest  manifested  in  him  knew  no  bounds.  He 
was  the  guest  of  the  city  for  weeks — but  none  others  felt  the 
true  and  earnest  satisfaction  at  his  deliverance  and  return, 
which  repaid  the  devoted  band  of  his  followers  who  had  so  anx 
iously  looked  for  him.  The  Morgan  men  felt,  in  the  knowledge 
that  their  idolized  leader  was  safe,  a  consolation  for  all  that 
they  had  endured. 

General  Morgan's  first  care,  upon  arriving  at  Richmond,  was 
to  strongly  urge  measures  which  he  thought  would  conduce,  if 
not  to  the  release,  at  least  to  a  mitigation  of  the  rigorous  treat 
ment  of  his  officers  and  men  in  prison.  He  repeatedly  brought 
the  subject  to  the  notice  of  the  Confederate  authorities,  but  per 
fect  indifference  was  manifested  regarding  it.  The  officials 
found  nothing  in  their  soft  berths  at  Richmond  which  could 
enable  them  to  realize  the  discomforts  of  a  prison,  and  the  chances 
of  their  own  captivity  appeared  so  remote  that  they  really  could 
not  sympathize  with  those  who  had  the  ill-luck  to  be  captured. 
Just  before  leaving  Richmond,  General  Morgan  addressed  a 
letter  to  President  Davis,  dated  the  24th  of  March,  in  which  he 
declared  that,  while,  imperatively  summoned  by  a  sense  of  duty 
to  place  himself  at  the  head  of  the  remnant  of  his  old  division, 
which  was  still  in  the  field,  he  desired  to  earnestly  press  the 
claims  of  those  who  were  captive  to  the  best  offices  of  their  Gov 
ernment.  No  men,  he  said,  better  deserved  than  his  own  "the 
proud  title  of  Confederate  soldiers/'  and  none  had  a  better  right 
to  expect  that  every  effort  would  be  made  by  their  countrymen 
in  their  behalf.  He  stated  that  in  his  entire  service,  "  not  one 
act  of  cruelty  was  ever  committed  by  men  of  my  command,  but 


A   NEW   REFORM.  513 

prisoners  of  war  met  with  uniform  good  treatment  at  our  hands." 
In  response  to  all  this,  Commissioner  Ould  made  a  public  protest 
against  the  treatment  of  the  officers  confined  in  the  peniten 
tiaries,  and  was  assured  that  their  condition  was  good  enough 
and  would  not  be  bettered. 

General  Morgan  was  naturally  desirous  of  having  all  of  the 
men  of  his  old  command  assigned  him,  but  in  this  he  was  griev 
ously  disappointed.  Breckinridge's  regiment,  the  Ninth  Ken 
tucky,  was  positively  refused  him  ;  nor  was  he  permitted  to  have 
Dortch's  battalion,  although  it  was  composed  of  men  from  more 
than  one  regiment  of  his  old  division,  the  bulk  of  which  was  in 
prison.  Kirkpatrick's  battalion  petitioned  to  be  assigned  to 
him,  immediately  that  the  news  of  his  arrival  within  the  Confed 
erate  lines  was  known.  General  Morgan  was,  in  this  respect, 
the  victim  of  an  utterly  absurd  policy  regarding  organization 
and  discipline,  which  was  prevalent  about  this  time  among  the 
military  sages  at  Richmond.  Some  other  equally  insane  idea 
having  just  gone  out  of  date,  this  one  was  seized  on  with  all  the 
enthusiasm  with  which  theorists  adopt  fancies  costing  them 
nothing  but  the  exercise  of  a  crazy  imagination.  It  is  hard  to 
combat  a  fantasy.  Three  years  of  warfare  had  elapsed,  and  the 
red-tape  and  closet  warriors  suddenly  discovered  and  gravely 
declared  a  reform  which  was  to  produce  a  military  inillenium. 
All  officers  were  to  be  removed  from  the  commands  with  which 
they  had  served  during  these  three  years,  and  placed  elsewhere. 
This  reform  was  to  pervade  the  army.  This  separation  of  officers 
and  men  who  had  learned  mutual  trust  in  each  other,  was  in 
tended  to  produce  a  perfect  and  harmonious  discipline.  A  com 
mander  who  had  acquired  the  confidence  and  love  of  his  men, 
was,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Richmond  gentry,  a  dangerous  man 
— such  a  feeling  between  troops  and  officers  was  highly  irregu 
lar  and  injurious.  They  thought  that  the  best  way  to  improve 
the  morale  of  the  army  was  to  destroy  all  that  (in  common 
opinion)  goes  to  make  it. 

They  said  that  this  policy  would  make  the  army  "  a  machine," 
33 


514  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

and  it  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  of  a  more  utterly  worthless 
machine  than  it  would  have  then  been.  It  is  highly  probable 
that,  under  certain  conditions,  the  Southern  boys  can  be  dis 
ciplined.  If  a  few  of  them  were  caught  up  at  a  time,  and  were 
penned  up  in  barracks  for  five  or  six  years,  so  that  a  fair  chance 
could  be  had  at  them,  they  might  perhaps  be  made  automatons,  as 
solemn  and  amenable  as  the  Dutch  of  the  "  old  army."  But  it  wa3 
absolutely  impossible  to  so  discipline  the  thousands  of  volunteers 
who  were  suddenly  organized  and  initiated  at  once  into  cam 
paigns  and  the  most  arduous  duties  of  the  field.  In  the 
lack  of  this  discipline,  it  was  imperatively  necessary  to  cherish 
between  officers  and  men  the  most  cordial  relations,  and  to  leave 
always  in  command  those  officers  whose  characters  and  services 
had  inspired  love,  confidence,  and  respect. 

In  the  spring  of  1864,  General  Morgan  was  sent  to  take 
command  of  the  Department  of  Southwestern  Virginia,  and 
which  included  also  a  portion  of  East  Tennessee. 

The  forces  at  his  disposal  were  two  Kentucky  cavalry  brigades 
and  the  militia,  or  "reserves,"  of  that  region.  One  of  these 
brigades  of  cavalry  had  been  previously  commanded  by  General 
George  B.  Hodge,  and  was  subsequently  commanded  by  General 
Cosby.  The  other  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Giltner.  Both 
were  composed  of  fine  material,  and  were  together  some  two 
thousand  or  twenty-five  hundred  strong. 

Kirkpatrick's  battalion  had  passed  the  latter  part  of  the  win 
ter  and  early  part  of  spring  at  Decatur,  Georgia,  a  small  village 
near  Atlanta.  Here  it  enjoyed  comparative  rest  and  comfort. 
The  men  recovered  from  the  effects  of  previous  hardships,  and 
the  effective  strength  of  the  command  was  more  than  doubled 
by  men  who  escaped  from  prison,  or  who,  having  been  absent 
upon  various  pretexts,  hurried  back  as  soon  as  they  learned  of 
General  Morgan's  return. 

Leaving  Decatur  in  April,  the  battalion  marched  leisurely 
through  Georgia  and  South  and  North  Carolina — receiving 
.every  where  the  greatest  kindness  at  the  hands  of  the  citizens — 


FEDERAL  MARCH  ON  SALTVILLE.  515 

and  reported,  in  early  May,  to  General  Morgan  at  Saltville  in 
Western  Virginia.  Almost  immediately  after  its  arrival,  it  was 
called  upon  to  again  confront  the  enemy. 

Upon  the  8th  or  9th  of  May,  the  intelligence  was  received  of 
the  advance  of  strong  columns  of  the  enemy;  the  department 
was  threatened,  simultaneously,  by  a  raid  upon  the  salt  works, 
and  the  approach  of  a  heavy  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  to 
Dublin  depot,  not  far  from  New  river  bridge.  The  cavalry  col 
umn  advancing  upon  Saltville  was  commanded  by  General 
Averill,  and  the  other  by  General  Crook.  It  was  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  repulse  both.  The  former,  if  successful,  would 
capture  the  salt  works,  and  the  lead  mines  near  Wytheville,  and 
the  loss  of  either  would  have  been  a  great  and  irreparable  disaster; 
the  latter,  if  established  at  New  river,  or  that  vicinity,  would 
entirely  cut  off  communication  with  Richmond,  prevent  the 
transmission  of  supplies,  from  all  the  region  westward,  to  Gen 
eral  Lee's  army  and  might  do  incalculable  damages  besides.  It 
was  necessary  then  that  battle  should  be  given  to  both,  and  that 
they  should  be  crippled  to  some  extent,  if  too  strong  to  be  defeated. 

The  dismounted  cavalry  of  the  department — most  of  which 
were  men  of  Morgan's  old  division — about  four  hundred  strong, 
were  sent  to  reinforce  the  troops  under  General  Jenkins.  The 
latter  had  fallen  back  before  Crook  to  Dublin  depot.  General 
Morgan  prepared  with  Giltner's  brigade,  and  the  mounted  men 
of  his  old  command,  now  formed  into  two  battalions  commanded 
by  Captains  Kirkpatrick  and  Cassell,  and  about  six  hundred 
strong  in  all,  to  fight  Averill.  The  two  battalions  of  Kirkpat 
rick  and  Cassell,  or  the  "  Morgan  brigade,"  as  the  organization 
was  then  called,  were  placed  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Alston. 

On  the  9th,  General  Morgan  became  convinced,  from  reports 
of  his  scouts,  that  Averill  did  not  intend  to  attack  Saltville  but 
that  he  was  about  to  march  on  Wytheville.  Leaving  Saltville 
on  the  10th,  General  Morgan  followed  upon  the  track  of  the 
enemy  to  the  junction  of  the  Jefferson ville  and  Wytheville  and 


516  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Jefferson  ville  and  Crab  Orchard  roads.  Here  Averill  had  taken 
the  Crab  Orchard  road,  designing,  General  Morgan  believed,  to 
induce  a  close  pursuit. 

Had  General  Morgan  followed  upon  his  track,  Averill,  by  the 
judicious  employment  of  a  comparatively  small  force,  could 
have  held  him  in  check  in  the  mountains,  and  could  himself  have 
turned  upon  Wytheville,  captured  the  provost-guard  there,  de 
stroyed  the  military  stores,  the  lead  mines,  and  torn  up  the  rail 
road,  rendering  it  useless  for  weeks. 

General  Morgan  therefore  moved  directly  through  Burk'g 
garden  to  Wytheville,  thus  (taking  the  shorter  road)  anticipating 
his  wily  adversary.  Reaching  Wytheville  some  hours  in  advance 
of  his  command.  General  Morgan  placed  a  small  detachment 
of  General  Jones'  brigade  of  cavalry,  which  he  found  there, 
under  Colonel  George  Crittenden  and  ordered  that  officer  to  oc 
cupy  a  small  pass  in  the  mountain  between  "  Crocket's  Cave  " 
and  Wytheville,  through  which  the  enemy  would  have  to  advance 
upon  the  town,  or  else  be  forced  to  make  a  wide  detour. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  llth,  the  command  reached  Wythe 
ville  and  were  received  by  the  terrified  citizens  with  the  heartiest 
greetings.  The  little  town  had  been  once  captured  by  the  Fed 
erals  and  a  portion  of  it  burned.  The  ladies  clapped  their  hands 
and  waived  their  handkerchiefs  joyfully  in  response  to  the  as 
surances  of  the  men  that  the  enemy  should  not  come  in-  sight 
of  the  town.  Fortunately,  while  the  men  were  resting  near 
Wytheville,  their  attention  was  attracted  by  the  efforts  of  a 
squad  of  citizens  to  handle  an  old  six-pounder  which  "belonged 
to  the  town."  A  good  deal  of  laughter  was  occasioned  by  their 
impromptu  method. 

General  Morgan,  having  no  artillery,  at  once  took  charge  of 
it  and  called  for  volunteers  to  man  it.  Edgar  Davis  and  Jerome 
Clark  of  Captain  Cantrill's  company  and  practical  artillerists 
come  forward  and  were  placed  in  command  of  the  piece. 

About  3J  P.  M.,  the  enemy  engnged  Colonel  Crittenden  at  the 
gap.  The  column  was  immediately  put  in  motion  and  marched 


DRIVING    THE   ENEMY   BACK.  517 

briskly  in  the  direction  of  the  firing.  When  near  the  gap,  it  filed 
to  the  left,  and  moving  around  the  mountain  and  through  the 
skirting  woods,  was  soon  in  line,  upon  the  right  flank  and 
threatening  the  rear,  of  the  enemy.  Alston's  brigade  was 
formed  on  the  right,  occupying  an  open  field,  extending  from 
Giltner's  left  to  the  mountain.  The  enemy  at  the  first  intima 
tion  of  this  movement  had  withdrawn  from  the  mouth  of  the 
gap  and  was  advantageously  posted  upon  a  commanding  ridge. 
Both  brigades  were  dismounted,  under  a  smart  fire  from  sharp 
shooters,  and  advanced  rapidly,  driving  in  the  skirmishers  and 
coming  down  upon  the  enemy  (before  his  formation  was  entirely 
completed),  they  dislodged  him  from  his  position. 

Falling  back  about  five  hundred  yards,  he  took  position  again 
around  the  dwelling  and  buildings  upon  Mr.  Crockett's  farm, 
and  maintained  it  obstinately  for  some  time.  The  piece  of  ar 
tillery,  well  served  by  the  gallant  volunteers,  did  excellent  ser 
vice  here. 

„ .General  Morgan,  himself,  assisted  to  handle  it.     The  enemy 

were  dislodged  from  this  position  also.  The  fight  continued 
until  after  nightfall,  and  was  a  succession  of  charges  upon  the 
one  side  and  retreats  upon  the  other.  The  Federal  troops  were 
well  trained  and  their  officers  behaved  with  great  gallantry. 

General  Morgan's  loss  in  this  engagement,  in  killed  and 
wounded,  was  about  fifty.  The  enemy's  loss  was  more  severe. 
Nearly  one  hundred  prisoners  were  taken  and  more  than  that 
number  of  horses. 

General  Morgan  was  cordial  in  his  praise  of  the  alacrity, 
courage,  and  endurance  of  officers  and  men. 

It  was,  indeed,  a  very  important  affair  and  a  defeat  would 
have  been  exceedingly  disastrous. 

The  dismounted  men  who  had  been  sent  under  Colonel  Smith 
to  reinforce  GeneralJenkins,  were  engaged  at  the  hotly  contested 
action  at  Dublin  depot,  and  behaved  in  a  manner  which  gained 
them  high  commendation. 

Colonel  Smith  reached  Dublin  about  10  A.  M.  on  the  10th,  and 


518  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

learned  that  the  forces  under  the  command  of  General  Jenkins 
were  being  hard  pressed  by  the  enemy  and  that  the  gallant 
General  \vas  severely  wounded. 

Colonel  Smith  immediately  marched  with  his  command,  about 
four  hundred  strong,  toward  the  scene  of  the  action.  After  pro 
ceeding  a  short  distance,  he  found  the  Confederate  forces  in 
full  retreat  and  some  disorder.  He  pressed  on  toward  the  front, 
through  the  retreating  mass. 

Reporting  to  Colonel  McCausland  (who  assumed  command 
upon  the  fall  of  General  Jenkins),  and  who  was  bravely  strug 
gling  with  a  rear-guard  to  check  the  enemy's  pursuit,  Colonel 
Smith  was  instructed  to  form  his  command  in  the  woods  upon 
the  left  of  the  road  and  endeavor  to  cover  the  retreat. 

This  was  promptly  done,  and  in  a  few  minutes  Colonel  Smith 
received  the  pursuing  enemy  with  a  heavy  and  unexpected 
volley. 

Driving  back  the  foremost  assailants,  Colonel  Smith  advanced 
in  turn  and  pressed  his  success  for  an  hour.  Then  the  entire 
hostile  force  coming  up,  he  was  forced  back  slowly  and  in  good 
order  to  Dublin,  which  had  already  been  evacuated  by  the  troops 
of  Colonel  McCausland. 

Colonel  Smith  followed  thence  after  Colonel  McCausland  to 
New  River  bridge,  crossing  the  river  just  before  sunset,  and  en 
camping  on  the  opposite  bank. 

After  some  skirmishing  on  the  next  morning,  the  Confederates 
retreated,  giving  up  the  position.  The  fight  on  the  10th  was  a 
most  gallant  one — highly  creditable  to  the  commanding  officer, 
subordinates  and  men. 

Among  the  killed  was  C.  S.  Cleburne  (brother  of  General  Pat 
Cleburne),  one  of  the  most  promising  young  officers  in  the  army. 
General  Morgan  had  made  him  a  captain,  a  short  time  previously, 
for  unusual  gallantry. 

In  the  latter  part  of  May,  General  Morgan  undertook  the  ex 
pedition  known  as  the  "last"  or  "June  raid"  into  Kentucky. 
He  had  many  reasons  for  undertaking  this  expedition.  He  was 


THE   LAST   RAID.  519 

impatient  to  retrieve,  in  some  manner,  the  losses  of  the  Ohio 
raid,  by  another  campaign  of  daring  conception,  and,  he  hoped, 
successful  execution.  He  wished  to  recruit  his  thinned  ranks 
with  Kentuckians,  and  to  procure  horses  for  the  men  who  had 
none.  Moreover,  there  were  excellent  military  reasons  for  this 
movement. 

Averill  and  Cook  were  not  far  off,  and  could  pounce  down  at 
any  moment,  but  were  supposed  to  be  awaiting  reinforcements, 
without  which  they  would  not  return. 

These  reinforcements  were  coming  from  Kentucky  under  Bur- 
bridge  and  Hobson,  and  consisted  of  all  or  nearly  all  the  troops 
in  Kentucky,  available  for  active  service. 

General  Morgan  despaired  of  successfully  resisting  all  these 
forces  if  they  united  and  bore  down  on  the  department.  But  he 
believed  that,  if  he  could  move  into  Kentucky,  and  gain  the  rear 
of  the  forces  coming  thence  before  the  junction  with  the  other 
Federal  forces  was  affected,  he  could  defeat  the  plan.  The  Ken 
tucky  troops  would  turn  and  pursue  him,  and  the  attack  upon 
the  department  would  not  be  made.  In  short,  he  hoped  to  avoid 
invasion  and  attack  by  assuming  the  offensive — to  keep  the 
enemy  out  of  South-western  Virginia  by  making  an  irruption 
into  Kentucky. 

He  wrote  on  the  31st  of  May  to  General  S.  Cooper,  Adjutant. 
General,  detailing  his  plan  and  the  information  upon  which  it 
was  based. 

In  this  letter,  he  said :  "  While  General  Buckner  was  in  com 
mand  of  this  department,  he  instructed  me  to  strike  a  blow  at 
the  enemy  in  Kentucky. 

"As  I  was  on  the  eve  of  executing  this  order,  the  rapid  move 
ment  of  the  enemy  from  the  KamLwha  valley,  in  the  direction 
of  the  Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railroad,  made  it  necessary  that 
I  should  remain  to  co-operate  with  the  other  forces  for  the  de 
fense  of  this  section.  Since  the  repulse  of  the  enemy,  I  have 
obtained  the  consent  of  General  Jones  to  carry  out  the  original 
plan  agreed  on  between  General  Buckner  and  myself." 


520  HISTORY  OP  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

"  I  have  just  received  information  that  General  Ilobson  left 
Mt.  Sterling  on  the  23rd  inst.,  with  six  regiments  of  cavalry 
(about  three  thousand  strong),  for  Louisa,  on  the  Sandy.  This 
force  he  has  collected  from  all  the  garrisons  in  Middle  and 
South-eastern  Kentucky.  At  Louisa  there  is  another  force  of 
about  two  thousand  five  hundred  cavalry,  under  a  colonel  of  a 
Michigan  regiment,  recently  sent  to  that  vicinity.  It  is  the  re 
ported  design  of  General  Hobson  to  unite  with  this  latter  force, 
and  co-operate  with  Generals  Averill  and  Crook  in  another  move 
ment  upon  the  salt  works  and  lead  mines  of  South-western  Virgi 
nia."  "  This  information  has  determined  me  to  move  at  once  into 
Kentucky,  and  thus  distract  the  plans  of  the  enemy  by  initiating 
a  movement  within  his  lines.  My  force  will  be  about  two  thou 
sand  two  hundred  men.  I  expect  to  be  pursued  by  the  force  at 
Louisa,  which  I  will  endeavor  to  avoid.  There  will  be  nothing  in 
the  State  to  retard  my  progress  but  a  few  scattered  provost- 
guards." 

In  the  latter  part  of  May,  General  Morgan  commenced  the 
movement  indicated  in  this  letter. 

His  division  consisted  of  three  brigades.  The  first  under  com 
mand  of  Colonel  Giltner,  was  between  ten  and  eleven  hundred 
strong,  and  was  a  magnificent  body  of  hardy,  dashing  young  men, 
drawn  chiefly  from  the  middle  and  eastern  counties  of  Kentucky. 
The  second  brigade  was  composed  of  the  mounted  men  of  the 
old  Morgan  division.  It  consisted  of  three  small  battalions, 
commanded  respectively  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bowles  and 
Majors  Cassell  and  Kirkpatrick.  It  was  between  five  and  six 
hundred  strong  and  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Alston.  The  third  brigade  was  composed  of  the  dismounted 
men  of  both  the  other  commands,  the  greater  number,  however, 
being  from  the  second  brigade.  It  was  organized  into  two  bat 
talions,  commanded  respectively  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Martin 
and  Major  Geo.  R.  Diamond,  a  brave  and  exceedingly  competent 
officer  of  Giltner's  brigade.  The  third  brigade  was  about  eight 
hundred  strong  and  was  commanded  by  Colonel  D.  Howard 


(521) 


522  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Smith.  No  artillery  was  taken — it  could  not  have  been  trans 
ported  over  the  roads  which  General  Morgan  expected  to  travel. 
The  column  reached  Pound  Gap  on  the  2nd  of  June  and  found  it 
occupied  by  a  force  of  the  enemy.  Colonel  Smith  was  ordered 
to  clear  the  path,  and  pushing  his  brigade  forward,  he  soon  did 
it.  Several  horses  were  captured,  which  was  accepted  as  a 
happy  omen. 

Sending  a  scouting  party  to  observe  the  direction  taken  by  the 
retreating  enemy,  and  to  ascertain  if  they  joined  a  larger  force 
and  turned  again,  General  Morgan  pressed  on,  hoping  to  reach 
Mt.  Sterling — the  general  Federal  depot  of  supplies  and  most 
important  post  in  that  portion  of  Kentucky — before  General 
Burbridge  could  return  from  the  extreme  eastern  part  of  the 
State.  As  Burbridge  was  incumbered  with  artillery  and  would 
be  two  or  three  days  in  getting  the  news,  General  Morgan  con 
fidently  believed  that  he  could  reach  Mt.  Sterling  first.  The 
mountainous  country  of  South-eastern  Kentucky,  so  rugged, 
steep  and  inhospitable,  as  to  seem  almost  impossible  of  access, 
had  to  be  traversed  for  this  purpose.  More  than  one  hundred 
and  fifty  miles  of  this  region  was  marched  over  in  seven  days. 
The  dismounted  men  behaved  heroically.  Straining  up  the 
steep  mountain  sides,  making  their  toilsome  way  through  gloomy 
and  deep  ravines,  over  tremendous  rocks  and  every  formidable 
obstacle  which  nature  collects  in  such  regions  against  the  intru 
sion  of  man,  footsore,  bleeding,  panting,  they  yet  never  faltered 
or  complained,  and  richly  won  the  enthusiastic  eulogy  of  their 
commander.  They  marched  from  twenty-two  to  twenty-seven 
miles  each  day.  This  march  was  terribly  severe  upon  the 
mounted  commands  also.  The  fatigue  and  lack  of  forage  caused 
many  horses  to  break  down — arid  the  dismounted  brigade  was 
largely  augumented.  Colonel  Giltner  stated  that  he  lost  more 
than  two  hundred  horses  in  his  brigade. 

On  the  6th  of  June,  Colonel  Smith  was  transferred  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  second  brigade.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Martin  was 
then  assigned  to  command  of  the  third.  On  the  7th,  finding 


IN  THE  BLUE  GRASS  REGION  AGAIN.          523 

that  he  would  succeed  in  anticipating  Burbridge  at  Mt.  Sterling 
and  that  he  would  not  require  his  whole  force  to  take  the  place, 
General  Morgan  dispatched  Captain  Jenkins  with  fi£ty  men  to 
destroy  the  bridges  upon  the  Frankfort  and  Louisville  Railroad 
to  prevent  troops  arriving  from  Indiana  for  the  defense  of  Lex 
ington  and  Central  Kentucky.  He  sent  Major  Chenoweth  to 
destroy  bridges  on  the  Kentucky  Central  Railroad  to  prevent  the 
-importation  of  troops  from  Cincinnati,  and  he  sent  Captain 
Peter  Everett  with  one  hundred  men  to  capture  Maysville. 
General  Morgan  instructed  these  officers  to  accomplish  their  res 
pective  commissions  thoroughly  but  promptly,  to  create  as  much 
excitement  as  possible,  occasion  the  concentration  of  forces  al 
ready  in  the  State  at  points  widely  apart,  to  magnify  his  strength 
and  circulate  reports  which  would  bewilder  and  baffle  any 
attempt  to  calculate  his  movements  and  to  meet  him  within  three 
or  four  days  at  Lexington. 

When  the  command  emerged  from  the  sterile  country  of  the 
mountains  into  the  fair  lands  of  Central  Kentucky,  the  change 
had  a  perceptible  and  happy  effect  upon  the  spirits  of  the  men. 
Night  had  closed  around  them,  on  the  evening  of  the  7th,  while 
they  were  still  struggling  through  the  ghastly  denies  or  up  the 
difficult  paths  of  the  "  Rebel  trace,"  still  environed  by  the  bleak 
mountain  scenery.  During  the  night,  they  arrived  at  the  con 
fines  of  the  beautiful  "Blue  Grass  country,"  and  when  the  sun 
arose,  clear  and  brilliant,  a  lovely  and  smiling  landscape  had  re 
placed  the  lowering,  stony,  dungeon  like  region  whence  they 
had  at  last  escaped.  The  contrast  seemed  magical — the  song, 
jest  and  laugh  burst  forth  again  and  the  men  drew  new  life  and 
courage  from  the  scene. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  day,  the  8th,  the  column  reached  the 
vicinity  of  Mt.  Sterling,  and  preparations  wrere  made  for  an 
immediate  attack  upon  the  place.  On  the  previous  day,  Captain 
Lawrence  Jones,  commanding  the  advance-guard,  had  been  sent 
with  his  guard  to  take  position  upon  the  main  road  between  Mt. 
Sterling  and  Lexington,  and  Captain  Jackson  was  sent  with  one 


524  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

company  to  take  position  between  Mt.  Sterling  and  Paris. 
These  officers  were  instructed  to  prevent  communication,  by 
either  telegraph  or  courier,  between  Mt.  Sterling  and  the  other 
two  places.  The  enemy  were  simultaneously  attacked  by  de 
tachments  from  the  first  and  second  brigades  and  soon  forced 
to  surrender  with  little  loss  on  either  side.  Major  Holliday,  of 
the  first  brigade,  made  a  gallant  charge  upon  the  encampment 
which  drove  them  in  confusion  into  the  town.  Three  hundred 
and  eighty  prisoners  were  taken,  a  large  quantity  of  stores  and 
a  number  of  wagons  and  teams. 

Leaving  Colonel  Giltner  to  destroy  the  stores,  and  provide 
for  the  remounting  upon  the  captured  horses  of  a  portion  of  the 
dismounted  men,  General  Morgan  marched  immediately  for  Lex 
ington  with  the  second  brigade.  Burbridge  making  a  wonder 
ful  march — moving  nearly  ninety  miles  in  the  last  thirty  hours — 
reached  Mt.  Sterling  before  daybreak  on  the  9th.  Then  occur 
red  a  great  disaster  to  General  Morgan's  plans  and  it  fell  upon 
the  brave  boys  who  had  so  patiently  endured,  on  foot,  the  long, 
painful  march.  Some  of  these  men  had  marched  from  Huytcr's 
gap  in  Virginia,  to  Mt.  Sterling,  a  distance  of  two  hundred  and 
thirty  miles  in  ten  days.  Their  shoes  were  worn  to  tatters  and 
their  feet  raw  and  bleeding,  yet  on  the  last  day  they  pressed  on 
twenty-seven  miles.  Encamping  not  far  from  the  town  but  to  the 
east  of  it,  Colonel  Martin  directed  Lieutenant  Colonel  Brent, 
who  had  been  left  with  him  in  command  of  some  forty  or  fifty 
men  to  act  as  rear-guard,  to  establish  his  guard  at  least  one 
mile  from  the  encampment  and  picket  the  road  whence  the  dan 
ger  might  come.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Brent  had  been  assigned 
to  General  Morgan's  command  a  short  time  previously  to  this 
expedition  and  was  not  one  of  his  old  officers.  Information 
which  had  been  received  a  day  or  two  before  had  induced  the 
belief  that  Burbridge  was  not  near.  Scouts  sent  by  General 
Morgan  to  observe  his  movements  had  returned,  reporting  that 
he  had  moved  on  toward  Virginia.  This  information  convinced 
General  Morgan  that  he  would  not  arrive  at  Mt.  Sterling  for 


FIGHT   AT   MT.  STERLING.  525 

two  or  three  days  after  the  8th — although  satisfied  that  he  would 
come. 

Colonel  Giltner's  command  was  encamped  some  distance  from 
Martin's  and  upon  a  different  road,  and  was  not  in  a  position  to 
afford  the  latter  any  protection.  Brent,  neglecting  the  precau 
tion  enjoined  by  Martin,  posted  his  guard  only  one  or  two  hun 
dred  yards  from  the  encampment  of  the  dismounted  men  and 
extended  his  pickets  but  a  short  distance  further. 

On  the  next  morning,  about  three  o'clock,  the  enemy  dashed 
into  the  camp,  the  pickets  giving  no  warning,  and  shot  and  rode 
over  the  men  as  they  lay  around  their  fires.  Many  were  killed 
before  they  arose  from  their  blankets.  Notwithstanding  the 
disadvantage  of  the  surprise,  the  men  stood  to  their  arms  and 
fighting  resolutely,  although  without  concert,  soon  drove  the  as 
sailants  out  of  the  camp.  Being  then  formed  by  their  officers, 
they  presented  a  formidable  front  to  the  enemy  who  returned, 
in  greater  strength  as  fresh  numbers  arrived  to  the  attack.  The 
fight  was  close  and  determined  upon  both  sides.  Colonel  Mar 
tin's  headquarters  were  at  a  house  near  by.  He  was  awakened 
by  the  rattling  shots  and  springing  upon  his  horse,  rode  toward 
the  camp  to  find  the  enemy  between  himself  and  his  men. 
Without  hesitation  he  rode  at  full  speed  through  the  hostile 
throng,  braving  the  volleys  of  both  lines,  and  rejoined  his  com 
mand.  The  enemy  brought  up  a  piece  of  artillery,  which  was 
taken  by  a  desperate  effort,  but  was  soon  recaptured.  The 
poor  fellows  undaunted  by  weariness,  the  sudden  attack  upon 
them,  and  their  desperate  situation, fought  with  unflinching  cour- 
a^e  for  more  than  an  hour. 

O 

At  length  Colonel  Martin  fell  back,  cutting  his  way  through  Mt. 
Sterling  which  was  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Two  miles  from 
the  town  he  met  Colonel  Giltner,  and  proposed  to  the  latter  that, 
with  their  combined  forces,  the  fight  should  be  renewed.  Giltner 
acceding,  it  was  arranged  that  he  should  attack  in  front,  while 
Martin,  moving  around  to  the  other  side  of  the  town  again, 
should  take  the  enemy  in  the  rear.  This  being  done,  the  fight 


526  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

was  pressed  again  with  energy,  until  Martin's  ammunition  fail 
ing  he  was  compelled  to  withdraw.  The  enemy  was  too  much 
crippled  to  pursue. 

In  this  affair,  although  inflicting  severe  loss  on  the  enemy, 
Martin's  command  lost  heavily.  Fourteen  commissioned  officers 
were  killed  and  forty  privates.  Eighty  were  so  severely  wounded 
that  they  could  not  be  removed,  one  hundred  were  captured  and 
more  than  that  number  cut  off  and  dispersed.  Colonel  Martin 
was  twice  wounded. 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th,  General  Morgan  entered  Lex 
ington  after  a  slight  skirmish.  He  burned  the  government  depot 
and  stables  and  captured  a  sufficient  number  of  horses  to  mount 
all  of  the  dismounted  men,  who  were  then  returned  to  their  re 
spective  companies  in  the  first  and  second  brigades. 

Moving  thence  to  Georgetown,  General  Morgan  sent  Captain 
Cooper  with  one  company  to  demonstrate  toward  Frankfort. 
Captain  Cooper  ably  executed  his  orders,  alarming  and  confining 
to  the  fortification  around  the  town  a  much  superior  force  of  the 
enemy. 

From  Georgetown,  General  Morgan  directed  his  march  to 
Cynthiana,  reaching  that  place  on  the  morning  of  the  llth. 
After  a  sharp  fight  the  garrison,  four  hundred  strong,  was  cap 
tured.  Unfortunately,  a  portion  of  the  town  was  burned  in  the 
engagement,  the  enemy  having  occupied  the  houses.  While  the 
fight  was  going  on  in  town,  Colonel  Giltncr  engaged  a  body  of 
the  enemy,  fifteen  hundred  strong,  under  General  Hobson.  Gen 
eral  Morgan,  after  the  surrender  of  the  garrison,  took  Cassell's 
battalion  and,  gaining  Hobson's  rear,  compelled  him  also  to  sur 
render. 

A  large  quantity  of  stores  were  captured  and  destroyed  at 
Cynthiana.  General  Hobson  was  paroled  and  sent,  under  escort 
of  Captain  C.  C.  Morgan  and  two  other  officers,  to  Cincinnati, 
to  effect,  if  possible,  the  exchange  of  himself  and  officers  for 
certain  of  General  Morgan's  officers  then  in  prison  and,  failing 
in  that,  to  report  as  prisoner  within  the  Confederate  lines.  He 


DEFEAT   AT    CYNTIIIANA.  527 

was  not  permitted  to  negotiate  the  exchange  and  his  escort  were 
detained  for  some  weeks. 

On  the  12th,  the  command  numbering,  after  all  losses,  and  de 
ducting  details  to  guard  prisoners  and  wagon  train  and  to  de 
stroy  the  track  and  bridges  for  some  miles  of  the  Kentucky 
Central  railroad,  some  twelve  hundred  men,  was  attacked  by  a 
force  of  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery  under  General  Burbridge 
which  General  Morgan  estimated  at  five  thousand  two  hundred 
strong.  Giltner's  command  had  been  encamped  on  the  Paris 
road  and  was  first  engaged  by  the  enemy.  This  brigade  was 
almost  entirely  out  of  ammunition.  The  cartridges  captured 
the  day  before  did  not  fit  the  guns  with  which  it  was  armed. 
General  Morgan  had  directed  Colonel  Giltner  to  take,  also,  the 
captured  guns  for  which  this  ammunition  was  available,  but  he 
was  unwilling  to  abandon  his  better  rifles  and  provided  his  brig 
ade  with  neither  captured  guns  nor  cartridges.  Giltner  soon  be 
came  hotly  engaged  with  the  advancing  enemy  and  although  the 
second  brigade  moved  to  his  support,  their  united  strength  could 
oppose  no  effectual  resistance. 

General  Morgan  ordered  the  entire  command  to  retreat  upon 
the  Augusta  road  and  charged  with  the  mounted  reserve  to 
cover  the  withdrawal.  The  action  was  very  disastrous.  Colonel 
Giltner,  cut  off  from  the  Augusta,  was  forced  to  retreat  upon  the 
Leesburg  road.  Colonel  Smith,  at  first,  doubtful  of  the  condition 
of  affairs,  did  not  immediately  take  part  in  the  fight.  His  gal 
lant  and  efficient  Adjutant,  Lieutenant  Arthur  Andrews,  rode  to 
the  scene  of  the  fight,  and  returning,  declared  that  Colonel  Gilt 
ner  required  his  prompt  support.  Colonel  Smith  instantly  put 
his  brigade  in  motion  and  was  soon  in  front  of  the  enemy. 

He  says :  "  My  brigade,  gallantly  led  by  its  battalion  com 
mander,  attacked  the  enemy  with  great  spirit  and  drove  him 
back  along  its  entire  length.  The  first  battalion  moved  with 
more  rapidity  than  the  third,  doubtless  on  account  of  the  better 
nature  of  the  ground  it  had  to  traverse,  until  it  swung  around  al 
most  at  right  angles  with  the  line  of  the  third  battalion. 


528  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Hastening  to  correct  this  defect,  I  rode  to  Colonel  Bowles,  but 
before  he  could  obey  my  instructions  a  heavy  force  was  massed 
upon  him,  and  after  a  desperate  contest  he  was  forced  back.  I 
directed  him  to  re-form  his  command  behind  a  stone  fence  on  the 
Ruddle's  Mill  road,  which  he  did  promptly  and  checked  the 
enemy  with  heavy  loss.  At  this  juncture  I  looked  for  Kirkpa- 
trick,  who  had  been  holding  his  line  with  his  usual  energy  and 
determination.  I  found  that  his  battalion  had  been  separated — 
two  companies,  commanded  respectively  by  Captain  Cantrill  and 
Lieutenant  Gardner,  had  been  fighting  hard  on  his  left,  while  the 
other  two  were  acting  with  the  first  battalion.  Captain  Kirkpa- 
trick,  severely  wounded,  wras  forced  to  quit  the  field.  About  the 
same  time,  gallant  Bowles  was  driven  from  his  second  position, 
strong  as  it  was,  by  overpowering  numbers.  Colonel  Smith  now 
retreated  through  Cynthiana,  seeking  to  rejoin  General  Morgan 
on  the  Augusta  road.  He  suddenly  found  himself  intercepted 
and  surrounded  on  three  sides  by  the  enemy,  while  upon  the 
other  side  was  the  Licking  river.  Seeing  the  condition  of  affairs, 
the  men  became  unmanageable  and  dashed  across  the  river. 
Having  been  re-formed  on  the  other  side,  they  charged  a  body 
of  cavalry  which  then  confronted  them  and  made  good  their  re 
treat,  although  scattered  and  in  confusion. 

Collecting  all  the  men,  who  could  be  gathered  together  upon  the 
Augusta  road,  General  Morgan  paroled  his  prisoners  and  rapidly 
retreated.  His  loss  in  this  action  was  very  heavy,  and  he  was 
compelled  to  march  instantly  back  to  Virginia.  Moving  through 
Flemingsburg  and  West  Liberty,  he  passed  on  over  the  moun 
tains  and  reached  Abingdon  on  the  20th  of  June.  On  this  raid, 
great  and  inexcusable  excesses  wrere  committed,  but,  except  in 
two  or  three  flagrant  instances,  they  were  committed  by  men 
who  had  never  before  served  with  General  Morgan.  The  men 
of  his  old  division  and  Giltncr's  fine  brigade  were  rarely  guilty. 
General  Morgan  had  accomplished  the  result  he  had  predicted, 
in  averting  the  invasion  of  Southwestern  Virginia,  but  at 
heavy  cost  to  himself. 


ORGANIZING   NEW    COMMAND.  529 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

UPON  his  return  to  Southwestern  Virginia,  General  Morgan 
applied  himself  assiduously  to  collect  all  of  his  men,  however 
detached  or  separated  from  him,  and  correct  the  organization 
and  discipline  of  his  command.  It  was  a  far  less  easy  task  then 
than  ever  before.  Not  only  was  a  conviction  stealing  upon  the 
Confederate  soldiery  (and  impairing  the  efficiency  of  the  most 
manly  and  patriotic)  that  the  fiat- had  gone  forth  against  us,  and 
that  no  exercise  of  courage  and  fortitude  could  avert  the  doom, 
but  the  demoralizing  effects  of  a  long  war,  and  habitude  to  its 
scenes. and  passions  had  rendered  even  the  best  men  callous  and 
reckless,  and  to  a  certain  extent  intractable  to  influences  which 
had  formerly  been  all  potent  with  them  as  soldiers.  Imagine 
the  situation  in  which  the  Confederate  soldier  was  placed :  Al 
most  destitute  of  hope  that  the  cause  for  which  he  fought  would 
triumph,  and  fighting  on  from  instinctive  obstinate  pride,  no 
longer  receiving  from  the  people — themselves  hopeless  and  im 
poverished  almost  to  famine  by  the  draining  demands  of  the 
war — the  sympathy,  hospitality  and  hearty  encouragement  once 
accorded  to  him ;  almost  compelled  (for  comfort  if  not  for  exist 
ence)  to  practice  oppression  and  wrong  upon  his  own  country 
men,  is  "it  surprising  that  he  became  wild  and  lawless,  that  he 
adopted  a  rude  creed  in  which  strict  conformity  to  military  reg 
ulations  and  a  nice  obedience  to  general^orders  held  not  very 
prominent  places?  This  condition  obtained  in  a  far  greater  de 
gree  with  the  cavalry  employed  in  the  "  outpost "  departments 
than  with  the  infantry  or  the  soldiery  of  the  large  armies.  It 
is  an  unhappy  condition,  and  destructive  of  military  efiiciency 
and  any  sort  of  discipline,  but  under  certain  circumstances  it  is 
hard  to  prevent  or  correct.  There  is  little  temptation  and  no 
34 


530  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

necessity  or  excuse  for  it  among  troops  that  are  well  fed,  regu 
larly  paid  in  good  money  and  provided  with  comfortable  cloth 
ing,  blankets  and  shoes  in  the  cold  winter ;  but  troops  whose  ra 
tions  are  few  and  scanty,  who  flutter  with  rags  and  wear  ventil 
ating  shoes  which  suck  in  the  cold  air,  who  sleep  at  night  under 
a  blanket  which  keeps  the  saddle  from  a  sore-backed  horse  in 
the  day  time,  who  are  paid  (if  paid  at  all)  with  waste  paper,  who 
have  become  hardened  to  the  licentious  practices  of  a  cruel  war 
fare — such  troops  will  be  frequently  tempted  to  violate  the  moral 
code.  Many  Confederate  cavalry  men  so  situated  left  their  com 
mands  altogether  and  became  guerrillas,  salving  their  consciences 
with  the  thought  that  the  desertion  was  not  to  the  enemy.  These 
men,  leading  a  comparatively  luxurious  life  and  receiving,  from 
some  people,  a  mistaken  and  foolish  admiration,  attracted  to  the 
same  career  young  men  who  (but  for  the  example  and  the  sym 
pathy  accorded  the  guerrilla  and  denied  the  faithful,  brave 'and 
suffering  soldier)  would  never  had  quitted  their  colors  and  their 
duty.  Kentucky  was  at  one  time,  just  before  the  close  of  the 
war,  teeming  with  these  guerrillas.  It  was  of  no  use  to  threaten 
them  with  punishment — they  had  no  idea  of  being  caught.  Be 
sides,  Burbridge  shot  all  that  he  could  lay  hands  on,  and  (for 
their  sins)  many  prisoners  (guilty  of  no  offense),  selected  at 
random,  or  by  lot,  from  the  pens  where  he  kept  them  for  the 
purpose,  were  butchered,  by  this  insensate  blood-hound.  Not 
only  did  General  Morgan  have  to  contend  with  difficulties  thus 
arising,  but  now,  for  the  first  time,  he  suffered  from  envy,  se 
cret  animosity  and  detraction  within  his  own  command.  Many 
faithful  friends  still  surrounded  him,  many  more  lay  in  prison, 
but  he  began  to  meet  with  open  enmity  in  his  own  camp.  It 
had  happened  in  the  old  times  that  some  of  his  warmest  and 
surest  adherents  had  occasionally  urged  strenuous  remonstrances 
against  his  wishes,  but  they  were  dictated  by  devotion  to  his 
interests  ;  now  officers,  recently  connected  with  him,  inaugurated 
a  jealous  and  systematic  opposition  to  him  in  all  matters,  and 
were  joined  in  it,  with  ungrateful  alacrity,  by  some  men  whom 


CHARGES  AGAINST  GEN.  MORGAN.  531 

lie  had  thought  his  fastest  friends.  Reports  of  excesses  commit 
ted  by  some  of  the  troops  in  Kentucky  had  reached  Richmond 
and  created  much  feeling.  General  Morgan  had  instructed  his 
Inspector  General,  Captain  Bryant  H.  Allen,  to  investigate  the 
accusations  against  the  various  parties  suspected  of  guilt  and  to 
prefer  charges  against  those  who  should  appear  to  be  implicated. 
Captain  Allen  was  charged  with  negligence  and  lack  of  industry 
in  pursuing  the  investigation  and  complaints  were  made  that 
General  Morgan  was  seeking  to  screen  the  offenders.  All  sorts 
of  communications,  the  most  informal,  irregular  and  some  of 
them  improper,  were  forwarded  to  Richmond  by  General  Mor 
gan's  subordinates,  often  unknown  to  him  because  not  passing 
through  his  office,  and  they  were  received  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  Mr.  Seddon,  without  questioning  and  with  avidity.  It  was 
at  length  announced  that  a  commission  would  be  appointed  to 
sit  at  Abingdon  and  inquire  into  these  charges,  and  also  into  the 
charge  that  General  Morgan  had  undertaken  the  raid  into  Ken 
tucky  without  orders. 

While  in  daily  expectation  of  the  arrival  of  these  commis 
sioners,  the  sudden  irruption  of  the  enemy  into  that  part  of  the 
country  which  was  occupied  by  his  command,  caused  General 
Morgan  to  proceed  to  the  threatened  points.  Colonels  Smith 
and  Giltner,  and  a  portion  of  General  Vaughn's  brigade  which 
was  stationed  in  East  Tennessee,  under  Colonel  Bradford,  were 
driven  back  to  Carter's  Station,  on  the  Wetauga  river,  some 
thirty-five  miles  from  Abingdon.  When  General  Morgan 
reached  that  place,  and  took  command  of  the  troops  assembled 
there,  the  enemy  were  retreating.  He  followed  as  closely  as 
possible  until  he  had  reoccupied  the  territory  whence  the  Con 
federates  had  been  driven.  While  at  Granville,  a  small  town 
upon  the  Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railroad,  seventy-two  miles 
from  Abingdon,  and  eighteen  from  Bull's  Gap,  where  a  portion 
of  his  troops  was  stationed,  he  had  occasion  to  revoke  the 
parole,  granted  a  few  days  previously,  to  a  wounded  Federal 
officer,  assistant  adjutant  general  to  General  Gillern,  who  was 


532  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

staying  at  the  house  of  a  Mrs.  Williams,  where  General  Morgan 
had  made  his  headquarters.  The  daughter-in-law  of  this  lady, 
Mrs.  Lucy  Williams,  a  Union  woman  and  bitterly  opposed  to 
the  Confederate  cause  and  troops,  was  detected  with  a  letter 
written  by  this  officer,  accurately  detailing  the  number,  condi 
tion  and  position  of  General  Morgan's  forces,  which  letter  she 
Avas  to  have  sent  to  Colonel  Gillem.  Dr.  Cameron,  General 
Morgan's  chaplain,  discovered  the  letter  in  a  prayer  book,  where 
it  had  been  deposited  by  the  lady. 

This  being  a  clear  violation  of  his  parole,  General  Morgan 
sent  the  officer  to  Lynchburg,  to  be  placed  in  prison.  The 
younger  Mrs.  Williams  (his  friend)  resented  this  treatment  very 
much,  declaring  that  in  his  condition,  it  might  prove  fatal  to 
him. 

This  incident  is  related  because  it  has  been  thought  to  have 
had  a  direct  influence  in  causing  General  Morgan's  death.  When 
General  Morgan  returned  to  Abingdon,  he  found  an  excitement 
still  prevailing  regarding  the  investigation,  but  the  members  of 
the  commission  had  not  yet  arrived. 

I  met  him,  then,  for  the  first  time  since  he  had  made  his  es 
cape,  or  I  had  been  exchanged.  He  was  greatly  changed. 
His  face  wore  a  weary,  care-worn  expression,  and  his  manner 
was  totally  destitute  of  its  former  ardor  and  enthusiasm.  He 
spoke  bitterly,  but  with  no  impatience,  of  the  clamor  against 
him,  and  seemed  saddest  about  the  condition  of  his  command. 
He  declared  that  if  he  had  been  successful  in  the  last  day's 
fight  at  Cynthiana,  he  would  have  been  enabled  to  hold  Ken 
tucky  for  months  ;  that  every  organized  Federal  force  which 
could  be  promptly  collected  to  attack  him,  could  have  then  been 
disposed  of,  and  that  he  had  assurance  of  obtaining  a  great  num 
ber  of  recruits.  He  spoke  with  something  of  his  old  sanguine 
energy,  only  when  proclaiming  his  confidence  that  lie  could  have 
achieved  successes  unparalleled  in  his  entire  career,  if  fortune 
had  favored  him  in  that  fight.  But  no  word  of  censure  upon 
any  one  escaped  him'.  ;.It  hud  never  been  his  habit  to  charge  the 


MORGAN'S  LAST  LETTER.  533 

blame  of  failure  upon  his  subordinates — his  native  magnanimity 
forbade  it;  and  tried  so  sorely  as  he  was  at  this  time, by  malignant 
calumny,  he  was  too  proud  to  utter  a  single  reproach.  A  letter 
which  he  intended  to  forward  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  but  the 
transmission  of  which  his  death  prevented,  shows  his  sense  of 
the  treatment  he  had  received.  This  letter  was  written  just 
after  the  conversation,  above  mentioned,  occurred,  while  he  was 
again  confronting  the  enemy,  and  immediately  before  he  was 
killed.  I  can  not  better  introduce  it  than  by  first  giving  the 
letter  of  the  officer  who  forwarded  it  to  me  (I  had  believed  it 
lost),  and  who  was  for  more  than  a  year  Adjutant  General  of  the 
Department  of  Southwestern  Virginia  and  East  Tennessee,  and 
served  for  some  months  on  General  Morgan's  staff.  He  is  well 
known  to  the  ex-Confederates  of  Kentucky,  as  having  been  an 
exceedingly  intelligent,  competent,  and  gallant  officer,  and  a 
gentleman  of  the  highest  honor. 

"  COVINGTON,  December  — , . 

"Dear  General:  In  looking  over  some  old  papers  (relics  of 
the  late  war),  a  few  days  ago,  I  discovered  one  which,  until 
then,  I  did  not  know  was  in  my  possession.  It  is  the  last  letter 
written  by  General  Morgan,  and,  in  a  measure,  may  be  consid 
ered  his  dying  declaration.  I  can  not  recollect  how  it  came  into 
my  possession,  but  believe  it  to  have  been  among  a  bundle  of  pa 
pers  that  were  taken  from  his  body  after  he  was  killed,  and  for 
warded  to  Department  Headquarters;  the  letter  of  Captain 
Gwynn,  which  I  will  also  inclose  you,  leaves  hardly  a  doubt 
upon  that  point. 

I  have  noticed  through  the  press,  that  you  were  engaged  in 
—writing  a  history  of  "Morgan's  command,"  and  under  the  impres 
sion  that  this  paper  will  be  of  service  to  you,  I  herewith  forward 
it.  I  am  familiar  with  the  embarrassments  that  surrounded  the 
General  for  some  time  previously  to  his  death,  and  in  reading  this 
last  appeal  to  the  powers  that  had  dealt  with  him  so  unjustly, 
the  remembrance  of  them  still  awakens  in  my  bosom  many 


534 

emotions  of  regret.  If  the  General  acted  adversely  to  his  own 
interests,  in  endeavoring  to  adjust  quietly  the  unfortunate 
affairs  that  he.  refers  to,  those  who  understood  his  motives  for 
so  doing  would  excuse  this  error  of  his  judgment  when  they 
realized  the  feelings  that  prompted  it.  He  saw  his  error  when 
it  was  too  late  to  correct  it,  and  died  before  opportunity  was 
given  to  vindicate  his  character.  I  remember  distinctly  the  last 
conversation  I  had  with  him,  only  a  few  clays  before  his  death, 
and  the  earnest  manner  in  which  he  spoke  of  this  trouble, 
would  have  removed  from  my  mind  all  doubt  of  the  perfect  rec 
titude  of  his  intentions,  if  any  had  ever  existed.  I  remember, 
too,  my  visit  to  Richmond  during  the  month  of  August,  1864, 
on  which  occasion,  at  the  General's  request,  I  called  upon 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  lay  before  him  some  papers  entrusted 
to  my  care,  and  also  to  make  some  verbal  explanations  regarding 
them.  The  excited,  I  may  say  the  exasperated  manner  in 
which  the  Honorable  Secretary  commented  upon  the  documents, 
left  but  one  impression  upon  my  mind,  and  that  was,  that  the 
War  Department  had  made  up  its  mind  that  the  party  was 
guilty  and.  that  its  conviction  should  not  be  offended  by  any 
evidence  to  the  contrary.  The  determination  to  pursue  and 
break  the  General  down  was  apparent  to  every  one,  and  the 
Kentucky  expedition  was  to  be  the  means  to  accomplish  this 
end  (the  reasons  for  a  great  deal  of  this  enmity  are,  of  course, 
familiar  to  you).  I  endeavored  to  explain  to  Mr.  Seddon  the 
injustice  of  the  charge  that  General  Morgan  had  made  this 
expedition  without  proper  authority  (I  felt  this  particularly  to 
be  my  duty  as  I  was  the  only  person  then  living  who  could  bear 
witness  upon  that  point),  but  being  unable  to  obtain  a  quiet 

hearing,  I  left  his  office  disappointed  and  disgusted. 

*  ^  *  #  *  *  *  * 

With  the  hope  that  you  may  succeed  in  the  work  you  have 
undertaken,  believe  me, 

Very  truly,  your  friend, 

J.  L.  SANDFORD." 


MORGAN'S  PROTEST  TO  SEDDON.  535 

"  HEADQUARTERS  CAV.  DEP'T,  EAST  TENNESSEE,  1 
Jonesboro',  Sept.  1,1864.      / 

"  SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  ask  your  early  and  careful  con 
sideration  of  the  statements  herein  submitted,  and,  although  I 
am  aware  that  the  representations  which  have  been  made  you, 
concerning  the  matters  to  which  these  statements  relate,  have 
so  decided  your  opinion  that  you  do  not  hesitate  to  give  it  free 
expression,  I  yet  feel  that  it  is  due  to  myself  to  declare  how 
false  and  injurious  such  representations  have  been  and  to  protest 
against  the  injustice  which  condemns  me  unheard. 

You  will  understand  that  I  allude  to  the  alleged  robbery  of 
the  Bank  of  Mt.  Sterling,  Kentucky,  and  other  outrages  which 
my  command  is  charged  with  having  committed  during  the  late 
expedition  into  that  State.  I  will  not,  myself,  countenance  a 
course  of  procedure  against  which- 1  feel  that  I  can  justly  pro 
test,  ^by  citing  testimony  or  waging  my  own  affirmation  in 
disproof  of  the  accusations  which  have  been  filed  against  me 
at  your  office — but  I  will  demand  a  prompt  and  thorough 
investigation  of  them  all,  and  will  respectfully  urge  the  pro 
priety  of  yourself  instituting  it. 

If,  as  has  been  asserted,  I  have  obstructed  all  examination 
into  the  truth  of  these  imputations,  a  proper  regard  for  the 
interests  of  the  service,  as  well  as  the  ends  of  justice,  requires 
that  some,  higher  authority  shall  compel  an  exposure.  Until 
very  recently,  I  was  ignorant  how  the  rumors  which  had  already 
poisoned  the  public  mind,  had  been  received  and  listened  to 
in  official  circles,  and  I  can  not  forbear  indignant  complaint  of 
the  injury  done  my  reputation  and  usefulness  by  the  encourage 
ment  thus  given  them. 

Allegations,  directly  implicating  me  in  the  excesses  above 
referred  to,  that  I  had  connived  at,  if  I  did  not  incite  them,  and 
that  I  have  striven  to  shield  the  perpetrators  from  discovery 
and  punishment — allegations,  the  most  vague  and  yet  all  tending 
to  impeach  my  character,  have  obtained  hearing  and  credence  at 
the  department. 


536  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

I  have  not  been  called  on,  indeed  I  may  say  I  have  not  been  per 
mitted  one  word  in  my  defense.  Permit  me  to  say  that  an  officer's 
reputation  may  suffer  from  such  causes,  in  official  and  public 
opinion,  and  that  he  may  find  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to 
vindicate  it,  unless  his  superiors  assist  him  by  inviting  inquiry. 
I  am  informed  that  communications  and  documents  of  various 
kinds,  relating  to  the  alleged'-crimirial  transactions  in  Kentucky, 
have  been  addressed  you  by  certain  of  my  subordinates,  and  I 
have  been  profoundly  ignorant  of  their  existence,  until  after 
their  receipt,  and  the  intended  impression  had  been  produced. 
I  have  but  little  acquaintance  with  the  forms  and  regulations  of 
your  office,  and  I  would  respectfully  ask  if  communications  so 
furnished  are  not  altogether  irregular  and  prejudicial  to  good 
order  and  proper  discipline  ?  If  these  parties  believe  my  con 
duct  culpable,  is  it  not  their  plain  duty  to  prefer  charges  against 
me  and  bring  me  before  a  court  martial  ?  And  if  failing  to  adopt 
measures  suggested  alike  by  law,  justice  and  propriety,  they 
pursue  a  course  which  tends  to  weaken  my  authority,  impair  my 
reputation  and  embarrass  my  conduct,  have  I  riot  the  right  to 
expect  that  their  action  shall  be  condemned  and  themselves 
reprimanded?  Indeed,  sir,  discipline  and  subordination  have 
been  impaired  to  such  an  extent  in  my  command  by  proceedings, 
such  as  I  have  described,  that  an  officer  of  high  rank  quitted  a 
responsible  post,  without  leave  and  in  direct  disobedience  to 
my  orders,  and  repaired  to  Richmond  to  urge  in  person  his 
application  for  assignment  to  duty  more  consonant  with  his 
inclinations.  It  is,  with  all  due  respect,  that  I  express  my  regret 
that  his  application  was  successful. 

Permit  me  again,  sir,  to  urge  earnestly,  that  the  investigation, 
which  can  alone  remove  the  difficulties  which  I  now  experience, 
shall  be  immediately  ordered. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

JOHN.  H.  MORGAN. 
To  HON.  JAMES  A.  SEDDON,  Secretary  of  War. 


LAST   CHEER   FROM    HIS    COMMAND.  537 

On  the  28th  or  29th  of  August,  General  Morgan  left  Abing- 
don,  and  taking  command  of  the  troops  at  Jonesboro'  on  the 
31st,  immediately  prepared  to  move  against  the  enemy.  Our 
forces  had  again  been  driven  away  from  their  positions  at  Bull's 
Gap  and  Rogers ville,  and  had  fallen  back  to  Jonesboro'.  After 
two  or  three  days  delay  for  refitment,  etc.,  General  Morgan 
marched  from  Jonesboro'  with  the  intention  of  attacking  the 
enemy  at  Bull's  Gap.  If  he  could  drive  them  from  that  position, 
by  a  sudden  and  rapidly  executed  movement,  he  would,  in  all 
probability,  cut  off-  that  force  at  Rogersville  and  either  force 
it  to  surrender  or  compel  it  to  retreat  into  Kentucky.  In  the 
latter  event,  the  enemy's  strength  would  be  so  much  reduced, 
that  all  of  East  Tennessee,  as  far  down  as  Kn-oxville,  would  be 
for  some  time,  in  possession  of  the  Confederates.  General  Mor 
gan's  strength,  including  the  portions  of  General  Vaughan's 
brigade,  was  about  sixteen  hundred  and  two  pieces  of  artillery. 
The  men  were  badly  armed  and  equipped  and  had  been  much 
discouraged  by  their  late  reverses,  but  reanimated  by  the 
presence  of  their  leader,  whom  they  loved  all  the  more  as  mis 
fortunes  befell  them,  they  were  anxious  for  battle. 

A  small  frame  house  upon  the  left  side  of  the  road  leading 
from  Jonesboro'  to  Greenville,  was  often  pointed  out  to  me  sub 
sequently,  as  the  spot  where  General  Morgan  received  (as  he 
rode  past  the  column),  the  last  cheer  ever  given  him  by  his  men. 
Reaching  Greenville  about  4  P.  M.  on  the  3d  of  September,  he 
determined  to  encamp  there  for  the  night  and  move  on  Bull's 
Gap  the  next  day.  The  troops  were  stationed  on  all  sides  of 
the  place,  and  he  made  his  headquarters  in  town,  at  the  house  of 
Mrs.  Williams.  The  younger  Mrs.  Williams  left  Greenville, 
riding  in  the  direction  of  Bull's  Gap  at  the  first  rumors  of  the 
approach  of  our  forces,  to  give,  we  have  always  believed,  the 
alarm  to  the  enemy. 

The  Tennesseeans  of  Vaughan's  brigade  (under  Colonel  Brad 
ford),  were  encamped  on  the  Bull's  Gap  road,  and  were  in 
structed  to  picket  that  road  and  the  roads  to  the  left.  Clark's 


538  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

battalion  of  Colonel  Smith's  brigade  and  the  artillery  were  en 
camped  on  the  Jonesboro'  road,  about  five  hundred  yards  from 
the  town.  The  remainder  of  Colonel  Smith's  brigade  was  en 
camped  on  the  Rogersville  road.  Colonel  Giltner's  command 
was  also  stationed  in  this  quarter,  and  the  two  picketed  all  the 
roads  to  the  front  and  right  flank.  The  town,  had  all  instruc 
tions  been  obeyed  and  the  pickets  judiciously  placed,  would  have 
been  perfectly  protected.  It  has  been  stated,  I  know  not  how 
correctly,  that  the  enemy  gained  admittance  to  the  town,  un 
challenged,  through  an  unaccountable  error  in  the  picketing  of 
the  roads  on  the  left.  According  to  this  account,  the  enemy, 
who  left  Bull's  Gap  before  midnight,  quitted  the  main  road  at 
Blue  Springs,  equi-distant  from  Greenville  and  Bull's  Gap,  and 
marched  by  the  Warrensburg  road,  until  within  one  mile  and  a 
half  of  the  town. 

At  this  point,  a  by-road  leads  from  the  Warrensburg  to  the 
Newport  road.  The  pickets  on  the  Warrensburg  road  were  not 
stationed  in  sight  of  this  point,  while  on  the  Newport  road  the 
base  of  the  pickets  was  beyond  the  point  where  the  by-road  en 
ters,  and  there  were  no  rear  videttes  between  the  base  and  town. 
The  enemy  (it  is  stated),  took  this  little  by-road,  and  turning  off 
in  front  of  one  picket,  came  in  behind  the  other.  At  any  rate, 
about  daylight,  a  body  perhaps  of  one  hundred  cavalry  dashed 
into  Greenville  and  were  followed  in  a  short  time  by  Gillem's 
whole  force.  It  was  the  party  that  came  first  which  killed  Gen 
eral  Morgan.  His  fate,  however,  is  still  involved  in  mystery. 
Major  Gassett,  of  his  staff,  states  that  they  left  the  house  toge 
ther  and  sought  to  escape,  but  found  every  street  guarded.  They 
took  refuge  once  in  the  open  cellar  of  a  house,  expecting  that 
some  change  in  the  disposition  of  the  Federal  forces  would  leave 
an  avenue  for  escape,  or  that  they  would  be  rescued  by  a  charge 
from  some  of  the  troops  at  the  camps.  They  were  discovered 
and  pointed  out  by  a  Union  woman.  Gassett  succeeded  in  effect 
ing  his  escape.  General  Morgan  made  his  way  back  to  the  gar 
den  of  Mrs.  Williams'  house.  Lieutenant  X.  Hawkins,  a  fearless 


GENERAL  MORGAN'S  DEATH.  539 

young  officer,  charged  into  the  town  with  fifteen  men  and  strove 
to  reach  the  point  where  he  supposed  the  General  to  be,  but  he 
was  forced  back.  General  Morgan  was  killed  in  the  garden — shot 
through  the  heart.  It  is  not  known  whether  he  surrendered  or 
was  offering  resistance. 

His  friends  have  always  believed  that  he  was  murdered  after 
his  surrender.  Certain  representations  by  the  parties  who 
killed  him,  their  ruffianly  character,  and  the  brutality  with 
which  they  treated  his  body,  induced  the  belief;  and  it  was  no 
torious  that  his  death,  if  again  captured,  had  been  sworn.  His 
slayers  broke  down  the  paling  around  the  garden,  dragged  him 
through,  and,  while  he  was  tossing  his  arms  'in  his  dying 
agonies,  threw  him  across  a  mule,  and  paraded  his  body  about 
the  town,  shouting  and  screaming  in  savage  exultation.  No 
effort  was  made  by  any  one  except  Lieutenant  Hawkins  to 
accomplish  his  rescue.  The  three  commands  demoralized  by 
General  Morgan's  death,  became  separated  and  were  easily 
driven  away.  The  men  of  his  old  command  declared  their  de 
sire  to  fight  and  avenge  him  on  the  spot,  but  a  retreat  was 
insisted  upon. 

Thus,  on  the  4th  of  September,  1864,  in  this  little  village  of 
East  Tennessee,  fell  the  greatest  partisan  leader  the  world  ever 
saw,  unless  it  were  the  Irishman,  S:irsfield.  Bat  not  only  was 
the  light  of  genius  extinguished  then,  and  a  heroic  spirit  lost  to 
earth — as  kindly  arid  as  noble  a  heart  as  was  ever  warmed  by 
the  constant  presence  of  generous  emotions  was  stilled  by  a 
ruffian's  bullet. 

As  the  event  is  described,  the  feelings  it  excited  come  back 
almost  as  fresh  and  poignant  as  at  the  time.  How  hard  it  was 
to  realize  that  his  time,  too,  had  come — that  so  much  life  had 
been  quenched.  Every  trait  of  the  man  we  almost  worshiped, 
recollections  of  incidents  which  showed  his  superb  nature, 
crowd  now,  as  they  crowded  then,  upon  the  mind. 

When  he  died,  the  glory  and  chivalry  seemed  gone  from  the 
c,  and  it  became  a  tedious  routine,  enjoined  by  duty,  and 


540  HISTORY  or  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

sustained  only  by  sentiments  of  pride  and  hatred.  Surely  men 
never  grieved  for  a  leader  as  Morgan's  men  sorrowed  for  him. 
The  tears  which  scalded  the  cheeks  of  hardy  and  rugged  vet 
erans,  who  had  witnessed  all  the  terrible  scenes  of  four  years  of 
war,  attested  it,  and  the  sad  faces  told  of  the  aching  hearts 
within. 

His  body  was  taken  from  the  hands  which  defiled  it,  by 
General  Gillem,  as  soon  as  that  officer  arrived  at  Greenville,  and 
sent  to  our  lines,  under  flag  of  truce.  It  was  buried  first  at 
Abingdon,  then  removed  to  the  cemetery  at  Richmond,  Avhere  it 
lies  now,  surrounded  by  kindred  heroic  ashes,  awaiting  the  time 
when  it  can  be  brought  to  his  own  beloved  Kentucky — the  hour 
when  there  is  no  longer  fear  that  the  storm,  which  living  rebels 
are  sworn  to  repress,  shall  burst  out  with  the  presence  of  the 
dead  chieftain. 

The  troops  again  returned  to  Jonesboro',  the  enemy  returning 
after  a  short  pursuit  to  Bull's  Gap.  Immediately  upon  learning 
of  General  Morgan's  death,  General  Echols,  then  commanding 
the  department,  ordered  me  to  take  command  of  the  brigade 
composed  of  his  old  soldiers — the  remnant  of  the  old  division. 
I  found  this  brigade  reduced  to  two  hundred  and  seventy-three 
effective  men,  and  armed  in  a  manner  that  made  it  a  matter  of 
wonder  how  they  could  fight  at  all.  There  were  scarcely  fifty 
serviceable  guns  in  the  brigade,  and  the  variety  of  calibers  ren 
dered  it  almost  a  matter  of  impossibility  to  keep  on  hand  a  sup 
ply  of  available  ammunition.  They  were  equipped  similarly  in 
all  other  respects.  Every  effort  was  at  once  instituted  to  col 
lect  and  procure  guns,  and  to  provide  suitable  equipments. 
General  Echols  kindly  rendered  all  the  assistance  in  his  power, 
and  manifested  a  special  interest  in  us,  for  which  we  were  deeply 
grateful.  Our  friends  at  Richmond  and  throughout  the  Con 
federacy,  seemed  to  experience  fresh  sympathy  for  us  after 
General  Morgan's  death. 

In  this  connection  it  is  fitting  to  speak  of  a  gentleman  to 
whom  we  were  especially  indebted,  Mr.  E.  M.  Bruce,  one  of  the 


E.  M.  BRUCE.  541 

Kentucky  members  of  the  Confederate  Congress.  It  would,  in 
deed,  be  unjust  as  well  as  ungrateful,  to  omit  mention  of  his 
name  and  his  generous,  consistent  friendship.  Not  only  were 
•we,  of  Morgan's  old  command,  the  recipients  of  constant  and 
the  kindest  services  from  him,  but  his  generosity  was  as  wide  as 
his  charity,  which  seemed  boundless.  His  position  at  Richmond 
was  such  as  to  enable  him  to  be  of  great  assistance  to  the  sol 
diers  and  people  from  his  state,  and  he  was  assiduous  arid  un 
tiring  in  their  behalf.  The  immense  wealth  which  his  skill  and 
nerve  in  commercial  speculations  procured  him,  was  lavished  in 
friendly  ministrations  and  charitable  enterprises.  An  intelligent 
and  useful  member  of  the  Congress,  a  safe  and  valuable  adviser 
of  the  administration  in  all  matters  within  the  province  of  his 
advice,  he  was  especially  known  and  esteemed  as  the  friend  of 
the  soldiery,  the  patron  of  all  who  stood  in  need  of  aid  and  in 
dulgence.  At  one  time  he  maintained  not  only  a  hospital  in 
Richmond  for  the  sick  and  indigent,  but  a  sort  of  hotel,  kept 
up  at  his  own  expense,  where  the  Kentucky  soldiers  returning 
from  prison  were  accommodated.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  he  did 
more  toward  furnishing  the  Kentucky  troops  with  clothing,  etc., 
than  all  of  the  supply  department  put  together.  The  sums. he 
gave  away  in  Confederate  money  would  sound  fabulous ;  and,  after 
the  last  surrender,  he  gave  thousands  of  dollars  in  gold  to  the 
Kentucky  troops,  who  lacked  means  to  take  them  home.  His 
name  will  ever  be  held  by  them  in  grateful  and  affectionate 
remembrance. 

My  command  remained  encamped  near  Jonesboro'  for  nearly 
two  weeks.  The  commands  of  Yaughan,  Cosby  (that  formerly 
commanded  by  General  George  B.  Hodge)  and  Giltncr  were 
also  stationed  in  the  same  vicinity,  all  under  command  of  Gen 
eral  John  C.  Vaughari. 

Upon  the  15th  of  September,  I  received  my  commission  as 
Brigadier  General  and  accepted  it — as  it  has  turned  out — an 
unpardonable  error.  During  the  time  that  we  remained  near 
Joncsboro',  the  brigade  improved  very  much.  Fortunately  sev- 


542  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

eral  of  the  best  officers  of  the  old  command,  who  had  escaped 
capture,  were  with  it  at  the  time  that  I  took  command,  Captains 
Cantrill,  Lea  and  Messick,  and  Lieutenants  Welsh,  Cunningham, 
Hunt,  HaAvkins,  Hopkins,  Skillman,  Roody,  Piper,  Moore,  Lu 
cas,  Skinner,  Crump  and  several  others  equally  as  gallant  and 
good,  and  there  were  some  excellent  officers  who  had  joined  the 
command  just  after  General  Morgan's  return  from  prison.  The 
staff  department  was  ably  filled  by  the  acting  adjutants,  Lieu 
tenants  George  W.  Hunt,  Arthur  Andrews,  James  Hines  and 
Daniels.  These  were  all  officers  of  especial  merit. 

Colonels  Ward,  Morgan  and  Tucker,  and  Majors  Webber  and 
Steele  had  been  exchanged  at  Charleston,  and  their  valuable  ser 
vices  were  secured  at  a  time  when  greatly  needed.  The  gallant 
Mississippi  company,  of  my  old  regiment,  was  there,  all,  at  least, 
that  was  left  of  it,  and  Cooper's  company,  under  Welsh,  as 
staunch  and  resolute  as  ever,  although  greatly  reduced  in  num 
bers.  All  the  old  regiments  were  represented. 

Daily  drills  and  inspections  soon  brought  the  brigade  into  a 
high  state  of  efficiency  and  the  men  longed  to  return  to  the  de 
batable  ground  and  try  conclusions,  fairly,  with  the  enemy  which 
had  boasted  of  recent  triumphs  at  their  expense.  An  opportu 
nity  soon  occurred.  In  the  latter  part  of  September,  General 
Vaughan  'moved  with  all  of  these  commands  stationed  about 
Jonesboro',  in  the  direction  of  Greenville.  One  object  of  the 
movement  was  to  attempt,  if  co-operation  with  General  John  S. 
Williams,  who  was  known  to  be  approaching  from  toward  Knox- 
ville,  could  be  secured,  the  capture  of  the  Federal  forces  at 
Bull's  gap.  General  Williams  had  been  cut  off,  in  Middle  Ten 
nessee,  from  General  Wheeler  who  had  raided  into  that  country. 
His  command  consisted  of  three  brigades.  One  under  command 
of  Colonel  William  Breckinridge  was  the  brigade  of  Kentucky 
cavalry  which  had  won  so  much  reputation  in  the  retreat  from 
Dalton  and  the  operations  around  Atlanta.  In  this  brigade 
were  Colonel  Breckinridge's  own  regiment,  the  Ninth  Kentucky 
and  Dortch's  battalion.  Another  of  these  brigades  was  a  very 


MAP     S  H  O Wl 

THOSE  PORTIONS  OF 

£,  leopessee  qifd  1 

Operated  in  by  Gen.  Morgan's  Brigade, 


UNDER  COMMAND  OF 


Brig.  Gen. 


Winte 


B.  W,  DUEE 

)/  18G4-'G5. 


"Indicates  Federals' rout 


30  UII.K8  TO  TBJt  IKOB 


(543) 


544 

fine  one  of  Tennessee  troops,  under  General  Debrell,  an  excel 
lent  officer.  The  third  commanded  by  General  Robertson,  a 
young  and  very  dashing  officer,  was  composed  of  "  Confederate ' ' 
battalions — troops  enlisted  under  no  particular  State  organiza 
tion.  General  Vaughan  learning  of  General  Williams'  approach 
dispatched  him  a  courier  offering  to  co-operate  with  him  and  ad 
vising  that  General  Williams  should  attack  the  rear,  while  he, 
Vaughan  would  attack  it  in  front. 

Passing  through  Greenville  at  early  dawn  upon  the  second 
day  after  we  left  Jonesboro',  the  column  marched  rapidly  to 
ward  the  gap.  My  brigade  was  marching  in  advance.  It  was 
at  this  time  three  hundred  and  twenty-two  strong  and  was  or 
ganized  into  two  battalions,  the  first  commanded  by  Colonel 
Ward  and  the  second  by  Colonel  Morgan.  About  four  miles 
from  Greenville,  Captain  Messick,  whose  Company,  A,  of  the 
second  battalion,  was  acting  as  advance-guard,  encountered  a 
scouting  party  of  the  enemy  fifty  or  sixty  strong.  Messick  im 
mediately  attacked,  routed  the  party  and  chased  it  for  several 
miles,  taking  eight  or  ten  prisoners.  Pressing  on  again  in  ad 
vance,  when  the  column  had  overtaken  him,  he  discovered  the 
enemy  in  stronger  force  than  before,  advantageously  posted  upon 
the  further  side  of  a  little  stream  about  two  miles  from  Lick 
creek.  Halting  his  command  here,  Captain  Messick,  accompa 
nied  by  Lieutenant  Hopkins,  galloped  across  the  bridge  and  to 
ward  the  enemy  to  reconnoitre.  Approaching,  despite  the  shots 
fired  at  them,  to  within  forty  or  fifty  yards  of  the  enemy,  they 
were  then  saluted  by  a  volley  from  nearly  two  hundred  rifles. 
Thinking  it  impossible,  or  impolitic,  to  procure  "further  infor 
mation"  they  rapidly  galloped  back.  Upon  the  approach  of  the 
column  this  party  of  the  enemy  fell  back  to  Lick  creek,  where 
it  met  or  was  reinforced  by  some  two  or  three  hundred  more. 
Lick  creek  is  some  three  miles  from  Bull's  gap.  There  were  no 
fords  in  the  vicinity  of  the  road  and  it  was  too  deep  for  wading 
except  at  one  or  two  points.  A  narrow  bridge  spanned  it  at 
the  point  where  it  crossed  the  road.  On  the  side  that  we  were 


ENGAGEMENT  AT  LICK  CREEK.  545 

approaching  there  is  a  wide  open  space  like  a  prairie,  perhaps 
half  a  mile  square.  Thick  woods  border  this  opening  in  the  di 
rection  that  we  were  coming  and  wooded  hills  upon  the  left — 
running  down  to  the  edge  of  the  creek. 

Perceiving  the  enemy  show  signs  of  a  disposition  to  contest 
our  crossing,  my  brigade  was  at  once  deployed  to  force  a  pass 
age.  A  portion  of  the  second  battalion  was  double-quicked, 
dismounted,  across  the  open  to  the  thickets  near  the  bank  of 
the  creek.  Although  exposed  for  the  entire  distance  to  the  fire 
of  the  enemy,  this  detachment  suffered  no  loss.  One  company 
of  the  second  battalion  was  also  sent  to  the  right,  and  took  posi 
tion  near  the  creek  in  that  quarter.  The  greater  part  of  the 
first  battalion  was  sent,  on  foot,  to  the  left,  and,  concealed  by  the 
thickets  upon  the  hills,  got  near  enough  the  creek  without  at 
tracting  the  attention  of  the  enemy.  Lieuten-ant  Conrad  was 
ordered  to  charge  across  the  bridge  with  two  mounted  companies. 
As  he  approached  it  at  a  trot,  a  battalion  of  the  enemy  galloped 
down  on  the  other  side  (close  to  the  bridge)  to  dispute  his  pass 
age.  The  dismounted  skirmishers,  who  had  taken  position  near 
the  creek,  prevented  Conrad's  column  from  receiving  annoyance 
from  the  remainder  of  the  Federal  force. 

"When  within  so  short  a  distance  of  the  bridge  that  the  fea 
tures  of  the  Federal  soldiers  at  the  other  extremity  were  plainly 
discernible,  Conrad  suddenly  halted,  threw  one'  company  into 
line,  keeping  the  other  in  column  behind  it,  and  opened  fire  upon 
it,  which  was  returned  with  interest.  Just  then  Lieutenant 
Welsh  carried  his  company  across  the  creek  on  the  extreme  left, 
followed  by  Lea  (the  water  coming  up  to  the  men's  shoulders) 
and  attacked  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear.  This  shook  their 
line.  General  Yaughan,  at  the  same  time,  brought  up  a  piece 
of  artillery  and  opened  fire  over  the  heads  of  our  own  men. 
Conrad  seized  the  moment  of  confusion  and  darted  across  the 
bridge  with  the  company  which  was  in  column,  the  other  follow 
ing.  It  was  then  a  helter-skelter  chase  until  the  enemy  took 
refuge  in  the  gap. 
35 


546  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

General  Vaughn  marched  on,  but  hearing  nothing  of  General 
Williams,  and  knowing  the  strength  of  the  position,  did  not  attack. 
He  had  a  brass  band  with  him,  which  he  made  play  "  Dixie," 
in  the  hope  that  it  would  lure  the  enemy  out ;  but  this  strategical 
banter  was  treated  with  profound  indifference.  General  Wil 
liams  had  marched  on  the  north  side  of  the  Holston  river  to 
Rogersville,  and  thence  to  Greenville,  where  we  met  him  upon 
our  return  next  day.  His  command  was  about  two  thousand 
strong,  but  a  part  of  it  badly  armed,  and  his  ammunition  was 
exhausted.  It  turned  out  that  his  advent  in  our  department 
was  most  opportune  and  fortunate. 

We  remained  at  Greenville  several  days,  and  then  marched  to 
Carter's  Station.  This  withdrawal  was  occasioned  by  the  un- 
formation  of  the  approach  of  Burbridge,  from  Kentucky,  with  a 
heavy  force.  His  destination  was  supposed  to  be  the  Salt-works, 
and  General  Echols  judged  it  expedient  to  effect  a  timely  concen 
tration  of  all  the  forces  in  the  department.  The  system  of  pro 
curing  information  from  Kentucky,  the  most  dangerous  quarter 
to  the  Department,  was  so  well  organized  that  it  was  nearly  two 
weeks  after  the  first  intimation  of  danger  before  Burbridge  en 
tered  Virginia.  Giltner's  brigade  had  been  moved  very  early 
to  Laurel  Gap,  or  some  position  in  that  vicinity,  between  the 
Salt- works  and  the  approaching  enemy.  Leaving  General 
Vaughan  with  his  own  brigade  at  Carter's  Station,  General  Echols 
ordered  General  Cosby  and  myself  to  Bristol.  General  Wil 
liams^  who,  with  great  exertion,  had  rearmed  his  command, 
moved  a  few  days  subsequently  to  the  Salt-works,  where  the 
"reserves  "  of  militia  were  now,  also,  collecting.  Simultaneously 
with  Burbridge's  advance,  the  enemy  approached  from  Knoxville 
(under  Generals  Gillem  and  Ammon),  marching  over  the  same 
ground  which  we  had  traversed  shortly  before. 
*  General  Vaughan  was  attacked,  and  was  compelled  to  divide 
his  brigade,  the  greater  part  remaining  at  Carter's  Station,  and 
a  part  being  sent,  .under  Colonel  Carter,  to  Duvault's  ford,  five 
miles  below  on  the  Wetauga,  where  the  enemy  sought  to  effect 


FIGHT  AT  CARTER'S  STATION..  547 

a  passngo.  Upon  the  night  after  the  first  demonstration  against 
General  Vaughan,  General  Cosby  and  I  were  sent  to  reinforce 
him,  and,  marching  all  night,  reached  the  position  assigned 
early  the  next  morning.  General  Cosby  was  posted  where  he 
could  support  most  speedily  whichever  point  needed  it,  and  I 
was  instructed  to  proceed  directly  to  Duvault's  ford.  Upon  ar 
riving  there,  I  found  Colonel  Carter  making  all  the  preparations 
within  his  power  to  repel  the  attack  which  he  anticipated.  About 
nine  A.  M.,  the  enemy  recommenced  the  fight  at  Carter's  Station, 
and  toward  one  or  two  P.  M.  made  his  appearance  again  upon 
the  other  side  of  the  river,  opposite  our  position.  The  firing  by 
this  time  had  become  so  heavy  at  Carter's  Station  that  I  feared 
that  General  Vaughan  would  not  be  able  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  crossing  the  river  there,  and  became  anxious  to  create  a 
diversion  in  his  favor.  I  thought  that  if  the  force  confronting 
us  could  be  driven  off  and  made  to  retreat  on  Jonesboro',  that 
confronting  General  Vaughan  would  also  fall  back,  fearing  a  flank 
attack,  or  it  would,  at  least,  slacken  its  efforts.  The  steep  and 
difficult  bank  just  in  our  front  forbade  all  thought  of  attack  in 
that  way,  but  there  was  a  ford  about  a  mile  and  a  half  below, 
from  which  a  good  road  led  through  level  ground  to  the  rear  of 
the  enemy's  position.  I  instructed  Captain  Messick  to  take  fifty 
picked  men,  cross  at  this  ford,  and  take  the  enemy  in  the  rear, 
and  requested  Colonel  Carter  to  cause  one  of  his  battalions  to 
dash  down  to  the  brink  of  the  river,  as  soon  as  the  firing  com 
menced,  and  cross  and  attack  if  the  enemy  showed  signs  of 
being  shaken  by  Messick's  movement. 

Captain  Messick  had  crossed  the  river  and  gotten  two  or  three 
hundred  yards  upon  the  other  side,  when  he  met  a  battalion  of 
Federal  cavalry  approaching,  doubtless  to  try  a  flank  movement 
on  us.  They  were  marching  with  drawn  sabers,  but  foolishly 
halted  at  sight  of  our  men.  Messick  immediately  ordered  the 
charge  and  dashed  into  them.  The  impetus  with  which  his  col 
umn  drove  against  them  made  the  Federals  recoil,  and  in  a  little 
while  entirely  give  way.  Stephen  Sharp,  of  Cluke's  regiment,  rode 


548  HISTORY  OP  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

at  the  color-guard,  and  shooting  the  color-bearer  through  the  head, 
seized  the  flag.  While  he  was  waving  it  in  triumph,  the  guard 
fired  upon  him,  two  bullets  taking  effect,  one  in  the  left  arm,  the 
other  through  the  lungs.  Dropping  the  colors  across  his  saddle, 
he  clubbed  his  rifle  and  struck  two  of  his  assailants  from  their 
horses,  and  Captain  Messick  killed  a  third  for  him.  Twelve 
prisoners  were  taken,  and  ten  or  fifteen  of  the  enemy  killed  and 
wounded.  Messick,  pressing  the  rout,  whirled  around  upon  the 
rear  of  the  position.  Colonel  Carter  ordered  the  Sixteenth 
Georgia  to  charge  the  position  in  front,  when  he  saw  the  confu 
sion  produced  by  this  dash,  and  the  whole  force  went  off  in 
rapid  retreat,  pursued  by  the  detachment  of  Captain  Messick 
and  the  Georgia  battalion  for  four  or  five  miles. 

Shortly  afterward  the  demonstration  against  Carter's  Station 
ceased.  Lieutenant  Roody,  a  brave  and  excellent  young  officer, 
lost  a  leg  in  this  charge.  Stephen  Sharp,  whose  name  has  just 
now  been  mentioned,  was  perhaps  the  hero  of  more  personal  ad 
ventures  than  any  man  in  Morgan's  command.  He  had  once 
before  captured  a  standard  by  an  act  of  equal  courage.  He  had 
made  his  escape  from  prison  by  an  exercise  of  almost  incredible 
daring.  With  a  companion,  named  Hecker,  he  deliberately 
scaled  the  wall  of  the  prison  yard,  and  forced  his  way  through 
a  guard  assembled  to  oppose  them.  Sharp  was  shot  and  bayo- 
netted  in  this  attempt,  but  his  wounds  were  not  serious,  and 
both  he  and  his  companion  got  away.  When,  subsequently,  they 
were  making'  their  way  to  Virginia  through  the  mountains  of 
Kentucky,  they  were  attacked  by  six  or  seven  bushwhackers. 
Hecker  was  shot  from  his  horse.  Sharp  shot  four  of  his  assail 
ants  and  escaped.  His  exploits  are  too  numerous  for  mention. 
Although  the  wounds  he  received  at  Duvault's  were  serious,  he 
survived  them,  to  marry  the  lady  who  nursed  him. 

On  the  next  day,  we  received  orders  from  General  Echols  to 
march  at  once  to  Saltville,  as  Burbridge  was  drawing  near  the 
place.  In  a  very  short  time  the  energy  and  administrative  skill 
of  General  Echols  had  placed  the  department  in  an  excellent 


FEDERAL  RETREAT  FROM  SALTVILLE.          549 

condition  for  defense.  But  it  was  the  opportune  arrival  of  Gen 
eral  Williams  which  enabled  us  to  beat  back  all  assailants. 
When  we  reached  Abingdon,  we  learned  that  General  Breckin- 
ridge  had  arrived  and  had  assumed  command.  After  a  short 
halt,  we  pressed  on  and  reached  Saltville  at  nightfall  to  learn 
that  the  enemy  had  been  repulsed  that  day  in  a  desperate  attack- 
His  loss  had  been  heavy. 

General  Williams  had  made  a  splendid  fight — one  worthy  of 
his  very  high  reputation  for  skill  and  resolute  courage.  His  dis 
positions  were  admirable.  It  is  also  positively  stated  that,  as  he 
stood  on  a  superior  eminence  midway  of  his  line  of  battle,  his 
voice  could  be  distinctly  heard  above  the  din  of  battle,  as  he 
shouted  orders  to  all  parts  of  the  line  at  once.  The  Virginia  re 
serves,  under  General  Jackson  and  Colonel  Robert  Preston,  be 
haved  with  distinguished  gallantry.  Upon  the  arrival  of  our 
three  fresh  brigades  it  was  determined  to  assume  the  offensive 
in  the  morning.  But  that  night  the  enemy  retreated.  General 
Cosby  and  I  were  ordered  to  follow  him.  We  overtook  his 
column  beyond  Hyter's  Gap,  but  owing  to  mistakes  in  reconnoi- 
sancc;  etc.,  allowed  it  to  escape  us.  General  Williams  coming 
up  with  a  part  of  his  command,  we  pressed  the  rear  but  did  little 
damage.  After  this,  my  brigade  was  stationed  for  a  few  days  at 
Wytheville. 

In  the  middle  of  October.  I  was  directed  to  go  with  two  hundred 
men  to  Floyd  and  Franklin  counties,  where  the  deserters  from  our 
various  armies  in  Virginia  had  congregated  and  had  become  very 
troublesome.  In  Floyd  county  they  had  organized  what  they 
called  the  "New  State"  and  had  elected  a  provisional  Governor 
and  Lieutenant  Governor.  I  caught  the  latter — he  was  a  very 
nice  gentleman,  and  presented  the  man  who  captured  him  with  a 
horse.  After  a  little  discipline  the  gang  broke  up,  and  some  two 
hundred  came  in  and  surrendered. 

Captain  Cantrill,  of  my  brigade,  was  sent  with  some  forty  men 
to  Grayson  county,  about  the  same  time.  In  this  county  the  de 
serters  and  bushwhackers  had  been  committing  terrible  outrages. 


550  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Upon  Cantrill's  approach  they  retreated  just  across  the  line 
into  North  Carolina,  into  the  mountains  and  bantered  him  to  fol 
low.  He  immediately  did  so.  His  force  was  increased  by  the 
reinforcement  of  a  company  of  militia  to  about  eighty  men.  He 
came  upon  the  deserters  (mustering  about  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  strong),  posted  upon  the  side  of  a  mountain,  and  at 
tacked  them.  Turning  his  horses  loose,  after  finding  that  it 
was  difficult  to  ascend  mounted — he  pushed  his  men  forward  on 
foot.  The  horses  galloping  back,  induced  the  enemy  to  believe 
that  he  was  retreating.  They  were  quickly  undeceived.  Letting 
them  come  close  to  a  belt  of  brush  in  which  his  men  were  rest 
ing,  Captain  Cantrill  poured  in  a  very  destructive  fire.  The 
leader  of  the  gang  was  killed  by  the  first  volley  and  his  men 
soon  dispersed  and  fled. 

Twenty-one  men  were  killed  in  this  affair,  and  the  others  were 
chased  away  from  the  country.  They  gave  no  further  trouble. 
Captain  Cantrill's  action  justified  the  high  esteem  in  which  his 
courage  and  ability  were  held  by  his  superiors.  Almost  imme 
diately  after  the  return  of  these  detachments,  the  brigade  was 
ordered  back  to  East  Tennessee  again. 

General  Vaughan,  supported  by  Colonel  Palmer's  brigade  of 
North  Carolina  reserves,  had  been  attacked  at  Russelville,  six 
miles  below  Bull's  Gap,  and  defeated  with  the  loss  of  four  or  five 
pieces  of  artillery.  General  Breckinridge,  immediately  upon 
hearing  of  this  disaster,  prepared  to  retrieve  it.  The  appoint 
ment  of  General  Breckinridge  to  the  command  of  the  department, 
was  a  measure  admirably  calculated  to  reform  and  infuse  fresh 
vitality  into  its  affairs.  He  possessed  the  confidence  of  both  the 
people  and  the  soldiery.  His  military  record  was  a  brilliant  one, 
and  his  sagacity  and  firmness  were  recognized  by  all.  With  the 
Kentucky  troops,  who  were  extravagantly  proud  of  him,  his 
popularity  was  of  course  unbounded.  Although  this  unfortunate 
department  was  worse  handled  by  the  enemy  after  he  com 
manded  it  than  ever  before,  he  came  out  of  the  ordeal,  fatal  to 
most  other  generals,  with  enhanced  reputation.  His  great 


HEAVY   SKIRMISHING.  551 

energy  and  indomitable  resolution  were  fairly  tried  and  fully 
proven.  He  could  personally  endure  immense  exertions  and  ex 
posure.  If,  however,  when  heavy  duty  and  labor  were  demanded, 
he  got  hold  of  officers  and  men  who  would  not  complain,  he  worked 
them  without  compunction,  giving  them  no  rest,  and  leaving  the 
reluctant  in  clover.  He  could  always  elicit  the  affection  in- 
spired  by  manly  daring  and  high  soldierly  qualities,  and  which 
the  brave  always  feel  for  the  bravest. 

Leaving  Wytheville  on  the  night  of  the  19th  of  October,  the 
brigade  marched  nearly  to  Marion,  twenty-one  miles  distant.  A 
blinding  snow  was  driving  in  our  faces,  and  about  midnight  it 
became  necessary  to  halt  and  allow  the  half  frozen  men  to  build 
fires.  Marching  on  through  Abingdon  and  Bristol,  we  reached 
Carter's  station  on  the  22d.  Here  General  Vaughn's  brigade 
was  encamped,  and  on  the  same  day  trains  arrived  from  Wythe 
ville  bringing  dismounted  men  of  my  brigade  and  of  Cosby's 
jind  Giltner's.  The  bulk  of  these  two  latter  brigades  were  in 
;he  Shenandoah  valley,  with  General  Early.  There  were  also 
two  companies  of  engineers.  The  dismounted  men  numbered  in 
all  between  three  and  four  hundred.  They  were  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Alston,  who  was  assisted  by  Major  (flieno- 
wetli,  Captain  Jenkins  and  other  able  officers.  Six  pieces  of 
artillery  also  arrived,  commanded  by  Major  Page.  On  the  23d, 
the  entire  force  was  marched  to  Jonesboro'.  From  Jonesboro' 
two  roads  run  to  Greenville,  or  rather  to  within  three  miles  of 
Greenville,  when  they  join.  These  roads  are  at  no  point  more 
than  three  miles  apart.  My  brigade  was  ordered  to  march  upon 
the  right  hand,  or  Rheatown,  road  and  General  Vaughan  took  the 
other.  The  dismounted  men  marched  along  the  railroad,  which 
runs  between  them.  A  short  distance  beyond  Rheatown,  Cap 
tain  Messick,  who  was  some  ten  miles  in  front  of  the  column 
with  the  advance-guard  of  twenty  men,  came  upon  an  encamp 
ment  of  the  enemy.  He  immediately  attacked  and  drove  in  the 
pickets.  Privates  Hi  Rogers,  Pat  Gilroy,  Porter  White,  and 
another  brave  fellow  of  Ward's  battalion,  followed  them  into  the 


55:2  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

encampment  and  came  back  unhurt.  Messick  halted  his  guard 
about  four  hundred  yards  from  the  encampment  and  awaited  the 
movements  of  the  enemy.  His  men  were  all  picked  for  their 
daring  and  steadiness  and  could  be  depended  on.  In  a  little 
while  the  enemy  came  out,  but  continued,  for  a  while,  to  fire  at 
long  range.  Fearing  that  arrangements  were  being  made  to  sur 
round  him,  Messick  began  to  retreat.  The  enemy  then  pursued 
him,  and  a  battalion  continued  the  pursuit  for  ten  miles.  Al 
though  closely  pressed,  this  gallant  little  squad  repeatedly 
turned  and  fought,  sometimes  dismounting  to  fire  more  accu 
rately,  and  repeatedly  checked  their  pursuers.  Every  round  of 
their  ammunition  was  exhausted  and  they  were  at  no  time  dis 
ordered  or  forced  into  flight.  Captain  Messick  lost  not  a  single 
man  captured  and  only  one  wounded. 

When  the  column  at  length  came  up,  the  enemy  had  aban 
doned  the  chase  and  returned.  That  evening  we  marched 
through  their  deserted  camp.  Passing  through  Greenville  the 
next  morning,  which  the  enemy  had  evacuated  the  night  before, 
we  reached  Lick  creek  about  4  p.  M.  The  enemy  showed  them 
selves  on  the  further  side,  but  did  not  contest  our  passage.  A 
mile  6*1-  a  mile  and  a  half  in  front  of  the  gap  we  came  upon  them 
again,  about  twelve  hundred  strong.  General  Breckinridge  or 
dered  me  to  attack.  I  did  so  and  in  a  short  time  drove  them 
into  the  gap.  They  came  out  twice  and  were  as  often  driven 
back.  General  Yaughan  had  been  sent  to  demonstrate  in  the 
rear  of  the  gap,  and  the  dismounted  men  had  not  gotten  up. 
After  the  third  trial  outside  of  the  works,  the  enemy  contented 
himself  with  shelling  us.  I  witnessed,  then,  a  singular  incident. 
One  man  was  literally  set  on  fire  by  a  shell.  I  saw  what  seemed 
a  ball  of  fire  fall  from  a  shell  just  exploded  and  alight  upon  this 
poor  fellow.  He  was  at  once  in  flames.  We  tore  his  clothing 
from  him  and  he  was  scorched  and  seared  from  head  to  foot. 

All  that  night  we  stood  in  line  upon  the  ground  we  occupied 
when  it  fell.  The  enemy's  pickets  were  a  short  distance  in  our 
front  and  fired  at  every  movement.  During  the  night  the  artil- 


DESPERATE  ASSAULTS.  553 

lery  arrived  and  was  posted  upon  a  commanding  position  pro 
tected  by  my  line.  The  dismounted  men  also  arrived  during 
the  night. 

On  the  next  morning,  at  day  light,  the  dismounted  men  and 
one  hundred  and  fifty  of  my  brigade,  in  all  some  five  hundred 
men,  were  moved  to  the  extreme  right  to  assault  the  gap  from 
that  quarter.  General  Vaughan  was  instructed  to  attack  it  in 
the  rear,  and  Colonel  George  Crittenden  was  posted  to  support 
the  artillery,  with  one  hundred  and  eighty  men,  and  to  demon 
strate  in  front.  The  right  was  the  real  point  of  attack.  Gen 
eral  Breckiriridge  hoped  to  carry  the  works  there,  and  the  other 
movements  were  intended  as  diversions.  The  enemy's  force, 
as  shown  by  captured  field  returns,  was  about  twenty-five  hun 
dred  men. 

Climbing  up  the  steep  mountain  side,  the  party  sent  to  the 
right  gained  the  ridge  a  little  after  daybreak.  The  .position  to 
be  assaulted  was  exceedingly  strong.  Two  spurs  of  the  hill  (on 
which  the  fortifications  were  erected)  run  out  and  connect  with 
the  mountain  upon  which  we  were  formed.  Between  them  is  an 
immense  ravine,  wide  and  deep.  The  summits  of  these  spurs 
are  not  more  than  forty  yards  wide,  and  their  sides  are  rugged  and 
steep.  Across  each,  and  right  in  the  path  of  our  advance,  earth 
works  were  erected,  not  very  formidable  themselves,  but  com 
manded  by  the  forts.  A  direct  and  cross  fire  of  artillery  swept 
every  inch  of  the  approach.  About  the  time  that  we  reached 
the  top  of  the  mountain,  Major  Page  opened  with  his  pieces 
upon  the  plain  beneath,  and  we  immediately  commenced  the  at 
tack.  Colonel  Ward  crossed  the  ravine  with  the  greater  part 
of  our  column,  and  I  moved  upon  the  left-hand  spur  with  eighty 
or  a  hundred  men  of  my  brigade.  A  good  many  men  of  the 
hastily  organized  companies,  of  the  dismounted  command,  hung 
back  in  the  ravine  as  Colonel  Ward  advanced,  and  did  no  ser 
vice  in  the  fight. 

General  Breckinridge  personally  commanded  the  assault. 
Colonel  Ward  pressed  on  vigorously,  and  despite  the  hot  fire  which 


554  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

met  him,  carried  the  line  of  works  upon  the  right,  but  was  driven 
out  by  the  fire  from  the  fort,  which  he  could  not  take.  He  re 
turned  repeatedly  to  the- assault,  and  could  not  be  driven  far  from 
the  works.  Upon  the  left  we  advanced  rapidly,  driving  in  the 
enemy's  skirmishers,  until,  when  within  thirty  yards  of  the 
earthwork,  the  men  were  staggered  by  the  fire,  halted,  and  could 
not  be  made  to  advance.  Both  ridges  were  completely  swept 
by  the  enfilading  fire,  which  each  now  poured  upon  us.  The 
enemy  once  sprang  over  the  work  upon  the  left  and  advanced 
upon  us,  but  was  forced  back.  The  men  were  much  galled  by 
the  fire  at  this  point. 

Major  Webber  had  but  one  company  of  his  battalion  present. 
It  was  twenty-eight  strong,  and  lost  fourteen.  After  failing  to 
carry  the  works,  we  remained  close  to  them,  upon  both  the 
ridges,  for  more  than  an  hour,  replying  as  effectively  as  we  could 
to  the  enemy's  fire.  Several  instances  of  great  gallantry  oc 
curred.  Sergeant  James  Cardwell,  of  my  old  regiment,  finding 
that  the  men  could  not  be  brought  up  again  to  the  attack,  walked 
deliberately  toward  the  enemy,  declaring  that  he  would  show 
them  what  a  soldier's  duty  was.  He  fell  before  he  had  taken  a 
dozen  steps,  his  gallant  breast  riddled  with  balls.  Gordon  Vor- 
hees,  a  brave  young  soldier,  scarcely  out  of  his  boyhood,  was 
mortally  wounded  when  Colonel  Ward  carried  the  works  upon 
the  right.  His  comrades  strove  to  remove  him,  but  he  refused 
to  permit  them  to  do  so,  saying  that  it  was  their  part  to  fight 
and  not  to  look  after  dying  men. 

Colonel  Crittenden  had  pressed  his  slight  line  and  Page's  guns 
close  to  the  front  of  the  gap,  during  our  attack,  and  did  splendid 
service.  But  the  attack  in  the  rear  was  not  made  in  time,  and 
almost  the  entire  Federal  force  was  concentrated  on  the  right, 
and  this,  and  the  strength  of  the  position,  was  some  excuse  for 
our  failure  to  take  it.  General  Breckinridge  exposed  himself  in 
a  manner  that  called  forth  the  almost  indignant  remonstrance 
of  the  men,  and  it  is  a  matter  of  wonder  that  he  escaped  unhurt. 
He  spoke  in  high  terms  of  the  conduct  of  the  men  who  pressed 


FAILURE    TO    CARRY    THE    GAP.  555 

the  attack,  although  much  disappointed  at  its  failure,  and  espe 
cially  commended  Colonel  Ward's  cool,  unflinching,  and  determ 
ined  bravery.  The  latter  officer  was  wounded,  and  when  we 
withdrew  was  cut  off  from  the  command,  but  found  his  way  back 
safely.  Our  loss  was  heavy. 

After  our  retreat,  which  was  not  pressed  by  the  enemy,  Col. 
Crittenden  was  in  a  critical  situation.  It  was  necessary  that  he 
should  also  withdraw,  and  as  he  did  so,  he  was  exposed  for  more 
than  Ifalf  a  mile  to  the  Federal  artillery.  Six  guns  were  opened 
upon  him.  The  chief  aim  seemed  to  be  to  blow  up  Page's  cais 
sons,  but,  although  the  shelling  was  hot,  they  were  all  brought 
off  safely. 

That  afternoon  Colonel  Palmer  arrived  from  Ashville,  North 
Carolina,  with  four  or  five  hundred  infantry.  General  Breckin- 
ridge  decided  to  make  no  further  attack  upon  the  position,  but 
to  march  through  Taylor's  Gap,  three  miles  to  the  west,  and  get 
in  the  rear  of  the  Federals  and  upon  their  line  of  retreat  and 
communication  with  Knoxville.  Accordingly,  we  broke  camp 
and  marched  about  ten  o'clock  that  night.  Yaughan,  who  had 
returned,  moved  in  advance.  Palmer's  infantry,  the  dismounted 
men,  and  the  artillery,  were  in  the  rear. 

As  we  passed  through  Taylor's  Gap,  information  was  received 
that  the  enemy  were  evacuating  Bull's  Gap,  and  that  an  oppor 
tunity  would  be  afforded  us  to  take  him  in  flank.  General 
Breckinridge  at  once  ordered  Vaughan  to  post  a  strong  detach 
ment  at  Russellville,  in  their  front,  and  to  attack  with  his  whole 
command  immediately  upon  the  detachments  becoming  engaged. 
I  was  ordered  to  turn  to  the  left  before  reaching  Russellville, 
go  around  the  place  and  cut  the  enemy  off  upon  the  main  road,  a 
mile  or  two  below,  or,  failing  to  do  this,  take  him  in  flank. 

The  enemy  broke  through  the  detachment  stationed  in  his 
front,  but  was  immediately  attacked  by  Vaughan.  "  Fight,  d — n 
you!"  yelled  a  Federal  officer  to  his  men,  as  the  firing  com 
menced;  "it's  only  a  scout."  "No,  I'll  be  d— d  if  it  is," 
shouted  one  of  Vaughan's  men  ;  "  we're  all  here."  The  greater 


556  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

part  of  Gillem's  column  and  his  artillery  escaped  here,  but  one 
regiment  was  cut  off  and  driven  away  to  the  right.  Moving 
very  rapidly,  my  brigade  managed  to  strike  the  main  body  again 
at  Cheek's  Cross  Roads,  about  two  miles  from  the  town,  and 
drove  another  slice  from  the  road  and  into  the  fields  and  woods. 
While  the  column  was  scattered  and  prolonged  by  the  rapid 
chase,  we  came  suddenly  upon  the  enemy  halted  in  the  edge  of 
a  wood,  and  were  received  with  a  smart  fire,  which  checked  us. 
Captain  Gus  Magee,  one  of  the  best  and  most  dashing  officers 
of  the  brigade,  commanding  the  advance  guard,  charged  in 
among  them.  As,  followed  by  a  few  men,  he  leaped  the  fence  be 
hind  which  the  enemy  were  posted,  he  was  shot  from  his  horse. 
He  surrendered,  and  gave  his  name,  and  was  immediately  shot 
and  sabered.  He  lived  a  short  time  in  great  agony.  One  of 
his  men,  Sergeant  Sam  Curd,  avenged  his  death  that  night. 
Curd  saved  himself  when  Magee  was  killed,  by  slipping  into  the 
Federal  line,  and  in  the  darkness,  he  escaped  unnoticed.  Some 
twenty  minutes  afterward,  the  murderer  of  Magee  was  captured, 
and  Curd,  recognizing  his  voice,  asked  him  if  he  were  not  the 
man.  He  at  once  sprang  upon  Curd,  and  tried  to  disarm  him. 
The  latter  broke  loose  from  his  grasp  and  killed  him.  Vaughan, 
after  we  moved  on,  kept  the  road,  and  I  moved  upon  the  left 
flank,  endeavoring  to  gain  the  enemy's  rear,  and  intercept  kis 
retreat.  Colonel  Napier,  who  kept  in  the  advance  with  a  small 
detachment,  succeeded  in  this  object. 

Three  or  four  miles  from  Morristown,  the  enemy  halted,  and, 
for  half  an  hour,  offered  resistance.  We,  who  were  moving  to 
take  them  in  flank  and  rear,  then  saw  a  beautiful  sight.  The  night 
was  cloudless,  and  the  moon  at  its  full  and  shedding  a  brilliant 
light.  The  dark  lines  of  troops  could  be  seen  almost  as  clearly 
as  by  day.  Their  positions  were  distinctly  marked,  however,  by 
the  flashes  from  the  rifles,  coming  thick  and  fast,  making  them 
look,  as  they  moved  along,  bending  and  oscillating,  like  rolling 
waves  of  flame,  throwing  off  fiery  spray.  When  my  brigade 
had  moved  far  around  upon  the  left,  and  had  taken  position. 


DEFEAT    OF   GEN.  GILLEM.  557 

obliquing  toward  the  enemy's  rear,  it  suddenly  opened.  The 
Federal  line  recoiled,  and  closed  from  both  flanks  toward  the 
road,  in  one  dense  mass,  which  looked  before  the  fighting  ceased 
and  the  rout  fairly  commenced,  like  a  huge  Catherine  wheel 
spouting  streams  of  fire. 

The  enemy  retreated  rapidly  and  in  confusion  from  this  posi 
tion,  pursued  closely  by  Vaughan's  foremost  battalions.  At 
Morristown  a  regiment,  just  arrived  upon  the  cars,  and  a 
piece  of  artillery,  checked  the  pursuit  for  a  short  time,  and 
enabled  the  enemy  to  reform.  They  were  again  driven,  and 
making  another  and  a  last  stand  a  short  distance  beyond 
the  town,  abandoned  all  further  resistance  Ifrhen  that  failed  to 
stop  us. 

Then  the  spoils  began  to  be  gathered,  and  were  strewn  so 
thickly  along  the  road  that  the  pursuit  was  effectually  retarded. 
Major  Day,  of  Vaughan's  brigade,  followed,  however,  beyond 
New  Market,  more  than  twenty-five  miles  from  the  point  where 
the  affair  commenced,  and  the  rest  of  us  halted  when  clay  had 
fairly  broken.  More  than  one  hundred  ambulances  and  wagons 
were  captured,  loaded  with  baggage  ;  six  pieces  of  artillery,  with 
caissons  and  horses,  and  many  prisoners.  The  rout  and  disin 
tegration  of  Gillem's  command  was  complete. 

On  the  next  day  we  moved  to  New  Market,  and,  when  all  the 
troops  had  gotten  up,  proceeded  to  Strawberry  Plains,  seven 
miles  beyond.  Here  the  enemy,  posted  in  strong  fortifications, 
were  prepared  to  contest  our  further  'advance.  We  remained 
here  three  or  four  days. 

Shelling  and  sharpshooting  was  kept  up  during  the  day,  and 
a  picket  line,  which  required  our  entire  strength,  was  maintained 
at  night.  The  Ilolston  river,  deep  and  swollen,  was  between  us, 
the  enemy  held  the  bridge  and  neither  of  the  combatants  ven 
tured  an  attack.  Yaughan  was  sent  across  the  river  at  an 
upper  ford  and  had  another  brush  with  Gillem,  who  came  out 
from  Knoxville  with  a  few  of  his  men  whom  he  had  collected  and 
reorganized.  He  was  easily  driven  back.  General  Breckinridge 


558  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

was  called  away  to  Wytheville  by  rumors  of  an  advance  of  the 
enemy  in  another  quarter,  and  we  fell  back  to  New  Market  and 
shortly  afterward  to  Mossy  creek,  eleven  miles  from.  Strawberry- 
plains. 

Some  ten  days  after  our  withdrawal  from  the  latter  place,  re 
ports  reached  us  that  a  large  force  was  being  collected  at  Beau's 
Station,  upon  the  north  side  of  the  Holston.  These  reports  were 
shortly  confirmed.  We  withdrew  to  Russelville,  and  subse 
quently  to  Greenville.  To  have  remained  further  down  would 
have  exposed  the  rest  of  the  department  entirely.  Having  the 
short  route  to  Bristol,  the  enemy  could  have  outflanked  and 
outmarched  us,  and  getting  first  to  the  important  points  of 
the  department,  which  they  would  have  found  unguarded,  they 
could  have  captured  and  destroyed  all  that  was  worth  protecting, 
without  opposition.  General  Vaughan  took  position  at  Green 
ville,  and  my  brigade  was  stationed,  under  command  of  Colonel 
Morgan,  at  Rogersville. 

Five  or  six  days  after  these  dispositions  were  made,  the  enemy 
advanced  upon  Rogersville  in  heavy  force,  drove  Colonel  Mor 
gan  away  and  followed  him  closely.  He  retreated  without  loss, 
although  constantly  skirmishing  to  Kingsport,  t\venty-five  miles 
from  Rogersville,  and  crossing  Clinch  river  at  nightfall,  pre 
pared  to  dispute  the  passage  of  the  enemy.  He  believed  that 
he  could  do  so  successfully,  but  his  force  was  too  small  to  guard 
all  of  the  fords,  and  the  next  morning  the  enemy  got  across,  at 
tacked  and  defeated  him,  capturing  him,  more  than  eighty  men, 
and  all  of  our  wagons.  Colonel  Napier  took  command  and  re 
treated  to  Bristol.  I  met  the  brigade  there,  and  found  it  reduced 
to  less  than  three  hundred  men. 

General  Vaughan  was  hurrying  on  to  Bristol,  at  this  time,  but 
had  to  march  further  than  the  enemy,  who  also  had  the  start  of 
him,  would  be  required  to  march  in  order  to  reach  it.  On  the 
night  of  the  13th,  the  enemy  entered  Bristol  at  3  or  4  p.  M. 
Vaughan  was  not  closer  than  twelve  or  fifteen  miles,  and  so  he 
was  completely  separated  from  the  forces  east  of  Bristol.  We 


HEAVY  FEDERAL  ADVANCE.  559 

now  had  tolerably  accurate  information  of  the  enemy's  strength. 
Burbridge's  Kentucky  troops  composed  the  greater  part  of  his 
force,  and  Gillem  was  present  with  all  of  his  former  command, 
whom  he  had  succeeded  in  catching,  and  one  fine  regiment,  the 
Tenth  Michigan.  General  Stoneman  commanded.  His  column 
numbered  in  all,  as  well  as  we  could  judge,  between  six  and  seven 
thousand  men. 

After  the  enemy  occupied  Bristol,  I  fell  back  to  Abingdon.  At 
Bristol  a  large  amount  of  valuable  stores  were  captured  by  the 
enemy,  and  more  clerks  and  attaches  of  supply  departments 
caught  or  scared  into  premature  evacuation  of  "bummers'" 
berths  than  at  any  precedent  period  of  the  departmental  history. 
They  scudded  from  town  with  an  expedition  that  was  truly  as 
tonishing  to  those  who  had  ever  had  business  with  them. 

Not  caring  to  make  a  fight,  which  I  knew  I  must  lose,  and  well 
aware  that  there  was  hard  work  before  us,  I  left  Abingdon  at 
nightfall,  and  encamped  about  three  miles  from  the  town  on  the 
Saltville  road.  At  10  o'clock  the  enemy  entered  Abingdon, 
driving  out  a  picket  of  thirty  men  I  had  left  there  and  causing 
another  stampede  of  the  clerical  detail.  The  brigade  was  at 
once  gotten  under  arms  in  expectation  of  an  advance  upon  the  road 
where  we  were  stationed,  but  the  enemy  moved  down  the  railroad 
toward  Glade  Springs  and  by  the  main  road  in  the  same  direction. 
After  having  ascertained  their  route,  we  moved  rapidly  to  Salt 
ville,  reaching  that  place  before  10  A.  M.  General  Breckinridge 
had  already  concentrated  there  all  of  the  reserves  that  could  be 
collected,  and  Giltner's  and  Cosby's  brigades,  which  had  just  re 
turned  from  the  valley.  Vaughan  had  retreated,  when  he  found 
himself  cut  off,  toward  the  North  Carolina  line  and  was  virtually 
out  of  the  fight  from  that  time.  Our  force  for  the  defense  of 
Saltville  was  not  more  than  fifteen  hundred  men,  for  offensive 
operations  not  eight  hundred. 

The  enemy  made  no  demonstration  against  Saltville  on  that 
day,  and  at  nightfall  General  Breckinridge  instructed  me  to  move 
with  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  of  my  brigade,  through  McCall's 


560 

Gap,  and  passing  to  the  right  of  Glade's  Springs,  where  the 
enemy  was  supposed  to  be,  enter  the  main  stage  road  and  move 
coward  Wytheville.  He  had  received  information  that  three  or 
four  hundred  of  the  enemy  had  gone  in  that  direction  and  he 
wished  me  to  follow  and  attack. 

Moving  as  directed,  I  found  the  enemy,  not  at  Glade  Springs, 
as  was  expected,  but  at  the  point  at  which  I  wished  to  enter  the 
main  road.  Driving  in  the  pickets,  I  advanced  niy  whole  force 
to  within  a  short  distance  of  the  road,  and  discovered  convincing 
proof  that  the  entire  Federal  force  was  there.  I  did  not  attack, 
but  withdrew  to  a  point  about  a  mile  distant,  and,  permitting 
the  men  to  build  fires,  and  posting  pickets  to  watch  the  enemy 
at  the  cross-roads,  awaited  daylight.  My  guide  had  run  away 
when  the  pickets  fired  on  us,  and  I  could  only  watch  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy  and  let  mine  be  dictated  by  circumstances. 

Just  at  daylight,  a  force  of  ten  or  twelve  hundred  of  the  en 
emy  appeared  in  our  rear,  and  between  us  and  Saltville.  This 
force  had  passed  through  Glade  Springs  and  far  around  to  the 
rear.  Fortunately  the  men  were  lying  down  in  line  and  by  their 
horses,  which  had  not  been  unsaddled.  They  were  at  once 
formed,  and  sending  to  call  in  the  pickets,  I  moved  my  line  slowly 
toward  the  enemy,  who  halted.  The  noise  of  the  pickets  gallop 
ing  up  the  road  perhaps  convinced  them  that  reinforcements 
were  arriving  to  us.  Not  caring  to  fight  when  directly  between 
two  superior  bodies  of  the  enemy,  and  but  a  short  distance  from 
either,  I  wheeled  into  column,  as  soon  as  the  picket  detail  ar 
rived,  and  moved  toward  a  wood  upon  our  right.  I  was  satisfied 
that  I  could  check  pursuit  when  there,  and  that  some  sort  of 
trace  led  thence  over  the  mountain  to  Saltville. 

The  enemy  did  not  pursue  vigorously,  and  soon  halted.  Only 
one  shot  was  fired,  and  that  by  one  of  my  pickets,  who  killed 
his  man.  No  one  in  my  detachment  knew  the  country,  but  a 
citizen  guided  us  over  an  almost  impracticable  route  to  the  road 
which  enters  Saltville  by  Lyon's  gap. 

Learning  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  at  Seven  Mile  ford  and 


SERIES    OF   ENGAGEMENTS.  561 

« 

gone  on  toward  Wytheville,  General  Breckinridge  determined  to 
follow.  He  wished  to  harass  him,  and  prevent,  as  well  as  he 
could  with  the  limited  force  at  his  command,  the  waste  and  de 
struction,  which  was  the  object  of  the  raid.  He  accordingly 
marched  out  from  Saltville  on  the  night  of  the  16th,  with  eight 
hundred  men,  leaving  the  reserves  and  the  men  belonging  to  the 
cavalry  whose  horses  were  unserviceable.  The  enemy  captured 
Wytheville  without  firing  a  shot,  as  there  was  no  one  there  to 
fire  at,  but  defeated  a  detachment  of  Yaughan's  command  not 
far  from  the  town,  taking  and  destroying  the  artillery  which  was 
attached  to  that  brigade.  A  detachment  also  took  and  did 
serious  damage  to  the  lead  mines. 

On  the  17th,  Colonel  Wycher,  who  had  been  sent  in  advance 
of  the  column  commanded  by  General  Breckinridge,  attacked  a 
body  of  the  enemy  near  Marion,  and  drove  it  to  Mt.  Airy,  eight 
miles  from  Wytheville.  General  Breckinridge  pressed  on  to 
support  him,  and  when  we  reached  Marion  we  found  Wycher 
coming  back,  closely  pursued  by  a  much  stronger  party  of  the 
enemy.  Cosby's  brigade,  which  was  in  the  front  of  our  column, 
at  once  attacked,  and  the  whole  command  having  been  deployed 
and  moved  up,  the  enemy  were  easily  driven  back  across  the 
creek,  two  miles  beyond  Marion.  Giltner  and  Cosby  halted 
without  crossing  the  creek.  My  brigade  crossed  and  pressed 
the  Federals  back  some  distance  further  on  the  right  of  our  line 
of  advance.  Night  coming  on  I  took  a  position  on  a  command 
ing  ridge,  which  stretches  from  the  creek  in  a  southeasterly  di 
rection.  My  left  flank  rested  near  the  ford  at  which  we  had 
crossed,  and  my  line  was  at  an  obtuse  angle  with  that  of  the 
other  brigades,  which  had  not  crossed,  and  inclining  toward  the 
position  of  the  enemy.  During  the  night  I  kept  my  men  in  line 
of  battle. 

On  the  next  morning,  it  became  soon  evident  that  Stoneman's 

entire  force,  or  very  nearly  all  of  it,  had  arrived  during  the  night 

and  was  confronting  us.     After  feeling  the  line,  commencing  on 

our  left,  the  enemy  apparently  became  impressed  with  the  be- 

36 


562  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

lief  that  the  proper  point  to  attack  was  upon  our  right,  and  he 
accordingly  made  heavy  rushes  in  rapid  succession  upon  my 
position.  I  had  but  two  hundred  and  twenty  men,  and  was  re 
inforced  at  mid-day  by  Colonel  Wycher  with  fifty  of  his  bat 
talion. 

The  line  we  were  required  to  hold  was  at  least  half  a  mile 
long,  and  I  say  without  hesitation,  that  troops  never  fought 
more  resolutely  and  bravely  than  did  those  I  commanded  on 
that  day.  The  men  were  formed  in  a  single  slim  skirmish  line, 
with  intervals  of  five  or  six  feet  between  the  files,  and  yet  the 
enemy  could  not  break  the  line  or  force  them  away.  We  were 
forced  to  receive  attack  where  the  enemy  chose  to  make  it,  not 
daring,  with  our  limited  number  and  the  important  responsibility 
of  holding  our  position,  to  attack  in  turn.  Had  the  position 
been  taken,  the  ford  would  have  fallen  into  the  possession  of  the 
enemy,  and  he  would  have  been  master  of  the  entire  field.  The 
fire  which  met  the  advancing  Federals  at  every  effort  which  they 
made  was  the  most  deadly  I  ever  saw.  Our  ammunition  gave 
out  three  times,  but,  fortunately,  we  were  enabled  to  replenish 
it  during  the  lulls  in  the  fighting.  The  sharpshooting  upon  both 
sides,  in  the  intervals  of  attack,  was  excellent.  Charlie  Taylor, 
the  best  shot  in  my  brigade,  and  one  of  the  bravest  soldiers, 
killed  a  man  at  almost  every  shot.  I  would  gladly  mention  the 
names  of  those  who  deserved  distinguished  honor  for  their  con 
duct,  but  it  would  require  me,  to  do  so,  to  give  the  name  of 
every  officer  and  private  in  the  brigade. 

About  three  o'clock,  Colonel  Napier,  who  was  commanding 
upon  the  extreme  left,  advanced,  and,  sweeping  down  the  line, 
drove  back  a  body  of  the  enemy  immediately  confronting  his 
own  little  b'attalion,  and  struck  the  flank  of  another  moving  to 
attack  the  right  of  the  position.  But  coming  suddenly  upon  a 
miscegenated  line  of  white  and  colored  troops,  which  rose  sud 
denly  from  ambush  and  fired  into  the  faces  of  his  men,  his  line 
fell  back.  The  combatants  fought  here,  for  a  while,  with  clubbed 
guns,  and  the  negroes,  who  seemed  furious  with  fear,  used 


SEVERE    ENGAGEMENT.  .  563 

theirs  as  they  would  mauls.  One  unusually  big  and  black  dar 
key  seemed  to  be  much  surprised>  when  first  stumbled  upon,  and 
exclaiming  "  Dar  dey  is  !  "  almost  let  his  eyes  pop  out  of  their 
sockets.  Soon  after  this,  the  most  serious  charge  of  the  day 
was  made  upon  the  right  and  center.  The  enemy  came  in  t'wo 
lines,  each  twelve  or  fifteen  hundred  strong.  The  front  line 
swung  first  one  end  foremost,  then  the  other,  as  it  came  on  at 
the  double-quick,  and  my  line,  facing  to  the  right  and  left, 
massed  alternately  at  the  threatened  points.  This  time  the 
Federals  came  up  so  close  to  us  that  I  believed  the  position  lost. 
Their  repulse  was  chiefly  due  to  the  exertions  of  Captain  Lea 
and  Colonel  Wycher,  so  far  as  the  efforts  of  officers  contributed 
to  a  victory  which  nothing  but  the  unflinching  courage  of  the 
men  could  have  secured. 

The  first  line,  after  driving  us  nearly  a  hundred  yards,  and 
completely  turning  our  right,  finally  recoiled,  and  the  second 
ran  as  early.  But  they  left  many  dead  behind.  Our  loss  was 
surprisingly  small  in  this  fight — the  enemy  fired  heavy  volleys, 
but  too  high. 

Receiving  a  reinforcement  of  sixty  men,  just  before  sundown, 
I  sent  it  to  get  in  the  enemy's  rear,  and  attack  his  horse-holders, 
expecting  great  results  from  the  movement.  But  the  officer  in 
command  was  timid  and  would  do  nothing. 

The  enemy  made  no  further  attack,  and  seemed  hopeless  of 
fencing  us  away. 

Late  that  night,  our  ammunition  having  almost  entirely  given 
out,  we  quitted  our  position  and  fell  back,  through  Marion. 
Marching  then  southwardly,  through  the  gorges  of  the  mountain, 
we  reached  Rye  Valley,  fifteen  miles  distant,  by  morning.  The 
enemy  did  not  move  during  the  night,  nor  indeed  until  ten  or 
eleven,  A.  M.,  next  day,  and  certain  information  had  reached  him 
of  our  retreat. 

It  can  safely  be  asserted  that  we  were  not  worsted  in  this 
fight,  although  for  lack  of  ammunition  we  quitted  the  field. 
Every  attack  made  by  the  enemy  upon  our  position  was  re- 


564  .   HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

pulsed,  notwithstanding  our  greatly  inferior  numbers.  Our  loss 
was  slight ;  his  was  heavy.  General  Breckinridge  declared  that 
no  troops  could  have  fought  better  or  more  successfully  than 
those  which  held  the  right. 

"From  Rye  Valley  wre  moved  to  the  main  road  again,  striking 
it  at  Mount  Airy,  thirteen  miles  from  Marion.  Here  General 
Breckinridge  learned  that  the  enemy  had  marched  directly  by  to 
Saltville.  He  entertained  grave  fears  that  the  place  would  be 
taken,  having  no  confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  small  garrison 
to  hold  it.  His  fears  were  realized.  He  instructed  me  to  col 
lect  details,  from  all  the  brigades,  of  men  who  were  least  ex 
hausted,  and  the  most  serviceable  horses,  and  follow  the  enemy 
as  closely  as  I  could,  relieving  Saltville,  if  the  garrison  held  out 
until  I  arrived.  I  accordingly  marched  with  three  hundred 
men,  arriving  at  Seven-mile  Ford  at  nightfall  on  the  19th.  I 
halted  until  one  o'clock  at  night,  and  then  pressed  on,  over 
terrible  roads,  and  reached  the  vicinity  of  Saltville  at  daylight. 
The  night  was  bitterly  cold,  and  the  men  were  so  chilled  that 
they  were  scarcely  able  to  sit  on  their  horses. 

Passing  through  Lyon's  gap  we  discovered  indication,  scarcely 
to  be  mistaken,  that  Saltville  had  indeed  fallen.  Still  it  was 
necessary  to  make  sure,  and  I  moved  in  the  direction  of  the 
southern  defenses.  Shortly  afterward,  the  sight  of  the  enemy 
and  a  skirmish  which  showed  a  strong  force  in  line,  convinced 
me  that  I  could  not  enter  the  place.  Scouts,  sent  to  reconnoiter, 
returned  declaring  that  the  enemy  held  all  the  entrances.  I  lost 
one  man  killed.  Falling  back  three  miles  I  went  into  camp  to 
await  the  time  when  the  enemy  should  commence  his  retreat. 
This  he  did  on  the  22d,  and  marched  toward  Kentucky.  We 
immediately  followed.  At  Hyter's  gnp  the  forces  of  the  enemy 
divided.  Those  under  Gillem  moving  in  the  direction  of  Ten 
nessee,  those  under  Burbridge  going  straight  toward  Kentucky. 
We  followed  the  latter.  There  is  no  word  in  the  English  lan 
guage  which  adequately  expresses  how  cold  it  was.  Our  horses, 
already  tired  down  and  half  starved,  could  scarcely  hobble.-- 


CEASING    BURBRIDGE.  565 

Those  of  the  enemy  where  in  worse  condition,  and  it  is  scarcely 
an  exaggeration  to  say  that  for  ten  miles  a  man  could  have 
milked  on  dead  ones.  They  lay  dead  and  stark  frozen  in  every 
conceivable  and  revolting  attitude,  as  death  had  overtaken  them 
in  their  agony.  Saddles,  guns,  accouterments  of  all  kinds 
strewed  the  road  like  the  debris  of  a  rout.  We  picked  up  many 
stragglers.  Some  pieces  of  artillery  were  abandoned  but  burned. 

When  we  reached  Wheeler's  ford,  fifty- two  miles  from  Salt- 
villc,  I  had  left,  of  my  three  hundred,  only  fifty  men.  Here  we 
had  our  last  skirmish  with  the  enemy,  and  gave  up  the  pursuit. 
More  than  one  hundred  prisoners  were  taken,  many  of  them 
unable  to  walk.  The  Federals  lost  hundreds  of  men,  whose 
limbs,  rotted  by  the  cold,  had  to  be  amputated.  Such  suffering, 
to  be  conceived,  must  be  witnessed.  The  raid  had  accomplished 
great  things,  but  at  terrible  cost.  Soon  after  this,  my  brigade 
went  into  winter  quarters.  Forage  was  scarcely  to  be  had  at 
all  in  the  department,  and  I  sent  my  horses,  with  a  strong  detail 
to  guard  and  attend  to  them,  to  North  Carolina.  The  men  could 
scarcely  be  reconciled  to  this  parting  with  their  best  friends,  and 
feared,  too,  it  preluded  infantry  service.  In  the  winter  huts 
built  at  Abingdon,  they  were  sufficiently  comfortable,  but  were 
half  famished.  The  country  was  almost  bare  of  supplies.  Still 
they  bore  up,  cheerful  and  resolute. 

In  March'  we  were  ordered  to  Lynchburg  to  assist  in  defend 
ing  that  place  against  Sheridan.  He  passed  by,  however,  and 
struck  at  larger  game.  About  this  time  the  men  who  had  lain 
so  long,  suffered  so  much,  and  endured  so  heroically  in  prison, 
began  to  arrive.  The  men  who  had  braved  every  hardship,  in 
field  and  camp,  were  now  reinforced  by  those  who  were  fresh 
from  the  harsh  insults  and  galling  sense  of  captivity.  Six 
months  earlier  this  addition  to  our  numbers  would  have  told — 
now  it  was  too  late. 

Our  gallant  boys  would  not  halt  or  rest  until  they  rejoined 
their  old  comrades.  Then  they  crowded  around  with  many  a 
story  of  their  prison  life,  and  vow  of  revenge — never  to  be  ac- 


566  HISTORY  OP  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

complished.  All  asked  for  arms,  and  to  be  placed  at  once  in  the 
ranks.  Very  few,  however,  had  been  already  exchanged,  and 
all  the  others  were  placed,  much  against  their  will,  in  "Parote 
camp"  at  Christiansburg.  In  April,  the  enemy  advanced  again 
from  East  Tennessee.  Stoneman  raided  through  North  Caro 
lina — tapped  the  only  road  which  connected  Richmond  with  the 
Southern  territory  still  available,  at  Salisbury,  and  then  suddenly 
turned  up  in  our  rear,  and  between  us  and  Richmond.  This  de 
cided  General  Early,  who  was  then  commanding  the  department, 
to  move  eastwardly  that  he  might  get  closer  to  General  Lee. 
All  the  troops  in  the  department  were  massed,  and  we  moved 
as  rapidly  as  it  was  possible  to  do.  At  Wytheville,  Giltner  met 
a  detachment  of  the  enemy  and  defeated  it.  At  New  river,  we 
found  the  bridge  burned  by  the  enemy,  who  had  anticipated  us 
there,  and  we  marched  on  toward  Lynchburg,  on  his  track. 
General  Early  having  fallen  ill,  the  command  devolved  upon 
General  Echols.  This  officer  did  all  that  any  man  could  have 
done,  to  preserve  the  morale  of  the  troops.  He  was  possessed 
of  remarkable  administrative  capacity,  and  great  tact,  as  well 
as  energy.  While  firm,  he  was  exceedingly  popular  in  manner 
and  address,  and  maintained  good  humor  and  satisfaction  among 
the  troops,  while  he  preserved  order  and  efficiency. 

General  Echols  had,  at  this  time,  besides  the  cavalry  commands 
of  Vaughan,  Cosby,  Giltner  and  mine,  some  four  or  five  thousand 
infantry — the  division  of  General  Wbarton,  and  the  small  brig 
ades  commanded  by  Colonels  Trigg  and  Preston.  My  brigade 
was  doing  duty  as  infantry — the  horses  having  not  yet  returned. 
Marching  about  twenty-five  miles  every  day,  the  men  became 
more  than  ever  disgusted  with  the  infantry  service,  and  their  feet 
suffered  as  much  as  their  temper.  It  was  observed  that  the  men 
just  returned  from  prison,  although  least  prepared  for  it,  com 
plained  least  of  the  hard  marching. 

We  well  knew  at  this  time,  that  General  Lee  had  been  at 
length  forced  to  evacuate  Richmond,  but  we  hoped  that  followed 
by  the  bulk  of  his  army,  he  would  retreat  safely  to  some  point 


LAST    THROES   OF   THE    CONFEDERACY.  567 

where  he  could  effect  a  junction  with  General  Joseph  Johnston, 
and  collect,  also,  all  of  the  detachments  of  troops  which  had  pre 
viously  operated  at  a  distance  from  the  large  armies.  The 
troops  which  General  EchoPs  commanded,  were  veterans,  and 
they  understood  the  signs  which  were  now  rife  and  public.  But 
they  were  not  altogether  hopeless,  and  were  still  resolute 
although  their  old  enthusiasm  was  utterly  gone.  They  still  re 
ceived  encouragement  from  the  citizens  of  the  section  through 
which  they  marched. 

It  is  hut  justice  to  the  noble  people  of  Virginia  to  declare  that 
they  did  not  despair  of  their  country  until  after  it  was  no  more. 
There  were  individual  defections  among  the  Virginians — rare 
and  indelibly  branded — but  as  a  people,  they  were  worthy  of 
their  traditions  and  their  hereditary  honor.  With  rocking  crash 
and  ruin  all  around  her,  the  grand  old  commonwealth,  scathed 
by  the  storm  and  shaken  by  the  resistless  convulsion,  still  tow 
ered  erect  and  proud  to  the  last,  and  fell  only  when  the  entire 
land  had  given  away  beneath  her.  Two  strange  features  charac 
terized  the  temper  of  the  Southern  people  in  the  last  days  of  the 
Confederacy.  Crushed  and  dispirited  as  they  were,  they  still 
seemed  unable  to  realize  the  fact  that  the  cause  was  utterly 
lost.  Even  when  their  fate  stared  them  in  the  face,  they  could 
not  recognize  it. 

Again,  when  our  final  ruin  came,  it  was  consummated  in  the 
twinkling  of  an  eye.  We  floated  confidently  to  the  edge  of  the 
cataract,  went  whirling  over  and  lying  utterly  stunned  at  the 
bottom,  never  looked  back  at  the  path  we  had  followed.  The 
Southern  people  strained  every  nerve  to  resist,  and  when  all  ef 
forts  failed,  sank  powerless  and  unnerved. 

The  struggle  was  a  hard  one.  Since  the  days  of  Roman  con 
quest  the  earth  has  not  seen  such  energy,  persistency  and  in 
genuity  in  arts  of  subjugation.  Since  Titus  encompassed  Jerusa 
lem  and  Aurelian  shook  the  east  with  his  fierce  legions,  a  more 
stubborn,  desparate  and  lavish  resistance  has  not  been  witnessed 
against  attack  so  resolute,  systematic  and  overwhelming.  The 


568  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S   CAVALRY. 

Roman  eagle  never  presaged  a  wider,  more  thorough  desolation 
than  that  of  which  the  flag  of  the  Union  was  the  harbinger.  For 
four  years  the  struggle  was  maintained  against  this  mighty 
power.  When  in  the  spring  of  18G5,  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
four  thousand  wretched,  broken-down  rebels  stood,  from  Rich 
mond  to  the  Rio  Grande,  confronting  one  million  fifteen  thou 
sand  veteran  soldiers,  trained  to  all  the  vicissitudes,  equal  to  all 
the  shocks  of  war — is  it  wonderful  that  when  this  tremendous 
host  moved  all  at  once,  resistance  at  length,  and  finally  ceased. 
And  this  struggle  had  worn  down  the  people  as  well  as  the  sol 
diery.  Four  years  of  such  bitter,  constant,  exhausting  strife, 
racking  the  entire  land,  until  the  foot  of  the  conqueror  had 
tracked  it  from  one  end  to  the  other,  accomplished  its  objects  in 
time.  Even  the  women,  whose  heroism  outshone  any  ever  dis 
played  upon  the  battle-field,  whose  devoted  self-sacrificing 
charity  and  benevolence  can  never  be  justly  recorded,  whose 
courage  had  seemed  dauntless,  were  at  last  overcome  by  the 
misery  which  surrounded  them,  and  a  power  which  seemed  re 
sistless  and  inexorable. 

While  we  were  marching  to  join  General  Lee,  and  after  the 
news  of  the  evacuation  of  Richmond  had  been  confirmed,  we 
heard  of  an  event  which  was  as  ominous  as  it  was  melancholy. 
We  learned  that  a  man  had  been  killed,  whose  name  had  so  long 
been  associated  with  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia  and  its  vic 
tories,  that  it  almost  seemed  as  if  his  life  must  be  identified  with 
its  existence.  The  officer  who  was  the  very  incarnation  of  the 
chivalry,  the  high-souled  constancy,  the  glorious  vigor  of  that 
army — General  A.  P.  Hill — was  dead.  He  was  a  hero,  and  he 
died  like  one.  When  the  lines  around  Richmond  were  forced — 
his  gallant  corps  overpowered,  he  was  slain  in  the  front  still 
facing  the  enemy.  His  record  had  been  completed,  and  he  gave 
his  life  away,  as  if  it  were  worthless  after  the  cause  to  which  he 
had  pledged  it  was  lost. 

While  General  Echols  was  still  confident  that  he  would  be  able 
to  join  General  Lee  at  some  point  to  the  southwest  of  Richmond, 


**•..     Liberty 


Gen.  Morgan's  Caralry  from  5.  W.  Virginia  to  Gen.  J.        \^ 
E.  Joktuton'i  Army  at  Charlotte,  X.  C. ,  April,  1804,  and  Route  while  \ 

tclih  President  Doris,  /row  CltarloUe  to  the  South  Carolina  Line. 


\ 


— —  Indicates  Route. 


(5G9) 


570 

most  probably  Danville,  we  learned  with  a  dismay  which  is  in 
describable,  that  he  had  surrendered.  If  the  light  of  heaven 
had  gone  out,  a  more  utter  despair  and  consternation  would  not 
have  ensued.  When  the  news  first  came,  it  perfectly  paralyzed 
every  one.  Men  looked  at  each  other  as  if  they  had  just  heard 
a  sentence  of  death  and  eternal  ruin  passed  upon  all.  The  ef 
fect  of  the  news  upon  the  infantry  was  to  cause  an  entire  disor 
ganization.  Crowds  of  them  threw  down  their  arms  and  left, 
and  those  who  remained  lost  all  sense  of  discipline. 

On  the  next -day,  General  Echols  called  a  council  of  war,  an 
nounced  his  intention  of  taking  all  the  men  who  would  follow 
him  to  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  and  consulted  his  officers 
regarding  the  temper  of  the  men.  The  infantry  officers  declared 
that  their  men  would  not  go,  and  that  it  was  useless  to  attempt 
to  make  them. 

General  Echols  then  issued  an  order  furloughing  the  infantry 
soldiers  for  sixty  days.  He  believed  that  this  method  would, 
at  the  end  of  that  time,  if  the  war  was  still  going  on,  secure 
many  to  the  Confederacy,  while  to  attempt  to  force  them  to 
follow  him  would  be  unavailing  and  would  make  them  all  bitterly 
hostile  in  the  future.  He  issued  orders  to  the  cavalry  command 
ers  to  be  prepared  to  march  at  four  P.  M.,  in  the  direction  of 
North  Carolina. 

I  obtained  permission  from  him  to  mount  my  men  on  mules 
taken  from  the  wagons,  which  were  necessarily  abandoned.  My 
command  was  about  six  hundred  strong.  All  the  men  furloughed 
during  the  winter  and  spring  had  promptly  reported,  and  it  was 
increased  by  more  than  two  hundred  exchanged  men.  Of  the 
entire  number,  not  more  than  ten  (some  of  these  officers)  failed 
to  respond  to  the  orders  to  continue  their  march  to  General 
Johnston's  army.  The  rain  was  falling  in  torrents  when  we 
prepared  to  start  upon  a  march  which  seemed  fraught  with  dan 
ger.  The  men  were  drenched,  and  mounted  upon  mules  without 
saddles,  and  with  blind  bridles  or  rope  halters.  Every  thing 
conspired  to  remind  them  of  the  gloomy  situation.  The  dread- 


MARCH    TO   JOIN   JOHNSTON.  571 

ful  news  was  fresh  in  their  ears.  Thousands  of  men  had  dis 
banded  around  them,  two  Kentucky  brigades  had  left  in  their  sight 
to  go  home,  they  were  told  that  Storieman  held  the  gaps  in  the 
mountains  through  which  they  would  have  to  pass.  The  gloomy 
skies  seemed  to  threaten  disaster.  But  braver  in  the  hour  of 
despair  than  ever  before,  they  never  faltered  or  murmured.  The 
trial  found  them  true.  I  can  safely  say  that  the  men  of  my 
brigade  were  even  more  prompt  in  rendering  obedience,  more 
careful  in  doing  their  full  duty  at  this  time,  when  it  was  entirely 
optional  with  themselves  whether  they  should  go  or  stay,  than 
they  had  ever  been  in  the  most  prosperous  days  of  the  Confed 
eracy.  To  command  such  men  was  the  proudest  honor  that  an 
officer  could  obtain. 

We  moved  off  in  silence,  broken  by  a  cheer  when  we  passed 
Yaughan's  brigade  which  was  also  going  on.  On  the  next  day 
we  were  overtaken  by  ninety  men  from  Giltner's  brigade,  who 
came  to  join  us.  Colonel  Dimond  and  Captains  Scott,  Rogers, 
Barrett,  and  Willis,  and  Lieutenant  Freeman,  well  known  as 
among  the  best  officers  of  the  Kentucky  Confederate  troops, 
commanded  them.  These  men  felt  as  we  did,  that  disaster  gave 
us  no  right  to  quit  the  service  in  which  we  had  enlisted,  and 
that  so  long  as  the  Confederate  Government  survived,  it  had  a 
claim  upon  us  that  we  could  not  refuse. 

The  reports  that  the  gaps  were  occupied  by  the  enemy  proved 
untrue,  and  we  entered  North  Carolina  without  seeing  a  Federal. 
At  Statesville,  General  Echols  left  us  to  go  to  General  Johnston's 
camp.  Yaughan  was  instructed  to  proceed  to  Morgantown, 
south  of  the  Catawba  river,  and  I  pushed  on  toward  Lincoln- 
town,  where  I  expected  to  find  Colonel  Napier  with  the  horses. 
Just  after  crossing  the  river,  information  was  received  that 
a  part  of  Stoneman's  force  was  marching  from  the  west  in  the 
same  direction.  I  hoped,  by  moving  rapidly,  to  get  to  Lincoln- 
ton  first.  The  enemy's  column  moved  upon  a  road  which  ap 
proached  closely  to  the  one  by  which  we  were  marching.  Our 
scouts  were  fighting,  during  the  afternoon,  upon  the  by-roads 


^>72  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

which  connected  the  main  ones.  When  within  two  miles  of 
Lincolnton,  videttes  came  back  rapidly  to  tell  me  that  the  enemy 
had  occupied  the  town,  and  were  coming  out  to  meet  us. 

I  was  unwilling  to  fight,  and  knew  that  to  countermarch  would 
be  ruinous.  Fortunately  an  officer  had,  a  little  while  before, 
mentioned  that  a  small  road  turned  off  to  the  left  two  miles  from 
Lincolnton,  and  led  to  other  traces  and  paths,  which  conducted 
to  the  main  road  to  Charlotte.  The  head  of  the  column  was 
just  at  a  road  which  answered  to  the  description  he  had  given,  and, 
strengthening  the  advance  guard  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check,  I 
turned  the  column  into  it.  It  proved  to  be  the  right  one,  and, 
pressing  guides,  we  reached,  after  a  march  of  twelve  or  fifteen 
miles,  the  Charlotte  road,  and  were  between  that  place  and  the 
enemy.  At  daybreak  next  morning  we  moved  on  slowly.  The 
enemy  reached  the  bridge  over  the  Catawba  after  we  had  passed 
and  had  partially  torn  up  the  bottom.  At  Charlotte  we  found 
a  battalion  of  General  Ferguson's  brigade  of  Mississippi  cav 
alry. 

On  the  next  day,  Mr.  Davis  and  his  Cabinet  arrived,  escorted 
by  General  Debrell's  division  of  cavalry,  in  which  was  Williams' 
Kentucky  brigade,  commanded  then  by  Colonel  Breckinridge. 
In  a  day  or  two  the  town  was  filled  with  unattached  offi 
cers,  disbanded  and  straggling  soldiers,  the  relics  of  the  naval 
forces,  fleeing  officials  and  the  small  change  of  the  Richmond 
bureaux. 

The  negotiations  were  then  pending  between  Generals  John 
ston  and  Sherman.  General  Breckinridge,  in  his  capacity  of 
Secretary  of  War,  assisted  at  these  conferences,  but  he  was 
impatiently  expected  by  Mr.  Davis.  The  latter,  on  the  day  of 
his  arrival,  made  the  speech  which  has  been  so  much  commented 
upon.  It  was  simply  a  manly,  courageous  appeal  to  the  people 
to  be  true  to  themselves.  The  news  of  the  assassination  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  was  received,  during  this  period,  but  was  almost  univer 
sally  disbelieved.  When  General  Breckinridge  arrived,  he 
brought  the  first  authoritative  account  of  the  Sherman  and 


., 


COMMANDED    BY 

BRIG.  GEN.  B.  W.  DUKE, 

Throityh  South  Carolina  into  Wilket  Co., 

Ga.,  icliile  escorting 
PRESIDENT    DAVIS. 


idicatca  Route. 


(573) 


574  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

Johnston  cartel.  But  two  days  later,  General  Johnston  tele 
graphed  that  the  authorities  at  Washington  had  repudiated  it  > 
that  the  armistice  was  broken  off,  and  that  he  was  preparing  to 
surrender.  Then  there  was  another  stir  and  commotion  among 
the  refugees.  The  greater  part  chose  to  remain  at  Charlotte, 
and  accept  the  terms  granted  General  Johnston's  army. 

Mr.  Davis,  accompanied  by  General  Breckinridge  and  the 
members  of  his  cabinet,  quitted  Charlotte,  to  march,  if  possible, 
to  Generals  Taylor  and  Forrest,  in  Alabama.  The  five  brigades 
of  Ferguson,  Debrell,  Breckinridge,  Vaughan,  and  mine,  com 
posed  his  escort.  .  At  Unionville  I  found  Colonel  Napier,  with 
all  the  forces  he  had  been  able  to  save  from  the  enemy,  and 
seventy  or  eighty  men.  This  increased  the  strength  of  the 
brigade  to  75  L  effectives. 

I  asked  and  obtained  promotion,  well  won  and  deserved,  for 
several  officers.  Major  Steele  was  made  Colonel ;  Captains 
Logan  and  Messick,  Lieutenant-Colonels ;  Sergeant  Jno.  Carter, 
Captain  ;  Captains  Davis  and  Gwynn,  of  my  staff,  to  whom  I 
owed  gratitude  for  inestimable  assistance,  were  made  Majors. 
I  wished  for  promotion  for  other  officers — indeed  they  all  deserved 
it — but  was  assured  that  so  many  commissions  could  not  be 
issued  at  once.  Even  the  gallant  officers  who  had  joined  us 
with  the  detachment  from  Giltner's  brigade,  could  not  obtain 
commissions,  which  they  would  have  valued  the  more  highly, 
because  they  were  soon  to  expire. 

We  moved  through  South  Carolina  with  great  deliberation — 
so  slowly,  indeed,  that  with  the  detachments  constantly  passing 
them  on  their  way  to  surrender,  the  morale  of  the  troops  was 
seriously  impaired.  Nothing  demoralizes  cavalry  more  than 
dilatory  movements  in  time  of  danger.  They  argue  that  it 
indicates  irresolution  on  the  part  of  their  leaders. 

While  in  South  Carolina,  an  old  lady  reproached  some  men  of 
my  brigade  very  bitterly  for  taking  forage  from  her  barn. 
'*  You  are  a  gang  of  thieving,  rascally,  Kentuckians,"  she  said  ; 
<*  afraid  to  go  home,  while  our  boys  are  surrendering  decently." 


LAST  CONFEDERATE  COUNCIL  OF  WAR.          575 

"  Madam,"  answered  one  of  them,  "  you  are  speaking  out  of 
your  turn  ;  South  Carolina  had  a  good  deal  to  say  in  getting  up 
this  war,  but  we  Kentuckians  have  contracted  to  close  it  out." 

At  Abbeville,  where  we  were  received  with  the  kindest  hospi 
tality,  was  held  the  last  Confederate  council  of  Avar.  Mr. 
Davis  desired  to  know,  from  his  brigade  commanders,  the  true 
spirit  of  the  men.  He  presided  himself.  Beside  Generals 
Breckinridire  and  Bragg,  none  others  were  present  than  the  five 
brigade  commanders.  Mr.  Davis  was  apparently  untouched  by 

any  of  the  demoralization  which  prevailed he    was   .affable, 

dignified  and  looked  the  very  personification  of  high  and  un 
daunted  courage.  Each  officer  gave  in  turn,  a  statement  of  the 
condition  and  feeling  of  his  men,  and,  when  urged  to  do  so,  de 
clared  his  own  views  of  the  situation.  In  substance,  all  said 
the  same.  They  and  their  followers  despaired  of  successfully 
conducting  the  war,  and  doubted  the  propriety  of  prolonging  it. 
The  honor  of  the  soldiery  was  involved  in  securing  Mr.  Davis' 
safe  escape,  and  their  pride  induced  them  to  put  off  submission 
to  the  last  moment.  They  would  risk  battle  in  the  accomplish 
ments  of  these  objects — but  would  not  ask  their  men  to  struggle 
against  a  fate,  which  was  inevitable,  and  forfeit  all  hope  of  a 
restoration  to  their  homes  and  friends.  Mr.  Davis  declared 
that  he  wished  to  hear  no  plan  which  had  for  its  object,  only 
his  safety — that  twenty -five  hundred  men  brave  men  were  enough 
to  prolong  the  war,  until  the  panic  had  passed  away,  and  they 
would  then  be  a  nucleus  for  thousands  more.  He  urged  us 
to  accept  his  views.  We  were  silent,  for  we  could  not  agree 
with  him,  and  respected  him  too  much  to  reply.  He  then  said, 
bitterly,  that  he  saw  all  hope  was  gone — that  all  the  friends  of 
the  South  were  prepared  to  consent  to  her  degradation.  When 
he  arose  to  leave  the  room,  he  had  lost  his  erect  bearing,  his 
face  was  pale,  and  he  faltered  so  much  in  his  step  that  he  was 
compelled  to  lean  upon  General  Breckinridge.  It  was  a  sad 
sio-ht  to  men  who  felt  toward  him  as  we  did.  I  will  venture  to 


576  HISTORY  OF  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

say  that  nothing  he  has  subsequently  endured,  equaled  the  bit 
terness  of  that  moment. 

At  the  Savannah  river,  next  day,  the  men  were  paid,  through 
the  influence  of  General  Breckinridge,  with  a  portion  of  the 
gold  brought  from  Richmond.  Each  man  got  from  twenty-six 
to  thirty-two  dollars — as  he  was  lucky.  Generals  Vaughan  and 
Debrcll  remained  at  the  river  to  surrender.  At  Washington, 

D  " 

Georgia,  on  the  same  day,  the  7th  of  May,  Mr.  Davis  left  us, 
with  the  understanding  that  he  was  to  attempt  to  make  his  es 
cape.  General  Breckinridge  had  determined  to  proceed,  with 
all  the  men  remaining,  in  an  opposite  direction,  and  divert  if  pos 
sible  all  pursuit  from  Mr.  Davis.  That  night,  General  Fergu 
son's  brigade  went  to  Macon  to  surrender,  Ferguson  himself 
going  to  Mississippi.  On  the  next  morning,  some  three  hun- 
and  fifty  of  my  brigade  and  a  portion  of  William's  brigade, 
under  Colonel  Breckinridge,  marched  to  Woodstock,  Georgia. 

Many  men  of  my  brigade,  dismounted  and  unable  to  obtain 
horses,  and  many  of  the  paroled  men,  hoping  to  be  exchanged, 
had  followed  us  out  from  Virginia,  walking  more  than  three  hun 
dred  miles.  When  at  length,  unwilling  to  expose  them  to 
further  risk  and  suffering,  I  positively  prohibited  their  coming 
further,  they  wept  like  children.  A  great  portion  of  the  men 
with  Colonel  Breckinridge  were  from  his  own  regiment,  the 
Ninth  Kentucky,  and  the  former  "  Morgan  men,"  so  long  sepa 
rated,  were  united  just  as  all  was  lost.  The  glorious  old  "'Ken 
tucky  brigade,"  as  the  infantry  brigade,  first  commanded  by 
General  Breckinridge,  then  by  Hanson  and  Helm,  was  not  many 
miles  distant,  and  surrendered  about  the  same  time.  Upon 
leaving  Washington,  General  Breckinridge,  accompanied  by  his 
staff  and  some  forty-five  men,  personally  commanded  by  Colo 
nel  Breckinridge  had  taken  a  different  road  from  that  upon 
which  the  brigade  had  marched.  When  I  arrived  at  Woodstock 
I  did  not  find  him  there  as  I  had  expected. 

Hours   elapsed   arid  he  did  not  come.     They  were  hours  of 
intense  anxiety.     In   our  front  was  a  much  superior  force  of 


SURRENDER  AT  WOODSTOCK.  577 

Federal  cavalry — to  go  forward  would  provoke  an  engagement, 
and  it  could  only  result  in  severe  and  bloody  defeat. 

Retreat,  by  the  way  we  had  come,  was  impossible.  Upon  the 
left,  if  we  escaped  the  enemy,  we  would  be  stopped  by  the  sea. 

I  could  not  determine  to  surrender  until  I  had  heard  from 
General  Breckinridge,  who  was,  at  once,  commander  of  all  the 
Confederate  forces  yet  in  the  field,  in  this  vicinity,  and  the  sole 
remaining  officer  of  the  Government. 

Nor,  until  he  declared  it,  could  I  know  that  enough  had  been 
done  to  assure  the  escape  of  Mr.  Davis. 

The  suspense  was  galling.  At  length  Colonel  Breckinridge 
arrived  with  a  message  from  the  General. 

While  proceeding  leisurely  along  the  road,  upon  which  he  had 
left  Washington,  General  Breckinridge  had  suddenly  encoun 
tered  a  battalion  of  Federal  cavalry,  formed  his  forty-five  men, 
and  prepared  to  charge  them.  They  halted,  sent  in  a  flag  of 
truce,  and  parlied. 

General  Breckinridge  saw  that  he  could  no  longer  delay  his 
own  attempt  at  escape,  and  while  the  conference  was  proceeding, 
set  off  with  a  few  of  his  personal  staff. 

After  a  sufficient  time  had  elapsed  to  let  him  get  all  away, 
Colonel  Breckinridge  marched  by  the  enemy  (a  flag  of  truce 
having  been  agreed  on),  and  came  directly  to  Woodstock.  Gen 
eral  Breckinridge  directed  him  to  say,  that  he  had  good  reason 
to  believe  that  Generals  Forrest  and  Taylor  had  already  surren 
dered.  That  if  we  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Mississippi,  we 
would  find  all  there  prepared  to  surrender.  He  counseled  an 
immediate  surrender  upon  our  part,  urging  that  it  was  folly  to 
think  of  holding  out  longer  and  criminal  to  risk  the  lives  of  the 
men  when  no  good  could  possibly  be  accomplished.  He  wished 
them  to  return  to  Kentucky — to  their  homes  and  kindred.  He 
forbade  any  effort  to  assist  his  escape.  "  I  will  not  have,"  he 
said,  "  one  of  these  young  men  to  encounter  one  hazard  more 
for  my  sake."  Bidding  his  young  countrymen  return  to  the 
loved  land  of  their  birth,  he  went  off  into  exile. 
37 


578  HISTORY  OP  MORGAN'S  CAVALRY. 

The  men  were  immediately  formed,  and  the  words  of  the 
chieftain,  they  most  loved  and  honored,  repeated  to  them.  They 
declared  that  they  had  striven  to  do  their  duty  and  preserve 
their  honor,  and  felt  that  they  could  accept,  without  disgrace, 
release  from  service  which  they  had  worthily  discharged.  Then 
the  last  organization  of  "  Morgan  men  "  was  disbanded.  Com 
rades,  who  felt  for  each  other  the  esteem  and  affection  which 
brave  and  true  men  cherish,  parted  with  sad  hearts  and  dimmed 
eyes.  There  remained  of  the  "  old  command,"  only  the  recol 
lections  of  an  eventful  career  and  the  ties  of  friendship  which 
would  ever  bind  its  members  together.  There  was  no  humilia 
tion  for  these  men.  They  had  done  their  part  and  served 
faithfully,  until  there  was  no  longer  a  cause  and  a  country  to 
serve.  They  knew  not  what  their  fate  would  be,  and  indulged 
in  no  speculation  regarding  it.  They  had  been  taught  fortitude 
by  the  past,  and,  without  useless  repining  and  unmanly  fear, 
they  faced  the  future. 


RETURN  TO  the  circulation  desk  of  any 
University  of  California  Library 

or  to  the 

NORTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 
Bldg.  400,  Richmond  Field  Station 
University  of  California 
Richmond,  CA  94804-4698 

ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 

•  2-month  loans  may  be  renewed  by  calling 
(510)642-6753 

•  1-year  loans  may  be  recharged  by  bringing 
books  to  NRLF 

•  Renewals  and  recharges  may  be  made  4 
days  prior  to  due  date, 

DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 
SENT  ON  ILL 

JUN  1  3  2001 

U.  C.  BERKELEY 


U.C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


